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1
Introduction
John Beirne and David G. Fernandez
The rise of the digital age has created challenges for macroeconomic 
policy makers around the globe. Early work on this issue by Cecchetti 
(2006) noted that macroeconomic management becomes more complex 
in an environment of digitalization given shifting trend productivity 
and difficulties in estimating potential output. For emerging market 
economies (EMEs), these policy challenges have been exacerbated by 
the digital finance revolution in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic, i.e., when many EMEs experienced 
large and volatile capital flows. Innovations related to payments 
systems, maturity transformation, and the allocation of capital can 
hinder macroeconomic stabilization to the extent that they disrupt the 
efficacy of policy tools used to manage the economy. This book provides 
an overview of the main issues facing policy makers in the digital 
age, which was also the focus of the “Macroeconomic Stabilization 
in the Digital Age”1 conference that brought together experts from 
academia, international organizations, think tanks, and central banks. 
The book is organized into three main areas: 1) digital finance and the 
macroeconomy; 2) capital flows and systemic risk in the digital age; and 
3) macroeconomic uncertainty and new challenges for central banks. 
Part I of the book is set against the context that advances in digital 
finance have led to a shift in financial intermediation away from 
traditional banks, with large technology firms increasingly providing 
financial services over the past decade. In addition, the involvement 
of so-called nonbanks in liquidity transformation and leveraged 
lending creates systemic financial vulnerabilities, and opportunities 
for regulatory arbitrage (BIS 2019). These vulnerabilities are amplified 
given the interconnectedness of nonbanks with the traditional banking 
1 The conference on “Macroeconomic Stabilization in the Digital Age”, was jointly 
organized by the Asian Development Bank Institute and the Sim Kee Boon Institute 
for Financial Economics at Singapore Management University, on 16–17 October 
2019, in Singapore.
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sector. Furthermore, competition by the traditional banking sector for 
deposits and funding may lead to excessive risk taking. Therefore, while 
the ongoing diffusion of digital finance into financial intermediation can 
spur economic activity and promote financial inclusion, it can lead to 
rising financial fragility and systemic risk. 
Part I comprises five chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview 
of macroeconomic challenges and resilience of EMEs in the 21st 
century. The enhanced use of countercyclical macroeconomic and 
macroprudential policies by EMEs is highlighted, as well as the 
challenges and opportunities posed by exposure to financial technology 
(fintech). In particular, while the adoption of fintech can help EMEs 
engage in financial intermediation at faster rates across a wider coverage 
of the economy, policy makers need to be aware of the potential risks to 
financial stability from the transfer of financial services from regulated 
banks to shadow banks. Chapter 3 presents a framework for assessing the 
macroeconomics of de-cashing, where paper currency is replaced with 
convertible deposits. The analysis indicates that the overall effect should 
stimulate output growth due to reduced transaction costs, a widening of 
the tax base, and an improved monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the implications of digital transformation on 
financial stability, payment systems, and macroeconomic stability, and 
discusses the need for changes in regulatory and macroeconomic policies 
to mitigate the associated risks. It is noted that digital transformation has 
significant implications for macroeconomic stability due to the resulting 
increased interconnectedness via regional and global production 
chains. Chapter 5 examines the macroeconomic implications of fintech 
development in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), where the shift 
to digital finance has taken place at an extraordinary pace in recent 
years. In particular, this chapter highlights the need for macroeconomic 
and macroprudential policies in the PRC to embrace digital technology 
more directly, particularly in areas related to regulation. While fintech 
has improved the efficiency of PRC financial services, the sector remains 
in an early stage of development. Financial regulation, risk management, 
and controls, such as big data-based credit scoring models, also still 
need time to develop further. Chapter 6 provides an empirical analysis 
of the relationship between digital finance and economic growth in 
India from April 2005 to May 2019. The chapter uses a Bayesian vector 
autoregression to show that advances in digital payments systems in 
India have contributed to the development of its financial sector and 
enhance efficiency, with positive spillovers to economic growth. 
Part II focuses on capital flow-related developments in the digital 
age, and issues pertaining to EMEs having had to deal with large and 
volatile capital flows in the post-global financial crisis period. While these 
Introduction 3
flows can have substantial benefits for economies in terms of growth 
and development, they can also pose risks to macroeconomic stability 
if not properly managed (ECB 2016). Where capital inflows lead to an 
increased volatility of domestic consumption, currency and maturity 
mismatches, as well as boom and/or bust cycles in asset prices, achieving 
macroeconomic stability can be difficult. In such an environment, new 
approaches to capital flow management and improving resilience to 
capital flow shocks become ever more important. The onset and growth 
of fintech and its implications for cross-border capital flows is an issue 
warranting consideration in this context. On the one hand, reductions 
in cross-border transaction costs via digital platforms has helped to 
improve the efficiency of global value chains (McKinsey Global Institute 
2019). However, the expansion in cross-border capital flow channels 
in the digital age places additional challenges on EME authorities in 
managing capital flows, with potentially a greater exposure to monetary 
policy spillovers and negative externalities (Prasad 2018). 
Part II comprises four chapters. Chapter 7 uses three empirical 
techniques from the late 1990s to 2014 to show that as financial 
systems become ever more digital, the impact of banking integration on 
commercial banks in East Asia has strong benefits in terms of enhancing 
cost efficiency and reducing default risks. Moreover, in crisis times, 
the chapter indicates that regional claims in East Asia compensate 
for reduced deposits, thereby supporting overall macroeconomic 
and financial stability, and underscoring the importance of regional 
integration in the digital age. Chapter 8 examines the empirical 
relationship between fintech and systemic risk using a conditional 
value-at-risk framework. Using a unique sample of 75 fintech companies 
quoted on the Nasdaq and Frankfurt stock exchanges from January 
2010 to December 2017, Chapter 8 shows that while fintech solutions 
lead to increased interconnectedness of financial sectors, they also 
promote greater competition, mitigating negative spillover risks at the 
systemic level. 
Further in Part II, Chapter 9 empirically examines the relationship 
between safe assets and financial stability, using a newly constructed 
index of safe assets from 1970 to 2017 across 17 developed economies. The 
findings indicate that safe asset shortages exacerbate financial stability 
risks via private sector credit growth implications. In addition, it is shown 
that a private credit growth boom that derives from safe asset shortages 
is a significant early warning indicator for crisis events. This chapter 
has important policy implications related to the need for a coordinated 
approach to fiscal and macroprudential policy in order to minimize the 
financial market reaction to a negative fiscal shock. Chapter 10 develops 
a new high-frequency dataset of capital flow management measures for 
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the Asia and Pacific region, and empirically examines the motivation for 
their use across macroeconomic stabilization, financial stability, capital 
flow, and exchange rate objectives. The chapter is set against the context 
of ongoing and rapid enhancements in fintech development that have 
resulted in a cheaper, faster, and more decentralized transmission of 
capital abroad. Overall, the chapter finds that capital flow management 
and exchange rate objectives appear to be strong predictors of net inflow, 
easing and tightening measures, while macroeconomic stabilization is 
an additional driver of tightening measures.
Part III relates the digital age to challenges faced by central 
banks and the implications of digitalization for the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. The emergence of private decentralized 
cryptocurrencies erodes the ability of central banks to affect the money 
supply. This has led to global discussions by central banks on whether 
they should issue their own digital currencies (BIS 2018). While the 
scale of private cryptocurrencies is at the moment not at a level that 
would detrimentally affect macroeconomic stability and the conduct 
of monetary policy, there still remain questions as to how a central 
bank digital currency (CBDC) would affect traditional bank operations 
(particularly in times of financial crisis). Academic research indicates 
that a CBDC would enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy to 
the extent that these currencies bear interest (Bordo and Levin 2017).  
The joint Asian Development Bank Institute and Sim Kee Boon Institute 
for Financial Economics at Singapore Management University October 
2019 conference delved further into these issues, with discussions 
indicating that macroeconomic stability is enhanced when a CBDC 
bears an adjustable interest and that exchange rate fluctuations are more 
stable in this environment. This latter point is particularly important for 
EMEs’ central banks that may be subject to bouts of capital flow and 
exchange rate volatility. 
Part III comprises three chapters. Chapter 11 constructs a 
macroeconomic uncertainty index for India that rises during recessions 
and in the midst of structural changes such as demonetization, which 
in India boosted the shift to digital payment systems. Managing 
macroeconomic uncertainty, particularly in the digital age, is one of 
the main challenges faced by monetary policy makers, with uncertainty 
being one of the key drivers of fluctuations in business cycles. Using a 
vector autoregression approach from 2008 to 2018, this chapter shows 
how macroeconomic activity responds to uncertainty shocks, such as 
those linked to demonetization. Chapter 12 assesses the implications of 
fintech development for the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
Using a sample of 25 developed economies from 2001 to 2018 (quarterly 
frequency), the chapter finds that internet and mobile technologies, as 
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well as the emergence of Bitcoin, significantly affect the money demand 
equation of the central bank. Moreover, the analysis indicates that in 
the post-fintech era (2009 to 2018), monetary policy is not a statistically 
significant determinant of the output gap, thus raising concerns about 
its effectiveness in the digital age. Chapter 13 examines foreign currency 
exposures in the Asia and Pacific region, indicating that the financial 
channel of exchange rates may be eroding the effectiveness of monetary 
policy in the digital age. In particular, for a panel of 10 Asian economies 
from 2002 to 2012, it is shown that there are trade-offs for policy makers 
between financial stability and macroeconomic stabilization, which 
gives rise to a fear of floating. This fear of floating is notably more 
pronounced in the presence of foreign currency exposures.
Overall, this book provides several insights for policy makers and, 
indirectly, for private sector financial technology participants who 
face regulatory risk. Policy makers need to be aware of the increasing 
prominence of the digital economy and digital finance, and seek to better 
understand how continued digitalization will affect policies aimed 
at managing the economy. In particular, the effect of traditional fiscal 
and monetary policies for stabilization purposes may be less potent in 
an era of ongoing digitalization. This calls for national authorities to 
be vigilant of the effects of digital transformation, and to devise and 
implement additional targeted policies to aid stabilization, e.g., aimed at 
the nonbank sector. Finally, international policy co-ordination becomes 
increasingly important in such an environment. 
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Macroeconomic  
Challenges and the Resilience 
of Emerging Market Economies 
in the 21st Century
Joshua Aizenman
2.1 Overview and Summary
This chapter takes stock of the recent challenges facing emerging market 
economies (EMEs) in the post-global financial crisis environment. The 
confluence of four key developments shaped the pre-global financial 
crisis environment. 
First, financial globalization and deregulation, a process 
that started in the late 1970s in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and continued in 
the EMEs in the 1990s–2000s transformed the global financial system 
into a complex web of global networks, exposing countries to financial 
shocks that volatile bursts of capital inflows and outflows of “hot 
money” transmitted.
Second, despite the emergence of the euro area and the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) as large hubs of economic activity 
approaching the real size of the United States (US), the US dollar has 
retained and even increased its global financial dominance. Somehow 
paradoxically, a crisis that started in the US in 2007–2008 ended 
up solidifying and even deepening the global dominance of the US 
dollar. Remarkably, as the global real gross domestic product (GDP) 
share of EMEs approached half the total (adjusted for purchasing 
power parity [PPP] issues) and the US share declined to one-fifth 
and below, the US dollar’s global importance approached two-thirds 
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in 2019.1 Figure 2.1 reports the US dollar share of official reserves, 
showing vividly the drop following the end of the Bretton Woods system 
from about 85% in the early 1970s to about 46% in 1991, then reversing, 
reaching about 70% at the creation of the euro area, 1999, and then 
gently sliding to 62% by 2019. 
Third, the quantitative easing policies that followed the global 
financial crisis and the euro area crisis pushed the nominal policy 
interest rate of most OECD countries toward the zero lower bound and 
some below zero. In tandem, the “risk-free” real interest rate maintained 
its secular trend toward zero and below. This trend started in the mid-
1980s, and the 3-month interest rate in the US and Germany during 
2009–2019 exemplifies it well (Figures 2.2a and 2.2b). In 2019, more than 
one-fourth of global bonds offered a negative yield (Figure 2.2c). These 
developments induced spells of “search for yield,” exposing the EMEs to 
1 Countries making up 70% of the global GDP use the US dollar as an anchor currency, 
and about half of global trade is invoiced in dollars. As of March 2018, 73.5% of the 
international credit to nonresidents was US dollar denominated, followed by 24% 
that was euro denominated (BIS 2018; Carney 2019).
Figure 2.1: US Dollar Share of Global International Reserves
US = United States.
Source: IMF WOLFSTREET.com. https://wolfstreet.com/2018/12/31/us-dollars-status-as-global 
-reserve-currency/ (accessed 17 August 2020).
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Figure 2.2a: 3-Month Interest Rate for US Treasury Bill
US = United States.
Note: Shaded areas indicate US recessions.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
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Figure 2.2b: 90-Day Interest Rates for Germany
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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large and volatile financial flows and later increasing the OECD demand 
for local currency debt in most emerging markets, as well as application 
of macroprudential tools, aiming for greater financial stability. 
Finally, the acceleration of financial innovations’ integration with 
the information technology revolution (fintech) and the growing 
globalization of finance imposed new and escalating challenges for 
regulators aiming to stabilize the formal economy and fight the black 
and informal economy. 
These developments validated the precautionary policies that 
EMEs adopted after the wave of sudden stop crises in the 1990s, but 
also brought new policies to the fore and increased their willingness to 
experiment with new defensive measures. Below is a summary of the 
main points that this chapter advances:
(i) EMEs increased the use of inflation targeting, a regime that has 
shown its resilience over the past 20 years. By 2018, 23 countries 
used inflation targeting de jure, 18 of which had adopted it 
by 2002. About half of these countries are EMEs. With the 
European Central Bank (ECB), the number of countries living 
with their currency following inflation targeting is much 
larger. In addition, a growing number of countries are de facto 
following a hybrid version of inflation targeting. A significant 
share of EMEs under inflation targeting, dominated by 
Figure 2.2c: Global Share of Negative Yielding Debt
Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
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commodity countries, adjust the policy interest rate as part of 
a broader policy with real exchange rate (RER) management. 
Under these circumstances, the RER and international reserve 
changes also affect the policy interest rate.
(ii) Inflation targeting works well with independent central 
banks, yet fiscal dominance concerns may hinder the 
efficacy. This suggests experimenting with the integration 
of monetary rules—like inflation targeting—with fiscal rules, 
possibly linking these rules with the operations of buffers like 
international reserves and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). 
The global financial crisis validated the benefits of counter-
cyclical management of international reserves and SWFs in the 
context of stabilizing the RER. Buffer policies may also benefit 
from applying macroprudential regulations that manage the 
balance sheet exposure of the financial system to foreign 
currency debt and the risk of sudden stops and capital flight.
(iii) A growing share of EMEs are experimenting with fintech 
as part of their adaptation to the information technology 
revolution. The growing fintech diffusion is profoundly 
changing the use of cash and transfer payments and the nature 
of financial intermediation. Fintech’s major impact has been 
the massive scaling up and consolidation of financial services, 
approaching the “winner takes (almost) all” syndrome. In 
principle, national borders do not bound the scaling dynamics 
associated with fintech. Nevertheless, the nation states may, at 
a cost, limit this scaling. 
(iv) The fintech revolution imposes growing pressure on traditional 
banks, providing consumers with the promise of cheaper and 
faster financial services. However, it may also undermine 
monetary policy and reduce the tax base. Finding the proper 
regulatory response to fintech’s impact on monetary policy 
transmission and on the tax base is a work in progress. While 
a nation state may focus on financial stability and its tax base, 
the fintech sector is mostly aiming for rent maximization, 
overlooking possible adverse externalities associated with its 
activities. Thereby, we may witness an accelerated arms race 
between the state and the fintech sector.
(v) An example of these forces is the advance of cryptocurrencies, 
promising anonymized financial intermediation. In contrast 
to the success of inflation-targeting regimes, there is no 
feasible path toward stability for a decentralized currency. 
This instability reflects “the tragedy of the commons” 
associated with cryptocurrencies—the public good aspect 
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of stable valuation conflicts with the possible interests of 
“whales” (the large holders of the currency that may benefit 
from endogenous volatility). The chances are that most nation 
states will aim to contain these activities to a small-scale 
niche of finance. The nation state may ignore niche financial 
innovations but will regulate or even “nationalize” them once 
their size and instability become a systemic threat. Thereby, 
efficient scalability of a successful decentralized currency will 
survive as long as the private sector coordinates its policies 
with the nation state. States may opt to follow a dual goal of 
encouraging the diffusion of efficient financial intermediation 
in ways that benefit consumers and simultaneously augment 
the government’s control while restricting anonymized 
exchange and global monies in ways that minimize the threat 
of a shrinking tax base and the state’s ability to control financial 
intermediation.
2.2  Emerging Markets in the Past Decades— 
A Brave New World? 
The short history of macroeconomics during the 21st century is a 
humbling experience to policy makers, scholars, and practitioners. 
Lucas (2003) summarized the buoyant assessment of the state of 
macroeconomics in his American Economic Association address, 
Macroeconomic Priorities: “Macroeconomics in this original sense 
has succeeded: Its central problem of depression prevention has been 
solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been solved for many 
decades. … The potential gains from improved stabilization policies are 
on the order of hundredths of a percent of consumption.”
At the dawn of the 21st century, a growing share of economists 
credited the US Federal Reserve (the Fed) with contributing to the “Great 
Moderation” associated with the large decline in the volatility of key 
macroeconomic indicators and lower risk premia. The Great Moderation 
period mostly overlapped the tenure of Alan Greenspan, who headed the 
Fed from 1987 to 2006. His views gained prominence and captured well 
the zeitgeist of the late 1990s and early 2000s—growing optimism about 
the stabilizing effect of market forces and the ability of the Fed to deal 
with adverse tail risk events, the importance of financial liberalization, 
and the view of regulations as cumbersome and ineffective: “As we 
move into a new century, the market-stabilizing private regulatory force 
should gradually displace many cumbersome, increasingly ineffective 
government structures” (Greenspan, 1997). Governor Ben Bernanke, the 
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Fed chairperson who replaced Alan Greenspan from 2006, attributed 
the Great Moderation to improved monetary policy in 2004, including 
the adaptation of the Taylor rule.2
Notable exceptions to these buoyant views included Shiller (2005), 
warning in the early 2000s that the bubble dynamics had migrated 
from the “dot com” technology sector in the late 1990s to the housing 
market. Rajan (2005) asserted that growing endogenous exposure to 
undervalued tail risk developments in the financial sector led to an 
expansion of its ability to spread risks, thereby creating much greater 
access to finance for firms and households. Rajan attributed this to the 
emergence of a whole range of intermediaries (“shadow banking”), 
the size and appetite for risk of which may expand over the business 
cycle. These intermediaries can also leave themselves exposed to certain 
small probability risks that their own collective behavior makes more 
likely. Applying principal–agent arguments and distance-from-default 
analysis, Rajan attributed these trends to the financial liberalization and 
banking deregulation processes that took off from the 1980s, concluding 
that the US economy became more exposed to financial sector-induced 
turmoil than in the past. 
The global financial crisis validated Rajan’s 2005 conjectures, 
challenging Greenspan’s assertion that bubbles are impossible to detect 
in advance, and easier to clean after.3 Specifically, Jordà, Schularick, and 
Taylor (2015) concluded that history has shown that not all bubbles are 
alike. Some have enormous costs for the economy, while others blow over. 
They also demonstrated that what makes some bubbles more dangerous 
than others is credit. When credit booms fuel asset price bubbles, 
they increase financial crisis risks; upon collapse, deeper recessions 
and slower recoveries tend to follow. Credit-financed housing price 
bubbles have emerged as a particularly dangerous phenomenon. They 
also showed that runaway credit growth increases the odds of reaching 
2 “The finding that monetary policymakers violated the Taylor principle during the 
1970s but satisfied the principle in the past two decades would be consistent with a 
reduced incidence of destabilizing expectational shocks.” … “The Great Moderation, 
the substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility over the past twenty years, is 
a striking economic development. … I have argued today that improved monetary 
policy has likely made an important contribution not only to the reduced volatility 
of inflation (which is not particularly controversial) but to the reduced volatility of 
output as well” (Bernanke, 2004). 
3 “It was very difficult to definitively identify a bubble until after the fact—that is, when 
its bursting confirmed its existence. Moreover, it was far from obvious that bubbles, 
even if identified early, could be preempted short of the central bank inducing a 
substantial contraction in economic activity—the very outcome we would be seeking 
to avoid” (Greenspan 2002).
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the zone of costly financial instability. The global financial crisis and 
the subsequent euro area crisis were watershed events, shifting the 
policy and research focus vis-à-vis the search for strategies that better 
fit the era of heightened volatility and interest rates approaching the 
zero boundary, as well as the growing threat of secular stagnation. The 
outcome has been a richer application of principal–agent, asymmetric 
information, behavioral, and other approaches.4 This chapter focuses on 
the current debates dealing with recent developments, occasionally in 
the context of these past macro contributions. 
2.3  Emerging Markets’ Trilemma Choices:  
From Fixed Exchange Rate and Financial 
Autarky to Inflation Targeting and Managed 
Financial Integration, Buffered by Reserve 
and Macroprudential Regulations 
The 1960s and 1970s induced profound changes: the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods regime reflected the recovery of Western Europe from 
World War II and the search for a global order that fit the aspirations 
of the core of Europe better. The greater exchange rate flexibility of 
key currencies and the acceleration of financial liberalization put new 
forces in motion. The remarkable recovery of Japan after World War II 
provided a vivid example of export-led economic takeoff, a process that, 
with a lag, inspired the takeoff of the Republic of Korea, the PRC, and 
more than a dozen other countries forming the block of EMEs. Within 
50 years, the EMEs became the hub of global growth, increasing their 
global GDP share toward half of the total and above (adjusted by PPP). 
Remarkably, in the early 1990s, the EMEs opted to embrace greater 
financial integration, a trend that Mexico, in the aftermath of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, illustrated, as well as the Republic 
of Korea, Thailand, and others. This came at the end of the lost decade 
of the 1980s, a time when most EMEs experienced exposure to the 
debt overhang crises that excessive borrowing in the 1970s generated, 
4 Stiglitz and Tirole were among the earlier contributors in this domain, although 
policy makers in the late 1990s and early 2000s mostly overlooked them. There 
has also been growing recognition of the need to refresh past macro-paradigms, 
including Mundell–Fleming’s trilemma, Triffin’s paradox, the zero lower boundary 
challenges, the paradox of thrift, the redundancy problem (aka the n − 1 problem), 
the inequality of the number of policy instruments and the number of targets at the 
international level, which Mundell (1969) suggested, an example of Tinbergen’s 1952 
analysis of targets and instruments, and other mostly overlooked concepts.
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funded by recycling the petro-dollar that the quadrupling of the 
price of oil generated in the early 1970s. The renewed hard currency 
borrowing of EMEs in the early 1990s, still mostly operating under 
a fixed exchange rate, promoted a brief “honeymoon”, with upbeat 
assessments of Mexico, the Republic of Korea, and other EMEs. These 
developments, however, set the stage for new types of banking and 
balance of payment crises. 
Mexico’s history illustrated the hazard of EMEs’ attempts to keep 
pegging their currency at times of greater financial integration while 
maintaining a proactive monetary policy. Simply put, this configuration 
contradicted the Mundell–Fleming  trilemma, putting in motion 
forces that induced the fully blown Tequila Crisis of December 1994. 
Intriguingly, Mexico adopted a flexible exchange rate regime after the 
crisis, while increasing its financial integration over time. The crisis 
also came at a time when people viewed the choice of deeper financial 
integration as a way to encourage the continuation of foreign direct 
investment inflows into Mexico that the North American Free Trade 
Agreement triggered, viewing this trend as the key to Mexico’s future. 
The Mexican crisis of 1994 turned out to be the first in a wave of more 
than a dozen similar crises, the most notable being the East Asian, the 
Russian Federation’s, and the Brazilian crises during the second half of 
the 1990s (Eichengreen 2019b). 
A common script of the dynamics leading to these crises was greater 
external borrowing in hard currencies that greater financial integration 
induced, an economic boom inducing RER appreciation, and current 
account deterioration pressures. Incipient capital flight that concerns 
about dwindling international reserves triggered frequently terminated 
the ensuing economic boom within several years. Calvo (1998) dubbed 
these crises “sudden stop crises,” in which the sudden stopping of 
external funding induces exchange rate, balance of payment, and banking 
crises. Most of the affected countries followed a similar adjustment, 
moving over time toward the middle ground of the Mundell–Fleming 
trilemma: controlled exchange rate flexibility, growing but controlled 
financial openness, and viable though limited monetary independence, 
which hoarding and managing growing buffers of international reserves 
supported (Figure 2.3). 
This trend also reflected the recognition that flexible exchange 
rates among key global currencies in the post-Bretton Woods world 
(US dollar, German mark, British pound, Japanese yen) expose 
EMEs to greater exchange rate flexibility, since pegging to one of 
these currencies implies floating against the others. The sudden stop 
crises also induced precautionary hoarding of international reserves, 
and EMEs tripled their international reserves/GDP in a decade, from 
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about 8% in the early 1990s to about 30% in the early 2000s (Aizenman 
and Lee 2007). This trend was more pronounced in countries in East 
Asia with a high savings rate, which “precautionary motives” that 
aimed at reducing the probability and the damage of sudden stop crises 
induced. Arguably, some of this trend also reflected “mercantilism”—
the proactive policy of delaying the real appreciation associated with 
a successful manufacturing export-led growth strategy, which the PRC 
exemplifies. Observers also noted the possibility of affected countries 
carrying out competitive hoarding, aiming to protect market shares, 
and “keeping up with the Joneses” dynamics (Cheung and Qian 2009). 
The empirical research that Aizenman (2019b) overviewed validated 
the emergence of a continuous version of the trilemma, in which most 
EMEs converged to its middle ground. However, it modified the original 
trilemma in several other important ways. 
First, financial stability was added as a key policy goal, morphing 
the trilemma into a possible quadrilemma. While financial stability was 
an implicit goal during the Bretton Woods system, the tight controls of 
capital flows (mostly prohibited, with few exceptions needing the state’s 
approval) implied limited exposure to financial fragility due to external 
factors. The overall tight regulation of banks, an outcome of the Great 
Depression, limited domestic banks’ leverage and risk taking, taming 
Figure 2.3: EMEs’ Convergence to the Trilemma Middle Ground
EME = emerging market economy, KAOPEN = Chinn-Ito index; an index measuring a country’s 
degree of capital account openness.
Sources: Adapted from http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/trilemma_indexes.htm; see the overview in 
Aizenman (2019b).
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exposure to domestic financial fragility. The sudden stop crises of the 
1990s vividly illustrated the cost of greater financial integration and 
hard currency external borrowing in the form of growing susceptibility 
to capital flight crises associated with real depreciations, inducing sharp 
increases in the real cost of serving the external hard-currency debt, a 
destabilized domestic banking system, and occasional costly sovereign 
defaults, banking crises, and restructuring. 
Second, the increasing global share of the GDP coming from the euro 
area and EMEs, along with the global financial crisis and subsequent 
euro area crisis, led to the paradoxical trend of increasing the global role 
of the US dollar as the dominant currency for invoicing international 
trade, supplying about two-thirds of international reserves and the 
deepest and most liquid market of “safe assets,” all at a time when the 
global GDP share of the US declined and reached parity with that of the 
euro area and the PRC (adjustment by PPP). These developments and 
the global financial crisis led Rey (2013) to conjecture that the trilemma 
had morphed into a dilemma over the past decades. Specifically, 
independently of exchange rate regime choices, countries adopting 
open capital markets experience exposure to the global financial cycle, 
a cycle that US monetary and financial policies dominate, substantially 
weakening their monetary independence. The only effective way 
to regain monetary independence in Rey’s dilemma is to shut down 
financial integration, control private flows heavily, and prohibit flows 
that countries deem to be too destabilizing. 
The ongoing debate propagated by the dilemma conjecture outlined 
several challenges to Rey’s view. While the financial importance of the 
US dollar and US monetary policies increased, exchange rate regimes 
still mattered in the presence of balance sheet exposure associated 
with external borrowing in hard currency. With proper management of 
financial policies, exchange rate flexibility provides greater monetary 
autonomy at the margin, though the GFC and the changing conduct of 
monetary policies amidst the challenges of quantitative easing and policy 
interest rates approaching the zero lower bound have affected the actual 
trilemma trade-offs, thereby increasing the global importance of the US 
financial and real cycles. Taking this perspective, Aizenman, Chinn, and 
Ito (2016) investigated how the movements in the central economies—
the US, Japan, the euro area, and the PRC—affect the trilemma choices 
and financial conditions of developing countries and EMEs (dubbed 
peripheral countries). In the 2000s–2010s, the strength of the links 
with the central economies were the dominant factor. The movements 
of the policy interest rate also appear to have been sensitive to global 
financial shocks around the EME crises of the late 1990s and since the 
global financial crisis. Research has found that the exchange rate regime 
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and financial openness have a direct influence on the sensitivity to the 
central economies. The weights of major currencies, external debt, and 
currency debt compositions are significant factors.5 
Klein and Shambaugh’s insightful 2015 analysis concerned whether 
partial capital controls and limited exchange rate flexibility allow for 
full monetary policy autonomy. They found that partial capital controls 
do not generally allow for greater monetary control than open capital 
accounts unless the capital controls are quite extensive. However, 
a moderate amount of exchange rate flexibility does allow for some 
degree of monetary autonomy, especially in emerging and developing 
economies. Empirically, they observed that, while some countries have 
long-standing, pervasive capital controls, a substantial subset of countries 
uses limited controls on an episodic basis.6 In this context, Obstfeld, 
Ostry, and Qureshi (2019) found that countries with fixed exchange rate 
regimes are more likely to experience financial vulnerabilities—faster 
domestic credit and house price growth and increases in bank leverage—
than those with relatively flexible regimes. The transmission of global 
financial shocks is likewise magnified under fixed exchange rate regimes 
relative to more flexible (though not necessarily fully flexible) regimes. 
The authors attributed this to both reduced monetary policy autonomy 
and greater sensitivity of capital flows to changes in global conditions 
under fixed rate regimes. 
Among the important developments influencing the conducting of 
monetary policy has been the emergence of inflation targeting as the new 
paradigm of monetary policy. The curious history of inflation targeting 
dates back to New Zealand in the early 1990s, which Archer (2000) 
reviewed. The emerging inflation targeting regime in New  Zealand is 
based on four pillars: the inflation rate as the medium-term objective 
for monetary policy; the use of a tightly specified inflation target to 
implement the medium-term objective; a clear institutional structure 
and typically an independent central bank; and heavy reliance on 
transparency to support the inflation targeting arrangement. By 2019, 
5 More specifically, having a greater weight on the dollar (or the euro) makes the 
response of financial variables more sensitive to a change in key variables in the US 
(or the euro area, respectively), such as policy interest rates, exchange rate market 
pressure, and the RER. Thus, the degree of exchange rate flexibility continues to 
affect the sensitivity of developing countries to policy changes and shocks in the 
central economies. 
6 Their results are in line with Klein (2012), who classified the capital control of 
these regimes into “walls” and “gates,” respectively, and showed that walls are more 
effective than gates in limiting asset price booms and swings in the value of the RER. 
In addition, in any given year, there is a wide scope for employing capital controls, 
generating an extensive middle ground between open and closed capital markets.
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23 countries have de jure adopted inflation targeting, of which 18 had 
adopted it by 2002. More than half of these  countries are current (or 
prior) EMEs. With the ECB following a rule akin to inflation targeting, 
the number of countries living under a de jure regime is approaching 
40.7 Inflation targeting gained momentum in tandem with the growing 
popularity and adoption of the Taylor Rule.8 
This remarkable yet short history of inflation targeting led Rose 
(2007) to publish “A Stable International Monetary System Emerges: 
Inflation Targeting is Bretton Woods, Reversed.” According to Rose, 
A stable international monetary system has emerged since the 
early 1990s. A large number of industrial and a growing number 
of developing countries now have domestic inflation targets 
administered by independent and transparent central banks. 
These countries place few restrictions on capital mobility 
and allow their exchange rates to float. The domestic focus of 
monetary policy in these countries does not have any obvious 
international cost. Inflation targeters have lower exchange 
rate volatility and less frequent ‘sudden stops’ of capital flows 
than similar countries that do not target inflation. Inflation 
targeting countries also do not have current accounts or 
international reserves that look different from other countries. 
This system was not planned and does not rely on international 
coordination. There is no role for a center country, the IMF, 
or gold. It is durable; in contrast to other monetary regimes, 
no country has been forced to abandon an inflation-targeting 
regime. Succinctly, it is the diametric opposite of the post-war 
system; Bretton Woods, reversed.
This characterization of the successful diffusion of inflation 
targeting was an insightful snapshot of the state of inflation targeting 
prior to the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, inflation targeting 
is not a panacea, and the global financial crisis triggered a debate 
7 The ECB is the Central Bank of 19 countries, with a mission statement of “The 
primary objective of the ECB’s monetary policy is to maintain price stability. The 
ECB aims at inflation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.” https 
://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/html/index.en.html (accessed 17 September 2020).  
8 Taylor’s 1993 rule was estimated for the Paul Volcker disinflation, 1984–92, as a 
linear policy rule adjusting the policy interest rate to the evolving inflation gap and 
the output gap. A key result of the calibration is that the semi-elasticity of the policy 
interest rate with respect to inflation shock is about 1.5, significantly above 1 (i.e., the 
way to deal with an inflationary shock is to increase the real interest rate by about 
half of the inflationary shock).
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about the effectiveness and desirability of the Taylor Rule type. 
Critiques noted that a growing share of OECD countries, including 
the US, Japan, and the euro area, are undershooting their targets. This 
observation, and the collapse of the US policy interest rate toward zero 
and into the negative domain across several European countries in the 
aftermath of the GFC, led to the concern that inflation targeting may 
be too conservative a rule, overlooking the challenges associated with 
debt deflation and zero boundary concerns. Specifically, Blanchard, 
Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro (2010) advocated that central banks should 
announce a higher inflation target, around 4% or 5%, raising the 
possibility of increasing the target in turbulent times and considering 
alternative rules like price-level targeting that will compensate 
periods of inflation below the target with periods of tolerating the 
overshooting of the target, as well as other ideas (Frankel 2012). 
Another concern has been that, in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, a growing share of central banks are losing their 
independence. Furthermore, some of the de jure inflation targeting 
countries follow policies that differ sharply from the original “four 
pillars” New Zealand variety to a degree that the targeted inflation 
is losing its credibility and relevance, as the country approaches the 
“collapsing regime” syndrome. Examples of this trend include the recent 
history of Turkey and Argentina. The case of Turkey illustrates vividly 
the hazard of losing central bank independence and the de-anchoring 
of inflation that may follow fiscal dominance.9 To recall, the distinction 
between fiscal and monetary dominance regimes is due to Sargent and 
Wallace (1981). If the government adjusts the primary deficit to limit 
debt accumulation, it does not force the central bank to inflate away the 
debt, allowing the central bank to focus on inflation targeting, in line 
with monetary dominance. Long periods of large fiscal deficits and high 
public debt-to-GDP ratios have raised concerns over growing fiscal 
dominance by heightening the links between fiscal policy, monetary 
policy, and government debt management. This may be the case when 
higher policy interest rates or depreciating currencies raise concerns 
about debt sustainability, limiting monetary independence. Possible 
manifestations of these concerns include the “fear of floating,” fiscal 
pressure to mitigate rises of policy interest rates, financial repression, 
and the like. The fiscal dominance argument may apply to both hard 
currency public and private debt (Ahmed, Aizenman, and Jinjarak 
9 As of August 2019, the Turkish central bank stated a target of 5% from 2012. It missed 
this target significantly, and inflation accelerated non-linearly from 10% in 2012 to 20% 
in 2018. (Turkish Central Bank 2019).
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2019).10 In the case of large private debt exposure, stabilizing the RER 
through large sales of international reserves that are necessary to fund 
the servicing of the private debt may prevent a banking and financial 
crisis, a crisis that may induce the socialization of private losses, as was 
the case in Ireland and Spain during the euro area crisis.
Countries facing large net hard-currency external debt face 
an open economy version of fiscal dominance in the form “fear of 
floating” (Calvo and Reinhart 2002). Specifically, RER depreciation 
increases the costs of serving their external debt by the external debt/
GDP times the depreciation rate (the cost measured as a fraction of 
the country’s GDP). Under these circumstances, the central bank may 
put greater weight on stabilizing the RER to reduce the cost of serving 
the external debt and may limit the increase in the policy interest rate, 
hoping to delay a recession and adjustment. While this “gambling for 
resurrection” policy may provide some policy space in the short run, it 
may backfire over time. 
In principle, the successful management of international reserves 
and the exchange rate in the context of large debt overhang is possible 
as long as the central bank is committed to following the necessary 
counter-cyclical buffers and regulatory policy consistently over the 
business cycle. For example, consider the Central Bank of the Russian 
Federation’s management of its commodity-intensive economy during 
the period 2000–2019. The Central Bank of Russian Federation 
hoarded large portions of the hard-currency oil revenue when the 
Russian Federation’s terms of trade improved during the oil price rise 
prior to the global financial crisis from about $40/barrel in 2000 to 
about $140/barrel in 2008. It used about one-third of these reserves 
to stabilize the RER when the price of oil subsequently collapsed. 
This policy of hoarding reserves for stormy days and selling them at 
times of collapsing revenue mitigated the Russian Federation’s RER’s 
appreciation at times of rising oil prices and probably prevented a full-
blown banking and financial crisis in the Russian Federation following 
the drop in oil prices (Aizenman, Jinjarak, and Zheng 2019). 
10 Ahmed, Aizenman, and Jinjarak (2019) reported that, in EMEs under non-inflation 
targeting regimes composed mostly of exchange rate targeters, the interest rate 
effect of higher public debt is non-linear and depends both on the ratio of foreign 
currency to total public debt and on the ratio of hard-currency debt to GDP. 
For these EMEs, RER depreciation and international reserve accumulation are 
significantly associated with higher interest rates. EMEs with high commodity 
exposure show the most persuasive evidence of debt levels influencing policy 
interest rates.
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Arguably, the Russian Federation’s successful international reserve 
buffer management during 2000–2019 is a second-best policy. The 
first-best policy may include macroprudential regulations and possibly 
external borrowing taxes scaling down the Russian Federation balance 
sheet exposure by raising the costs of borrowing in good times. Proper 
application of these policies may reduce the need for large-scale 
hoarding to support the bailouts of systemic borrowers in bad times 
(Rodrik 2006). Political economy considerations suggest that the 
Russian Federation central bank, probably operating with limited ability 
to impose macroprudential regulations on powerful insiders, saved the 
country in the 2000s–2010s from a much costlier exposure to sudden 
stops of the 1998 crisis variety. In contrast, Turkey in the 2010s did 
not adopt a systematic buffering policy, to its own peril (see Kalemli-
Özcan [2019] for a critical assessment of EMEs’ capacity to deal with 
the international spillover effects of US policies and Alfaro, Kalemli-
Özcan, and Volosovych [2008] for the importance of the quality of 
institutions in stabilizing the patterns of capital flows and the credibility 
of implementing desirable macroprudential policies).
Asian countries have made significant use of macroprudential tools, 
especially housing-related measures. Zhang and Zoli (2016) found that 
housing-related macroprudential policies, particularly loan-to-value ratio 
caps and housing tax measures, have helped to curb housing price growth, 
credit growth, and bank leverage in Asia.11 Aizenman, Jinjarak, and 
Zheng (2019) found that, although house price appreciation is positively 
associated with output growth, house price depreciation may either 
undermine or stimulate growth, depending on the depth of correction 
and the market environment. Large house price depreciation is associated 
with strong recovery in growth in the absence of banking crises, and 
this is stronger in countries with a relatively weak safety net.12 Thereby, 
regulations reducing the risk of banking crises during periodic corrections 
of the real estate market are associated, on average, with a higher and 
more stable growth rate. Macroprudential policies also mitigated the 
growing balance sheet exposures associated with more volatile flows of 
11 Research has reported similar results in other regions (Vandenbussche, Vogel, and 
Detragiache 2015).
12 These results are consistent with the conjecture that delaying adjustment to large 
valuation losses induces deeper and more prolonged stagnation. Faster realization 
of losses combined with income support that deals with poverty mitigation may be 
superior to adjustment delays. The legal system and personal bankruptcy laws and 
the prevalence of mortgage insurance also affect the association between house price 
depreciation and economic growth.
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“hot money” in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (Korinek 2011; 
Shin 2011; Ostry 2012; Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven 2017).13 
While the original inflation targeting and Taylor Rule ignored the 
RER as a policy goal in OECD countries, the research dealing with 
EMEs brought it to the fore (Aizenman, Hutchison, and Noy 2011; 
Berganza and Broto 2012; Ghosh, Ostry, and Chamon 2016; Ahmed, 
Aizenman, and Jinjarak 2019). Indeed, it is possible to accomplish 
exchange rate targeting (also known as exchange rate stabilization) by 
putting greater policy weight on stabilizing the RER, possibly through 
proactive management of sizable buffers of international reserves and 
SWFs. Concerns about fiscal dominance led to the augmentation of 
inflation targeting rules with fiscal rules. Chile and Norway provide 
vivid examples of the possible benefits associated with such rules, 
helping to reduce the pro-cyclicality of the fiscal policy and providing 
greater fiscal and monetary spaces (Frankel, Vegh, and Vuletin 2014). 
Time will tell the degree to which other countries with more limited 
institutional capacities and policy stability will follow similar policies. 
2.4  Fintech Diffusion, Financial Intermediation, 
and the Future Role of Central Banks and 
Regulators—Work in Progress or Regress?
A growing share of EMEs are experimenting with fintech innovations. 
The diffusion of fintech profoundly changes the use of cash and transfer 
payments and the nature of financial intermediation. Fintech may be 
especially attractive in EMEs, as it allows countries with limited and 
inefficient banking services to leapfrog into the 21st century, utilizing 
the penetration of cell phone services in countries that limited phone 
line services historically constrained. The International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank report, Fintech: The Experience So Far (2019) described 
13 Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2020) found that more extensive implementation of 
macroprudential policies would lead EMEs to regain greater monetary independence 
from central economies (the US, the euro area, and Japan) when the central 
economies implement an expansionary monetary policy; when EMEs run a current 
account deficit; when they hold lower levels of international reserves; when their 
financial markets are relatively closed; when they are experiencing an increase in net 
portfolio flows; and when they are experiencing credit expansion. Macroprudential 
policies negatively affect the interest rate connectivity between the central economies 
and the EMEs especially in periods when the central economies implement an 
expansionary monetary policy. The results also suggest that macroprudential policies 
and international reserve holding are substitutes, in line with Rodrik (2006).
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the benefits of financial inventions. The report’s highlights included the 
following: 
Asia is ahead of other regions in many aspects of fintech. In 
China, the massive scale of its markets and a regulatory ‘light 
touch’ in the early years supported fintech development, 
with China emerging as a global leader. In India, large-scale 
adoption of mobile payments and an increase in money 
transfers have driven growth in mobile payments … Sub-
Saharan Africa is a global leader in mobile money innovation, 
adoption, and usage. The region leads the world in mobile 
money accounts per capita (both registered and active 
accounts), mobile money outlets, and volume of mobile 
money transactions. In Africa, close to 10 percent of GDP in 
transactions are occurring through mobile money, compared 
with just 7 percent of GDP in Asia and less than 2 percent of 
GDP in other regions. Across Africa, the adoption and use of 
technology in the provision of financial services is changing 
the way in which financial service providers operate and 
deliver products and services to their customers. 
While some view the wave of fintech as the path to a brave new 
world, supplying cheaper and faster financial services, it also involves 
disruptive forces. Fintech’s easier scalability has consolidated financial 
services, approaching the “winner takes (almost) all” syndrome.  In 
principle, national borders do not bound fintech scaling dynamics, yet 
nation states may, at a cost, limit this scaling. Deeper fintech diffusion 
may redirect financial intermediation from regulated banks to emerging 
fintech “shadow intermediaries,” some of which may have a global reach. 
Fintech’s disruptive power also leads to complex agency problems, 
whereby the growing market clout of fewer dominant suppliers aiming 
at profit maximization may increase social costs. 
To put fintech’s disruptive effects into the proper context, note that 
history is loaded with innovations with double-edged features. The 
diffusion of phone networks via costly landlines during the 20th century 
induced powerful network externalities, leading to the emergence of 
“natural monopolies.”14 The benefits of fast and reliable communication 
that a few suppliers provided led regulators to view phone companies 
as “utilities,” regulating their pricing and mergers and acquisitions. 
14 The percentage of housing units with telephones in the US in 1920 was 35%, reaching 
78% in 1960 and 95% by 1990. https://www.statista.com/statistics/189959/housing 
-units-with-telephones-in-the-united-states-since-1920/ (accessed 20  September 
2019). 
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Oil and coal provide plentiful cheap energy but lead to environmental 
degradation, polluted air, and accelerated climate change. A common 
feature across these examples is that scalability frequently leads to 
externalities and requires proper policies to curb the forces that it 
unleashes.15 These concerns led Rajan and Zingales (2004) to warn about 
the gloomier side of under-regulated capitalism in Saving Capitalism 
from the Capitalists.16 
Financial innovations provide growing benefits to underserved 
populations at low costs and with improving efficiency. However, 
the growing market clout of a few global giant suppliers of inflation 
targeting and fintech services may induce them to compromise privacy 
as part of their business model. The data that the suppliers of financial 
and commercial services relying on scalable inflation targeting 
services gather become a traded commodity.17 While the benefits of 
cheaper, faster financial services are frontloaded, the possible costs 
of diluting the existing regulatory capabilities of the nation state are 
lurking, increasing the exposure to more disruptive tail risks and 
financial instability (Rajan 2005). The arrival of cryptocurrencies 
promising anonymized liquidity services further up the ante. Scalable 
cryptocurrencies may undermine monetary policy, channeling 
financial intermediation into shadowy networks facilitating tax 
dodging. Finding the proper regulatory response to fintech’s impact on 
monetary policy transmission and on the tax base is a work in progress. 
While nation states have focused on financial stability and securing 
the tax base after the global financial crisis,, the fintech sector is mostly 
15 With Bitcoin, the analogy of fintech’s social effects to energy’s pollution is by now a 
reality: in September 2019, Bitcoin’s capitalization was $182 billion, about 0.2% of the 
global GDP, at times when managing bitcoin transactions consumed 0.3% of global 
electricity. This probably explained the PRC authority’s declaration of April 2019, 
“Bitcoin is Wasteful Activity”. (Wired 2019).
16 They noted that the capitalist economic order receives frequent praise for its 
efficiency, yet this efficiency holds as long as competitive forces dominate and 
powerful agents do not use their economic clout to bend the rules of the game in 
favor of their narrow benefits, inducing what some have dubbed “crony capitalism.” 
Underregulated large corporations have no interest in the creation of a modern 
and flexible financial system with free entry of competitors, as that would provide 
opportunities for newcomers to challenge the incumbent dominance. Left to its own 
devices, a market that powerful corporations dominate is not self-regulated, and 
maintaining efficiency needs government regulation. This is not without risk either, as 
insider corporations have incentives to invest in capturing and keeping governments 
in their service, suppressing the market. Therefore, securing the full advantages of 
capitalism requires the right balance of regulations enacted by governments that are 
not following narrow corporate interests.
17 It may also open the door for predatory states to engage in “social engineering,” with 
big data providing real-time feedback, possibly in the form of a “social score” and 
the like.
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aiming for rent maximization, paying little regard to the possible adverse 
externalities associated with these activities. Thereby, we may witness 
an accelerated arms race between the state and the fintech sector. 
Putting this arms race into the public finance perspective, financial 
stability is a public good providing the infrastructure supporting faster 
growth. Financial innovators may overlook this public good aspect. 
Thus, an underregulated fintech sector leads to moral hazard—financial 
instability increases the odds of costly financial crises. As the global 
financial crisis, illustrated, at a time of peril, even governments that 
championed “no bailouts” prior to the crisis socialize private-sector 
losses.18 
The growing number of cryptocurrencies illustrates the large private 
demand for anonymized, decentralized financial innovations. The 
history of cryptocurrencies dates back to the Bitcoin mission statement, 
“Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” (Nakamoto 2008).19 
With a short lag, this paper inspired growing trade in the “electronic 
cash” bitcoin. Figure 2.4 plots the volume and price history of Bitcoin. 
Notable are the high volatility and the positive co-movements of prices 
and volume. Other cryptocurrencies have similar features. This price 
volatility has intensified the debates about the stability problems of 
decentralized currencies.20 Believers have argued that smarter software 
managing future cryptocurrencies will solve these issues and that it is 
only a matter of time until a stable, decentralized currency emerges. 
Accordingly, inflation targeting has illustrated the viability of stable 
currency regimes. 
18 The bailing out by “market-friendly governments” is not an accident—the modern US 
more than quintupled the average federal tax/GDP in comparison to the tax burden 
in the era of Free Banking (1837–62) and National Banking (1863–1913). In exchange, 
the taxpayer expects the state to provide financial and economic stability, frequently 
punishing administrations that overlook the need to stabilize the economy at times of 
peril. This modern social contract is the outcome of evolutionary forces that led the 
US to converge from the Free and National Banking eras and the absence of federal 
level regulations of the 19th century to the New Deal era that emerged after the Great 
Depression. A key example of this evaluation is the 1933 formation of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, “backed by the full faith and credit of the United 
States,” (i.e., backed by the taxpayer), ultimately relegating to the Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve the task of securing financial stability. 
19 Specifically, “A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online 
payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a 
financial institution. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using 
a peer-to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them 
into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be 
changed without redoing the proof-of-work….” 
20 The analysis below expends and update the arguments outlined in the “VoxEu” 
column of Aizenman (2019a). See also the overview of these issues in Eichengreen 
(2019a), Roubini (2018), and Cukierman (2019).
Macroeconomic Challenges and the Resilience of 
Emerging Market Economies in the 21st Century 29
However, an extrapolation from inflation targeting to the feasibility 
of a stable cryptocurrency suffers from the fallacy of composition. Due 
to a systemic coordination failure, akin to the tragedy of the commons, 
there is no feasible path toward a global central bank that would ensure 
the stability of a decentralized currency.  The successful diffusion 
of inflation targeting has shown that a nation state can stabilize the 
purchasing power of its currency in terms of the country’s price level. 
Competent and relatively independent central banks can achieve this. In 
2019, inflation targeting countries produced most of the global GDP. In 
contrast, countries that have limited the independence of their central 
banks have found, with a lag, that their currencies have lost value. 
This increases the likelihood of capital flight, financial fragility, and 
banking crises. Under inflation targeting, the national central bank has 
clear ownership and the duty to stabilize the national currency, using 
the tools under its control. It can adjust the policy interest rate to keep 
inflation low, manage key monetary aggregates, and communicate the 
central bank’s policies. 
In contrast, there is no clear central ownership and management 
of a decentralized cryptocurrency with the duty of keeping it stable 
and taking responsibility for it. Consequently, its valuation is unstable, 
as gaming among various stakeholders may lead to multiple equilibria, 
bubbles, and crashes.  This instability reflects the tragedy of the 
commons associated with cryptocurrencies—the public good of stable 
Figure 2.4: Bitcoin Daily Price (right axis, $/BTC)  
and Volume (left axis, $ billion)
BTC = Bitcoin.
Source: https://data.bitcoinity.org/markets/price_volume/5y/USD?r=day&t=.
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valuation conflicts with the interests of anonymous large holders of the 
currency (“whales”) who can influence its value. Whales may benefit 
from the endogenous instability associated with exploiting their market 
influence (Gandal et al. 2018).21 Instability may also reflect the multiple 
equilibria associated with gaming decentralized cryptocurrencies (Biais 
et al. 2019).  Their valuations experience exposure to the excessive 
optimism or pessimism of traders and possible market manipulation. 
Cryptocurrencies do not change the rules of finance and the agency 
problems that accompany financial intermediation. The anonymized 
nature of the exchange only magnifies these problems.
National currencies are, of course, exposed to similar speculative 
attacks, yet the clear allocation of duties to the central bank, and its 
willingness to adopt policies for financial stability and stable currency 
valuation, provide the public good services associated with scalable 
safe currency. This is part of a complex system that may include deposit 
insurance schemes (akin to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), 
backstopped by the nation’s taxpayers.  Again, there is no comparable 
allocation of duties and “property rights” in a decentralized currency. 
Therefore, one can expect relative instability to be the rule, not the 
exception. The combination of a decentralized currency and the 
anonymity associated with cryptocurrencies makes the use of stabilizing 
forces, as large players used during the era of “national banking” in the 
US, impossible. To recall, during the financial panic of 1907, J. P. Morgan 
pledged large sums of his own money and convinced other New York 
bankers to act accordingly to shore up the banking system. They operated 
as de facto lenders of last resort. The whales of that time clearly owned 
the rents associated with stable financial intermediation, so they chose 
to provide stabilization services as long as that would minimize their 
expected losses. The crisis of 1907 also illustrated the risks of private 
bailouts—the balance sheets of financial institutions constrained their 
credibility, and they required a leader who could convince other financial 
whales to join the bailout. Furthermore, private bailouts reflected the 
wish of whales to maximize their rents more than their concerns about 
households, small banks and firms, and national welfare. Indeed, the 
dynamics of the 1907 crisis led to the formation of the Federal Reserve 
System, which the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created. In contrast to the 
bailout that J. P. Morgan coordinated, the anonymity of cryptocurrency 
holders means that there is a lack of agency and no stabilizing forces of 
the type that the 1907 private bailout exhibited. 
It is no surprise that there is no clear path toward a global central 
bank with responsibility for the price stability of a decentralized 
21 On 6 September 2019, the top 10 Bitcoin addresses accounted for 5.6% of the total 
supply, the top 100 14.7%, and the top 1,000 34.6%. 
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currency. Among national central banks, there is reluctance to cooperate 
in normal times, as the mandate of each central bank prioritizes domestic 
goals that focus on domestic price stability and not on the global value 
of its currency. The observation that, in normal times, deeper macro-
cooperation among countries is associated with welfare gains akin to 
Harberger’s second-order magnitude triangle, thus making the odds 
of cooperation low, compounds this coordination failure. When bad 
tail events induce imminent threats of financial collapse, the perceived 
losses have a first-order magnitude of terminating the total Marshallian 
surpluses. The apprehension of these losses in perilous times may elicit 
rare and beneficial macro cooperation (Aizenman 2016). In contrast, 
the anonymity of cryptocurrency owners may magnify the volatility, 
as there is no reason to expect the cryptocurrency’s whales to provide 
stabilization in bad times (Aizenman 2019a).22 Indeed, the market clout of 
Bitcoin whales provides ample opportunities to induce bubbly dynamics 
that insiders may exploit to their own benefits. These observations are 
consistent with the curious correlation patterns of bitcoin valuation that 
Baur, Hong, and Lee (2018) reported, noting that Bitcoin “is uncorrelated 
with traditional asset classes such as stocks, bonds and commodities 
both in normal times and in periods of financial turmoil. The analysis 
of transaction data of Bitcoin accounts shows that Bitcoins are mainly 
used as a speculative investment and not as an alternative currency and 
medium of exchange.”23
Taking the public finance perspective, one may conjecture 
that successful scalability of decentralized cryptocurrencies would 
breed private failure—the nation state may ignore niche financial 
innovations but would regulate or even “nationalize” them if their 
size and instability became a systemic threat. Efficient scalability of a 
successful decentralized currency is possible as long as the private 
sector coordinates its policies with the nation state. Scalable financial 
innovations that challenge the nation state’s ability to enforce law 
and order would trigger an “arms race” between users and the nation 
state’s law enforcement. A well-functioning nation state has access to 
deep, scalable resources. OECD countries, the PRC, and other efficient 
centralized regimes find ways to control scalable financial innovations. 
22 An example is the recent “fork fights”; see “Bitcoin Cash Hard Fork Battle: Who 
Is Winning the Hash War?”, Cointelegraph Column, 18 November 2018. https://
cointelegraph.com/news/bitcoin-cash-hard-fork-battle-who-is-winning-the-hash-
war (accessed 20 September 2019). 
23 The close to zero correlation of Bitcoin with other assets induced some to conclude 
that it may provide diversification opportunities. Without controlling for the cost of 
these “opportunities,” this argument is akin to viewing casino gambling as investment 
in portfolio diversification. 
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If the decentralized currency is scalable, nation states and central banks 
will face growing competition. They will react by either imposing 
regulations or reducing scalability and encryption. Either course of 
action crushes the emerging competition. Alternatively, they may 
compete directly with cryptocurrencies by offering their own e-money, 
as Lagarde (2018) articulated.24 
To put it in a historical perspective, the supplier of currencies benefits 
access to significant resources, aka seigniorage. History provides ample 
examples of regimes oversupplying the means of exchange, resulting 
in runaway inflation. Similar dynamics may occur in a weak federal 
system, in which the states compete for a greater share of seigniorage 
(Aizenman 1992; Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992). By now, 
most nations have converged to a social contract in which the state 
has the monopoly on supplying currency and controlling the banking 
system and the seigniorage and, in exchange, is responsible for the 
provision of financial stability, deposit insurance services, and a battery 
of regulations aiming to reach these goals.25 The wave of fintech of the 
2010s imposed clear risks on the monopoly of the state, shifting the bulk 
of financial intermediation to “virtual shadow banks” associated with 
anonymized intermediation. 
The PRC provides an example of the feasibility and ability of the 
state to follow a dual goal of encouraging the diffusion of efficient 
fintech exchange in ways that benefit private uses and augment the 
24 “What if, instead, central banks entered a partnership with the private sector—banks 
and other financial institutions—and said: you interface with the customer, you store 
their wealth, you offer interest, advice, loans. But when it comes time to transact, 
we take over. This partnership could take various forms. Banks and other financial 
firms, including startups, could manage the digital currency. Much like banks which 
currently distribute cash. Or, individuals could hold regular deposits with financial 
firms, but transactions would ultimately get settled in digital currency between 
firms. Similar to what happens today, but in a split second. All nearly for free. And 
anytime. The advantage is clear. Your payment would be immediate, safe, cheap, 
and potentially semi-anonymous. As you wanted. And central banks would retain 
a sure footing in payments … Putting it another way: the central bank focuses on its 
comparative advantage—back-end settlement—and financial institutions and start-
ups are free to focus on what they do best—client interface and innovation. This is 
public–private partnership at its best.” (Lagarde 2018).
25 An exception to these are states that chose to adopt a foreign currency as their legal 
tender, frequently as a mechanism to reduce the past instability associated with their 
currency, or joined a monetary union like the euro area, delegating the supplying of 
local currency to the central bank of the currency area.
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government’s controls,26 while restricting anonymized exchange in 
ways that minimize its threats to shrink the tax base and to the state’s 
ability to control financial intermediation.27 The chances are that other 
states will choose their own menu of policies aiming at achieving these 
dual goals. 
26 “The landscape of Chinese fintech is dominated by two players: Ant Financial, 
an affiliate of Alibaba, and Tencent … Mobile transactions in China reached nearly 
$18.7trn last year, 100 times more than in 2013—and more than all transactions handled 
worldwide by Visa and MasterCard combined. Regulators are more conflicted. By 
making spending easier, the fintech duo boost consumption, which has long been too 
low as a share of China’s GDP. They bring financial services to poorer people and force 
state-owned behemoths to up their game. But their popularity is also an economic 
risk ... ‘Customers are leaving banks’ … A bigger exodus might destabilise the financial 
system. So over the past year, regulators have put speed bumps in their way … Ant 
has capped the amount of cash users can invest or withdraw in a day. The online 
banks launched by Tencent and Ant—respectively, WeBank and MYBank—have also 
been hindered by deposit caps. And the central bank called off a trial in which Ant 
and Tencent were developing credit scores on individuals. Instead, they were given 
stakes in Baihang, a state-owned credit-rating system. Potentially most significant 
is the launch in July of NetsUnion, a clearing house for online payments. Although 
it should make mobile payments safer, it will also stand between fintech firms and 
banks, making it more difficult for Ant and Tencent to drive a hard bargain over fees 
… it is only a matter of time before it is used to limit mobile transactions, ostensibly 
to address concerns such as money-laundering but also protecting banks from 
competition. All this is the backdrop for the decision by Ant and Tencent to play up 
technology offerings instead of financial services … The idea for both is that, with their 
vast user bases and data troves, they can help banks identify smaller borrowers and 
manage lending risks. Banks put up the capital; Ant and Tencent get ‘technology fees.’” 
“Ant and Tencent As Regulators Circle, China’s Fintech Giants Put the Emphasis on 
Tech.” The Economist 2018).
27 On 4 September 2017, a PRC government announcement stated: “initial coin 
offerings (ICOs) financing that raises so-called ‘virtual currencies’ such as Bitcoin 
and Ethereum through the irregular sale and circulation of tokens is essentially 
public financing without approval, which is illegal. The announcement warned that 
tokens or virtual currencies involved in ICO financing are not issued by monetary 
authorities and therefore not mandatorily-accepted legal tender, and thus do not 
have equal legal status with fiat currencies and cannot and should not be circulated 
and used in the market as currencies.” 
 “As early as December 3, 2013, a notice declared banks and payment institutions in 
China are prohibited from dealing in bitcoins. Financial and payment institutions are 
prohibited from using bitcoin pricing for products or services or buying or selling 
bitcoins, nor can they provide direct or indirect bitcoin-related services, including 
registering, trading, settling, clearing, or other services.” (Library of Congress 2008).
 See also “Starting January 2019, non-bank payments companies must place 
100 percent of their customer deposit funds under centralized, interest-free accounts 
as Beijing moves to rein in financial risks. In the past, third-party payments firms 
were allowed to hold pre-paid sums from buyers for a short period of time before 
transferring the money to merchants. This layout allowed companies like Alibaba’s 
payments affiliate Ant Financial and Tencent to earn interest by depositing customer 
money into bank accounts.” https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/17/policy-squeezes-at 
-china-payments-firms/ (accessed 20 September 2019).
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We close the section with a short overview of Libra, which Facebook 
introduced in 2019. Libra’s white paper provided preliminary details of 
the mission and its design:
Libra is a simple global currency and financial infrastructure that 
empowers billions of people. Libra is made up of three parts that will 
work together to create a more inclusive financial system:
(1) It is built on a secure, scalable, and reliable blockchain.
(2) It is backed by a reserve of assets designed to give it intrinsic 
value.
(3) It is  governed by the independent Libra Association  tasked 
with evolving the ecosystem.28 
While Libra’s promised design differs from that of Bitcoin, the 
two share similar agency problems, and there are concerns about their 
impacts on the potency of the state’s monetary and financial stability. 
First, Libra is accountable to its shareholders, with limited accountability 
to the actual users and the citizens of the countries experiencing its 
ultimate effects. A successful Libra will weaken the potency of monetary 
policy and dilute the state’s seigniorage, and it may increase countries’ 
financial instability resulting from foreign shocks, like capital controls, 
global web disruptions, etc. Depending on the design of the future 
Libra, it may also shrink the state’s tax base. Thereby, there is no clear 
reason why central banks and treasuries will support the outsourcing 
of financial intermediation and the payment system to a globalized 
private platform. The public finance logic is clear: privatize scalable 
and globally successful Libra profits, but socialize any future losses 
associated with financial instability and crisis. Consequently, states may 
28 International reserves buffer the promised stability of the future Libra: 
 “What are the actual assets that will be backing each Libra coin? The actual assets will be 
a collection of low-volatility assets, including bank deposits and government securities 
in currencies from stable and reputable central banks. As the value of Libra will be 
effectively linked to a basket of fiat currencies, from the point of view of any specific 
currency, there will be fluctuations in the value of Libra. The makeup of the reserve 
is designed to mitigate the likelihood and severity of these fluctuations, particularly 
in the negative direction (i.e., even in economic crises). To that end, the above basket 
has been structured with capital preservation and liquidity in mind. On the capital 
preservation point, the association will only invest in debt from stable governments 
with low default probability that are unlikely to experience high inflation. In addition, 
the reserve has been diversified by selecting multiple governments, rather than just 
one, to further reduce the potential impact of such events. In terms of liquidity, the 
association plans to rely on short-dated securities issued by these governments, that 
are all traded in liquid markets that regularly accommodate daily trading volume in the 
tens or even hundreds of billions.” (Libra Association 2019).
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impose clear regulations akin to or more stringent than the one that they 
have presently invoked on globalized financial institutions. 
The list of other concerns is long, stating that reliance on the 
“scalable, and reliable blockchain” is speculative, as only time will tell us 
the convergence of blockchain into this Promised Land. Backing up Libra 
with reserve accounts composed of a basket invested “in debt from stable 
governments with low default probability that are unlikely to experience 
high inflation” raises serious currency valuation risks, inflationary risks, 
and agency issues related to real-time monitoring of the adequacy of this 
coverage. To illustrate, the dollar/euro exchange rate swings in the past 
20 years included several spells of 25% changes in 2 years. Similarly, the 
Swiss franc/US dollar experienced even larger fluctuations after the global 
financial crisis. This suggests that the basket valuation will be far from 
stable. History has shown that even “stable governments” occasionally 
impose capital controls at times of peril and crisis and renege on past 
promises (Edwards 2018). Furthermore, the balance sheet of a private 
supplier of money constrains its ability to back its commitment, as well as 
the will of its shareholders to undertake what is necessary to provide the 
promised services. By contrast, the state’s ability to monetize liabilities 
(i.e., to print money) and to tax its citizens backs its ability to support 
financial stability. In the US, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
covers the banking system, but one doubts the willingness of the US and 
its taxpayers to support Libra’s type of global arrangements.29 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
The winds of trade and currency wars of recent years are vivid 
illustrations of the growing scarcity of global cooperation in the late 
2010s, validating the need for EMEs to put their house in order. The 
sudden stops of the 1990s, the global financial crisis, and the euro area 
crisis induced EMEs to adopt defensive strategies, experimenting 
with new policy tools. The convergence to the middle ground of the 
trilemma helped. Greater monetary space has emerged through the 
proper precautionary management of international reserves, with the 
supplement of prudential regulations aimed at reducing the exposure 
to hot money inflows at times of “risk on,” thereby mitigating the cost of 
hot money outflows at times of “risk off.” Nevertheless, these steps are 
not sufficient to deal with the looming challenges, including the growing 
29 See Eichengreen (2018) and Niepelt (2019) “VoxEu” columns for further discussion 
of Libra.
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exposure of EMEs to fiscal dominance; the need to adjust policy to fast-
moving endogenous fintech innovations; and deglobalization trends. 
Greater application of SWFs as buffers integrated with fiscal rules may 
help. Experimentation with modified inflation targeting schemes and 
dynamic macroprudential regulations aiming to mitigate pro-cyclical 
leverage cycles and fintech shadow banking may be essential to reduce 
EMEs’ exposure to costly future volatility. These defensive postures 
may be EMEs’ second-best response to the limited global international 
coordination. 
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The Economics of De-Cashing
Alexei Kireyev1
3.1 Introduction
De-cashing is defined as the gradual phasing out of currency from 
circulation and its replacement with convertible deposits. This initiative 
does not in any way target the abolition of money as an institution, but 
is, rather, a sweeping reduction of the role of currency, i.e., its cash 
component, in favor of transferrable deposits, i.e., its noncash component. 
The monetary authorities in many countries have already taken steps 
towards de-cashing. These steps include abolishing large denomination 
bills, imposing ceilings on cash transactions, introducing declaration 
requirements on the carriage of cash in and out of the country, reporting 
requirements for cash payments exceeding a specified amount, and even 
taxing cash transactions.  
The purpose of this chapter is to suggest a simple framework for 
the analysis of the macroeconomic implications of de-cashing. Starting 
from a traditional savings–investment balance, the chapter develops a 
four-sector macroeconomics framework, which allows for the tracing 
of key implications of de-cashing for any country. The macroeconomic 
framework is then disaggregated into the real, fiscal, monetary, and 
external sectors of the national economy and the rest of the world. 
This analytical presentation allows for the study of sector-specific 
implications of de-cashing and the ability to highlight possible positive 
and negative effects of de-cashing in the sectors of particular importance 
for a specific country.  
1 The author is grateful to S. Arslanalp, J. Cartas, J. Crowley, C. Jarvis, A. Khan, 
D. King, D. Kostroch, G. Maciel, M. Martins, S. Matei, E. Mottu, P. Rabanal, and 
P. van Oudheusden for careful reading and helpful comments. Any remaining errors 
are the author’s. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do 
not necessarily represent the views of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), its 
Executive Board, or IMF management.
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The chapter is not meant to either endorse or condemn de-cashing 
in the ongoing debate. A recent and detailed overview of the positions 
on both sides of this heated debate is included in, among others, Sands 
(2016) and Rogoff (2014). The starting premise of this chapter is to 
examine effects of de-cashing from a macroeconomic perspective. Also, 
the chapter does not review recent money reforms (demonetization in 
India and some other countries); neither does it take a view on the role 
of de-cashing in reducing illegal cash-financed activities, nor on the 
ethical, legal, and political aspects of de-cashing.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly 
reviews the use of cash in the world and highlights some of the 
recent trends of de-cashing, including a few case studies of individual 
countries. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 analyze the statistical treatment of cash 
in the macroeconomics accounts, and, on this basis, propose a traceable 
accounting model of de-cashing. Finally, Section 3.5 includes conclusions 
and policy recommendations.
3.2 The Use of Cash
Cash is still used extensively across the world, in particular for small 
transactions. A study of payment habits in Australia, Austria, Canada, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States (US) has shown 
that in terms of the number of transactions, currency accounts for more 
than half everywhere, except the US. Since the introduction of the euro, 
cash in circulation has more than quadrupled in the euro area. In 2016, 
cash stood at more than €1 trillion, with both banknotes and coins still 
popular mediums of payment. Cash continues to play an important role 
in lower-value transactions. The 2012 survey of the US suggests that if 
the amount of the transaction is less than $20, the probability that it will 
be settled in cash is over 90%. If the transaction is larger than $20, the 
probability decreases to 57% (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014).
Cash remains popular for technical and symbolic reasons. 
Technically, cash is seen as a simple, safe, and private medium of 
payment that helps control spending and plan a budget. Cash can 
be used to pay anonymously and directly without any sophisticated 
technical infrastructure, even without electricity, and is largely seen 
as irreplaceable in emergency situations. Historically, cash is the 
most convenient form of money, and carrying it in the wallet is often 
perceived as a fundamental human right. On the international scale, 
common money has often been seen as the most discernable sign 
of integration, in particular in the euro area or the African Financial 
Community franc zones. 
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The use of cash differs substantially depending on the 
denomination. Low denomination banknotes are used mainly for small 
daily transactions, whereas high denomination banknotes represent 
the bulk of currency in circulation, but are not generally used for cash 
transactions. High denomination banknotes, although dominating the 
cash turnover, mainly store value. Such banknotes ($50 to $100 in the US, 
€50 to €500 in the euro area, ¥5,000 to ¥10,000 in Japan, and SKr500 
to SKr1,000 in Sweden) represent 80%–90% of currency in circulation, 
although are rarely used in daily cash payments. 
Large denomination banknotes pose institutional risks. First, they 
are a vehicle often used for money laundering. The larger the value of 
the banknote, the easier it is to transport larger amounts of money. As an 
example, $1 million in currency in $100 bills weighs 22 pounds, whereas 
the same amount in €500 notes would weigh less than 3 pounds. 
Second, large denomination banknotes are more often forged. The US 
Treasury considered re-issuing a $500 banknote when €500 banknotes 
began circulating. However, after the recognition that this would 
fuel worldwide criminals, this option was not pursued. Third, high 
denomination banknotes are most likely used for overseas circulation 
with no supervision from the respective central bank. One estimate for 
the US suggests that about 65% ($580 billion) of all banknotes are in 
foreign circulation. Several countries are officially dollarized, which 
could explain this high percentage.
Cashless transactions have also gained importance across the world. 
The US Federal Reserve estimates that in 2016 cashless transactions 
amounted to $617 billion, up from $60 billion in 2010. In Germany, 
33% of consumer transactions are cashless. Sweden is fast becoming a 
cashless society: in 2015, cash transactions made up barely 2% of the 
value of all payments and may drop to 0.5% by 2020. In shops, cash is 
now used for barely 20% of transactions, half the number from 5 years 
ago, and well below the global average of 75% (Riksbank 2015). A similar 
trend toward de-cashing is clearly observed in Norway, Denmark, and 
Finland.
Many countries have already taken steps to limit cash in transactions, 
initially deciding to abolish large denomination bills. In 2016, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) abolished the €500 banknote, mainly out 
of concern for counterfeiting and money laundering. In other countries, 
some high denomination notes have been eliminated in recent years, 
such as Canada’s Can$1,000 note in 2000, and Singapore’s S$10,000 note 
in 2014 (Sands 2016). In Sweden, all older banknotes and coins, except 
the SKr10 coin, became invalid in 2017, and some will not be replaced by 
new ones. Calls to scrap the $100 bill—the most widely used currency 
note in the world—have been heard in the US (Summers 2016). Second, 
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restrictions on cash payments are currently in place in 12  of the 28 
European Union (EU) member states (Deutsche Bundesbank 2016). In 
the euro area, an idea of imposing a ceiling of €5,000 on cash payments 
has been discussed. Restrictions were also put on the use of cash for 
specific purposes, such as paying rent (Sands 2016). In Israel, a special 
committee recommended a three-phase plan to restrict the use of cash, 
limit the use of checks as a means of payment and exchange for cash, 
and promote electronic payments. Any violation of these limits would 
be a criminal offense (Alonyi 2014). Third, the reporting and declaration 
requirement on carrying cash has been in place in many countries. For 
example, in the US, it is contrary to Title 26 of the tax code to carry 
more than $10,000 into the country without reporting it. A similar 
requirement is now in place for the EU, as all sums exceeding €10,000 in 
cash must be declared to customs authorities.  
The private sector also seems to prefer to do away with cash. 
Many businesses in the euro area have self-imposed the policy of not 
accepting large denomination bills for payments, in particular €500 and 
€200 bills, out of fear of counterfeit money. In the US, getting change 
from a $100 bill may pose a problem at a small business. In Sweden, 
banks no longer accept or dispense cash; further, about 900 of Sweden’s 
1,600 bank branches no longer keep cash on hand or take cash deposits, 
and many, especially in rural areas, no longer have ATMs. Swedish 
buses have not taken cash for years, it is impossible to buy a metro ticket 
with cash, retailers are legally entitled to refuse coins and notes, and 
street vendors—and even churches—increasingly prefer card or phone 
payments (Henley 2016).
3.3 Macro-Analytics of De-Cashing
3.3.1 Cash Economics: Primer2
In monetary statistics, cash is synonymous to currency. In the 
strict sense, currency refers to notes and coins, which are financial 
instruments of fixed nominal values issued or authorized by central 
banks or governments (IMF 2016b). Domestic currency is given the 
status of a legal tender by the constitution or other relevant law, which 
generally requires its mandatory acceptance in the country. The value 
and credibility of a currency depend on the ability of the state to support 
2 The discussion is based on definitions and concepts from the Monetary and Financial 
Statistics Manual (IMF 2016b).
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it.3 Currency in circulation is the amount outside the central bank held 
by all residents and nonresidents. 
Currency is part of money; money is a broader concept than currency. 
In addition to notes and coins, money also includes assets or instruments 
that are readily convertible into such, for example, transferrable deposits 
and short-term deposits. Money is issued generally by central banks, 
and can take the form of increasing a commercial bank’s deposits at the 
central bank or transporting currency to the vaults of a commercial bank. 
Transferrable deposits, which are similar to currency, are exchangeable 
for currency on demand at par, without penalty or restriction, and 
directly usable for making payments to third parties by check, draft, giro 
order, direct debit and/or credit, or other direct payment facility.
Both currency and transferrable deposits are part of broad money 
and, as any money, has four basic functions. Currency is i) a medium of 
exchange—a means for acquiring nonfinancial assets (goods, merchandise, 
equipment, etc.), services, and financial assets without resorting to 
bartering; ii) a store of value—a means of holding wealth; iii) a unit 
of account—a standard for denominating the prices of goods and 
services, and the values of financial instruments and nonfinancial assets, 
thereby providing a means for comparisons of values and for preparation 
of financial accounts; and iv) a standard of deferred payment—a means 
for settling liabilities.
The amount of currency placed into circulation relative to deposits 
is determined by demand. Currency demand is determined by the bank’s 
clients, who establish the amount they would like to have in the form of 
deposits and cash. The central bank places currency into circulation when 
it transports it to a commercial bank.4 To account for this transaction in 
its balance sheet, the central bank reduces the “transferrable deposits” 
of the commercial bank and increases “currency in circulation.” The 
commercial bank in its balance sheet increases “domestic currency” 
and decreases its transferrable deposits at the central bank. However, as 
long as this currency stays in the vaults of the commercial bank, it does 
3 This is not the case in all countries. For instance, the Indian rupee is legal tender in 
Nepal and Bhutan, in addition to their own domestic currency.
4 Transportation is not always the point where cash becomes currency in circulation. 
Some countries (e.g., in the euro area with the “Notes Held to Order” practice, 
and some Commonwealth countries with the practice of “currency chests”) have 
arrangements with commercial banks where non-circulated “banknotes” (i.e., 
paper) are transported from the central bank to vaults of commercial banks. These 
(partitioned) vaults are physically in commercial banks, and maintained but them, but 
are to be seen as extensions of the central bank’s vault. “Notes” being transported to 
those commercial banks are still listed as assets on the central bank’s balance sheet, 
and will only turn into a liability and/or banknotes when transferred out of this vault.
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not perform the role of money. Currency only starts performing this 
role and is included in broad money when the bank’s clients exchange 
their deposits for currency. Upon demand from its clients for cash, the 
bank reduces its currency in vault cash in exchange for a reduction in 
their transferrable deposits. As an accounting entry, this currency in 
circulation is labeled “currency outside banks” and is included in broad 
money liabilities.
Electronic money is a special case of transferrable deposits and 
is classified as deposits rather than currency. All types of electronic 
money issued by residents that can be used for direct payments to 
third parties are included in broad money as transferrable deposits. 
Electronic money is a payment instrument whereby monetary value is 
electronically stored either on a physical device or remotely at a server. 
To qualify as electronic money, the payment instrument must be usable 
for making payments to third parties. While currency has only physical 
security features, electronic money uses cryptography to authenticate 
transactions and to protect the confidentiality and the integrity of the 
data processing. Examples of electronic money include an electronic 
purse where monetary values are stored on cards for small payments; 
prepaid cards, except those designed for specific needs and that can be 
used only in a limited way; web-based electronic money, such as PayPal; 
and money accessible on a mobile phone (e.g., M-Pesa in Kenya and 
Tanzania). Not all electronic payments involve electronic money. For 
instance, credit cards or debit cards are not electronic money because 
no monetary value is stored on them, and neither are store cards because 
they are similar to credit cards, but with use limited to only the issuing 
stores. Internet-based currency, such as Bitcoin, is not electronic money 
because it does not meet the definition of currency. Bitcoin is not issued 
by a central bank and is not widely accepted as a medium of exchange.
Therefore, currency and transferrable deposits are similar and both 
meet the definition of broad money; both can be used as a medium of 
exchange, are immediately exchangeable on demand at par to acquire 
financial or nonfinancial assets, and can be considered legal tender if the 
legal framework (likely the central bank act) indicates that. Currency 
is accepted for domestic transactions because of its status as legal 
tender. Transferrable deposits are accepted for transactions because 
recipients perceive them as a medium of exchange. Both currency and 
transferrable deposits have fixed nominal (face) value. The nominal 
values of currency and non-interest-bearing transferrable deposits are 
fixed, with real values changing with movements in the price level. 
Both currency and transferrable deposits can be used to make direct 
payments to a third party, and both have no or very low transaction costs. 
Payment by currency has no fees or other transaction costs, and the use 
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of transferrable deposits usually bears very small fees. Both currency 
and transferrable deposits are divisible financial assets and are suitable 
for making small transactions; further, they do not have maturity and 
are immediately accessible by their holders. Finally, currency and 
transferrable deposits earn no or low interest. Their usefulness as a 
medium of exchange compensates the holder for the forgone interest 
that could have been received by holding other types of financial assets. 
There is no surprise, therefore, that central banks stand ready to convert 
transferrable deposits into currency in unlimited amounts. 
The differences between currency and transferrable deposits are 
also remarkable. They are often used by both sides of the debate on the 
pros and cons of de-cashing. First, currency can become technically 
obsolete. Banknotes fade and break, and the efforts to remedy the 
problem with plastic notes are of little help and involve unneeded costs. 
Transferrable deposits do not have this problem. Second, payments 
with currency are anonymous, which make them a popular vehicle 
for abuse, tax avoidance, terrorism financing, and money laundering. 
Transferrable deposits are personified and generally cannot be used for 
these purposes. Third, currency is prone to counterfeiting, at times on 
a large scale. Fourth, currency is often perceived as a means to preserve 
privacy, i.e., economic operators generally are not interested in the 
history of the currency of their transaction. Also, the individual right 
to privacy is usually enshrined in laws and transferrable deposits store 
each step of the payment history, which can be viewed as a threat to 
privacy. Transferrable deposits lead to full transparency, at least to the 
issuing bank, and a complete record of transactions, which, by virtue of 
the law, can be used by tax and law enforcement authorities. 
3.3.2 Macroeconomic Framework
One way to look at the macroeconomic implications of de-cashing 
is through the prism of the System of National Accounts (SNA). The 
SNA provides an internationally recognized accounting framework, 
which allows for the compiling and presenting of macroeconomic data 
in a consistent manner (UN, EC, OECD, IMF, and World Bank 2008). 
Economic agents in any economy can be subdivided into five sectors: 
households, enterprises, financial intermediaries, the government, 
and the rest of the world; all are linked by accounting identities. In a 
simplified form, these linkages can be presented as shown in Figure 3.1.
In any economy, there is supply of resources and demand for 
resources or their use. Supply of resources consists of its own output 
Y and imports IM. These resources are used for public and private 
consumption C, investment I, and exports X (1). According to the 
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Figure 3.1: De-Cashing: The Macroeconomic Framework
Note: The variables potentially most affected by de-cashing are shown in gray.
Source: Author.
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expenditure approach, income generated by the output is equal to the 
sum of its final uses (2). Additional income for the country includes net 
factor income and net transfers, which can be added to both sides of 
the identity, but are omitted here to simplify the presentation. Income 
not consumed equals saving S, and the difference between exports and 
imports equals the current account CA in the balance of payments (3). 
Therefore, ex post, the gap between savings and investment is equivalent 
to the current account balance (4). In other words, the current account 
deficit is driven by investment exceeding saving and should be financed 
from abroad. The current account surplus reflects saving exceeding 
investment and can be used to finance investment abroad. The saving–
investment balance, which is equal to the current account, is the 
fundamental identity of international macroeconomics.
The outcome of the savings and investment balance depends 
on the performance of the public and private sectors. On the left-
hand side of the savings–investment balance, national saving can be 
presented as a sum of government saving Sg and private saving Sp, and 
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national investment as a sum of government investment Ig and private 
investment Ip (5). On the right-hand side of the savings–investment 
balance, the current account itself is part of the balance of payments 
identity. It says that the current account balance CA plus the financial 
account balance FA5 should equal the change in international reserves 
R of the country (6). In other words, any disequilibrium between 
savings and investment either in the public or private sector would be 
reflected in the flows in the financial account or reserves. Assume for 
simplicity that the private sector always adjusts to the equilibrium, its 
savings–investment balance is zero, i.e., Sp – Ip = 0, and the savings–
investment balance of the government sector is the only determinant 
of the current account.
The savings–investment balance of the public sector broadly 
reflects the government’s budget position. The level of government 
saving Sg depends on the fiscal balance B, which is the difference 
between revenue Rev and expenses Exp, and is financed –F either from 
external sources Ext or domestic sources Dm (7). Revenue consists of 
tax revenue Tx, nontax revenue NTx, and grants grnts. Expenses include 
only final consumption expenditure by the general government, i.e., 
usually payments of wages and salaries W&S, procurements of goods and 
services G&S, and subsidies Sb. In turn, tax revenue consists of domestic 
taxes Td and taxes on international trade and transactions Ti (8). Nontax 
revenue includes fees and charges Fs and other revenue Oth (9).
The current account is a crucial component of the balance 
of payments and the external balance. Depending on the balance 
between domestic savings and investment, the current account can be 
in deficit or surplus. In the case of a deficit, it is financed by inflows in 
the financial account FA and/or drawing down international reserves 
R (10). This is a budget constraint for the economy, because the deficit 
can persist only as long as financial inflows are maintained, and the 
reserve level remains appropriate. In a current account surplus, the 
country finances the rest of the world by outflows in the financial 
account and/or accumulates reserves. The current account balance 
is usually determined mainly by the balance on trade in goods and 
services X – Im. In addition, the net factor income NF and net transfers 
NT may be important for the current account in certain countries. The 
flows in the financial account can be FDI, portfolio investment PI, and 
other flows Oth, which consist mainly of public and private loans.
The savings–investment balance has an important impact on 
monetary accounts. Assuming international reserves equal net 
5 FA refers to “net capital and financial account excluding reserve assets” and NFA 
refers to “net foreign assets excluding reserve assets”.
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foreign assets (NFA) of the central bank and no changes in the NFA of 
commercial banks, then change in reserves R generated by the balance 
of payments outcome together with the changes in net domestic assets 
NDA lead to changes in broad money M (11). Changes in the NDA can 
be driven by net credit to the government Cg, credit to the private 
sector Cp, and other items net OIN. The monetary sector identity 
shows the distinction between money of external origin (NFA, reserves) 
and domestic origin (NDA, domestic credit). Unless sterilized, any 
accumulation of international reserves would translate into an increase 
in the supply of broad money for a given level of domestic credit. Because 
in equilibrium money supply always equals money demand, rapid 
accumulation of reserves may lead to a spike in inflation. Conversely, 
any expansion in domestic credit at a given level of reserves can have 
similar consequences.
Finally, the savings-investment balance of any country is closely 
linked to the level of the exchange rate of its currency. The exchange 
rate level broadly reflects the balance between supply and demand 
for currency between residents of the domestic economy and the rest 
of the world. This balance of supply and demand for currency may 
be an outcome of current account transactions, as exporters sell their 
foreign currency earnings and importers buy foreign currency to pay 
for imports; financial account transactions, as residents demand foreign 
currency to invest abroad and nonresidents need local currency to invest 
domestically; and transactions with international reserves, as the central 
bank buys and sells foreign currency to achieve its policy objectives. As 
a result, flows under all three key accounts of the balance of payments—
the current account, the financial account, and the international reserves 
account—have an impact on the level of the exchange rate (12).
How does de-cashing enter into this simple framework? On a 
purely macro-accounting level, commitments taken by countries in the 
process of de-cashing directly affect their savings–investment balance. 
The impulse may originate in any of the four sectors from the variables 
shown in red on Figure 3.1. In the real sector, de-cashing would directly 
influence private consumption and private investment, generally by 
shifting the means of payments from paper currency to electronic 
means. In the fiscal sector, the impact of de-cashing would be felt on 
both the revenue and the expenditure sides. On the revenue side, the 
level of nontax revenue for governments from seigniorage will be 
inevitably affected. The impact on the expenditure side will be mainly 
through reduced and even eliminated currency printing and transaction 
costs. In the external sector, the impulse should be expected from the 
savings–investment balance in the private sector, where the interplay 
between the changes in the two components —investment and savings—
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would affect the current account. Finally, in the monetary sector, the 
impact of de-cashing on the assets side would be from the credit to the 
private sector, most, if not all of which, will have to be de-cashed. On 
the liabilities side, the composition between currency and deposits in 
reserve money would change in favor of the latter. 
3.4 Macroeconomic Effect of De-Cashing
3.4.1 Monetary Effects
The initial macroeconomic impulse of de-cashing would originate 
from a drop in demand for currency. In equilibrium, the central bank 
stands ready to meet demand for money, be it in the form of currency 
or transferrable deposits, and stands ready to convert currency into 
transferrable deposits and vice versa in unlimited amounts. In fact, 
if demand for currency drops and is offset in full by an increase in 
demand for transferrable deposits, the impact on money supply will be 
zero (Figure 3.2). The process of de-cashing would be reflected on the 
liabilities side of the central bank balance sheet and monetary survey as 
a simple rebalancing between currency and transferrable deposits. 
On the assets side showing the sources of money supply, the net 
foreign assets will not be affected as this is money of external origin. 
Some rebalancing is possible between net claims of government and 
claims of the private sector, depending on their relative demand 
for currency and deposits. In a most probable scenario of creating 
incentives for de-cashing, the public sector most likely would reduce 
its demand for currency more than the private sector, for example, if a 
decision is taken to pay all public sector salaries by cashless means, i.e., 
by their transfer to deposits of public employees, and to pay taxes only 
with cashless means. The private sector may also react to incentives for 
de-cashing if the authorities introduce a requirement that all payments 
exceeding a certain amount should be made by cashless means. In any 
case, the rebalancing in monetary accounts would be purely mechanical 
with no impact on money supply.
Therefore, the de-cashing incentives should be explicitly included 
in the demand for currency estimations. Demand for currency is usually 
modeled in an error correction framework to account for a possible 
cointegration between currency holdings, gross domestic product 
(GDP), and interest rates. Indicators of ease of access to currency, such 
as the number of ATMs, fund transfer terminals, and bank branches 
per capita, and the ratio of self-employment to total employment in 
the long-run relationship can be also included. Additional variables to 
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capture the impact of de-cashing on currency demand may include the 
projected share of salaries paid in cash, an implicit opportunity cost 
of holding cash, and the number of checking and other transferrable 
accounts held by economic agents.
De-cashing may improve the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. In principle, the transmission of monetary impulses from the 
policy rate to inflation may become easier as all rates—money market, 
interbank, bank deposit, and lending—may react faster to the changes 
in the policy rate as economic agents would have fewer non-interest 
bearing assets in the form of saved currency. In particular, the negative 
interest rate policy becomes a feasible option for monetary policy if 
savings in physical currency are discouraged and substantially reduced. 
With de-cashing, most money would be stored in the banking system, 
and, therefore, would be easily affected by negative rates, which could 
encourage consumer spending. Moreover, currency has not been an 
efficient instrument of monetary policy, as in most countries currency is 
neither the largest part of money supply, nor an efficient mechanism for 
providing liquidity. The amount of currency in circulation has no impact 
on inflation, and there are no quantitative limits on banknote issuance in 
Figure 3.2: Monetary Effect of De-Cashing
Source: Author, based on the Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual (IMF 2016b).
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central banks, which also suggests that currency has largely lost its role 
in monetary policy, in particular in developed countries. 
The opposite scenario is also possible, in particular in developing 
countries with a large share of currency in money, where currency may 
have an impact on inflation. Even a small negative interest rate would 
likely result in a sudden jump in demand for cash, both during and after 
the period of negative interest rates. The supply of cash would increase 
to meet this demand. In this scenario, negative interest rate policies 
might be feasible only if cash and prepaid debit cards were eliminated, 
but even then they would be highly controversial. Also, with negative 
interest rates, agents could move into other assets for storing value 
if domestic interest rates are largely negative (think of using other 
countries’ paper currencies, virtual currencies, gold, real estate, etc.).
After de-cashing, the banking system laden with fresh deposits 
would be able to boost lending. In countries where the depositor base 
is weak, de-cashing would help increase deposits as economic agents 
convert their currency holdings into convertible and other types of 
deposits with the banking system. The availability of deposits should in 
principle help reduce the lending interest rate and make credit more 
affordable, therefore increasing borrowing and contributing to growth. 
Clearly, de-cashing is not the only instrument to lower interest rates. 
Central banks can lower interest rates whenever they consider it 
desirable, as long as the zero lower bound is not binding. Even when 
the zero bound is binding, banks would have excess liquidity. Banks’ 
credit is also constrained by capital requirements and sound lending 
considerations.
The only useful function of currency, which can be lost with de-
cashing, is that demand for cash may help predict financial crises. 
Such crises usually happen when the public loses confidence in banks 
and bank money and run into hard cash, erroneously viewed as a safe 
haven. The strong demand for cash in September 2008 reflected the 
panic that swept across most developed countries with the visible onset 
of one of the biggest crises in history. The rise in demand for currency, 
in particular for high denomination banknotes, was mainly due to an 
increase in precautionary holdings by people concerned about the 
liquidity or solvency of financial institutions, and by financial institutions 
as a contingency. However, it is not entirely clear whether de-cashing 
would eliminate the ability to see early warning signs. Even in a fully 
cashless society, people may revert to gold, other commodities, or other 
(still existing) cash currencies (such as the dollar), demand for which 
would function as early earning indicators. 
Finally, de-cashing may have implications for central bank 
independence, mainly in emerging economics. It may be argued that 
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de-cashing would lead to a loss of the revenue from seigniorage, one 
of the important sources of revenue for central banks that allow them 
to maintain financial independence. However, for most central banks, 
seigniorage is not a significant revenue stream and, at times, even 
notional, as all of it is transferred to the general budget. For example, 
in the euro area, the ECB receives interest only on its 8% share of the 
total currency issuance, as national central banks’ members of the 
euro system put most currency into circulation. Seigniorage from high 
denomination banknotes does not exceed 0.1% of GDP in the US, the 
euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland (Sands 2016). 
The ECB earns interest only on its share of the issued currency and 
at a very low marginal rate (or fixed rate) for the euro system’s main 
refinancing operations. Moreover, most central banks have diversified 
revenue sources. In addition to the seigniorage, they earn income on 
their holdings of foreign reserves, which are usually invested in interest-
bearing assets, holdings of government securities, issuances of their 
own securities, revaluation of assets with rising prices, including gold, 
exchange rate differentials, and other sources. Also, most central bank 
laws have arrangements for limited profit distribution arrangements 
with their sovereigns, in particular to safeguard financial independence. 
Therefore, the examples listed are not necessarily the countries that 
face significant threats to central bank independence. It is, however, 
in particular, central banks in numerous emerging markets where 
seigniorage is key for the central bank’s financial independence. 
Obviously, central banks also bear costs, but their substantial part, 
such as printing, minting, and retiring banknotes and coins, would be 
dramatically reduced, if not eliminated, with de-cashing.
3.4.2 Real Effects
De-cashing would have an impact on growth, which may be both positive 
and negative. The positive impact in the form of higher growth can be 
expected as de-cashing would reduce transaction costs in the economy 
estimated at about 2%–2.5% of GDP (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014). 
Lower costs would mean higher profits, investment, and ultimately 
growth. This positive impact may be significant as cash transactions are 
mostly conducted with small denomination bills and are thus the cost of 
such multiple small transactions may be substantial. Second, de-cashing 
may reduce the underground and gray economy, and, therefore, increase 
the GDP captured by official statistics beyond the usual estimates, 
thus making them explicitly contribute to it. On the other hand, de-
cashing may have negative repercussions for private sector growth as a 
substantial part of private investment (house construction, remodeling, 
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and extensions), especially those financed by remittances, is settled in 
cash. De-cashing may introduce disruptions in this well-established 
process. Also, with the elimination of high denomination banknotes, 
consumers will have to use an increasing number of lower denomination 
banknotes to settle the same transaction, which will increase costs. 
Finally, should governments impose de-cashing without the general 
approval of the population, de-cashing may lead to social tensions, 
mistrust, walkouts, demonstrations, and, as a result, GDP losses.
At a more granular level, the GDP is produced and spent, and 
currency is used as a medium of exchange in this process. On the 
supply side, the GDP can be further decomposed into the value added 
plus the adjustment of taxes less subsidies on products in the primary 
sector (mining and agriculture), secondary sector (manufacturing), and 
tertiary sector (services) (Figure 3.3), and can explicitly show the public 
and private sectors, both on the supply and demand sides. Arguably, the 
use of cash is substantially higher in the private sector than in the public 
sector. Depending on the shares of private and public ownership, the 
impact may be felt mainly in the tertiary sector, where most services 
are provided by private agents, and the secondary sector, if the role of 
the private sector is high in a particular economy. As natural resources 
are usually in the public sector, the impact of de-cashing on it may 
be marginal.
On the demand side, de-cashing would affect both private 
consumption and private investment. While public consumption and 
Figure 3.3: Real Effects of De-Cashing
GDP = gross domestic product, G&NFS = goods and non-factor services.
Source: Author, based on the System of National Accounts (SNA 2008).
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investment are usually noncash transactions, private consumption is 
strongly influenced by the amount of net disposable income. People 
generally spend and consume more from their disposable income if 
they feel financially safe, therefore increasing demand for currency. 
As consumption spending by the private sector is an important GDP 
component and is conducted in a significant part in paper currency, 
de-cashing may have a negative impact on it and somewhat hamper 
economic growth. Investment, however, should be generally a lesser 
source for currency demand, in particular in developed countries where 
it is executed in bank money. Therefore, de-cashing most likely will not 
significantly affect public consumption and investment, but may create 
temporary hurdles for private consumption and investment.
3.4.3 Fiscal Effects
De-cashing will have an impact on a country’s fiscal balance. As shown 
above, the fiscal balance is directly linked to the savings–investment 
balance of the public sector, and, therefore, can have a major impact on 
external and balance of payments stability. Any changes in government 
revenue and consumption resulting from de-cashing will translate into 
changes in the level of government saving, which, for a given level of 
public investment and an unchanged private sector savings–investment 
balance, would change the current account. The direction of the shift 
would largely depend on whether de-cashing would improve the overall 
fiscal balance or lead to its deterioration. The outcome depends on its 
relative impact on specific revenue and expenditure lines, primarily 
those shown in red (Figure 3.4).
In principle, de-cashing should improve tax collection by reducing 
tax evasion. In Sweden, for example, with de-cashing, the government 
has benefited from more efficient tax collection, because electronic 
transactions leave a trail. By contrast, in countries like Greece and 
Italy, where cash is still heavily used, tax evasion remains a problem. 
The visibility of tax payments by transfers through banks can serve as 
a deterrent to tax underreporting and other evasion strategies. Most 
developed countries and many developing countries have already 
implemented policies on electronic tax payments and use them as a 
tax control instrument. However, as these policies require taxpayers to 
acquire and install electronic payment systems, compliance costs are 
unavoidable. Recent studies showed that while electronic payments did 
not appear to influence value-added tax (VAT) collection, the negative 
effects of cash collection on VAT performance is unambiguous, at least 
in the countries where electronic cash payments are well-established 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2014). Finally, electronic payments may also 
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Figure 3.4: Fiscal Effects of De-Cashing
VAT = value-added tax.
Source: Author, based on the IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual (2001).
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lead to new forms of tax evasion and could incentivize barter, facilitated 
by improved technology, which will hamper tax collection.
The magnitude of possible improvements in tax collection is 
hard to estimate. Given the scale of cash-based tax evasion, one must 
assume a fairly modest impact on behavior to generate a substantial 
increment to tax revenues. For example, tax evasion in the US, called 
the tax gap, was estimated by the Internal Revenue Service at $458 
billion on average in 2008–10 (IRS 2016). The major components of the 
tax gap are the underreporting of individual income tax ($264 billion) 
and employment tax ($84 billion). If eliminating $100 bills—to take a 
simple assumption—meant that 10% of this gap would be collected, the 
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additional tax contribution would be $35 billion a year. In the EU, tax 
evasion is estimated at €1 trillion a year (European Commission 2017). 
Using the same illustrative logic, the elimination of large denomination 
bills of the euro and British pound would help recover €100 billion in 
tax arrears. In developing countries, additional tax revenue is hard to 
estimate, given the paucity of analysis on tax compliance gaps in general.
With de-cashing, governments may reduce their interest expenditure 
due to lower interest payments to central banks. Central banks usually 
put currency into circulation by purchasing government bonds on the 
secondary market, meaning the purchase does not increase interest 
costs to the government. On the contrary, it increases the demand for 
bonds and thus lowers the interest rate that the government would have 
to pay. Governments have to pay interest to the central banks on these 
bonds, which represents their seigniorage and may be substantial. In the 
US, for example, the fiscal year 2017 seigniorage amounted to 0.46 per 
dollar issued (US Mint 2017), with such payments amounting to about 
$70 billion a year. In Sweden, however, seigniorage represents only 1.1% 
of the central bank’s balance sheet (Riksbank 2015). Overall, however, 
it is not immediately clear that de-cashing would provide savings to 
the consolidated balance sheet of the public sector (i.e., the Ministry of 
Finance and the central bank) because of the effects described above. 
These interest payments are a transfer between the central bank and the 
Ministry of Finance.
De-cashing may reduce the government’s nontax revenue through 
lower profit on currency issuances. The government purchases the 
currency from a domestic or foreign mint (or bureau of engraving) and 
delivers the currency to the central bank. In the central bank’s accounts, 
the nominal (face) value of the currency is recorded as vault cash 
(currency—domestic), along with a corresponding increase in the central 
bank’s liability (transferrable deposits—in domestic currency) to the 
central government. Through this transaction, the central government 
obtains revenue, which is equivalent to the difference between the 
nominal value of the currency and the cost of its acquisition, distribution, 
and maintenance. If the nominal value of currency issued declines with 
de-cashing, so does government revenue from this operation.
Finally, de-cashing may lead to budgetary costs. In most cases, the 
country would have to introduce deep institutional and legislative reform 
to initiate and carry over de-cashing. The implementation of many 
electronic payment procedures is technically complex, and requires 
extensive training of personnel, procurement of new equipment and 
technology, redrafting of domestic regulation, and the corresponding 
institutional changes, including strengthening enforcement. The 
specific expenditure items that can be affected by the need to finance 
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these implementation costs may include additional staff, procurement 
of new equipment, and investment in rebuilding an electronic payment 
infrastructure. Investment can be financed domestically, while some 
countries may also receive the support of external donors for the 
adjustment period. In the latter case, the source of financing can 
be either loans, shown as a financing item in the budget, or grants 
included in revenue. 
Overall, fiscal implications of de-cashing seem ambiguous. The 
impact on the fiscal balance and, as a result, on the savings–investment 
balance of the government, would largely depend on the relative impact 
of revenue and expenditure items affected by de-cashing. On the 
revenue side, taxes most likely will increase, owing to more rigorous 
and traceable collection procedures. Nontax revenue most likely would 
drop, with lower profit transfers from seigniorage by the central bank. 
On the expenditure side, interest to be paid to the central bank on 
government bonds would be lower. However, at the same time, additional 
expenditure, at least for the transition period, can be expected to finance 
de-cashing. Relatively prolonged transition periods could help smooth 
out the negative impact, as an increase in tax collection would help 
offset some losses.
3.4.4 Balance of Payments Effects
The impact on de-cashing on most balance of payment flows most likely 
will be marginal (Figure 3.5). For small to medium-sized countries, 
de-cashing is mainly a domestic operation with little direct implications 
for the rest of the world. The impact on the current account should be 
expected mainly through the savings-investment balance, which in turn 
critically depends on the outcome of de-cashing for the public sector. If 
the fiscal balance improves as tax revenue increases outweigh nontax 
revenue losses and additional transitional expenditure, the current 
account will improve. This outcome would mainly reflect stronger 
exports, as government invests part of its collected taxes, and improves 
infrastructure, competitiveness, and the business environment. On 
the other hand, in some countries de-cashing may require additional 
imports of equipment and technology, which may temporarily worsen 
the current account.
The balance on the primary and secondary income accounts 
would be affected mainly through income transfers. If de-cashing 
is based on the distributed ledger-like technology, such as with 
Bitcoin, it can dramatically reduce the cost of international transfers, 
especially remittances intermediated by correspondent banks. Through 
correspondent banking relationships—agreements between banks to 
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Figure 3.5: Balance of Payments Effects of De-Cashing
IMF= International Monetary Fund.
Source: Author, based on the IMF Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual. 
(2006).
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provide payment services to each other—banks can access financial 
services in different jurisdictions and provide cross-border payment 
services. The costs of sending international remittances, however, 
are notoriously high, at about 8% of the amount sent. In contrast, the 
cost with electronic money, such as Bitcoin, is estimated to be about 
1% (Goldman Sachs 2014). A blockchain-based remittance system has 
already emerged in some economies. For instance, in the Philippines 
and Kenya, blockchain-based intermediaries offer money transfer 
services via Bitcoin and subsequent conversion back into fiat currency 
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for withdrawal by recipients through either their mobile phones or a 
bank account (IMF 2016a).
Finally, de-cashing may reduce a very profitable impact on the balance 
of payments of certain countries from the international circulation of 
their national currency. While the cost of printing banknotes is minimal, 
foreign economic agents must provide goods and services at the face 
value of the banknote to obtain it. Primarily, this flow is important for 
the US and the euro area. “What is true is that the large holdings of U.S. 
currency outside the United States—largely in the form of $100 bills, 
held for obvious reasons—represent, in effect, a roughly $500 billion 
zero-interest loan to America. That’s nice, but even in normal times it’s 
only worth around $20 billion a year, or roughly 0.15 percent of GDP” 
(Krugman 2013).
3.4.5 Structural Effects
De-cashing may lead to increased financial inclusiveness. By construction, 
a shift from currency to transferrable deposits would require people to 
have at least debit accounts with banks. Small businesses that would 
accept bank money would increase their profits, as most people would 
have easily accessible and reliable means of payments in the form at 
least of debit cards and, potentially, tele-payments.
De-cashing should help reduce illegal migration. With less currency 
in circulation, employers that attract illegal immigration by cash payment 
would have fewer options to pay for their services off the books.
De-cashing can help improve the environment. Paper money has been 
the currency of choice for centuries with clearly negative implications for 
forestry. Now, it is being replaced with polymer notes, which are already 
in use in over 20 countries. A polymer bill leads to a 32% reduction in 
global warming potential and a 30% reduction in primary energy demand 
compared with paper (Wang 2016). However, from the environmental 
standpoint, transferrable deposits would outperform both paper and 
polymer currencies, as they need to be neither produced nor disposed.
However, social implications of de-cashing can be substantial. 
Carrying cash is a human right and is written into constitutions, 
which therefore have to be changed. Social conventions may also be 
disrupted as de-cashing may be viewed as a violation of fundamental 
rights, including freedom of contract and freedom of ownership. While 
convertible deposits cannot be stolen in a conventional robbery, they 
can be hacked. There are, obviously, concerns as the cases of electronic 
fraud have more than doubled in the past decade.
De-cashing would remove a tacit means of social support. In 
many developing societies, the government implicitly encourages 
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small, unregistered entrepreneurship, which relies entirely on cash 
transactions with no or little formal accounting. By forgoing tax revenue, 
the authorities allow small businesses to create informal mechanisms 
of social self-support, which the government simply cannot afford to 
finance through formal social payments. At the same time, microfinance 
most likely will be more difficult as it still relies largely on cash 
contributions.
Finally, currency substitution can become possible. If there is 
not enough domestic currency because of the unmeasured pace of 
de-cashing, foreign currencies or surrogate currencies may start to be 
used for murky transactions. 
3.5 Conclusions and Policy Options
De-cashing by a shift toward transferrable deposits reflects a natural 
drive towards economic flexibility and growth. It should be seen as a 
long-term project and does not suggest an immediate move to a cashless 
society. Although some countries most likely will de-cash in a few years, 
going completely cashless should be phased in. The de-cashing process 
could build on the initial and largely uncontested steps, such as the 
phasing out of large denomination bills, the placement of ceilings on 
cash transactions, and the reporting of cash moves across the borders. 
Further steps could include creating economic incentives to reduce the 
use of cash, simplifying the opening and use of transferrable deposits, 
and further computerizing the financial system. 
Private sector de-cashing seems preferable to public sector 
de-cashing. The former seems almost entirely benign (e.g., more use of 
mobile phones to pay for coffee), but still needs policy adaptation. The 
latter seems more questionable, and people may have valid objections 
to it. De-cashing of either kind leaves both individuals and states more 
vulnerable to disruptions, ranging from power outages to hacks to 
cyberwarfare. In any case, the tempting attempts to impose de-cashing 
by a decree should be avoided, given the popular personal attachment 
to cash. A targeted outreach program is needed to alleviate suspicions, 
in particular that, by de-cashing, the authorities are trying to control all 
aspects of peoples’ lives, including their use of money, or push personal 
savings into banks. The de-cashing process would acquire more 
traction if it were based on individual consumer choice and cost-benefit 
considerations.
The macroeconomic impact of de-cashing would depend on the 
balance of its costs and benefits, but most likely will still be positive on 
a net basis. On the side of the benefits, de-cashing should raise recorded 
GDP growth by reducing transaction costs, creating incentives for the 
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informal economy to join the formal sector, and simplifying transactions, 
in particular in the private sector, services, and consumption. 
De-cashing would also expand revenue collection by expanding the 
taxable base, curbing tax evasion and fraud, and reducing interest 
payments on government debt. De-cashing should improve the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. With most money having 
the form of transferrable deposits, central banks would be able to 
influence liquidity conditions and credit better with their interest rate 
policy. As de-cashing gives incentives to economies’ agents to convert 
their currency in bank deposits, the deposit base of the banking system 
will increase, which can help reduce the lending rates and expand credit. 
In particular, if the negative interest rate policy becomes a mainstream 
policy option, de-cashing would be critical for its efficiency. 
On the external side, de-cashing can improve the current account, 
mainly through its impact on the savings–investment balance of the 
government sector and on remittances and other income flows, which 
should increase with lower transaction costs. Finally, in the structural 
area, de-cashing can help improve financial inclusiveness with easier 
digital access to banking services. The labor market would be more 
orderly, as fewer illegal immigrants would be attracted by cash payments. 
The central banks will cut their costs with no need to produce and 
destroy either paper or plastic currency.
On the side of the costs, de-cashing may create temporary frictions 
in all sectors as the well-established cash procedures have to contract. 
In the private sector, there may be disruptions, as a substantial part 
of consumption transactions and private investments, in particular in 
housing, is made in cash. Also, households and small private businesses 
may see carrying cash and conducting anonymous transactions as 
their constitutional right. Their discontent can lead to social tensions, 
strikes, and, therefore, GDP losses. For the fiscal sector, de-cashing 
may represent a substantial financial burden, as additional capital and 
current expenditure will have to be made to procure equipment to 
manage cashless settlements. Additional spending will be needed for the 
training of personnel on cashless transactions, although part of these 
costs would be borne by the private sector. Losses in profit transfers 
are also possible. In the monetary sector, de-cashing may reduce central 
bank independence with the lost seigniorage revenue. De-cashing 
would also deprive central banks of a useful tool in the form of changes 
in the demand for cash, which has served as a leading indicator of a 
possible financial crisis. It is not immediately obvious that de-cashing 
would help improve financial inclusiveness. If the poorest cannot have 
access to computers or mobile phones, they will lose the most important 
financial asset that they rely on to save: cash. 
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In the external sector, some deterioration of the current account 
may be expected, at least on a temporary basis, as the de-cashing 
country has to import the massive equipment needed to service cashless 
transactions and outsource the services (programming, training, etc.) 
to nonresidents. Finally, in the structural area, substantial groups of the 
population not yet familiar with digital payments may feel disadvantaged, 
which could lead to social strain. Also, the tacit form of social protection 
used in many developing countries in the forms of forgone tax payments 
would be largely eliminated and need to be replaced with more direct 
forms of social protections. Finally, if cash is still an important means of 
payment in a de-cashing country, currency substitution may become an 
issue, as economic agents would be forced to use other currencies as a 
means of payment.
Coordinated efforts on de-cashing could help enhance its positive 
effects and reduce potential costs. At least at the level of major countries 
and their currencies, the authorities could coordinate their de-cashing 
efforts. Such coordinated efforts are, in particular, important in the 
decisions to phase out large denomination bills for all major currencies, to 
use ceilings and other restrictions on cash transactions, and to introduce 
the reporting requirements for cash transactions or their taxation. For 
currency areas, a single de-cashing policy would be clearly preferable 
to a national one. Finally, consensus between the public and the private 
sector and outreach on the advantages and modalities of gradual 
de-cashing should be viewed as key preconditions for its success.
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Digital Transformation:  
Some Implications for Financial 
and Macroeconomic Stability
Hans Genberg
4.1 Introduction
The increased use of computers, machine learning, robots, and artificial 
intelligence has been compared with the introduction of the steam 
engine and electricity as drivers of economic progress. Some scholars 
have suggested that we are at the beginning of a Second Machine Age 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014), where technology-driven changes in 
market structures based on ideas rather than physical goods will lead to 
large increases in welfare not measured well by traditional metrics such 
as gross domestic product (GDP). Others see much less promise in the 
new technologies (Gordon 2016). According to these views, measured 
productivity is likely to decrease, leading to slower future economic 
growth.
Other scholars have debated the future of traditional banking 
and payment practices. They ask whether digital transformation will 
mean that financial technology firms, online commerce and payment 
platforms, or social media platforms will replace traditional banks as 
providers of financial and payment services.
This chapter does not aspire to pass judgment on these opposing 
views, but rather to ask what challenges the new technologies might 
pose for policymakers, particularly those maintaining monetary and 
financial stability. 
In approaching this subject, the chapter will focus on how new 
digital-based technologies have transformed, and are likely to further 
transform, financial intermediation (Section 4.2) and payment systems 
(Section 4.3), and the production and pricing of goods and services 
(Section 4.4). The chapter ends with some brief reflections on the 
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possible consequences the current coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic 
might have for the analysis and conclusions reached. 
4.2  Implications for the Banking System  
and Financial Stability
4.2.1 The Advent of Big Data and Data Analytics
“Big data” and “data analytics” are important drivers of the digital 
transformation in banking and the financial system more broadly. 
Although there is no universally agreed definition, “big data” generally 
refers to very large structured and/or unstructured data sets containing 
tens of thousands of observations on bank customers, holders of 
insurance policies, users of online payment platforms, etc. Textual data 
can also be digitalized and made available for computer-aided analysis 
of content. Examples include the digitalization of documents containing 
the latest financial regulations so that these can be incorporated 
in compliance routines, newspaper articles to aid in the search for 
indicators of economic uncertainty, and reports by investment banks 
that may reveal market sentiment providing useful information for 
regulators.
These sources of information have, of course, existed for a long 
time, but it is only with the advent of inexpensive storage facilities, huge 
increases in computing power, and new analytical techniques capable 
of dealing with very large data sets that the full benefits of big data have 
been realized. 
The analytical techniques that have enabled financial institutions to 
take advantage of big data are commonly known as “machine learning 
or “artificial intelligence”. Logistic regressions, decision trees, random 
forests, and neural networks are examples of these techniques, which 
are sophisticated methods for discovering intricate, often nonlinear, 
relationships between variables. While the methods rely on advanced 
computer algorithms to discover patterns in the data, they do not do so 
without human input. First, the algorithms are conceived by humans, and 
humans typically decide which variables they will have access to when 
they search for patterns. But humans may also be involved in the process 
by which computers learn from the data. For example, in “supervised 
learning” by the computer, the analyst will tell the computer which 
variable is to be explained (e.g., the occurrence of a nonperforming 
loan), and which variables are to be used as possible explanatory factors, 
but the analysis need not impose a particular functional relationship 
between them. “Unsupervised learning,” on the other hand, refers to a 
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situation where the computer is simply given a data set and is tasked 
with finding patterns among the variables without being told specifically 
what to look for. A combination of the two machine learning methods is 
also possible where the analyst takes the output from the unsupervised 
learning, imposes some further structure on it, and proceeds to supervise 
the computer in a follow-up learning step. This method is referred to as 
“reinforced learning.”
It is important to realize that in all three cases the methods typically 
cannot determine underlying causal structures, and that it is often 
difficult to explain the underlying reasons for the relationship patterns 
they identify.
4.2.2  Implications of Digital Finance for Traditional 
Financial Intermediation
Digitalization, and financial technology (fintech) more generally, have 
already changed many aspects of financial intermediation, and will 
continue to do so in the coming years. The changes apply both to the 
way intermediates operate internally and to the products, services, and 
experiences offered to customers. This section deals with traditional banks 
as well as new fintech institutions. The reason for combining the two is that 
fintech companies themselves are unlikely to pose existential challenges 
to the traditional banks as the latter will either adopt it themselves or 
acquire fintech start-ups. The case of BigTech may be different, and the 
challenges they pose will be taken up in Section 4.3 below.
Several back office and analytical functions have been transformed. 
Electronic record keeping and account management have of course been 
available for a long time, but it is now possible to use information from 
movements in accounts when proposing new investment products 
to customers or granting loans. Banks and other financial firms have 
introduced so-called “chatbots,” which are virtual assistants like 
Apple’s Siri except for financial services, that use natural language-
processing technology to interact with customers. While early versions 
of these chatbots mostly dealt with providing account information, 
they are increasingly turning to giving advice on financial planning and 
investments. 
Institution-wide risk management is another function that can be 
affected. Effectiveness can be improved by having a more comprehensive 
and precise view of the quantity and prices of assets and liabilities 
on the consolidated balance sheet, and algorithms can calculate risk 
measures and conduct stress tests based on alternative scenarios. The 
automation of gathering and treatment of the data decreases costs, 
enables obtaining more timely indications of changes in risk profiles, 
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and allows management to concentrate on analyzing the results and 
take appropriate decisions rather than on searching for information.
Algorithm-aided assessment of the creditworthiness of borrowers 
can help reduce nonperforming loans. Big data and sophisticated 
classification algorithms are being used to estimate the probability that a 
loan will get repaid in full, based on several characteristics of the potential 
borrower. Credit-scoring techniques have of course already been used to 
assess creditworthiness, but the new algorithms are typically designed 
to detect more subtle relationships and are potentially more accurate.
Financial institutions that engage in asset allocation activities 
either on their own account or as a service to clients are using machine 
learning to aid in the set allocation. Machine learning algorithms can 
in principle detect correlation patterns between asset classes that are 
difficult to discern with traditional methods, thereby improving the risk-
return profile of the investment portfolio.
Most traditional models employed to forecast macroeconomic 
outcomes use conventional linear regression techniques with varying 
degrees of complexity. Machine learning may be able to improve 
the accuracy of such forecasts by allowing for possible nonlinear 
relationships. A recent publication from the Bank of England, for 
example, argues that neural network models can beat conventional 
forecasting models of inflation in the United Kingdom. Private sector 
financial institutions are heavy users of forecasts both for internal use 
and in communications with clients, and machine learning is making 
inroads.
A survey of the use of artificial intelligence in financial services 
conducted jointly by the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance 
(CCAF) and the World Economic Forum (CCAF and WEF 2020) 
found that between 70% and 80% of the firms surveyed had already 
implemented or were in the process of implanting some form of 
artificial intelligence solution in their business model.1 Not surprisingly, 
fintech firms were in general more active users of artificial intelligence, 
although only by a relatively small margin. 
Artificial intelligence had been implemented most in risk 
management, followed by revenue-generating introductions of new 
products, customer service, process automation, and client acquisition 
(Figure 4.1). With business domains, payment processes benefited from 
artificial intelligence, particularly with respect to automation and risk 
management, whereas in investment management the generation of 
1 The survey obtained responses from 151 firms from 33 countries. Among the 
respondents, 54% were fintech firms with the remainder being incumbent financial 
institutions.
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new revenue through new products and processes was the dominant 
incentive.
Another survey by CCAF focusing on the fintech industry in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region revealed that 
a majority of the firms in the industry were focusing on digital lending 
(32%) or digital payments (26%).2 In terms of lending, peer-to-peer 
(P2P) lending to businesses was the dominant activity (52%), followed 
by P2P lending to consumers. In the payment space, mobile money/
wallets/P2P transfers was the dominant segment (67%), followed by 
remittances and international transfers (65%).
Predictive analytics, e.g., logistic regression and decision trees, based 
on the availability of big data, were by far the most common techniques 
used by the ASEAN fintech firms.
2 CCAF, the Asian Development Bank Institute, and FinTechSpace (2019). The survey 
received data from 173 fintech firms operating in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. Data from an additional 35 firms 
operating in the ASEAN region were also used in the study. 
Figure 4.1: Implementation of Artificial Intelligence  
in Fintech and Incumbent Financial Institutions  
(%)
Source: CCAF and WEF (2020).
Risk
management
Generation of new
revenue through
products and 
processes
Customer
service
Process 
re-engineering
and automation
Client 
acquisition
Implemented Currently implementing
40
50
60
70
80
90
30
20
10
0
Digital Transformation: Some Implications for Financial and Macroeconomic Stability 73
4.2.3 The Challenge from BigTech
The developments just described will change the nature of financial 
services and how they are provided by incumbent financial institutions 
and new start-up fintech companies. But by themselves they are not 
likely to pose an existential threat to the traditional financial services 
industry. The arrival of new institutions, so-called “BigTech firms,” may 
do so, however. 
The term BigTech connotes firms such as Alibaba and Tencent in 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC); Amazon, Google, and Facebook 
in the United States; Uber in Europe; and Grab in Southeast Asia. These 
companies did not start as financial services companies, but, taking 
advantage of their vast networks of customers and the consequent huge 
amount of data generated by these customers, they have entered into the 
business. In developed economies, their activities have so far focused 
mainly on payment services, but in emerging and developing markets 
they also offer lending, insurance, and asset management products 
(Financial Stability Board 2019). 
BigTech companies are a source of numerous direct benefits for 
consumers, especially in emerging and developing economies where they 
have contributed substantially to the financial inclusion of previously 
unserved segments of the populations. Particularly important has been 
their engagement with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
which traditional financial institutions have not served adequately. 
Particularly in lending, BigTech firms can use their wealth of data on 
payments and receipts of SMEs to assess creditworthiness and hence be 
in a better position to grant loans. 
BigTech companies are also a source of indirect benefits for 
consumers by providing technology infrastructure to traditional 
financial institutions, and by encouraging innovation, diversification, 
and efficiency.
With their size and their extensive customer base and access to 
customer information, BigTech companies constitute a competitive 
threat to traditional banks that goes beyond that of fintech start-ups. 
While incumbent financial service providers can and do replicate many 
of the innovations of fintech, it is much more difficult to replicate the 
business model of BigTech because of the advantages the latter can 
extract from their vast information database on just about all aspects of 
their customers’ behavior.
Hence it does not come as a surprise that incumbent firms view 
BigTech companies as a major competitive threat (BIS 2019, CCAF and 
WEF 2020). 
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4.2.4  Financial Stability Impact and Required  
Regulatory Response
Liberalization and innovation have traditionally preceded stresses in the 
financial system. The title of an article published in 1985 by the eminent 
Latin American economist Carlos Diaz-Alejandro is telling. Describing 
the experience of some Latin American economies in the late 1970s 
and early 80s, he titled his article “Good-bye Financial Repression, 
Hello Financial Crash (Diaz-Alejandro 1985).” This title also describes 
the chain of events that led to the financial crisis in Scandinavia in 
1991–92, and, with some adjustments, to the Asian financial crisis in the 
late 1980s and the North Atlantic crisis of 2008–2009.
The basic mechanism is as follows. Deregulation and innovation 
enable expanding credit extension and engaging in new financial 
ventures without adequate understanding and appreciation of the 
underlying risks. The extension of credit leads to economic expansion, 
which makes the increased debt burden of the borrower seem tolerable, 
and the riskiness of new financial products is not well understood 
because, by definition, there is no or very little past data to guide 
decisions. The result is overextended borrowers and over-leveraged 
lenders; when the tide turns, turmoil ensues.
What does this have to do with digital transformation of finance? 
There are several possible reasons why financial stability may be at risk. 
The emergence of new types of financial services institutions is akin to 
financial liberalization, as some of the activities of these institutions lie 
outside the perimeter of the regulatory system. Innovations brought 
by fintech and BigTech include the introduction of products whose 
risk characteristics are not well known, and which can have systemic 
stability consequences. For example, rapid growth of P2P lending by 
fintech firms may in some jurisdictions lead to an increased incidence 
of nonperforming loans in the absence of a robust regulatory response. 
Indeed, according to the survey by CCAF on practices in ASEAN 
economies, several activities of fintech companies are unregulated. In 
addition, greater competitive pressures, particularly from BigTech firms, 
may reduce the franchise value of incumbent institutions, inducing 
increased risk taking on their part.
Machine learning and artificial intelligence may also amplify 
systemic risk as risk management functions in financial institutions 
optimize compliance with the existing regulatory framework. If the 
algorithms lead to solutions that are similar across institutions, the 
result may be a financial system that is increasingly procyclical when 
shocks materialize (Danielsson, Macrae, and Uthemann 2017). 
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Similarly, if several traditional financial service providers rely 
significantly on a small number of BigTech firms to provide technological 
solutions to some of their business processes, a type of single-point-of-
failure risk may materialize for many of the traditional firms.
Regulators must be vigilant and ready to adapt to the new 
financial landscape. As some activities of unregulated institutions are 
indistinguishable from the same activities in regulated institutions, there 
is a risk of regulatory arbitrage. It is therefore imperative that regulatory 
frameworks be adjusted to focus on activities rather than on institutions. 
4.3  Digital Transformation of the Payment System
Payment systems have evolved and digitalization has been an important 
contributor. Transfers are now more rapid as real-time gross settlement 
systems have been introduced in many jurisdictions for wholesale 
payments and fast payments for retail transactions are becoming more 
common. 
The decreased cost of cross-border transfers has been noted as one 
of the important potential benefits of using financial technology. This 
is the case in particular for the cost of remittances. According to World 
Bank data quoted by The Economist (2019), in 2018 the average costs 
of sending $200 through banks and fintech firms were 8% and 4%, 
respectively, with traditional money transfer firms lying in between. 
These differences lead to huge benefits for countries like the Philippines, 
where remittances amount to close to 10% of GDP.
Fintech applied to payments has also contributed significantly 
to financial inclusion, whereby formerly nonbanked individuals and 
households have not only been able to carry out transactions via mobile 
phones, but also access simple financial services in the form of placing 
deposits and receiving loans. 
The systemic financial stability risks of the entrance of fintech 
companies operating in the payment system are modest as long as 
their operations are limited to transactions, and as long as they do not 
dominate the overall payment system. If payment innovators use their 
position to enter credit extension activities this benign situation may 
change, particularly if they remain unregulated as lenders. As noted 
above, if they encroach on the credit extension business of traditional 
intermediaries, the franchise value of the latter may be threatened, 
leading them to pursue riskier lending to preserve their market share. 
As with the entrance of BigTech companies in the credit extension 
business, regulators will need to monitor payment innovators on an 
activity, rather than an institutional, basis.
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While fintech payment companies do not constitute a threat to the 
business model of banks, another innovation made possible by advances 
in technology might: cryptocurrencies. The threat is not from the current 
collection of privately issued cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and the 
like. These should not be considered money in the conventional sense 
of being units of account, means of payment, and stores of value; rather, 
they are speculative assets, and, as such, do not encroach significantly 
on intermediation activities of banks and other financial institutions. 
The Libra project floated by Facebook could have had an impact on 
the structure of banking, not principally through its role as a payment 
vehicle but rather as a means for Facebook to enter the financial services 
industry providing deposit, lending, and asset management facilities.
Unlike Bitcoin and other similar cryptocurrencies, Libra promised 
to maintain a stable value relative to a government fiat currency or a 
basket of such currencies. This constitutes its fatal flaw, because we 
have learned from countless efforts to fix currency values that success 
in doing so requires holding inventories of the fiat currency that are at 
least as large as the outstanding stock of the Libra. Combined with the 
unreceptive attitude of central banks and regulators towards the project, 
the threat from Libra to banks is not likely to be significant.
A threat to bank intermediation could, however, come from 
cryptocurrencies issued by central banks, so-called central bank digital 
currencies (CBDC). These are digital means of payments guaranteed in 
value by the central bank in terms of the domestic fiat currency. The 
central bank can live up to this promise because it is the issuer of the 
domestic currency. A CBDC can take one of two forms: a token-based 
form that is issued by the central bank but managed by the banking 
system, or an account-based form whereby individuals would have 
accounts with the central bank denominated in the CBDC. It is the 
second form that could lead to substantial challenges for the private 
sector intermediation system. Since accounts with the central bank 
would be less risky than accounts with commercial banks, there is a 
risk that such a system would lead to disintermediation of the banking 
system. For this reason, it is likely that the implementation of any CBDC 
would be a token-based model.
4.4  Macroeconomic Consequences  
of Digital Transformation
Digital transformation is also taking place in the nonfinancial sectors of 
the economy. Industrial robots are increasingly used in manufacturing, 
online commerce has been growing rapidly, globalization of production 
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chains has upended traditional production processes, etc.3 These changes 
have important implications for how we should think about economic 
growth and for the sources and consequences of macroeconomic 
fluctuations and what the appropriate policy responses should be. The 
next section discusses each of these issues in turn.
4.4.1  Will Digital Transformation Bring about  
a New Industrial Revolution?
The conventional way to think about economic growth is in terms of a 
relationship between the economy’s output per capita and inputs such 
as physical and human capital per capita on the one hand, and a residual 
that captures the state of the available technology, broadly defined, on 
the other. Economic growth in this framework can come about through 
investment in physical and human capital in excess of population growth 
and technological progress. 
In a balanced growth environment where investments are just 
enough to equip the growing labor force with the existing amount 
of capital and skills, growth will come about exclusively through 
technological progress, or “total factor productivity” as it is called in 
the technical literature. The issue of whether digital transformation will 
bring about a burst of economic growth then hinges on its effect on this 
total factor productivity.
Nobel Laureate Robert Solow famously said about the effect of 
computers on economic growth that “[y]ou can see the computer age 
everywhere but in the productivity statistics,” suggesting that early 
digitalization did not lead to measurable increases in growth (Solow 
1987). Could it be that the effects of more recent developments in 
robotics, autonomous vehicles, and internet availability will also fail to 
show up in productivity statistics?
One of the proponents of this view is Robert Gordon, who points 
to the decline in total factor productivity growth in the United States 
since 1970 to less than 1% per year, following the historically high 
growth rate of close to 2% per year during the 50 years from 1920 to 1970 
(Figure 4.2). According to Gordon, the strong total factor productivity 
growth in that period was the consequence of the application of 
electricity in manufacturing, transport, and communication, the internal 
combustion engine, and devices such as the telephone and the radio, and 
3 The importance of global production chains, and the disruption that ensues when 
the chains are damaged, is being demonstrated all too clearly as this is being written 
(March 2020) in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.
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to the increasing availability of running water and sewage that improved 
health and longevity.4
Gordon’s views have not gone unchallenged. According to some 
authors, digital transformation of the entire economy, not just the 
financial sector—industrial robots, self-driving cars and trucks, the 
“internet of things”—driven by artificial intelligence has the potential to 
increase productivity far beyond what we have seen in the recent past 
(See, for example, Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014).
According to this view, several features of the current wave of 
digital transformation are said to be different from past information 
communication technology developments and will therefore have a 
greater effect on productivity and well-being. First, much of the current 
digital transformation is about the production of ideas rather than the 
production of goods. Furthermore, ideas are public goods, and because 
a large proportion of them are shared on the internet, their reach is 
global and available for anyone to build on and improve. Networks of 
innovators can be formed, and the shared knowledge and progress 
will be much more rapid and widespread, spurring additional ideas. 
Second, many of the internet-based services that have great value (e.g., 
4 For a comprehensive treatment, see Gordon (2016).
Figure 4.2: Average Annual Growth Rates  
of Total Factor Productivity  
(%)
Source: Gordon (2015).
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online shopping, online translation) are available free of charge and are 
therefore not measured in GDP and hence in productivity statistics even 
though they are of great value. 
In contrast to these optimistic scenarios, the easy scalability 
of digital transformations may contain seeds whose effects are less 
benign. Combined with large setup costs and very low marginal costs 
of expansion, it is possible that concentration and market dominance 
will emerge. That in turn could lead to increased inequality and reduced 
motives for innovation. 
I will not attempt to evaluate which of the two views of the future 
of growth will prevail.5 Instead, I will briefly discuss what the potential 
consequences could be for macroeconomic stability and stabilization 
policy, the principal objective of this chapter. 
Stabilization policy is, by definition, concerned with short- to 
medium-term fluctuations in economic activity around its longer-run 
potential path. If the longer-run path is uncertain, so will be any measure 
of the deviation therefrom. If monetary and fiscal policies are calibrated 
to erroneous measures of economic activity gaps, the resulting policy 
stance will be inappropriate. 
A related issue concerns modeling, and particularly a standard 
modeling of inflation. The conventional approach is to relate inflation 
pressures to some measure of slack in the economy, usually measured 
by an output gap measure. Could it be that difficulties encountered in 
explaining inflation are due to difficulties in measuring the relevant 
output gap?6 More research on these issues is warranted.
4.4.2  Global Value Chains, the Phillips Curve,  
and Monetary Policy
This is being written as the COVID-19 pandemic is ravaging the globe. 
The economic fallout of the pandemic and the measures taken in 
attempts to contain it have brought home how immensely interwoven a 
country’s different economic regions and sectors are. A manufacturing 
firm in one region has to curtail its operations because it cannot obtain 
the required parts produced by another firm in another region. As a 
consequence, the firm is unable to ship its products that are crucial for 
5 Making any long-term economic predictions is notoriously difficult, but it is perhaps 
particularly hazardous when it involves new technologies. Many embarrassing 
quotes can be mentioned, but one of the classics is attributed to Ken Olsen, founder 
of Digital Equipment Corporation, who in 1977 allegedly opined that “[t]here is no 
reason anyone would want a computer in their home.”
6 Remember that one of the consequences of digital transformations in the economy is 
that GDP is a flawed measure of economic activity.
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the assembly of the final product, which is carried out in yet another 
region by yet another firm. 
Replace “regions” in this example with “countries” in the global 
economy and we have a description of global value chains (GVCs). The 
importance of these GVCs has increased over time as digitalization 
has facilitated fragmentation and outsourcing of production to take 
advantage of different comparative advantages and economies of scale. 
As illustrated in Figure 4.3, the importance of GVCs increased steadily 
during the period from 1970 to the global financial crisis, after which it 
declined somewhat.
The implications of production chains, and GVCs in particular, are 
that they tie regions and economies more closely together. A dislocation 
in supply in one part of the chain, a supply shock, will propagate 
throughout the system, decreasing output in the system as a whole, be 
it the entire domestic economy in the case of domestic supply chains or 
the world as a whole in the case of GVCs.
Likewise, an increase in demand for the final output will propagate 
throughout the production system as the demand for intermediate 
inputs will increase.
Figure 4.3: The Evolution of Global Value Chains 
(%)
GVC = global value chain.
Note: The chart measures “GVC participation,” which is defined as the share of world exports that 
flow through at least two borders.
Source: World Bank (2020).
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Price developments will also become more global, as the price of the 
final output will depend not only on the cost of production locally but 
on the additions throughout the value chain. Inflation rates will become 
more closely linked across economies. 
Data on linkages across economies are consistent with these 
predictions. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the correlations of business cycles 
and inflation rates, respectively, across countries. For high-income 
countries in particular, the increase in these correlations is similar to 
the increase in GVC participation shown in Figure 4.3.
Statistical work presented in the World Bank’s 2012 World 
Development report lends some formal support to the visual impressions 
in the graphs. Country pairs that have greater trade connectedness also 
have higher correlations of business cycles and inflation (World Bank 
2020, Chapter 4). 
What are the implications for macroeconomic stability and 
stabilization policies? The most obvious is that greater connectedness 
means that policy spillovers will be stronger, making some form of 
policy consultation between country authorities more desirable. To 
some extent, this is already taking place in fora such as the Group of 20, 
the Bank for International Settlements, and the International Monetary 
Fund. While formal policy coordination may not be achievable because 
authorities in every country are accountable to their own constituents, 
some tacit agreement to proscribe polices that directly harm others, 
so-called “beggar-thy-neighbor policies,” would be desirable. 
Figure 4.4: Correlation between Business Cycles
Note: Each year represents the midpoint of a 10-year moving window. Each line represents the 
average of all detrended country-pair gross domestic product correlations, taken over all country 
pairs containing at least one country in the income group considered (high, middle, and low).
Source: World Bank (2020).
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At the national level, the increased importance of GVCs appears 
to have changed inflation dynamics. A 2017 study by Auer, Borio, 
and Filardo at the Bank for International Settlements indicates that, 
as GVCs have increased in importance, the output gap in domestic 
inflation has decreased, and the role of a measure of a global output gap 
increased. There are also studies suggesting that the Phillips curve has 
become flatter, i.e., that the coefficient on domestic economic slack (or 
overheating) in an estimated inflation equation has become smaller (See, 
for example, Carney 2017). If this last finding is indeed a feature of the 
new economic structure central banks are facing, it begs the question 
as to how they can hope to implement inflation-targeting strategies 
successfully.
4.5  Reflections on the Possible Implications  
of the Coronavirus Pandemic
As noted, this is being written in the midst of the 2020 COVID-19 
pandemic that has created unimaginable human suffering and great 
economic upheaval. As it unfolds, it is hard to imagine that the world 
will return to what it was only half a year ago. In this final section I will 
look at only a small corner of this very broad and important question. 
Specifically, I will make two brief remarks on how the analysis and 
Figure 4.5: Correlation of CPI Inflation Rates
CPI = consumer price index.
Note: For each country, the correlation is measured between domestic and world inflation. An 
average is then taken across two income groups separately. Each year represents the midpoint of a 
15-year rolling window.
Source: World Bank (2020).
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conclusions in this chapter could be affected by this momentous 
experience.
A salient feature of the digital transformation of finance is that 
artificial intelligence is challenging financial intermediation and 
payment services that are based on personal contacts. The social 
distancing that has been mandated or highly recommended during the 
pandemic increases the competitive advantage of the virtual business 
model. Entities that have a broad access to potential customers, either 
through their social media presence or their internet-based commerce 
engagement, will be particularly strongly positioned to expand in this 
environment. These are the BigTech firms. 
I have already suggested that, because of their ability to take 
advantage of scale, there is a risk of greater concentration in the financial 
intermediation industry, and hence a greater risk of monopoly pricing, 
cybersecurity challenges, and too-big-to-fail problems. Regulatory 
authorities must be vigilant and make sure that the financial services 
activities of these firms are appropriately regulated.
The discussion on the macroeconomic stability effects of digital 
transformation focused primarily on the consequences of increased 
interconnectedness brought about by production chains, both regional 
and global. Some of the economic havoc brought about by the COVID-19 
pandemic is the result of this interconnectedness. The business case 
for some fragmentation of production processes will certainly remain, 
but one cannot rule out that there will be some retrenchment. This may 
give back some of the effectiveness of domestic economic policies lost 
to global influences, but it would also reduce some of the benefits from 
trade, which would be particularly painful for small trade-dependent 
developing and emerging economies. 
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Fintech Development in the 
People’s Republic of China and 
Its Macroeconomic Implications
Yiping Huang
5.1 Introduction
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) successfully maintained 
macroeconomic stability during much of the reform period. Until 
recently, the PRC’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth stayed within 
a relatively narrow band, while inflationary pressure remained very 
modest. Stable macroeconomic conditions are often regarded as one 
of the key factors contributing to the PRC’s economic miracle (Dollar, 
Huang, and Yao 2020). However, over the last few years, the situation 
has started to change. For instance, GDP growth decreased steadily from 
10.6% in 2010 to 6.1% in 2019. Financial risks also emerged in various 
parts of the economy. In this chapter, we take a close look at the latest 
development of financial technology (fintech) in the PRC and draw 
implications for its macroeconomic stability.
Fintech is currently revolutionizing the world’s financial landscape 
at an extraordinary pace (Gomber et al. 2018; Goldstein, Jiang, and 
Karolyi 2019). This transformation is even more profound in the PRC 
(Chen 2016; Xiao et al. 2017; Huang and Huang 2018). Each of the two 
leading PRC mobile payment service providers, Alipay and WeChat 
Pay, has around 1 billion active users. Many of these users organize 
their daily lives around payment ecosystems, from making doctor’s 
appointments to purchasing air tickets, and from paying electricity bills 
to investing in financial products. Each of the three main online banks, 
WeBank, MyBank, and XWBank, with between 1,000 and 2,000 staff, 
extends around 10 million loans annually for individuals and/or small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Fintech development in the 
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PRC has attracted widespread international attention (see, for instance, 
Frost et al. 2019; Klein 2019).
In many ways, the PRC’s fintech sector looks different from those 
in the developed world. While in North America and Western Europe 
much attention is placed on cryptocurrencies and cross-border 
payment, in the PRC, most of the headline news cover mobile payment 
and online lending. The PRC’s fintech landscape is dominated by a 
small number of unicorn players such as Ant, Tencent, Baidu, and JD 
Digits.1 Unlike many of their developed country counterparts, most PRC 
fintech companies directly offer financial services by utilizing digital 
technology, i.e., big platforms linking large numbers of mobile terminals, 
cloud computing, and big data analysis. This often generates productive 
results but, at times, also causes serious problems, such as privacy 
invasion. Perhaps the most striking feature of the PRC’s fintech industry 
is its “inclusion”—it improves access to financial services by SMEs and 
low-income households on scales never seen before in human history 
(Huang and Huang 2018; Chong et al. 2019).
The PRC’s fintech sector also evolved dramatically over time. It 
started in December 2004 when Alipay first came online, although 
the real boom did not begin until June 2013, when Ant Financial 
successfully launched its online money market fund Yu’ebao. From 2014, 
the Government Work Report, which is delivered by the Premier at the 
National People’s Congress at the beginning of the year, has mentioned 
“internet finance” (the PRC term for fintech) almost every year, but 
the tune gradually shifted from appraising innovation to warning of 
risks. The PRC once developed the world’s largest online peer-to-peer 
(P2P) lending industry, with more than 6,000 platforms cumulatively. 
After the government started to introduce proper regulation from 
late 2015, however, the industry gradually collapsed (Wang, Shen, and 
Huang 2016). One failed P2P, E’zubao, involved almost 1 million online 
investors. It became a source of social tension as well as financial stress.
While the PRC’s fintech sector has achieved unprecedented success 
in improving financial services, it has also created serious financial risks 
and social problems. The sector as a whole is still in its early stage of 
development. Many of the business models are not yet well developed. 
1 Ant Group is affiliated with the e-commerce giant Alibaba, owns Alipay, and sponsors 
MyBank. While Tencent started business in online games, it is probably most widely 
known for its social media service WeChat, on which it also built WeChat Pay 
and sponsored WeBank. Baidu specializes in search engines in PRC texts, owns a 
financial arm, Duxiaoman, and also formed a joint venture bank, Baixin Bank, with 
Citic Bank. JD Digits, which was previously known as JD Financial, is affiliated with 
the e-commerce giant JD and owns numerous financial licenses.
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Some newly invented risk control approaches, such as big data-based 
credit-scoring models, still need to be tested through full financial 
cycles. The authorities are yet to bring the sector under full coverage 
of financial regulation and to formulate new methods of regulation in 
order to balance innovation and stability. All these changes will likely 
have important implications for macroeconomic stability in the PRC.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 5.2, 
we take stock of the recent fintech development in the PRC, with special 
attention on the development of mobile payment services and data-
based online bank lending. In section 5.3, we document the key financial 
risks in the fintech sector, by focusing on the P2P lending industry as 
a case study, and draw some implications for financial regulation. In 
section 5.4, we briefly introduce the People’s Bank of China’s (PBC’s) 
digital currency/electronic payment (DC/EP) system—its design, key 
features, and likely impact on the fintech sector and the broad financial 
industry. In section 5.5, we discuss the likely implications of fintech 
development for macroeconomic stability, followed by some concluding 
remarks in the final section.
5.2 Recent Fintech Development
The PRC’s first online payment transaction took place on 18 October 
2003. A university student in Xi’an bought a second-hand Fujifilm 
camera for CNY750, on Alibaba’s newly established e-commerce 
platform T-Mall, from a PRC student studying in Yokohama, Japan. 
But it was difficult to complete the transaction because of a lack of trust 
between the buyer and the seller. In the end, Alibaba had to provide 
a guarantee for the transaction: the buyer would first send money to 
Alibaba, then Alibaba would advise the seller to mail the camera to 
the buyer, and once the buyer had confirmed receipt of the camera, 
Alibaba would wire the money to the seller. Even with this guarantee, 
Alibaba’s customer officer still took hours to convince the buyer to 
proceed with the transaction. This was the beginning of the PRC’s 
fintech development, which confirms that most fintech products are 
created to satisfy real demand.  
Today, the PRC is a global leader in many fintech businesses. 
According to the 2018 edition of “Fintech100,” PRC companies occupied 
three of the top five places, with Ant Financial, JD Finance, and Baidu 
in first, second, and fourth place, respectively (H2 Ventures and KPMG 
2018). To proffer a bird’s-eye view of fintech development in the PRC, we 
first introduce the Peking University Digital Financial Inclusion Index 
of China, which quantifies annually the PRC’s fintech development, 
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disaggregated at provincial, municipal, and county levels, as well as for 
different businesses including mobile payment, online lending, digital 
insurance, online investment, and other digital financial services (Guo 
et al. 2020).2 
The index reveals at least two important characteristics. One is 
extraordinary growth. The median of provincial indices was 33.6 in 
2011, and rose to 294.3 in 2018, implying an average growth of 36.4% 
per annum (Figure 5.1). As a comparison, the newly increased total 
social finance of the formal financial sector rose from CNY12.8 trillion 
to CNY19.3 trillion during the same period, recording an average growth 
rate of 6%.
The second characteristic is a clear trend of convergence. The 
highest-to-lowest provincial index ratio dropped from 50.4 in 2011 to 
1.4 in 2018, revealing dramatic narrowing of provincial gaps. Data at the 
municipal level also show that the inland regions caught up with the 
east coast region rapidly between 2011 and 2018, exhibiting an important 
quality of inclusion (Guo et al. 2020).
2 The Peking University Digital Financial Inclusion Index of China was developed by 
Peking University’s Institute of Digital Finance, in collaboration with Ant Financial. 
https://en.idf.pku.edu.cn/docs/20190610145822397835.pdf
Figure 5.1: Provincial Means and Medians  
of Digital Financial Inclusion Index, 2011–2018
Source: Guo et al. (2020).
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In 1935, a PRC economic geographer, Hu Huanyong, drew a line on 
the map of the PRC from Heihe in Heilongjiang to Tengchong in Yunnan, 
which later became known as the “Hu Huanyong Line” (Hu 1935). On the 
right side of this line, about 46% of the total land area supported 96% of 
the population. Western PRC lags in economic development, even today. 
However, recently, with the help of technology and innovation, fintech 
crossed the Hu Huanyong Line for the first time and moved rapidly into 
many regions in the western part of the country.
At the disaggregated level, fintech development has been more 
successful in mobile payment, online lending, digital insurance, and 
online investment funds. Due to concerns about money laundering and 
financial instability, the authorities banned trading in cryptocurrencies 
and initial currency offerings. Currently, however, the People's Bank 
of China (PBC) is actively exploring issuance of its own version of 
sovereign digital currency: DC/EP. 
Mobile payment is the most prominent fintech business in the PRC, 
and started as a means to support e-commerce. It benefited from a rapid 
increase in the penetration rate of smartphones, which makes it possible 
to use mobile payment services anywhere, any time. The success of Ant 
Financial’s money market fund Yu’ebao, which was launched in June 
Figure 5.2: Transaction Value of  
Mobile Payment in the PRC, 2013–2018 
(CNY trillion)
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: CEIC database, People's Bank of China.
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2013, significantly boosted the society’s awareness of, and enthusiasm 
about, fintech, including mobile payment. The distribution of red 
(cash) envelopes on WeChat Pay during the PRC New Year holiday in 
2014 helped attract hundreds of millions of new users. The adoption of 
the Quick Response code, starting from 2017, made it possible for any 
businesses, formal or informal, to use the mobile payment service by 
printing out the code on a piece of paper.
The last few years witnessed rapid expansion of the PRC’s mobile 
payment business, in terms of users and transactions. The number of 
active users of Alipay increased from a little over 100 million in 2013 
to 900 million in 2018, while that of WeChat Pay grew from about 350 
million to 1.1 billion during the same period. The total transaction value 
jumped from CNY14.5 trillion in 2013 to CNY277.4 trillion in 2018, 
recording an annual growth rate of 80% (Figure 5.2). The share of mobile 
payment in total noncash payment value rose from less than 1% to 7.4% 
during the same period, while the share of mobile payment in the total 
number of noncash payment transactions increased from 3.3% to 27.3%.
Perhaps the most impressive development concerning mobile 
payment is the ecosystems built around it. Today, users can organize 
their daily lives around the payment app. These ecosystems not only 
make people’s lives easier, but also bring about significant changes to 
the broader financial sector and the economy. Facilitated by mobile 
payment, e-commerce now accounts for more than 20% of total retail 
sales, with major consequences for offline supermarkets and department 
stores. Commercial banks also started to reduce the number of branches 
and lay off employees.
Another prominent fintech business is online lending. Here, there 
is a tale of two online lending models—one refers to the P2P lending 
platforms and the other points to the new online banks. In general, 
the former largely failed, while the latter is functioning well so far. 
These two types of institutions are distinguishable in several ways. While 
the online banks are licensed from the beginning, most of the P2Ps are 
not properly regulated. According to the current regulation, the banks 
can engage in credit intermediation, while a P2P can only serve as an 
information intermediary. The most important distinction between the 
two, however, lies in their abilities to assess and control financial risks. 
Most of the P2Ps do not have the necessary means of controlling either 
the adverse selection problem or the moral hazard problem. 
The online banks, WeBank, MyBank, and XWBank, all created 
their own credit-scoring models based on machine learning and big 
data analyses (Gambacorta et al. 2019). They provide loans to SMEs 
and low-income households, which often lack historical data, fixed 
assets, and government guarantees. In 2017, MyBank had a total of 377 
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employees but extended 5 million SME loans. WeBank was built on 
social media data, MyBank started with e-commerce information, and 
XWBank established an open banking system to connect with other 
existing platforms. For instance, WeBank assesses creditworthiness by 
looking at one’s work office environment, residential property quality, 
close social media friends, and other digital footprints. In a similar way, 
MyBank invented the so-called “310 model”—it takes the customer 
3 minutes to apply, the approved loan amount is in the borrower’s 
account within 1 second, and there is no human interference in this 
whole process. Existing evidence suggests that fintech credit-scoring 
models based on big data and the machine learning method outperform 
the traditional bank approaches, as illustrated by a higher receiving 
operating characteristic curve for the fintech credit model than others 
(Figure 5.3).
Other prominent fintech businesses include digital insurance 
and online investment. During the last few years, several financial 
institutions and fintech companies have tried to develop a robo-advisor 
service for individual investment and crowdfunding but they have made 
very limited progress so far.
Figure 5.3: Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve  
for Credit Scoring Models
Source: Gambacorta et al. (2019).
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5.3 Evolving Financial Risks
In retrospect, three main factors probably contributed to the unusual 
success of the PRC’s recent fintech development. The first factor was 
a supply shortage in the traditional financial industry. After 40 years of 
economic reform, the PRC has already built a gigantic financial industry; 
nonetheless, some economic entities, especially SMEs and low-income 
households, are not well serviced financially. For instance, only about 
20% of PRC SMEs have ever borrowed from the banks, compared to 50% 
in the United Kingdom (UK). Therefore, the new fintech products have 
often been enthusiastically embraced by the market. The second factor 
is the rapid development of digital technology, particularly the BigTech 
platforms, cloud computing, and big data analyses. By connecting to 
hundreds of millions of users and reducing information asymmetry, 
fintech business models mitigate two important problems in financial 
transaction, i.e., adverse selection and moral hazard problems. A further 
factor is tolerant financial regulation. Seeing the potential benefits of 
fintech products in filling gaps in the markets, the regulators did not 
go out to end these practices abruptly. This provided the window for 
fintech companies to experiment with their innovation.
This last factor was likely also behind the very volatile sentiment in 
the fintech industry (Figure 5.4). During much of the past decade or so, 
the fintech industry has been largely unregulated. For instance, Alipay 
first came online in December 2004, but it did not obtain an official 
payment license from the central bank until May 2011. Again, the first 
P2P, Paipaidai (PPD), was established in June 2007. In the following 
years, thousands of other platforms were created. The authorities 
adopted the first temporary regulation of P2Ps in August 2016. For many 
years, the fintech players were left to do almost whatever they wanted. 
Such a regulatory environment led to risky business practices and even 
Ponzi schemes. 
The discussion here focuses on the P2P sector as a case study, which 
shows that its development trajectory was actually a result of dynamic 
interactions among real economic demand, credit culture, and the 
regulatory environment. Like its counterparts in the United States (US) 
and the UK, PPD was initially set up as an information intermediary. 
This means that the platform did not provide any guarantee or pool the 
funds. Lenders and borrowers can transact directly on PPD’s system, 
which sounded like a revolution, as most of the borrowers would not 
be able to obtain loans from the banks and the lenders can now receive 
higher returns. Since the interest rates were not regulated by the central 
bank, such transactions could also be viewed as a de facto method of 
interest rate liberalization. There is only one small problem with such 
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a seemingly wonderful financial innovation: How to control financial 
risks? The borrowers and the lenders never met before. The platforms 
could neither access the central bank’s credit-scoring system nor engage 
in risk intermediation, making it impossible for the lenders to evaluate 
and control adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Wang, Shen, 
and Huang 2016).
In order to continue the business, P2P operators were forced to 
change their practices, by pooling the funds and providing guarantees. 
These activities literally turned the P2P platforms into de facto banks, 
however, they were not regulated as banks, as they are not subject to 
the usual capital adequacy and reserve requirement regulations. These 
made the P2P platforms excessively vulnerable for several reasons. 
First, because they are not properly regulated, public sentiment toward 
the platforms was very volatile. Any bad news could result in runs on 
the platforms. Second, the platforms often did not have much capacity 
to withstand losses of funds because they did not have the capital or 
liquidity buffers. Third, most platforms did not have effective ways to 
collect debts from the borrowers. If a borrower decided not to repay 
the debt, the costs for the platform to recover the debt would be very 
high. Zhang and Huang (2018) even discovered what they described as a 
“reversal run” on the platform. By looking at individual borrowers’ data, 
they found that “low credit score” borrowers were more likely to borrow 
Figure 5.4: Peking University Fintech Sentiment Index
Note: The sentiment was measured by both positive and negative subindices, using 18 million news 
articles during the period covered. The measure plotted in this figure is the net sentiment. 
Sources: Institute of Digital Finance, Peking University; Wang and Huang (2018).
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when the platform appeared to be vulnerable, in the hope that nobody 
would collect the debt from them if the platform collapsed.
It is, therefore, not difficult to imagine, when the temporary 
regulation requiring the P2Ps to only function as information 
intermediaries was announced in 2016, that most of the platforms 
had to find ways to exit from the industry. The collapse of P2Ps was 
unfortunate. But the total outstanding loan amount in the peak 
year, 2017, was CNY1.2  trillion, which was only about 1% of the total 
outstanding loans by commercial banks. However, the social impact 
was much greater, as the sector involved a large number of investors. 
Most of these investors did not have the ability to both understand and 
accept investment risks. In a way, the collapse of P2Ps in many PRC 
cities is a bigger concern for social stability than for financial stability. 
This suggests that, in the current PRC credit environment, P2P is 
probably not a viable business model. This conclusion could change if 
the platforms could effectively reduce information asymmetry by either 
accessing the central bank’s credit data or independently analyzing credit 
risks. This implies that probably only a small number of platforms can 
exist in the PRC market. However, because of the absence of regulation, 
the number of “cumulative” platforms reached more than 6,000 
(Figure 5.5). After 2016, the number of “functioning” platforms declined 
Figure 5.5: Total Number of P2P Platforms in the PRC, 
Functioning vs. Cumulative
P2P = peer-to-peer, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: WDZJ.com (accessed 24 September 2020).
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sharply. In 2019, it fell to 492. But even this number is not sustainable, as 
most of them still do not satisfy the regulatory requirements. 
The experiences of P2Ps and other fintech businesses during the 
past decade or so offer some important implications for regulation. 
Currently, the PRC financial regulatory framework consists of four 
core institutions: the central bank, the banking and insurance regulator, 
the security regulator, and the local financial regulation bureaus. Each 
regulator is responsible for regulating a set of financial institutions, 
coordinated by the State Council Financial Stability and Development 
Commission. This system is incompatible with the current financial 
practice in the PRC, especially the fintech businesses. In fact, there 
are several lessons to be learned from the experiences of fintech 
development in terms of financial regulation.
The first lesson is that all financial transactions need to be regulated. 
The industry-segregated approach to regulation often leaves out 
many financial activities that do not fall into the traditional categories 
of financial institutions. Shadow banking and fintech were very 
important new financial activities in the PRC, but were unregulated or 
underregulated. Financial activities need to be closely regulated because 
financial risks often change quickly, with economy-wide amplifying 
consequences. Given the reasons already discussed, most of the P2Ps 
should not have existed. This probably requires the regulators to change 
their institution-focused approach to an institution- and function-
focused approach. Anybody who wants to engage in financial services 
should have the necessary qualities and apply for a license.
The second lesson is that a new regulatory framework needs to be 
devised to adapt to a de facto universal banking business model. All of 
the leading fintech players in the PRC, i.e., Ant Financial, JD Financial, 
Baidu, and Tencent, all own multiple financial licenses. This does 
not necessarily mean that the PRC should combine all the financial 
regulators. For instance, the US adopted a segregated regulatory systems 
while the UK adopted the twin-peak framework. Both the UK and the 
US are able to monitor and regulate cross-industry fund flows and risk 
transmission. In the case of the PRC, one urgent task is to improve the 
coordination of regulatory policies.
The third lesson is that the regulators also need to use policy 
tools to monitor and regulate financial risks. With fintech, especially 
BigTech platforms, the speed and breadth of risk spreading is 
unprecedented. Routine reports by financial institutions, or on-site/
off-site inspections, are not sufficient to grasp the problems. Regulators 
also need to apply digital technologies to improve their regulatory 
capability. Regulatory technology should be capable of benefiting 
regulators in many ways (Sheridan 2017). Zhu and Zhou (2016) 
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revealed that digital technologies such as blockchain help solve the 
problems of regulatory compliance and security of fund management 
by developing a distributed voting system for crowdfunders. Beijing’s 
local financial regulatory bureau also created a “smoke index,” which 
monitors the risks of P2Ps in real time.
The final lesson is that regulators should try to balance innovation 
and stability. Good innovations can bring huge benefits, while bad 
innovations can cause immense damage. But it is not always crystal clear 
whether an innovation proposal is good or bad. One of the practices 
adopted by regulators in other countries is the so-called “regulatory 
sandbox”, which is an experimentation space that allows a firm to make 
its advice platform available to a limited number of financial consumers. 
By reducing time and cost, as well as enabling greater access to finance for 
innovators, it helps to deliver more effective competition in the interests 
of consumers (FCA 2015). To engage with the fast-paced developments 
in the fintech industry, it is necessary to rationally evaluate the costs and 
benefits of market innovations by adopting a regulatory sandbox regime 
in the PRC. In this way, PRC regulators will have a more informed 
context in which to navigate their regulatory priorities and build a 
regulatory environment where such new fintech business models will 
thrive in appropriate approaches.
5.4 Digital Currency/Electronic Payments
While the authorities banned trading of cryptocurrencies and initial 
currency offerings due to concerns about money laundering and financial 
instability, the PBC began to study central bank digital currency from as 
early as 2014. In 2017, it established its own Institute of Digital Currency, 
and, in late 2019, senior PBC officials disclosed that the central bank had 
completed top-level design, standard setting, function development, and 
operational testing of the digital currency and had started implementing 
trials in certain areas. In fact, the digital currency could be rolled out in 
the perceivable future (Fan 2019). 
The PBC’s digital currency, DC/EP, is a loosely coupled hybrid of 
digital currency and electronic payment, issued by the central bank, 
operated and exchanged by authorized operators. The key features of 
DC/EP may be summarized as follows. First, DC/EP is a legal tender, 
i.e., a digital version of the yuan, and substitutes only for M0. A legal 
tender is different from electronic cash offered by commercial banks and 
mobile payment providers. It is almost impossible for DC/EP to default, 
but commercial banks and mobile payment providers could, potentially. 
The fact that DC/EP is a substitute only for M0, but not for M1 or M2, 
implies that it would not become a means of credit. For now, the PBC 
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would not pay any interest to DC/EP. But it can be conveniently used in 
retail transaction and daily payment. 
Second, DC/EP will be operated through a two-tier system, and the 
PBC will not directly interact with the public. Like any other sovereign 
currency, DC/EP is the liability of the central bank. It functions through 
a two-tier system, in which the central bank creates and issues the 
digital currency to the authorized institutional operators, and then the 
general public exchange cash for digital currency from the authorized 
financial institutions (Figure 5.6). The fact that the central bank does 
not directly interact with the public helps avoid competition with 
existing financial institutions, which otherwise could lead to financial 
disintermediation. DC/EP is 100% reserved, meaning that authorized 
financial operators must deposit one-to-one reserves with the central 
bank. The operators can then issue DC/EP to the general public in the 
same way they issue paper notes. The central bank will likely also set a 
ceiling for the amount of transaction and account balance. The purpose of 
this is to avoid the possibility that the public exchanges all their deposits 
into digital currency, and, therefore, to prevent the potential risk of a 
bank run. It also ensures limited anonymity in payment transactions. 
More importantly, the authorized institutional operators should have 
the necessary information about the owners of these digital wallets.
Figure 5.6: Illustration of the Two-Tier System of DC/EP
DC/EP = digital currency/electronic payment.
Source: People’s Bank of China.
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Third, DC/EP is a loosely coupled and value-based account, i.e., it 
is token-based. The value transfer can be achieved without an account. 
In comparison, credit cards, Alipay, and WeChat Pay are account-based 
and require linking to bank accounts. But DC/EP is a stand-alone set of 
passcodes, like cash. P2P payment can take place without linking to the 
internet.
So why does the PBC create a DC/EP but ban the trading of 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum? Cryptocurrencies have 
two distinctive features: the value of anonymity and a lack of intrinsic 
value. They are neither precious metals nor sovereign currencies 
guaranteed by the states. So, they do not have all three key functions of 
money: means of payment, unit of accounting, and vehicle of investment. 
This is why  cryptocurrencies are often regarded as digital assets, not 
digital currencies. The anonymity creates concerns for policy makers, 
especially in countries where management of cross-border capital flows 
is common and corruption is widespread. These are the key reasons why 
it is hard for the PRC regulators to tolerate onshore active trading of 
cryptocurrencies.
There are many reasons why the PBC made so much effort to roll 
out DC/EP. One possible reason is to promote financial inclusion—one 
does not require a bank account to have a digital currency account and 
enjoy basic financial services. The loosely coupled digital currency and 
payment account make it possible for those previously underserved by 
the financial system. With the support of the DC/EP system, foreigners 
could have a digital wallet without a bank account in the PRC and 
enjoy the convenience of mobile payment. This could seriously reduce 
the burdens of anti-money laundering and certificates in finance and 
technology processes. In a way, this is an important step forward from 
the current mobile payment system, which still requires linking to a 
bank account to be operable.
Clearly DC/EP is only the first step of the PBC’s digital currency 
ambition, although nobody knows when the central bank will take 
further steps, such as paying interest on the digital currency. For now, 
since it only substitutes for M0, it might have limited impact on the 
PRC’s macroeconomy. At the end of December 2019, the PRC’s M0 
was  CNY7.72 trillion, which was only about 3.9% of the broad money 
supply M2, CNY198.65 trillion. Therefore, even if DC/EP completely 
replaces M0, it still does not constitute a significant part of the country’s 
financial operation.
However, DC/EP could potentially have a very significant impact on 
the fintech sector. Most of the PRC’s fintech businesses are built around 
its mobile payment system. Mobile payment facilitated the boom of 
e-commerce, which created the initial business area for digital insurance 
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for the delivery and return of goods. It also opened the opportunities for 
online investment and online lending. In fact, almost the entire fintech 
ecosystem is built on the mobile payment facility.
The mobile payment system offers two unique features: connectivity 
and data. The mobile payment platforms attract hundreds of millions 
of users and thus substantially reduce the costs of acquiring customers. 
More importantly, transactions with payment and other services 
leave a gigantic digital footprints on those platforms. Equipped with 
extraordinary analytical capabilities, the mobile payment platforms are 
then able to provide a wide range of financial services, such as digital 
insurance and online lending. Without the mobile payment services, the 
PRC’s fintech industry would probably be much more modest in terms 
of scale and complexity.
To be fair, policy makers have legitimate concerns about this business 
model. Since the fintech business is concentrated in a small number of 
unicorn players, any risks that occur to them could be systemic risks. At 
the same time, abuse of data by big fintech platforms, such as invasion of 
individual privacy, is also quite common.
It is too early to be sure about the exact impact of DC/EP on the 
fintech industry. But now that the public has an alternative to mobile 
payment that can also carry out payment transactions but does not leave 
a digital footprint with a private company, it is possible that many will 
substitute mobile payment accounts with DC/EP. If this happens, then 
the consequences for the fintech industry could be game changing. 
5.5 Implications for Macroeconomic Stability
How does this exciting fintech development affect the PRC’s 
macroeconomic stability? Our assessment so far arrives at the following 
three takeaways:
•	 The fintech space is still rapidly changing, and thus the shape of 
the industry and its macroeconomic implications could evolve 
in the coming years. 
•	 In many ways, the use of digital technology, especially fintech, 
could improve macroeconomic stability by reducing the short-
term volatility of economic activities and prices.
•	 It could also give rise to new risks and magnify existing risks, 
especially if regulation does not keep pace with innovation.
The PRC’s fintech industry is probably entering a new phase of 
development. In the past, many tech companies engaged directly in 
financial services, partly because there was no strict requirement for 
a license then. This could change as financial regulation tightens. A 
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clearer division of labor could emerge between tech and financial 
players, with financial institutions focusing on providing financial 
products, and tech companies specializing in offering technological 
solutions. Even Jack Ma, founder of Ant Financial, said that the unicorn 
fintech player aims to become a techfin institution, concentrating only 
on the tech part of financial transactions. One likely scenario is that 
traditional financial institutions could become the main providers of 
financial services. But many small tech companies might emerge to 
provide specialized tech services to these financial institutions. The 
unicorn tech companies, such as Ant Financial, Tencent, Baidu, and JD 
Digits, could become platforms for financial products, just like Taobao 
for goods. While the form of the fintech industry could change, the 
essence of using digital technology to improve financial transaction 
should not.
One potential wild card that could substantially transform the PRC’s 
fintech landscape is the PBC’s DC/EP, alongside tighter regulation. If, as 
some suggest, DC/EP offers a more attractive alternative to the current 
mobile payment service, because it does not depend on bank accounts 
and maintains a certain degree of anonymity, then it is  quite possible 
that it could serve as a negative shock to mobile payment businesses and, 
more fundamentally, undermine unicorn BigTech companies’ function 
of accumulating and analyzing digital footprints. Since connectivity and 
data are the backbones of the existing fintech businesses, DC/EP could 
potentially weaken BigTech companies’ position in the fintech space. 
Furthermore, if the PBC decides to grant more functions to its digital 
currency, such as making it interest-bearing and a means of credit, then 
even the traditional financial institutions, including commercial banks, 
could experience a major “earthquake.” This, however, will probably not 
happen in the perceivable future.
There is preliminary but important evidence confirming that 
fintech could actually improve macroeconomic stability. The first piece 
of evidence shows rapid convergence of regional fintech development—
the lagging regions developed at faster paces than the leading regions 
between 2013 and 2018. More importantly, tentative analysis of the 
regional growth pattern shows that, while, in general, growth is still 
diverging in the PRC, the fintech variable facilitates growth convergence 
across regions. If this effect can be confirmed, then fintech development 
is definitely helpful for improving macroeconomic stability, since 
regional economic development could become even greater as a result 
of the spreading of fintech businesses.
The second piece of evidence relates to unsecured loans provided by 
several online banks, using data instead of collateral in risk assessment. 
In fact, this method can also be applied by traditional commercial 
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banks. As discussed earlier, the fintech credit-scoring models, based on 
big data and the machine-learning approach, often perform better than 
the traditional bank models, especially for SME loans. Such unsecured 
loans have the additional benefit of delinking credit decisions from asset 
prices. The elasticity of collateralized bank loans with respect to housing 
prices is 0.91, that of banks’ SME loans is 0.50, while that of MyBank’s 
unsecured SME loans is insignificant (Figure 5.7). This breakdown of 
connection between loan growth and housing prices takes out the 
so-called “financial accelerator,” which was often behind financial crises 
through the formation of a vicious cycle among asset price, credit policy, 
and real economic activities. Therefore, the data-based credit-scoring 
models should improve financial and macroeconomic stability.
The third piece of evidence can be observed from the current PRC 
economy suffering the devastating novel coronavirus (COVID-19)—the 
fintech-supported new economy serves as a macroeconomic stabilizing 
force. Like the severe acute respiratory syndrome that haunted the 
PRC in early 2003, COVID-19 is infectious and deadly, restricts people’s 
mobility, and reduces consumption demand, especially for restaurants, 
shopping, and other tourism activities. Compared with 2003, what is 
different this time is the greater role of the new economy. Online shopping 
already accounts for more than 20% of all retail sales. A tentative look at 
Alipay’s data confirms that, during the PRC New Year holiday this year, 
Figure 5.7: Elasticity of Bank Credit  
with Respect to Housing Prices in the PRC
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Note: 1 Data from traditional banks and 2 Data from MyBank.
Source: Gambacorta et al. (2019).
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which coincided with the heightened COVID-19 warning, transactions 
with offline vendors declined by almost 10%, while transactions with 
online vendors were up by 10%. Clearly, the new economic activities 
help mitigate negative shocks such as disease. More generally, there are 
also tentative research findings confirming that the mobile payment 
service helps to improve risk sharing among households (Wang et al. 
2019).
The final piece of evidence is still only a hypothesis, which needs 
to be verified by rigorous analysis. Figure 5.8 plots both the consumer 
price index (CPI) and the producer price index for the period 2001–
2019, finding a structural break in 2013 for the former, but not the latter. 
One possible explanation is growing e-commerce. One might recall from 
earlier discussions that Alipay was initially created to facilitate online 
transactions on Alibaba’s e-commerce platform Taobao. The real fintech 
boom, however, did not happen until June 2013 when Yu’ebao came 
online. This also led to an extraordinary expansion of e-commerce. The 
growing e-commerce helped integrate different regional markets and 
significantly reduced price volatility.
But clearly, fintech would also pose new risks to macroeconomic 
stability. Any financial innovation, including fintech, could magnify or 
Figure 5.8: Consumer Price Index and  
Producer Price Index in the PRC, 2001–2019 
(%)
CPI = consumer price index, PPI = producer price index, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/ (accessed 
24 September 2020).
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even create financial risks, as well as improving financial efficiency. The 
most striking example is the derivative product, which was initially 
created to manage exchange rate volatility after the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system. However, it caused the subprime crisis. Similarly, 
fintech businesses should help to improve both financial inclusion and 
financial efficiency, but it could also generate new financial risks. For 
instance, the PBC has issued a total of more than 200 payment licenses 
in recent years. With the exception of a couple of the largest players, 
most of the license holders suffer from financial problems. Fortunately, 
the sizes of these institutions’ businesses are small. With the help of 
digital technology, fintech businesses adjust very rapidly. This presents 
a serious challenge to the existing regulatory system, which normally 
requires the financial institutions to disclose information periodically. 
Without also applying digital technology in regulation, it is hard to 
monitor and control fintech risks. In addition, the BigTech firms 
sometimes result in greater concentration of market shares, and are able 
to further concentrate market power. They have the potential to give 
rise to new financial systemic risks (Frost et al. 2019).
5.6 Concluding Remarks
While it is too early to make any accurate assessment at the moment, 
it is quite clear that fintech is rapidly changing the financial industry, 
with important implications for macroeconomic stability. Therefore, we 
need to monitor and study this new development very closely. Analyses 
suggest that while fintech could provide some stabilizing forces, it could 
potentially also become a major threat to macroeconomic stability. In 
order to maximize the benefits, while keeping the risks under control, 
we make the following policy recommendations:
First, the regulators need to develop new techniques such as a 
“sandbox” in order to balance fintech innovation and financial stability. 
All financial transactions need to be regulated and all financial service 
providers need to obtain proper licenses. The experiences of the 
unregulated P2Ps should not happen again. Following the practices in 
the UK, Singapore, and many other countries, the PBC also started a 
practice similar to sandbox. Under this new scheme, regulators first call 
for proposals of new fintech businesses. If they meet certain criteria, 
such as strengthening financial access, improving financial efficiency, 
and managing financial risks, then the proposals may be tested under 
the regulators’ close watch. If the experiment turns out to be successful, 
then the business could be formally licensed.
Second, the regulatory framework needs to apply digital technology, 
i.e., regulatory technology, in regulating fintech and other financial 
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businesses. The fintech businesses, in particular, have the typical 
features of large numbers of customers and very rapid transmission of 
risks. The traditional regulatory approach, however, would not win the 
race with financial risks, either in terms of breadth or speed. Using big 
data analytical tools, the regulators should be able to monitor real-time 
data and detect any irregular symptoms.
Third, the macroprudential policies also need to be upgraded to 
incorporate the new features of fintech. For instance, simply judged 
by asset size, some of the key fintech players such as Ant Financial and 
Tencent might not qualify as “systemically important institutions.” But 
these two players are behind almost all new economic activities. If there 
is a collapse of the mobile payment system, or simply a power blackout, 
a large part of the economy will become dysfunctional, with serious 
macroeconomic and financial implications.
Finally, the central bank will have to consider these new fintech 
features when making monetary policy. Although the full implications 
still need to be studied and appreciated, we found that data-based 
online bank lending responds to monetary policy more aggressively 
than collateral-based traditional bank loans. Likewise, we also found 
that the CPI become a lot more stable during the age of fintech and 
the new economy. This would have serious implications for monetary 
policy making, especially with an explicit or implicit inflation targeting 
scheme. If the CPI becomes more stable because of technology, then 
there is the question of whether monetary policy expansion might lead 
to the accumulation of financial risks, such as the subprime risks in the 
early 2000s in the US.
The bottom line is that the PBC, financial regulators, and academics 
should follow the development of the fintech industry and understand 
its implications for macroeconomic stability.
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A Multivariate Bayesian Vector 
Autoregression Analysis of 
Digital Payment Systems and 
Economic Growth in India
Debasis Rooj and Reshmi Sengupta
6.1 Introduction
A well-developed financial sector is an essential ingredient for the long-
run economic growth of a country (Schumpeter 1911). In recent times, 
the world has witnessed a rapid increase in technological innovation, 
including that in the financial sector. Rapid advances in financial 
technology, commonly referred to as fintech, are transforming the 
economic and financial landscape of the world economy (IMF 2018). 
Financial technologies are offering a wide range of services across the 
world. While different definitions of fintech are possible and are in use 
internationally, it can be categorized either in the form of a new product 
or a new process for supplying an already existing product, or in terms 
of market arrangements (Lewis and Mizen 2000). One such example of 
financial innovation is the digitalization of means of payment. 
One of the primary functions of the financial sector is to provide 
efficient and fast modes of payments. By reducing transaction costs, 
the payment system can facilitate trading and thus allow for greater 
specialization in economic activities by economic agents (Bech and 
Hobijn 2007). Moreover, emerging market economies such as India, 
have less developed financial sectors than developed economies. Further 
regarding India, a large section of its population is also financially 
excluded due to a lack of knowledge and awareness about financial 
institutions. Although a large section of the population does not have 
access to banking and other financial services or to formal credit 
facilities, it does have widespread access to mobile phones and mobile 
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data. In such a scenario, India can bring in infrastructural innovations 
and digitalization, which have enormous potential in terms of making 
the financial sector inclusive.
In recent years, the Government of India has made a push to bring 
a broad ambit of its economy under the digital umbrella. The objective 
is to provide an inclusive, leakage-free delivery of services to a vast 
majority of its population. One such mechanism is digital transactions, 
and Indian banks are being encouraged to make various electronic 
payment modes available to their customers. 
The central bank of a country is responsible for providing the medium 
of payment to settle small-value cash transactions, as well as supporting 
an interbank system that settles large-value transactions and time-critical 
payments (Bech and Hobijn 2007). Moreover, the central bank also uses 
the interbank payment system to implement monetary policies. The 
system also serves as the platform for the interbank money market. 
Payment and settlement systems are the backbone of any economy 
(RBI 2019). Over the last decade, India has witnessed a significant 
development in the use of modern technology in financial services. 
In India, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is the sole custodian of the 
payment system. The RBI has endeavored to ensure that India has one of 
the most state-of-the-art payment and settlement systems in the world. 
One such payment and settlement system introduced in 2004 is 
real-time gross settlement (RTGS), an internet-based funds transfer 
system where there is a continuous and real-time settlement on an 
individual transaction basis (without netting). “Real time” refers to 
the processing of instructions at the time they are received, and “gross 
settlement” means that the settlement of funds transfer instructions 
occurs individually. The RTGS system primarily deals with large-value 
transactions with the objective of providing not only a safe and secure 
but also an efficient, fast, and affordable payment system to boost the 
economic activity in the country.  This transaction system requires a 
minimum transfer value of INR200,000 (approximately $3,000) with 
no upper limit. RTGS payments are final and are not revocable by the 
paying bank. An RTGS system reduces settlement risk, as payments are 
settled individually and irrevocably on a gross basis in real time.1 
The database on the payment system from the RBI shows that 
electronic transactions in the total volume of retail payments increased 
to 95.4% in 2018–19 from 92.6% in the previous financial year. In 2018–19, 
RTGS transactions constituted less than 0.40% of the total volume of 
payments but were close to 46% of the transactions in terms of value. 
1 More details on the Indian RTGS can be found at https://m.rbi.org.in/Scripts 
/FAQView.aspx?Id=65
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While the volume of RTGS increased by close to 10% in 2018–19 from 
2017–18, the value increased by close to 17% during the same period.
The RBI plans the ratio of digital payment transaction turnover to 
nominal gross domestic product (GDP) to increase from 10.37 in 2019 to 
12.29 in 2020 and consequently to 14.80 in 2021. To facilitate this process, 
on 6 June 2019, the RBI decided to withdraw the charges levied upon 
the transaction processes using RTGS and National Electronic Funds 
Transfer systems. The RBI also directed the banks to pass these benefits 
to their customers. Some commercial banks have already implemented 
this policy. 
Using data on the indicators of the payment system, as well as on 
economic growth, we observe that the value and the volume of RTGS 
are steadily growing in India. A visual analysis (Figure 6.1) shows a close 
linkage between the value of RTGS and economic growth, measured by 
the index of industrial production in India. A similar trend is observed 
between the volume of RTGS and economic growth (Figure 6.2). 
Motivated by these observations, we attempt to understand the 
dynamic relationship between the use of financial technology and 
economic activity in India. We use RTGS as a proxy for the payment 
system and the index of industrial production (IIP) as a measure of 
economic activity. 
Figure 6.1: The Dynamics of the Value of Real-Time Gross 
Settlement, and the Index of Industrial Production
Note: RTGS represents the growth rate of the value of real-time gross settlement (right-hand vertical 
axis); IIP represents the growth rate of the index of industrial production (left-hand vertical axis). 
The observations are percentage changes, year on year (monthly). The sample period is from 2005 
M4 to 2019 M5. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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We use a Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) methodology that 
simultaneously addresses the problem of model misspecification and the 
“curse of dimensionality.” We corroborate our findings through several 
sensitivity analyses. In this chapter, we provide a detailed understanding 
of the empirical linkage between the development of a digital payment 
system and economic growth, thereby providing a strong basis for policy 
recommendations to promote the digital economy.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 briefly 
discusses the relevant literature. The data sets used for the study are 
discussed in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4, we describe the empirical 
methodology, and in Section 6.5, the empirical results are presented. 
Finally, in Section 6.6, we conclude.
6.2 Related Literature
Information technology plays a vital role in driving economic activity. 
Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999) suggest that information technology could 
be a substitute for capital and labor inputs, given its high contribution 
to the growth of total output in the United States (US). They show that 
although computers contributed virtually nothing to US economic 
growth before 1973, from 1990 to 1996, they contributed close to 
Figure 6.2: The Dynamics of the Volume of Real-Time Gross 
Settlement, and the Index of Industrial Production
Note: RTGSV represents the growth rate of the volume of real-time gross settlement; IIP represents 
the growth rate of the index of industrial production. The observations are percentage changes, year 
on year (monthly). The sample period is from 2005 M4 to 2019 M5. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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16% of US output growth. Dedrick, Gurbaxani, and Kraemer (2003) 
and Jorgenson and Vu (2007) provide further evidence of the role of 
information technology on economic growth. 
The role of information technology in the financial and banking 
sector is also widely accepted (Berentsen 1998; Nsouli and Fullenkamp 
2014; Goodhart and Sims 2000). However, the quantitative literature on 
the dynamics of the payment system and the economy is limited. 
Yilmazkuday (2011), using vector autoregression (VAR), examines 
the linkage between the use of credit cards and monetary policy in 
Turkey, finding that credit card use has an increasing effect on inflation 
rates over time. He suggests that there is an increasing need to consider 
the credit channel of monetary policy transmission through credit cards. 
Geanakoplos and Dubey (2010) argue that the introduction and 
widespread use of credit cards not only increases trading efficiency but 
also increases the velocity of money, which in turn causes inflation in 
the absence of monetary intervention. They also point out that price 
increases might worsen when there is any default on the part of the 
credit card holders. Tule and Oduh (2017) demonstrate that the increase 
in financial innovation has gradually dampened the effectiveness of the 
money multiplier. Milbourne (1986) argues that financial innovation 
complicates the task of monetary policy by shifting the monetary 
aggregates, making it difficult to understand the behavior of interest 
rates and using the asset demand function as the basis for the conduct 
of monetary policy. 
Bech and Hobijn (2007) examine the diffusion of RTGS technology 
across the world’s 174 central banks, finding that the probability of its 
adoption in a given year increases significantly with the per capita GDP 
of an economy. Moreover, they also show that countries with a lower 
relative price of capital and countries whose major trading partners 
have already adopted RTGS are also more likely to adopt it themselves. 
These determinants are similar to those that seem to drive the cross-
country adoption patterns of other technologies.
Lee and Yip (2008) argue that higher RTSG turnover correlates 
with faster growth and is a good indicator of the overall performance of 
the economy.  
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study so far has focused 
on empirically analyzing the impact of such payment systems on the 
economic growth in India. Given the increasing adoption of modern 
technology in the financial sector across the globe, it is essential to 
empirically analyze the role of RTGS in enhancing economic growth 
and vice versa, especially since it is widely used in almost all parts of the 
world (Bech, Shimizu, and Wong 2017). In the case of India, this is the 
prime form of electronic transaction. 
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To the best of our knowledge, this is also the first study to examine 
the dynamic linkages between RTGS and economic growth using a 
multivariate framework and the BVAR methodology that simultaneously 
addresses the problem of model misspecification and the “curse of 
dimensionality.” We corroborate our findings using several sensitivity 
analyses. 
The findings from our empirical analysis show a positive and 
significant relationship between RTGS and economic growth in India. 
We demonstrate the existence of bidirectional causality between RTGS 
and IIP, where one affects the other. Our variance decomposition analysis 
also shows that both RTGS and IIP explain a considerable variation in 
each other’s fluctuations. We also find that RTGS increases the general 
price level in the economy; however, we do not find any direct evidence 
on the effect of monetary policy on RTGS in India. Our study provides 
evidence-based policy implications highlighting the importance of 
digitalization in facilitating economic growth in India.
6.3 Data and Variable Selection 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the dynamic relationship 
between RTGS and economic growth. This translates into considering 
variables that capture financial transactions, economic activity, monetary 
policy, and a price index. The data on RTGS are available for both the 
value and the volume (number of transactions) of the transactions. We 
use the value of transactions in our baseline model and the volume while 
conducting the sensitivity analyses. 
For economic activities, we use the data on the IIP as a proxy for 
economic growth. The IIP data series is available from the Central 
Statistics Office, Government of India. The monetary policy is 
represented by the yield on the 91-day T-Bill (INT). We include the 
consumer price index (CPI) as a measure of price in our analysis. Finally, 
we use M1 as a measure of the money supply in our analysis. All the 
variables mentioned above are available from the RBI website. 
We use a sample period of 170 months from 2005-M4 to 2019-M5. 
All the relevant variables are seasonally adjusted using the X-13ARIMA-
SEATS seasonal adjustment program by the United States’ Census 
Bureau.2 
2 Hamilton (1994) argues that the Minnesota prior is not very suitable for seasonal data.
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6.4 Empirical Methodology
6.4.1 BVAR 
Empirical macroeconomics literature often employs a VAR model to 
examine the linear causal relationship between the time series variables 
and also to forecast their evolution (Sims 1972, 1980). The VAR model 
in this study is a simple dynamic simultaneous equations system with 
endogenous variables that allows us to examine the dynamic link 
between RTGS and IIP alongside capturing the feedback mechanism 
that exists among the other controls, CPI, INT, and the money supply. 
Consider the following VAR(p) model:
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endogenous variables; 
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. T is the size of the sample used for the regression. 
For n and p of modest size, the number of estimated coefficients becomes 
quite large leading to the problem of the “curse of dimensionality.”3 
BVAR models can resolve this problem by shrinking these coefficients 
toward some prior belief.
The primary advantage of using Bayesian analysis is its ability 
to combine prior information with the likelihood function as derived 
from the sample. This helps in obtaining the posterior distribution for 
any parameter and deals with the over-parameterization problem (the 
“curse of dimensionality”) by imposing prior beliefs on the parameters. 
Howev r, posterior results must be confronted with prior beliefs, 
and hence prior distributions must be chosen carefully to avoid any 
missp cifications, which may affect the posterior results. Therefore, we 
follow Litterman (1986) in defining the BVAR prior specifications with 
some modifications as proposed by Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997) and 
Sims and Zha (1998) to improve the model outcomes.
3 The structure of the VAR implies that there are k = np + m coefficients to estimate for 
each equation, leaving a total of q = nk = n(np + m) coefficients to estimate for the full 
VAR model.
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Following Koop and Korobilis (2010) and Dieppe and Legrand 
(2016), equation (1) can be rewritten as 
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Now, for the prior distribution of β, it is assumed that β follows a 
multivariate normal distribution with mean β0 and covariance matrix 
W0: with p(b): N(b0,W0). 
We follow Litterman (1986) to identify β0 and W0. In a VAR setup, the 
explanatory variable in any equation can take several lag structures, such 
as the dependent variable’s own lag and those of the other dependent 
variables and the exogenous or the deterministic variables, including 
the constant. 
In the Minnesota prior, most or all of the coefficients of the 
parameters are set to zero, thereby ensuring shrinkage of the VAR 
coefficients toward zero and lessening the risk of overfitting. As most 
observed m croeconomic variables seem to be characterized by a unit 
root, our prior belief is that each endogenous variable as included in the 
model presents a unit root in its first own lag and coefficients equal to 
zero for further lags and cross-variable lags. Moreover, in the absence of 
any prior belief about exogenous variables, the most reasonable strategy 
is to assume that they are neutral with respect to the endogenous 
variables, and hence their coeffic ents are equal to zero. All these 
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elements thus translate into β0 being a vector of zeros, except for the 
entries concerning the first own lag of each endogenous variable, which 
are given a value of 1 each. 
For the variance-covariance matrix, W0, it is assumed that no 
covariance exists among the elements in β, which implies that W0 is 
diagonal.
Moreover, Litterman (1986) argues that the further the lag, the more 
confident one should be that coefficients linked to it have a value of zero. 
Therefore, the variance of the coefficients linked to a lag should be smaller 
than the initial lags the further it is from them. Also, the confidence is 
expected to be greater for the coefficients that relate variables to their 
past values. Finally, as little is known about the exogenous variables in 
the model, we assume that their variance is large. Thus, according to 
Litterman (1986), Minnesota priors are imposed by setting the following 
moments for the prior distribution of the coefficients:
For parameters in β that relate the endogenous variables to their 
own lags, the variance is given by
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where λ1 is an overall tightness parameter, l is the lag considered by 
the coefficient, and λ3 is a scaling coefficient controlling the speed at 
which coefficients for lags greater than 1 converge to 0 with greater 
certainty.
For parameters related to cross-variable lag coefficients, the 
variance is given by:
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 denote the ordinary least squares residual variance 
of the autoregressive models estimated for variables i and j, and λ2 
represents a cross-variable specific variance parameter.
For exogenous variables, including constant terms, the variance is 
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 is again the ordinary least squares residual variance of an 
autoregressive model previously estimated for variable i, and λ4 is a 
large (potentially infinite) variance parameter. Several combinations are 
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possible for λ1, λ2, λ3, and λ4. Following the standard literature practice, 
for example in Sims and Zha (1998) and Giannone et al. (2014), we 
choose λ1 = 0.2, λ2 = 0.5, λ3 = 1, and λ4 = 100.
6.4.2  Identification of the Structural Shocks  
in the BVAR Model
Following Bańbura, Giannone, and Lenza (2015), we identify several 
shocks using a simple recursive ordering, commonly known as the 
Cholesky decomposition of the error covariance matrix. In other words, 
as indicated by Forni and Gambetti (2016) and Erten (2013), this implies 
that the independent standard normal shocks can be identified based 
on the estimated reduced-form shocks, and also the ordering of the 
variables in equation 1. Thus, the initial ordering is as follows: IIP, CPI, 
INT, money supply, RTGS. The initial ordering of the variables in the 
model determines the sequence of the structural shocks and their effect 
on the other endogenous variables. We place the variables in order of 
output, prices, and monetary policy instruments. This ordering assumes 
that the RBI sees current output and prices when it sets the policy 
instrument, but that output and prices only respond to a policy shock 
with one lag. RTGS is ordered last, implying that the financial sector 
variable responds to a policy shock with no lag. This ordering mostly 
follows the monetary policy literature (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and 
Evans 1996, 2005; Thorbecke 1997), which places the VAR variables in 
the following order: macroeconomic, monetary policy, and financial. 
In our sensitivity analysis, we place RTGS before other variables and 
examine the implications of such identification for the other variables 
of our model.
All the variables in our model enter in log levels. Sims, Stock, and 
Watson (1990) argue that as the Bayesian approach is entirely based on 
the likelihood function, the associated inference does not need to take 
special account of non-stationarity. The likelihood function has the 
same Gaussian shape regardless of the presence of non-stationarity. 
Moreover, estimation of a VAR model in levels will produce 
consistent estimates of impulse responses and is robust to 
cointegration of an unknown order (Barsky and Sims 2011). Hamilton 
(1994) also indicates that when there is uncertainty regarding 
the nature of the common trends in the data, estimating a VAR in 
levels is a “conservative” approach. Brooks (2014) also favors using 
VAR in levels, when the objective is to purely examine the dynamic 
relationship among the variables and not to merely estimate the 
parameters of a model, as opposed to differencing where we may lose 
important information as embedded in a series. Given this, all the 
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variables (except for interest rate, which is levels) have been specified 
in log levels (Fujiwara 2006). 
In macroeconomics literature, a common practice is to use a log 
transformation of the variables. According to Ehrlich (1977) and Layson 
(1983), a log transformation helps in providing better empirical results 
than a linear specification. Moreover, the coefficient estimates can be 
interpreted in terms of elasticities (i.e., a percentage change in one 
variable due to a percentage change in the other variable).
We include one lag of each endogenous variable and a constant 
term. This choice of lag structure is selected by deviance information 
criteria (DIC) that measure the goodness of fit and complexity of fitted 
Bayesian models to optimize the behavior of the residual error terms 
(Spiegelhalter, Best, and Carlin 2002; Saldías 2017).4 The stability of 
the VAR model is important as the impact of the shocks is calculable 
and finite only when it is stable. The stability condition requires all 
the eigenvalues to be less than unity, i.e., no root lies outside the unit 
circle (Patterson 2000). Our estimated VAR model satisfies the stability 
condition. We present the impulse responses based on 15,000 Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo draws after discarding the first 10,000 draws as 
burn-in.5 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Impulse Response Analysis
In this section, we present the impulse responses from our baseline 
BVAR, as presented in Section 6.4.2. We present the impulse responses to 
all the shocks in Figure 6.3. The continuous solid line depicts the median 
posterior response, and the shaded area represents a 68% confidence 
interval. We follow Sims and Zha (1999) for the 68% interval band.6 The 
horizontal axis shows the time period or the horizon after the initial 
shock, while the vertical lines in impulse responses show the magnitude 
of the response to the shocks. 
4 The DIC value for our baseline model is –2,919.39. We provide an alternate model 
using classical Akaike information criterion (AIC) lag selection criteria in our 
robustness analysis.
5 BVAR estimation is carried out by using the BEAR toolbox (Dieppe and Legrand 
2016).
6 Sims and Zha (1999) argue that the conventional frequentist error bands can be 
misleading because they mix information about parameter location with information 
about model fit. They propose likelihood-based bands and suggest using 68% interval 
bands to provide a more precise estimate of the true coverage probability.
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We present the impulse responses for a one-standard-deviation 
shock on IIP in the first column of Figure 6.3. A one-standard-deviation 
shock leads to a close to 2% increase in IIP. This shock is persistent and 
remains significant almost for the entire horizon of nearly 20 months. 
The impact of IIP on RTGS is also positive and significant. The effect 
is maximum immediately on impact and declines slowly over the time 
horizon. On impact, the value of RTGS increases by close to 4%. This is 
a significant impact of economic growth on the high-value transfer of 
money using RTGS. We find that IIP also increases money supply, but 
the effect becomes insignificant after 6 months. Interestingly, we find no 
significant impact of IIP on CPI. 
Next, we examine the impact of RTGS on the other variables of our 
model. In the fifth column of Figure 6.3, we show the impulse responses 
for a one-standard-deviation shock on RTGS. A one-standard-deviation 
shock increases RTGS by close to 10%. The impact of RTG on IIP is 
positive and significant. This impact reaches its peak at around the 
seventh month with an increase in IIP of 0.4% at the peak. The effect 
remains significant for the entire horizon. We also find that an increase in 
RTGS also increases CPI; the effect is persistent and remains significant 
for the entire horizon.
The inflationary impact of RTGS on CPI is akin to the inflationary 
impact of credit cards in Turkey (Yilmazkuday 2011). In our analysis, 
we control for the money supply. Hence, the finding indicates that an 
increase in RTGS not only increases the value of output but also impacts 
prices through an increase in the velocity of money. 
Thus, our multivariate BVAR analysis suggests the existence of 
bidirectional causality between IIP and RTGS. 
6.5.2 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
In this section, we discuss the contribution of IIP and RTG shocks, 
respectively, in explaining each other’s variations. We use forecast error 
variance decomposition (FEVD) to show the significance of each of the 
identified shocks in fluctuations of the variables. The FEVDs presented 
in Figure 6.4 show that RTGS contributes close to 10% of the fluctuations 
in IIP in the long run. Similarly, IIP is responsible for explaining almost 
16% of the fluctuations in RTGS. Combined with the impulse responses, 
FEVDs also support the close link between RTGS and IIP in India. These 
findings suggest that high-value online transactions and economic 
growth are closely interlinked. RTGS also contributes to approximately 
20% of the variations in the CPI. 
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6.5.3 Historical Decomposition
The historical decompositions are presented in Figure 6.5. Similar to 
impulse response and FEVD, they also emphasize the impact of RTGS 
on IIP and CPI. The roles have clearly been stronger during the post-
2012 period with the growth of the RTGS activity. The impacts have 
been less in the recent past given that other forms of digital payments 
are also growing.
Figure 6.4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition –  
Baseline Bayesian VAR
VAR = vector autoregression.
Note: The FEVD is based on median target IRFs as suggested by Fry and Pagan (2011). The 
shocks are represented as follows: IIP is an index of industrial production, CPI is consumer price 
index, INT is short-term interest rate, MS is nominal money supply, RTGS is the value of real-time 
gross settlement. The impulse responses are generated from the five-variable Bayesian VAR with 
Minnesota prior including, in this order, IIP, CPI, INT, MS, RTGS.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
CPIIIP INT
MS RTGS
CPI
IIP
INT
MS
RTGS
1.0
0.5
0.0
10 20
1.0
0.5
0.0
10 20
1.0
0.5
0.0
10 20
1.0
0.5
0.0
10 20
1.0
0.5
0.0
10 20
122 Macroeconomic Stabilization in the Digital Age
Figure 6.5: Historical Decomposition – Baseline Bayesian VAR
VAR = vector autoregression.
Note: Shock contributions are expressed in the deviation from the unconditional model forecast. 
The shocks are represented as follows: IIP is an index of industrial production, CPI is consumer price 
index, INT is short-term interest rate, MS is nominal money supply, RTGS is the value of real-time 
gross settlement. The impulse responses are generated from the five-variable Bayesian VAR with 
Minnesota prior including, in this order, IIP, CPI, INT, MS, RTGS.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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6.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our empirical results to 
several changes in the basic setup of our model. We primarily examine 
the robustness of our model by (i) using the volume of RTGS as a 
measure of the usage of a digital payment system; (ii) ordering RTGS 
before the other variables for identification of the shocks; (iii) using 
the Akaike information criterion (AIC) as an alternative lag selection 
criterion; (iv) including an exogenous variable capturing the change in 
monetary policy stance in India (inflation-targeting regime); (v) using 
an alternative measure of the digital payment system; and (vi) using 
interpolated real GDP as a measure of economic activity. In each case, 
the model is identified through the Cholesky ordering as discussed 
for our baseline model. We evaluate these changes by comparing the 
impulse responses with our baseline model.
A Multivariate Bayesian Vector Autoregression Analysis 
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Using Volume of RTGS as a Measure of Usage of Payment System
In this specification, we use the volume of RTGS (RTGSV) as a measure 
of the payment system in our analysis. RTGSV represents the number of 
monthly RTGS transactions. The ordering of the variables is the same 
as in the baseline model, with RTSGV coming after IIP, CPI, INT, and 
real money supply. The impulse responses are presented in Figure 6.6. 
We find that the impact of the impulse responses is not as strong as the 
value of such transactions, indicating that the value of RTGS is a better 
measure of the payment system than the volume to capture the dynamic 
linkage between RTGS and economic activity.
Ordering RTGS before the Other Variables in Our Model 
In our baseline BVAR, we identified the shocks by placing RTGS last. 
However, it can be argued that online payment impacts the other variables 
in our model (IIP, CPI, INT, and money supply) contemporaneously, but 
itself is impacted by the other variables with a lag. Thus, we provide an 
alternate ordering where RTGS is placed before the output, price, and 
monetary variables. Figure 6.7 represents the impulse responses with 
such identification. The impulse responses indicate that the impact of 
RTGS on IIP and CPI is similar to our baseline model, but the impact of 
IIP on RTGS is not significant with such identification of shock.
Identification with Alternative Lag Selection Criteria 
There are alternative procedures to select the number of lags for the 
endogenous variables in a VAR model (Bańbura, Giannone, and Lenza 
2015). In our baseline model, we chose the lag length of 1 based on DIC. 
However, the use of other lag selection criteria based on AIC, Hannan-
Quinn Information Criteria, Bayesian Information Criteria, and similar 
methods is not uncommon (Chatziantoniou et al. 2013). Given our data, 
AIC suggests a lag length of 4. Thus, we re-estimate our model with four 
lags. Once again, the qualitative impulse responses remain unchanged 
between RTGS and IIP (see Figure 6.8). 
Further, a few empirical studies (Ivanov and Kilian 2005; Carriero, 
Clark, and Marcelliano 2015) using monthly observations employ longer 
lag lengths to capture the long-run dynamics of the variables. Generally, 
the lag length is set to p = 13, which for any monthly data represents a 
year’s worth of lags +1. Figure 6.9 presents the impulse responses using 
a lag length of 13. We find that the impact of RTGS on IIP is similar to 
those in the baseline model. 
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Identification with an Exogenous Variable that Captures the 
Inflation-targeting Regime Change 
Following an agreement between the Government of India and the RBI, 
a monetary policy committee was constituted in February 2015 with the 
mandate to target CPI inflation from 5 August 2016 to 31 March 2021. 
The objective was to keep the rate of inflation of 4%, with a band of two 
percentage points on either side. To capture this structural change, we 
use a dummy variable indicating the shift in policy change and use it as 
an exogenous variable in our model. In this specification, our baseline 
VAR includes an exogenous dummy (0 and 1) after July 2016 to account 
for the changes in the monetary policy stance. The impulse responses 
presented in Figure 6.10 reveal that the introduction of this exogenous 
variable does not affect the primary findings of our analysis. 
Use of Alternate Measure of Payment System
Next, we use the other most frequently used digital mode of the 
payment system in our analysis. This variable captures the retail 
electronic clearing service (RECS), which includes Electronic Clearing 
Service  (both credit and debit), National Electronic Funds Transfer, 
Immediate Payment Services, and National Automated Clearing House 
to compare with our baseline model and we use the value of RECS in 
this specification. In 2018–19, RECS constituted about 36% in volume 
and about 9% in the value in the transactions for all kinds of payment 
system indicators. Figure 6.11 plots the impulse responses with RECS 
as the measure of the payment system. We find that the impact of RECS 
on IIP and other variables is weaker and insignificant, indicating that 
the value of such a mechanism is yet to develop in India and it has not 
been able to create any significant impact on the other macroeconomic 
indicators. 
Using Interpolated Real GDP as a Measure of Economic Activity
Finally, we use real monthly GDP (GDPM) as the measure of real 
economic activity. We use linear interpolation to convert the quarterly 
real GDP into monthly observations using the interpolation method 
based on the Chow-Lin procedure (Silva and Cardoso 2001). The other 
parameters remain the same as our baseline BVAR, including the lag 
length of 1. Figure 6.12 plots the impulse responses with GDP as the 
measure of economic activity. We find the impulse responses resemble 
those of IIP.
Therefore, even after using several different specifications in our 
robustness analysis, we find no major shift from our initial finding of 
bidirectional causality between RTGS and economic growth in India. 
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Hence, we conclude that our baseline model is robust to any changes in 
the specifications.
6.6 Conclusion
The world is expanding the use of digital technology, and the banking 
sector is no different. The digital payment system is increasingly being 
adopted by central banks to streamline the financial sector. However, 
quantitative literature examining the role of the electronic payment 
system in driving economic growth is still underexplored. Therefore, in 
this study, we use a multivariate BVAR model to capture the relationship 
between the online payment system and economic growth and add 
several important endogenous variables that may affect both the payment 
system and economic growth. The BVAR model is helpful in this setting 
as it simultaneously addresses the misspecification problem and the 
“curse of dimensionality,” which may arise due to the incorporation of 
multiple endogenous variables in a simultaneous equations setup. Also, 
this is the first study of its kind to analyze the relationship between a 
payment system and economic growth using uniquely available data on 
India in monthly frequencies.
Our results from the BVAR model after controlling for several 
endogenous variables (such as consumer price index, monetary policy 
variables, and nominal money supply) suggest that RTGS positively 
impacts economic growth in India. At the same time, economic growth 
also leads to an increase in the value and volume of RTGS, indicating 
the presence of bidirectional causality between RTGS and economic 
growth. The forecast error variance decomposition also suggests a strong 
association between RTGS and economic growth where a change in one 
variable (say, RTGS) causes a change in the other (say, economic growth), 
and vice versa. Several robustness checks using alternative measures of 
the online payment system, the inclusion of an exogenous variable, and 
a change in the lag structure not only preserve our primary findings but 
also provide additional support for the bidirectional causality between 
RTGS and economic growth, as is evident from our baseline model. We 
also find that an increase in RTGS leads to an increase in money supply 
and price level as indicated by the CPI. This finding indicates that 
when the economy is performing well and incomes are rising, thereby 
increasing demand in the economy, people tend to indulge in more 
electronic transactions and thus enhance economic growth. 
Electronic payment modes are cost-effective, fast, and convenient; 
the increasing use of online payments thus has a potential economic 
effect. While the promotion of online payment systems will accelerate 
economic growth, our findings also indicate that greater usage of digital 
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payments can also lead to higher price levels. Given that monetary policy 
has no significant impact on inflation and online payment systems, we 
need to explore further the channels through which payment systems 
and monetary policy are linked. 
We also find that agents involved in retail transactions still prefer 
conventional modes of payment rather than a digitalized payment 
system. Thus, we do not find any effect of retail electronic payments on 
economic growth. With increasing penetration and digitalization of the 
banking sector, a detailed micro-level analysis could shed more light on 
the role of digital payment at the retail level, such as the impact of mobile 
banking or payment banking on a particular sector of the economy, e.g., 
agriculture or daily wage earners. 
134 Macroeconomic Stabilization in the Digital Age
References
Bańbura, M., D. Giannone, and M. Lenza. 2015. Conditional Forecasts 
and Scenario Analysis with Vector Autoregressions for Large 
Cross-Sections. International Journal of Forecasting 31(3): 739–56. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2014.08.013 (accessed 19 
September 2020).
Barsky, R. B., and E. R. Sims. 2011. News Shocks and Business Cycles. 
Journal of Monetary Economics 58(3): 273–89. https://doi.org 
/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2011.03.001 (accessed 19 September 2020).
Bech, M. L., and B. Hobijn. 2007. Technology Diffusion Within Central 
Banking: The Case of Real-Time Gross Settlement. International 
Journal of Central Banking (212): 147–82. https://doi.org/10.2139 
/ssrn.932596 (accessed 19 September 2020).
Bech, M., Y. Shimizu, and P. Wong. 2017. The Quest for Speed in Payments. 
BIS Quarterly Review (March): 57–68. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2931564 (accessed 19 September 2020).
Berentsen, A. 1998. Monetary Policy Implications of Digital Money. Kyklos 
51(1): 89–117. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6435.00039 (accessed 
19 September 2020).
Brooks, C. 2014. Introductory Econometrics for Finance (3rd edition). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carriero, A., T. E. Clark, and M. Marcelliano. 2018. Measuring 
Uncertainty and Its Impact on the Economy. Review of Economics 
and Statistics 100(5): 799–815.
Chatziantoniou, I., G. Filis, B. Eeckels, and A. Apostolakis. 2013. Oil Prices, 
Tourism Income and Economic Growth: A Structural VAR Approach 
for European Mediterranean Countries. Tourism Management 36: 
331–41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2012.10.012 (accessed 
19 September 2020).
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, and C. L. Evans. 1996. The Effects of 
Monetary Policy Shocks: Evidence from the Flow of Funds. Review 
of Economics and Statistics 78(1): 16–34.
____. 2005. Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to 
Monetary Policy. Journal of Political Economy 113(1): 1–45. https://
doi.org/10.1086/426038 (accessed 19 September 2020).
Dedrick, J., V. Gurbaxani, and K. L. Kraemer. 2003. Information 
Technology and Economic Performance. ACM Computing Surveys 
35(1): 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1145/641865.641866 (accessed 
19 September 2020).
Dieppe, A., and R. Legrand. 2016. Working Paper Series. The BEAR 
Toolbox. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/research/working-papers 
/html/bear-toolbox.en.html (accessed 19 September 2020).
A Multivariate Bayesian Vector Autoregression Analysis 
of Digital Payment Systems and Economic Growth in India 135
Ehrlich, I. 1977. Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further 
Thoughts and Additional Evidence. Journal of Political Economy 
85(4): 741–88.
Erten, B. 2013. Macroeconomic Transmission of Eurozone Shocks 
to Emerging Economies. International Economics 131 (April): 
43–70. https://doi.org/10.1016/s2110-7017(13)60054-2 (accessed 
19 September 2020).
Forni, M., and L. Gambetti. 2016. Government Spending Shocks in Open 
Economy VARs. Journal of International Economics 99: 68–84. ttps://
doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.11.010 (accessed 19 September 2020).
Fry, R., and A. Pagan. 2011. Sign Restrictions in Structural Vector 
Autoregressions: A Critical Review.  Journal of Economic 
Literature 49(4): 938–60.
Fujiwara, I. 2006. Evaluating Monetary Policy When Nominal Interest 
Rates Are Almost Zero. Journal of the Japanese and International 
Economies 20(3): 434–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jjie.2006.02.001 
(accessed 19 September 2020).
Geanakoplos, J., and P. Dubey. 2010. Credit Cards and Inflation. Games 
and Economic Behavior 70(2): 325–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb 
.2010.02.004 (accessed 19 September 2020).
Giannone, D., M. Lenza, D. Momferatou, and L. Onorante. 2014. Short-
Term Inflation Projections: A Bayesian Vector Autoregressive 
Approach. International Journal of Forecasting 30(3): 635–44. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2013.01.012 (accessed 19 September 
2020).
Goodhart, E., and C. A. Sims. 2000. Can Central Banking Survive the IT 
Revolution? International Finance 3(2): 189–209.
Hamilton, J. D. 1994.  Time Series Analysis  (Vol. 2). Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2018. The Bali Fintech Agenda, 1–3. 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2018 
/10/11/pp101118-bali-fintech-agenda (accessed 19 September 2020).
Ivanov, V., and L. Kilian. 2005. Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and 
Econometrics: A Practitioner’s Guide to Lag Order Selection for 
VAR Impulse Response Analysis. Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and 
Econometrics Volume 9(1): 1–36.
Jorgenson, D. W., and K. J. Stiroh. 1999. Information Technology and 
Growth. American Economic Review 89(2): 109–15. https://doi 
.org/10.1257/ aer.89.2.109 (accessed 19 September 2020).
Jorgenson, D. W., and K. Vu. 2007. Information Technology and 
The World Economy. German Economic Review 8(2): 125–45. 
https://doi.org/10.11111/j.1467-9442.2005.00430.x (accessed 
19 September 2020).
136 Macroeconomic Stabilization in the Digital Age
Kadiyala, K. R., and S. Karlsson. 1997. Numerical Methods for Estimation 
and Inference in Bayesian VAR-models. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics 12(2): 99–132.
Koop, G., and D. Korobilis. 2010. Bayesian Multivariate Time Series 
Methods for Empirical Macroeconomics. Foundations and Trends® 
in Econometrics 3(4): 267–358.
Layson, S. 1983. Homicide and Deterrence: Another View of the Canadian 
Time Series Evidence. Canadian Journal of Economics 16: 52–73.
Lee, E., and Yip, S. 2008. Liquidity and Risk Management in the RTGS 
System: The Hong Kong Experience. Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
Quarterly Bulletin (March): 1–4.
Lewis, M. K., and P. D. Mizen. 2000. Monetary Economics.  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Litterman, R. B. 1986. Forecasting with Bayesian Vector Autoregressions: 
Five Years of Experience. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 
4(1): 25–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/07350015.1986.10509491 
(accessed 19 September 2020).
Milbourne, R. 1986. Financial Innovation and The Demand for Liquid 
Assets: Note. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 18(4): 506–11.
Nsouli, S. M., and C. Fullenkamp. 2004. Six Puzzles in Electronic 
Money and Banking. IMF Working Papers WP/04/19. https://doi 
.org/10.5089/9781451843774.001 (accessed 19 September 2020).
Patterson, K. D. 2000. Which Vintage of Data to Use When There Are 
Multiple Vintages of Data?: Cointegration, Weak Exogeneity And 
Common Factors. Economics Letters 69(2): 115–21.
Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 2019. Payment and Settlement Systems in 
India: Vision-2021 Empowering Exceptional (E)payment Experience. 
New Delhi: Reserve Bank of India. 
Saldías, M. 2017. The Nonlinear Interaction Between Monetary Policy 
and Financial Stress. IMF Working Papers, WP/17/184. https://doi 
.org/10.5089/ 9781484313794.001 (accessed 19 September 2020).
Schumpeter, J. 1911. The Theory of Economic Development. Harvard 
Economic Studies. Vol. 46.
Silva, J. S., and F. N. Cardoso. 2001. The Chow-Lin Method Using 
Dynamic Models. Economic Modelling 18(2): 269–80.
Sims, C. A. 1972. Money, Income, and Causality. The American Economic 
Review: 62(4): 540–52.
____. 1980. Macroeconomics and Reality. Econometrica 48(1): 1–48. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2223855.
Sims, C. A., J. H., Stock, and M. W. Watson. 1990. Inference in Linear 
Time Series Models With Some Unit Roots. Econometrica: Journal 
of the Econometric Society 58(1): 113–44. 
Sims, C.A., and T. Zha. 1998. Bayesian Methods for Dynamic Multivariate 
Models. International Economic Review 39(4): 949–68.
A Multivariate Bayesian Vector Autoregression Analysis 
of Digital Payment Systems and Economic Growth in India 137
____. 1999. Error Bands for Impulse Responses. Econometrica 67(5): 
1113–55. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00071.
Spiegelhalter, D. J., N. G. Best, and B. P. Carlin. 2002. Bayesian Measures 
of Model Complexity and Fit. Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society: Series b (Statistical Methodology) 64, Part 4: 1–57. papers2://
publication/uuid/ D36F390C-E803-4A64-A6B2-EF72A6EB7B5F.
Thorbecke, W. 1997. On Stock Market Returns and Monetary Policy. 
Journal of Finance 52(2): 635–54. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540 
-6261.1997.tb04816.x.
Tule, M. K., and M. O. Oduh. 2017. Financial Innovations and The Future 
of Monetary Policy in Nigeria. Economics of Innovation and New 
Technology 26(5): 453–76. https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2016 
.1229854.
Yilmazkuday, H. 2011. Monetary Policy and Credit Cards: Evidence 
from a Small Open Economy. Economic Modelling 28(1–2): 201–10. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.econmod.2010.09.010.

PART II
Capital Flows  
and Systemic Risk  
in the Digital Age

 141
7
The Impact of Banking 
Integration on East Asian 
Commercial Banks
Dung Thuy Thi Nguyen, Ivan Diaz-Rainey, and Helen Roberts1
7.1 Introduction
Financial integration is the term used to refer to closely linked financial 
markets at the subnational, national, regional, or global level. It 
encapsulates concepts such as financial openness, free movement of 
capital, and integration of financial services (Agénor 2001; Fung, Tam, 
and Yu 2008). The key expected benefits of financial integration are 
efficient capital allocation and international risk-sharing; however, 
financial integration also poses substantial risks to a country’s 
financial and macroeconomic stability, including capital volatility and 
the transmission of shocks across markets (Agénor 2001; Allen et al. 
2011).  The dual nature of financial integration means that academic 
researchers, financial sector practitioners, and policy makers are all 
challenged by the longstanding question: “How can a country maximize 
the benefits and mitigate the costs of financial integration to ensure its 
financial and macroeconomic stability?”
Across the finance industry, the banking sector best illustrates 
both the potential costs and benefits of financial integration (World 
Bank 2018). Research dedicated to international banking activities has 
1 We sincerely thank participants at the Asian Development Bank Institute conference 
on “Macroeconomic Stabilization in the Digital Age” (2019), the Vietnam Symposium 
in Banking and Finance (VSBF 2018 and 2019), the New Zealand Finance Colloquium 
(NZFC 2019), the Financial Markets and Corporate Governance conference (FMCG 
2018), and seminar participants at the University of Otago, Vietnam National 
Economics University, and the Vietnam National University for providing useful 
comments on the three empirical studies (Nguyen et al. 2020a; Nguyen et al. 
2020b; Nguyen et al. 2020c) summarized in this chapter. The first author gratefully 
acknowledges the Otago Doctoral Scholarship that financed her doctoral study. 
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produced inconclusive evidence. On the positive side, foreign bank 
presence induces technological know-how and management expertise, 
thereby leading to a more competitive and efficient banking sector for 
the host countries (Claessens, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Huizinga 2001). 
Similarly, foreign capital channeled by international banks enables 
funding diversification and risk-sharing (Allen et al. 2011). On the 
negative side, local market consolidation because of fierce competition 
with foreign banks can lower overall bank efficiency (Casu and Girardone 
2009). Excessive liquidity because of capital inflows leads local banks to 
take risks (Acharya and Naqvi 2012). On balance, some research suggests 
that institutional quality (Mian 2006; Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta 
2008) and financial development (Kose, Prasad, and Taylor 2011) serve 
as essential prerequisites for a country to reap net benefits from banking 
integration. 
The latest reversal and regionalization trends in the international 
banking landscape following the global financial crisis further motivate 
the examination of the long-standing research concern from two new 
perspectives, namely the level and the types of banking integration. 
Specifically, the first trend is the reversal in international banking activities 
that is mainly observed in developed countries (World Bank 2018). Figure 
7.1 documents the substantial decline experienced by the foreign banking 
claims on high-income Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development countries during the post-crisis period. Further, a series 
of financial crises in the 1990s made the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) soften their insistence on full financial liberalization, i.e., the so-
called institutional view (IMF 2012). Taken together, the recent reversal 
following the global financial crisis increases the attention given to the 
level of banking integration and, in particular, identifying the point 
beyond which its costs outweigh its benefits.
Figure 7.1 also shows that, in contrast to the retrenchment 
among developed countries, the post-crisis period has witnessed the 
expansion of international banks from other regions. These emerging 
international banks have started expanding primarily within their 
region of origin (Claessens and Van Horen 2015). This is described as 
the trend of regionalization in the post-crisis international banking 
landscape (World Bank 2018). As the potential benefits and costs of 
financial regionalization remain largely unknown (World Bank 2018), 
the impact of different types of banking integration with regard to their 
geographical origination should be thoroughly examined.  
Another related lens to view the foreign banking capital is its methods 
of extension. Specifically, international banks can extend foreign claims 
across borders or use local affiliates set up by international banks in 
the recipient countries. As seen in Figure 7.2, local claims, which carry 
more knowledge than cross-border claims, were resilient during the 
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Figure 7.1: Foreign Banking Claims on  
Counterparty Regions in the World 
($ billion)
EU = European Union, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Source: Compiled from Bank for International Settlements’ Consolidated Banking Statistics on 
Immediate Counterparty basis (BIS-IC), bank type “All excluding 4C banks, excluding domestic 
position”.
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Figure 7.2: Foreign Banking Claims (Classified by Methods of 
Extension) on High-Income OECD and East Asia Pacific Region 
($ billion)
OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Source: Compiled from Bank for International Settlements’ Consolidated Banking Statistics on 
Ultimate Risk basis (CBS-UR), bank type “Domestic banks, excluding domestic position”.
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global financial crisis.  The variation in resilience is another motive for 
studying the impact of different types of banking integration with regard 
to their methods of extension in addition to their geographical source 
(regionalization). 
Following the recent reversal and regionalization trend of 
international banking activities, this chapter reveals the impact of 
banking integration on the banking sector from three studies (Nguyen 
et al. 2020a; Nguyen et al. 2020b; Nguyen et al. 2020c). Specifically, 
the first study (Nguyen et al. 2020a) explores the non-monotonic 
relationship between banking integration and bank cost efficiency. The 
second study (Nguyen et al. 2020b) examines the impact of different 
types of banking integration, i.e., classified by their geographical origin 
and methods of extension bank default risk. Finally, the third study 
(Nguyen et al. 2020c) brings together issues related to the impact of 
natural disasters and banking integration. As shown in Figure 7.3, Asia 
has borne a considerable share of damage from natural disasters. Given 
the potential impact of disastrous events on the banking and financial 
system, the final study investigates the impact of natural disasters on a 
broad range of bank performance measures and, in particular, explores 
whether banking integration moderates these impacts.
The chapter focuses on commercial banks in East Asia. The 1997 
Asian financial crisis led to high-profile bank defaults and a painful 
economic contraction in many East Asian economies (ADB 2008). 
Despite this troubled history, banking integration in the region 
has reached a new level of development, especially after the global 
financial crisis (Figure 7.1). More interestingly, East Asian countries 
Figure 7.3: The Global Economic Damage of Natural Disasters  
($ billion) and the Asian Share of Those Damages (%)
Source: Compiled from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT). https://www.emdat.be/ 
(accessed 20 September 2020).
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
100
200
300
400
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
Global costs (left-hand axis) Asian share (right-hand axis)
The Impact of Banking Integration on East Asian Commercial Banks 145
are proactively promoting intraregional integration (ADB 2018). These 
features highlight the region as an important case to examine. 
To address their research concerns, three studies employ different 
econometric methods. In the first study (Nguyen et al. 2020a), stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) consistently reports the non-monotonic impact 
of banking integration on bank cost efficiency. This result suggests that a 
healthy amount of banking integration is likely to be beneficial for bank 
cost efficiency. Given this finding, the revision by policy makers, such 
as the IMF, about the need for full capital financial liberalization would 
seem to be justified—crudely put, banking integration is a good thing 
but only up to a point. The chapter also investigates the optimal degree 
of banking integration. As studies about the IMF’s institutional view 
mainly focus on the effect of capital management tools and the impact 
of foreign capital flows on financial crisis (Kawai and Takagi 2010; 
Guichard 2017), the point that financial liberalization, generally, and 
banking integration specifically, should be pursued remains ambiguous 
in the academic literature—an important gap that is addressed in this 
chapter. 
Employing the system generalized method of moments (GMM) 
modelling technique, the second study (Nguyen et al. 2020b) reports 
that neighboring foreign capital is associated with lower information 
asymmetry and is beneficial to the financial stability of recipient 
countries. Neighboring foreign capital is extended either by banks 
from other Asian countries or foreign affiliates of international banks 
established in the recipient countries. These results highlight that 
regionalism still matters even as Asian financial systems and banks 
become more digital (McKinsey and Company 2018; Ernst and Young 
2018).2  Further, these results are proven to hold even during the 
periods of local shocks following natural disasters as reported by the 
third study summarized in this chapter (Nguyen et al. 2020c). We 
report that foreign banking claims extended by Asian neighbors prove 
to be an alternative source of finance to support the post-disaster 
recovery process. In short, these findings imply that distance matters 
to international banking activities. 
Overall, the book chapter highlights the importance of the level 
and type of banking integration. Existing research, notably Mian 
(2006), Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2008), and Kose, Prasad, and 
Taylor (2011) suggests that countries should meet a certain threshold of 
2 McKinsey and Company (2018) reports that, in Asia, digital transactions are 1.6 to 
5 times as frequent as branch transactions during the surveyed period of 2014–17. 
Financial institutions associated with members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations members also have high digital adoption rate; 45.6% of these institutions 
have initiated digital projects (Ernst and Young 2018).
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institutional quality and financial development to reap the net benefits 
of financial integration. Given the findings from this chapter, in response 
to the longstanding question of “How could a country maximize benefits 
and mitigate the costs of financial integration to ensure its financial 
and macroeconomic stability?”, policy makers and practitioners can 
find their answers by further examining the level and type of banking 
integration, respectively. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.2 reviews the literature 
related to the three studies. Methodology, data, and sample information 
is described in Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5, respectively. Section 7.6 presents 
and discusses the key findings. Section 7.7 contains concluding remarks.
7.2 Literature Review
7.2.1  The Impact of Banking Integration  
on Bank Cost Efficiency
The first study (Nguyen et al. 2020a) tests whether a non-monotonic 
relationship between banking integration and bank cost efficiency 
exists. There have been arguments, theoretical models, and propositions 
advanced in the literature that suggest a non-monotonic impact of 
financial integration on bank performance. For example, based on 
portfolio diversification theory, Allen et al. (2011) hypothesize that the 
marginal benefits of integration diminish while its marginal costs rise 
as the level of financial integration increases. Following this hypothesis, 
there is an optimal level of financial integration such that additional 
integration efforts adversely impact capital allocation efficiency and 
international risk-sharing benefits. A mathematical model developed by 
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2016) proves that when a country passes a 
certain threshold of financial integration, it exposes itself to greater risk.
Empirical findings from the bank efficiency literature suggest 
a non-monotonic relationship between financial integration and 
cost efficiency. For instance, Fries and Taci (2005) suggest that the 
association between a country’s progress in banking reform and cost 
efficiency is nonlinear. Casu, Deng, and Ferrari (2017) find that financial 
liberalization improves bank cost efficiency; the effect is more evident 
in countries with pronounced regulatory change and less so in the case 
of limited liberalization. Unfortunately, these studies only highlight the 
potential existence of the non-monotonicity but do not formally test 
it. Additionally, these studies focus on the impact of financial reforms 
and financial liberalization, which are considered as a prerequisite for 
financial integration (Vo and Daly 2007; Kim and Lee 2008). The first 
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study addresses this important gap in the literature by formally testing, 
for the first time, the non-monotonic impact of banking integration on 
bank cost efficiency. 
7.2.2  Different Forms of Banking Integration  
and Their Impacts on Bank Default Risk
The second study examines the impact of foreign banking claims on 
bank default risk and whether the types of foreign banking claims 
(i.e., classified by their geographical origin and methods of extension) 
moderate that relationship.
With regard to the impact of foreign banking claims on bank default 
risk, the existing literature provides limited and contrasting findings. For 
instance, Dinger and Kaat (2017) report that inflows of foreign capital 
lead to higher impaired loans, while Karolyi, Sedunov, and Taboada 
(2018) show that cross-border banking flows lower systemic risk in the 
banking sector. To shed more light on the impact of foreign banking 
claims on bank default risk, the second study provides additional 
evidence from East Asia,  a dynamic and growing region, which relies 
increasingly on foreign claims from international banks (Figure 7.1). 
After establishing the baseline result, the study explores the impact 
of different types of foreign banking claims classified by their lenders’ 
nationality and methods of extension. Concerning the former, foreign 
banking claims are extended either by regional (Asian) lenders or by 
distant (non-Asian) lenders. Regarding the latter, foreign claims are 
extended via local affiliates set up by international banks in the recipient 
countries or extended by international banks across borders 
We propose that each type of capital is associated with different 
levels of information asymmetry. Specifically, regional (Asian) claims 
face less information asymmetry in comparison with their non-Asian 
counterparts due to the geographical, cultural, and institutional 
proximity between Asian lenders and their regional borrowers (Mian 
2006; Claessens and Van Horen 2014). Similarly, the extension of funds 
via local affiliates rather than across borders involves some forms of 
foreign direct investment (García-Herrero and Martínez Pería 2007), 
which also helps to obtain local knowledge. Therefore, the information 
advantage associated with regional claims and local claims arguably 
creates an effective discipline mechanism and a strong competitive 
pressure over banks in the recipient countries, thus leading to lower risk-
taking behavior. Although the rationale for expecting the preferential 
impact of regional claims and local claims is highly intuitive, there is 
currently no research that has investigated this possibility. Therefore, 
the second study addresses this important gap in the literature.
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7.2.3  The Moderating Role of Banking Integration  
on the Relationship between Natural Disasters  
and Bank Performance
The third study summarized in this chapter (Nguyen et al. 2020c) 
examines the impact of natural disasters on a broad range of bank 
performance measures before investigating the moderating effect of 
foreign banking claims on that relationship. The study then explores 
whether the moderating role varies by several types of foreign banking 
claims classified by lenders’ nationality and methods of extension, as in 
the second analysis.
Cross-country analyses are rare in studying the impact of natural 
disasters on the banking sector. Prior studies include Klomp (2014) and 
Brei, Mohan, and  Strobl (2019), which report the negative impact of 
disasters on the aggregated country-level measures of bank performance. 
The third study augments these by examining the impact of disasters on 
various measures of bank-level performance (including deposits ratio, 
liquidity, credit risk, profitability, and default risk).    
The unconstrained and immediate access to finance is important 
for post-disaster recovery. Bank deposits and credit, insurance, and 
government support are key domestic sources of finance post-disaster; 
additionally, foreign capital could serve as an alternative post-disaster 
funding source in times of local shocks (Noy 2009). However, the 
literature provides opposing predictions on the potential moderating 
role of banking integration. On the one hand, foreign banking capital 
could compensate for the volatility of domestic credit (De Haas and 
Van Lelyveld 2006; Allen et al. 2011), thus assisting the post-disaster 
recovery. On the other hand, the likelihood of associated international 
capital outflows (Yang 2008; David 2011) could amplify the shortage 
of funds, thereby slowing down the recovery process. This study aims 
to confirm which effect is present (or is dominant) for the case of 
commercial banks located in the disaster-prone region of East Asia.
As postulated in the second study, each type of foreign banking 
claim is associated with a different level of information asymmetry. 
More specifically, the neighboring claims that are either regional (Asian) 
claims or local claims are associated with lower information asymmetry. 
The information advantage is crucial to maintaining the credit supply, 
as lenders face severe information asymmetry when disasters destroy 
customer information as well as collateral (Chavaz 2014; Cortés and 
Strahan 2017). Relying on this line of argument, the third study re-
investigates the preferential effect of neighboring claims in moderating 
the relationship between disasters and bank performance.
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7.3 Model Specification and Estimation Method
7.3.1  Bank Cost Efficiency and Determinants of Inefficiency
Bank efficiency is defined as the distance to a best-performance frontier 
that is not explained by statistical noise. SFA is a well-established 
empirical approach for measuring bank efficiency, which allows a 
single-step approach to estimate the best-practice frontier and the 
determinants of the inefficiency term. More specifically, the chapter 
applies  the SFA non-monotonic efficiency effect model developed by 
Wang (2002). The model is presented in the context of panel data as 
follows:
 TCit = f (Wit; Qit) + vit + uit (1)
 uit ∼ N+ (μit, σ2it ); vit ∼ N (0, σ2v) 
 uit = δ0 + δZit (2)
 σ2it = exp (γ0 + γZit) (3)
where TCit is the total cost for bank i at time t; Wit and Qit are, respectively, 
vectors of input prices and outputs; vit is a normally distributed error term 
with zero mean and variance (σ 2v); and the non-negative component uit 
follows a truncated normal distribution with an observation-specific 
mean (μit) and variance (σ 2it) that measures the inefficiency term. 
As presented in Equations 2 and 3, the model allows both the mean 
and variance of the pre-truncated distribution to be expressed as the 
function of some environmental variables (Zit). The non-monotonic 
impact of a Zit variable is measured by its marginal effect on the 
inefficiency term.3 The non-monotonicity means that Zit can positively 
(negatively) affect the mean and variance of the inefficiency term 
when its values are within a certain range, and then change to negative 
(positive) for values outside the range. In linear efficiency effect models, 
the impact of Zit is either positive or negative, but not both.
3 The marginal effect depends on the slope coefficients from both the mean and the 
variance functions (as presented in Equations 2 and 3) and an adjustment function. 
To make statistical inferences, the standard error and confidence interval of the 
marginal effect are obtained by bootstrapping. For the detailed equations, please see 
Wang (2002).
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The parameters of the model are estimated by the maximum 
likelihood method. Specifically, Equation 1 is specified in the trans-log 
functional form with two outputs and three input prices to represent 
the underlying cost structure of the banking industry. With respect to 
the function of the level and variance of the inefficiency term given by 
Equations 2 and 3, the environmental group of variables Zit, include 
several bank-specific, country-specific and event-specific variables in 
addition to banking integration indicators. Please refer to Appendix 7.1 
for the detailed specification of these equations and Appendix 7.2 for the 
definition of variables. 
7.3.2  Different Forms of Banking Integration  
and Their Impacts on Bank Default Risk
The second study adopts a dynamic specification to examine the impact 
of banking integration on bank default risk. More specifically, the first-
order dynamic model of bank default risk is specified as in Equation 4.
 RISKijt = β0 RISKijt-1+ β1 INTEGjt + βk BANKkijt 
 + βm COUNTRY
m
jt + θi + γj + µt + εijt   (4)
The default risk (measured via the distance to default z-score) of 
bank i in year t for country j is written as a function of its past level, 
banking integration (INTEG), a vector of k bank-level variables 
reflecting the characteristics of each bank i (BANK), and a vector of m 
variables reflecting the macroeconomic condition to all banks including 
bank regulation and supervision (COUNTRY) for any given country j. θi 
is the bank- specific fixed effect to control for unobserved time-invariant 
factors for each bank. γj and µt are the country and time dummies, 
respectively; εijt is the error term. The definitions and construction 
details for all variables are provided in Appendix 7.2.
To examine the impact of different types of banking integration, 
the aggregate measure of banking integration (INTEGjt) in Equation 4 
is replaced by the specific measure to represent the Asian claims, non-
Asian claims, local claims and cross-border claims, respectively. 
To estimate the dynamic model presented in Equation 4, the chapter 
employs the two-step system GMM developed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
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7.3.3  The Moderating Role of Banking Integration  
on the Relationship between Natural Disasters  
and Bank Performance
Similar to the second study, a dynamic panel data model of bank 
performance ratios is constructed to reveal the short-term and 
contemporaneous response of banks toward disasters. The two-step 
system GMM is also used to estimate this dynamic relationship. 
 Yijt = β0Yijt-1+ β1DAMAGEjt + β2INTEGjt + βkBANKkijt 
 + βmCOUNTRYmjt+ θi+ γj+ µt+ εijt (5)
Yijt is the dependent variable (such as deposits ratio, liquidity, credit 
risk, profitability, and distance to default) for bank i in country j at time t. 
Other notations remain unchanged from Equation 4. The variable of 
interest is DAMAGE; its coefficient β1 reflects the relation between bank 
response and contemporaneous shocks from disasters occurring in year 
t. The definitions and construction details for all variables are provided 
in Appendix 7.2.
Equation 6 examines the moderating role of banking integration 
on the relationship between natural disasters and bank performance, 
by including the interaction term between the measures of banking 
integration (INTEG) and disasters impact (DAMAGE) in Equation 5:
 Yijt = β0Yijt-1 + β1 DAMAGEjt + β2 INTEGjt + β3 DAMAGEjt 
 * INTEGjt+ βk BANK
k
ijt + βm COUNTRYmjt + θi + γj + µt + εijt (6)
To examine the moderating role of each type of banking integration, 
the aggregate measure of banking integration in Equation 6 is estimated 
with specific factors to represent the Asian, non-Asian, local and cross-
border claims, respectively. 
7.4 Banking Integration Measures and Data 
The first study measures the level of banking integration (i.e., INTEGjt) 
by the foreign bank penetration and the receipt of foreign banking 
capital. The percentage of foreign banks relative to the total number of 
banks in a country (FOR) proxies for the former. The data for foreign 
bank ownership are sourced from Claessens and Van Horen (2015). FOR 
has been widely studied as a determinant of bank efficiency (Lensink, 
Meesters, and Naaborg 2008; Pasiouras, Tanna, and Zopoinidis 2009). 
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Another measure is the foreign claims of international banks on a 
country to the gross domestic product (GDP) of that country (CLAIM). 
The data of the foreign claims are sourced from the Consolidated Banking 
Statistics (CBS) on Intermediate Counterparty basis (IC) published by the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS).4 Foreign claims are originally 
reported on a quarterly basis. The chapter estimates annual claims by 
taking the stock data on the last quarter of each year in the sampled period. 
Bilateral claims of a source-recipient country pair are then aggregated by 
the recipient country. After these steps, the year- and country-level claims 
on each of the sampled countries are obtained. The foreign claims are then 
scaled by the GDP of the corresponding sampled countries to construct 
the variable CLAIM. In short, CLAIM is relevant to assess the size of the 
international banking activities of one country in comparison with its 
GDP. Higher values of CLAIM are associated with more participation in 
the international banking activities and greater banking integration.  
For the second and third studies, the chapter only focuses on 
the receipt of foreign banking claims as the main measure of banking 
integration. Specifically, being extended by all lenders regardless of their 
nationality or methods of extension, CLAIM is regarded as the aggregate 
measure of banking integration. To classify the total foreign claims by 
lenders’ nationality, the chapter draws data on the Asian claims and non-
Asian claims from the CBS-IC report. To break down the foreign claims 
by the methods of extension, data for local claims and cross-border claims 
are sourced from the CBS on Ultimate Risk (CBS-UR) basis.5 Following 
the same procedure of construction as CLAIM, these statistics are then 
scaled by the GDP of the sampled countries to construct the variables, 
namely ASIAN, NON_ASIAN, LOCAL, and CROSS, respectively.6
4 Though not originally designed with the borrower perspective in mind, BIS CBS 
statistics are one of the few publicly available sources to provide information on 
the reliance of a borrower country on foreign bank credit (Cerutti, Claessens, and 
McGuire 2012). However, one limitation of CBS is that its data are subject to break-
in-series and exchange-rate adjustment. To rule out this concern, following Karolyi 
et al. (2018), we checked and ensured that the reported statistics for the sampled 
countries do not exceed 100% increase in their absolute values. 
5 The CBS-UR separately reports cross-border claims and local claims while the 
CBS-IC does not provide a clear-cut distinction between these two measures. There 
are additional differences in the reporting basis of CBS-IC and CBS-UR. For instance, 
while CBS-IC looks at the immediate relationship between borrowers and lenders, 
CBS-UR tracks the counterparty who is ultimately responsible for servicing any 
outstanding obligations in the event of a default by the immediate borrower (BBIS 
2015). Since July 2019, CBS-UR changed its name to CBS on a guarantor basis (CBSG) 
to closely reflect its nature of reporting. Furthermore, CBS-UR is only available since 
2005, while CBS-IC is available since the 1980s. 
6 Please refer to Appendix 7.3, Panel B and C, for the descriptive statistics of these 
measures.
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7.5 Sample
The chapter focuses on commercial banks in East Asia; however, due to 
data availability, there are slight variations in the samples used for each 
study. Specifically, an unbalanced sample of 3,628 bank-year observations 
(about 386 banks) from nine economies (including the People's Republic 
of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Malaysia; the Philippines; the 
Republic of Korea; Singapore; Thailand; and Viet  Nam) during the 
period 1997–2014 is examined in the first study (Nguyen et al. 2020a). An 
unbalanced sample of 2,280 bank-year observations (about 393 banks) 
over the period 1999–2014 is applied to the second study (Nguyen et al. 
2020b); Viet Nam is dropped from the list of the sampled countries.7 A 
sample of 2,219 commercial bank-year observations (about 379 banks) 
for the period 1999–2014 is analyzed in the third study (Nguyen et al. 
2020c); Singapore is dropped from the list of the sampled countries.8 
Bank-level data are obtained from Bankscope. Banks with less than 
three consecutive years of available financial data for all bank-specific 
variables are excluded. All mergers and acquisitions and bank failures 
during the sample period are accounted for in the dataset so that both 
active and inactive banks are included to avoid survivorship bias. All 
bank-level data are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5th percentile. 
7.6 Key Findings
7.6.1  The Non-Monotonic Impact of Banking Integration 
on Bank Cost Efficiency
The first study tests whether the non-monotonic impact of banking 
integration on bank cost efficiency exists (Nguyen et al. 2020a). Table 7.1 
reports the sample mean of the marginal effect of banking integration 
indicators on the inefficiency term, as well as the average marginal 
effect of the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile (ordered by value 
7 Bank regulation and supervision are among important determinants of bank risks 
(Laeven and Levin 2009), thus the sample of the second study relies on availability 
of this data. Accordingly, the examined period starts from 1999, which is the first 
available year of regulation data. Comparing the country sample used in the first 
study, Viet Nam is removed due to the unavailability of regulation data. Otherwise, 
the sample remains unchanged.
8 Comparing to the second study, the list of countries remains unchanged except for 
Singapore, which reported no natural disasters.
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of the marginal effect).9 The change in the sign of the marginal effect 
across the percentiles illustrates the non-monotonic impact of banking 
integration on cost inefficiency. The marginal effect of CLAIM reported 
in Column 1 (Panel A) is taken as an example. At the 25th percentile, a 
1-percentage-point increase in CLAIM reduces total cost approximately 
9 The marginal impact of other environmental variables is not reported to save space, 
but available on request. 
Table 7.1: The Non-Monotonic Impact of Banking Integration  
Indicators on the Inefficiency Term
Statistics
The marginal impact of CLAIM The marginal impact of FOR
on E(u) on V(u) on E(u) on V(u)
Panel A: The whole sample
INTEG
Average -0.0036** 0.0004 -0.0021** 0.0010
25th per. -0.0067** -0.0009 -0.0042*** -0.0009
50th per. -0.0024** -0.0004 -0.0003  0.0002
75 per. -0.0003 0.0002 0.0018**  0.0013**
90 per. 0.0018** 0.0016*** 0.0045***  0.0037***
Panel B: The low-integration group countries
INTEG
Average -0.0069*** 0.0058*** 0.0020 0.0010*
25th per. -0.0320*** 0.0010*** -0.0038*** -0.0006
50th per. -0.0060*** 0.0020***  0.0008  0.0007
75th per. 0.0077*** 0.0042***  0.0033  0.0021
90th per. 0.0239*** 0.0172***  0.0054**  0.0040**
Notes: This table reports the marginal impact of banking integration indicators (at the average, 25th, 50th, 
75th, and 90th percentile levels ordered by the value of the marginal effect) on the mean and variance of 
the inefficiency term, i.e., E(uit) and V(uit), respectively. The significance levels are calculated based on 
the bootstrapping confidence intervals and standard errors produced from 1,000 replications. ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. CLAIM refers to the foreign 
claims of international banks on a country as compared to the gross domestic product of that country. FOR 
refers to the percentage of foreign banks relative to the total number of banks in a country.
Source: Nguyen et al. (2020a)
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by 0.67%.10 As we move from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, 
the benefit diminishes substantially. At the 90th percentile, an increase 
in CLAIM increases total cost approximately by 0.18%. In the case of 
FOR (reported in Column 3), the efficiency reduction starts at the 75th 
percentile. 
To assist the interpretation of the findings, the top left-hand panel 
of Figure 7.4 identifies the turning point of the marginal effect when the 
value of CLAIM reaches 100%. This means that policy makers should be 
concerned when the foreign banking claims reach this level, as they may 
become detrimental to cost efficiency. Similarly, the level of inefficiency 
rises (see the top right-hand panel of Figure 7.4) when more than 40% of 
banks are owned by foreign investors. 
To summarize, the results imply that initially, the foreign banking 
capital and foreign bank presence provide competitive incentives for 
managers to be cost-effective (Lin, Doan, and Doong 2016; Casu et 
al. 2017). However, at higher levels of banking integration, additional 
costs will be incurred from updating bank products and services to 
keep up with greater competition or managing excess risk-taking 
behavior due to the open financial market (Fries and Taci 2005; 
Lensink,  Meesters, and Naaborg 2008; Casu and Girardone 2009). 
These findings support the theoretical prediction of Allen et al. (2011) 
on the non-monotonic impact of banking integration on bank cost 
efficiency (see Section 2.1).
Regarding the impact of CLAIM (FOR) on the variance of the 
inefficiency term (as reported in Columns 2 and 4), only the positive 
impact is significant. Cost performance becomes more variable for 
banks operating in more competitive and financially integrated systems. 
As seen in Panel B of Table 7.1, the non-monotonicity still holds when 
Wang’s 2002 model is applied for the low-group countries (specifically, 
all the sampled countries excluding the two financial centers Hong 
Kong, China; and Singapore).11 This is to address the concern that the 
non-monotonic relationship between banking integration and cost 
10 The negative sign of the marginal effect of the Z variable on E(u) implies that Z 
does not cause an overuse of inputs, which in turn helps to lower costs (and vice 
versa). In other words, the negative sign indicates the decrease in inefficiency level, 
which suggests an increase in cost efficiency. With regard to the economic impact, 
the percentage increase in costs due to inefficiency could be obtained based on the 
approximation formula: u=ln (actual cost/minimum cost). For instance, the average 
marginal effect of the first quantile is (-0.0067); this means that a 1-percentage-point 
increase in CLAIM is translated into a (0.0067*100) 0.67% decrease in total cost. 
11 Panel A of Appendix 7.3 provides descriptive statistics to highlight the heterogeneity 
in the level of banking integration among the sampled countries. 
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Figure 7.4: The Non-Monotonic Impact of Banking Integration 
Indicators on Bank Cost Efficiency
CLAIM refers to the foreign claims of international banks on a country as compared to the gross domestic 
product of that country. FOR refers to the percentage of foreign banks relative to the total number of banks 
in a country.
Source: Nguyen et al. (2020a).
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efficiency may originate from the heterogeneity in the level of banking 
integration between the two groups of countries (low-integration and 
high-integration). Moreover, the lower panels of Figure 7.4 indicate that 
the turning point for the marginal impact of CLAIM on the inefficiency 
level occurs at 55%, while the turning point for FOR remains at 40%.
7.6.2  Different Forms of Banking Integration  
and Their Impacts on Bank Default Risk
The second study (Nguyen et al. 2020a) examines the impact of foreign 
banking claims on bank default risk and whether the types of foreign 
banking claims moderate that relationship. Table 7.2 reports key findings 
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Table 7.2: The Impact of Foreign Banking Claims and  
Its Components On Bank Default Risk
        (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)
L.LN(zscore) 0.423*** 0.460*** 0.434*** 0.464*** 0.455***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
CLAIM 0.046*
  (0.02)
ASIAN 0.071**
  (0.03)
NON_ASIAN 0.013
(0.03)
LOCAL 0.101**
(0.04)
CROSS 0.046
(0.05)
Bank-level 
control 
variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-
level control 
variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -6.383* 0.246 -3.777 -15.697* -4.613
(3.58) (3.02) (4.17) (8.53) (6.40)
# Obs.       836    836      836     615    615
# Banks       202    202      202     156    156
# IV       100    100      100     80    80
AR(2) test  
(p value)
0.342 0.308 0.397 0.103 0.150
Hansen-J test 
(p value)
0.602 0.643 0.655 0.509 0.415
Notes: The table reports the impact of banking integration on bank default risk from Equation 4. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Z-score to proxy for bank default risk (LN(zscore)). Banking 
integration indicators include CLAIM, ASIAN and NON_ASIAN, and LOCAL and CROSS. Bank-level 
control variables include bank size (SIZE), equity ratio (CAP), credit risk (CRERISK), cost management 
ratio (COST), income diversification (INC_DIV), bank charter value (CHARTER), market concentration 
(CON), and a dummy variable to proxy for bank ownership (ODUM). Country-level control variables 
include gross domestic product growth rate (GDP), the inflation rate (IFL),  interest rates (INT), financial 
development (PRICE), dummies to proxy for a bank crisis (CRISIS) and insurance scheme (INS), and 
regulation and supervision variables (ACT, SUP, and PRIMON). For the definition and construction of 
these variables, see Appendix 7.2.  Bank FE, country and time dummies are included, but not reported 
to save space. All models are estimated by the system generalized method of movements. The robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.
Source: Nguyen et al. (2020b).
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for these research concerns. As seen in Column 1, the coefficient of 
CLAIM is positive and significant. This implies that banking integration 
is associated with the increase in bank Z-score (or reduction in bank 
default risk). The significant and positive coefficients of ASIAN and 
LOCAL, reported in Columns 2 and 4, contrast with the coefficients for 
NON_ASIAN and CROSS, reported in Columns 3 and 5. These results 
imply that Asian claims and local claims contribute to the higher stability 
of banks in the recipient countries.12 Overall, these findings confirm the 
link between lower information asymmetry and regional lending as well 
as local affiliates-based lending.  
7.6.3  The Moderating Role of Banking Integration  
on the Relationship between Natural Disasters  
and Bank Performance
The third study (Nguyen et al. 2020c) examines the impact of natural 
disasters on a broad range of bank performance measures before 
investigating the moderating effect of foreign banking claims as well as 
their components (i.e., classified by lenders’ nationality and methods 
of extension) on that relationship. Table 7.3 presents our key findings. 
From Column 1 of Table 7.3, disasters significantly lower the deposits 
ratio.13 The result is consistent with evidence of deposit withdrawal 
in the small Eastern Caribbean islands following disasters reported by 
Brei, Mohan, and  Strobl (2019). The finding implies that depositors in 
East Asian countries withdraw cash from banks to cope with losses. 
As seen in Column 2, the coefficient of the interaction term between 
CLAIM and DAMAGE is significant and positive, indicating that the 
total foreign banking claims help to alleviate the bank deposit decline 
during the aftermath of disasters. The result suggests that foreign 
banking claims serve as an alternative source of finance (in addition to 
bank deposits) to support the post-disaster recovery of households and 
firms.
Columns 3 to 6 report the detailed evidence of the moderating 
impact of foreign claims classified by the lenders’ nationality. The 
coefficient for the interaction term between ASIAN and DAMAGE 
12 These findings also hold for the sub-sample of low-integration countries (i.e., the 
whole sample except for Hong Kong, China; and Singapore). These findings are not 
reported but available upon request. 
13 Other than deposits ratio, this study finds no significant impact of disasters on 
liquidity, credit risk, profitability, and default risk. This finding implies that the East 
Asian commercial banking system has become more resilient after the Asian financial 
crisis. These results are not reported but available upon request. 
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reported in Column 4 is significant and positive. This contrasts with the 
insignificance of non-Asian claims reported in Column 6. The significant 
Asian interaction term suggests that Asian claims help to alleviate the 
decline in bank deposits ratio following disasters.
Columns 7 to 10 report the models estimated when the total foreign 
banking claims are classified into local claims and cross-border claims. 
Reported in Columns 8 and 10, the coefficients for the interaction 
terms between either LOCAL or CROSS and DAMAGE are positive 
as expected; however, the standard errors are quite large, making the 
coefficients insignificant. This could be due to the lack of variation in 
the response of local claims and cross-border claims to natural disasters. 
Overall, the evidence on the moderating role of both local and cross-
border claims is unclear.
7.7 Conclusion
The chapter summarizes three empirical studies that examine the 
impact of banking integration, with a focus on the level and type of 
integration and the moderating impact of natural disasters. The first 
study (Nguyen et al. 2020a) consistently reports the non-monotonic 
impact of banking integration on bank cost efficiency. Specifically, while 
banking integration initially improves bank cost efficiency, it eventually 
reduces it. Turning points of the non-monotonicity occur when more 
than 40% of banks are foreign and the foreign claims of international 
banks exceed 100% of GDP. In the sub-sample of low-integration 
countries, the turning point of the foreign bank ratio is 40% and the 
foreign banking claims ratio is 55%. These findings can inform national 
policy makers in East Asia concerning the degree country-level financial 
integration. In the wider context of financial globalization, these findings 
provide empirical evidence to support the more nuanced policy toward 
the full capital financial liberalization adopted by the IMF. 
Our second study (Nguyen et al. 2020b) finds that banking 
integration lowers bank default risk in the recipient countries. The 
impact is primarily driven by the foreign claims either extended by 
regional (Asian) lenders or via local affiliates of international banks. The 
preferential impact of regional claims points to the benefit of financial 
regionalization since close proximity between lenders and borrowers 
alleviates information asymmetry, allowing for effective monitoring and 
disciplining of the loan relationship. The presence of international banks 
through local affiliates in the recipient countries and the extension of 
funds via this channel also leads to an equivalent impact. These two 
options of the neighboring foreign claims are complementary, providing 
East Asian policy makers with flexibility in their choice of preferred form 
of banking integration. Future research could examine whether this 
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result also holds for digital institutions. Intuitively, fintech companies 
providing banking services via online platforms (i.e. peer-to-peer 
lending) rather than the traditional brick-and-mortar approach may 
face different types and levels of information asymmetry (Yan, Yu, and 
Zhao 2015; Cummins et al. 2019). Empirical validation of this argument 
can inform policy concerning digital-era banking and financial stability. 
Notwithstanding this suggestion, it is clear that Asian financial systems 
have become more digital generally (McKinsey and Company 2018; 
Ernst and Young 2018); yet our evidence shows that regionalism still 
matters even as financial systems have become more digital.
The third study (Nguyen et al. 2020b) finds that natural disasters 
significantly lower the bank deposits ratio. Further, it shows that 
foreign banking claims, specifically those extended by regional (Asian) 
lenders, help to alleviate the decline in deposits in the aftermath 
of natural disasters. These results highlight the role of commercial 
bank deposits and regional banking claims as sources of finance for 
post-disaster recovery. Accordingly, policy makers in East Asia have 
additional evidence to support the intra-regional financial integration; 
this recommendation is also robust during the episodes of local shocks.
Overall, the chapter generally points to the beneficial impacts 
of banking integration in terms of bank efficiency and stability. 
Furthermore, the chapter emphasizes the importance of considering the 
level and nature of banking integration to obtain such benefits. Findings 
from the chapters can assist policy makers to design their policy to reap 
net benefits from integration and maintain their financial stability.  
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Appendix 7.1: Model Specification  
of Bank Cost Efficiency 
The underlying cost structure of the banking industry is represented by 
the trans–log functional form. Equations 1, 2, and 3 are specified in the 
system of Equations A1, A2, and A3, respectively:
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 (A1)
  μit = δ0 + δ1 SIZEit + δ2 CRERISKit + δ3 CAPit + δ4 CONt  
+ δ5 INTEGt + δ6 IFLt + δ7 PRICREt + δ8YEAR1997 
+ δ9 YEAR1998 + δ10YEAR1999 + δ11YEAR2007  
+ δ12YEAR 2008+ δ13YEAR 2009 (A2)
  σ2it = exp (γ0 + γ1 SIZEit + γ2 CRERISKit + γ3 CAPit  
+ γ4 CONt + γ5 INTEGt + γ6 IFLt +γ7 PRICREt  
+γ8YEAR1997 + γ9YEAR1998 + γ10YEAR1999  
+ γ11YEAR2007 + 12YEAR2008 + γ13YEAR2009) (A3)
In addition to two outputs (q1, and 2) and three input prices (w1, 
w2, and w3), Equation A1 also includes the first- and second-order time 
trends (T and T2) to account for the effect of technological changes. A 
dummy variable (HIGH) is added to control for the difference between 
two groups, namely most countries in the sample and the two financial 
centers, Hong Kong, China; and Singapore. Following Fiordelisi, Marques-
Ibanez, and  Molyneux (2011) and Luo, Tanna, and De Vita (2016), the 
environmental group of variables Zit (in Equations A2 and A3) include 
bank-specific, country-specific and event-specific variables such as bank 
size (SIZE), credit risk (CRERISK), and equity capital ratio (CAP); market 
concentration (CON); banking integration indicators (INTEG); inflation 
(IFL) and credit to private sector (PRICRE); and year dummy variables to 
account for the effects of the Asian and global financial crisis. 
In several (unreported) robustness tests, additional control variables 
are included such as other measures of banking integration (i.e., TOTAL, 
KAOPEN) and regulation variables (i.e., REG, ACT). The detailed 
definition and specification of all variables are provided in Appendix 7.2.
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Appendix 7.2: Variables Definition  
and Specification
Variables Definition Source
Bank cost efficiency variables
TC Total costs= total interest expenses  
+ total non-interest expenses
Bankscope and 
author’s calculation
W1 Prices of funds = Total interest expenses/  
total customer deposits
Bankscope and 
author’s calculation
W2 Price of physical capital = Overhead expenses 
net of personnel expenses / Total assets
Bankscope and 
author’s calculation
W3 Price of labor = Personnel expenses/  
Total assets
Bankscope and 
author’s calculation
Q1 Output = Gross loans Bankscope
Q2 Output = Total securities Bankscope
Other bank-level variables
LN(zscore) Default risk = Natural logarithm of bank Z-score. 
Z-score = [ROA+ (Equity/total assets)]/  
[Std. (ROA)]. 
The Std. (ROA) is calculated over a three-year 
rolling window. 
Bankscope and 
author’s calculation
DEPO Deposits ratio = total customers deposits/  
total assets (%)
Bankscope and 
author’s calculation
ROA Profitability = Net Income/ Total assets (%) Bankscope 
CRERISK Credit risk = Non-performing loans/  
Gross loans (%)
Bankscope 
LIQ Liquidity = Liquid assets/deposits and  
short-term funding (%)
Bankscope
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets Bankscope and 
author’s calculation
CAP Equity ratio = total equity/ total assets (%) Bankscope and 
author’s calculation
INC_DIV Income diversification = (non-interest income/ 
total income) (%)
Bankscope and 
author’s calculation
COST Overhead cost = Total non-interest operating 
expenses/total assets (%)
Bankscope and 
author’s calculation
CHARTER Charter value = customer demand deposits/ 
total assets (%)
Bankscope and 
author’s calculation
LOANS Loans to assets = gross loans/ total assets (%) Bankscope and 
author’s calculation
CON Market concentration = Top 3 largest banks 
assets/ total banks assets (%)
Bankscope and 
author’s calculation
continued on next page
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Variables Definition Source
ODUM Foreign ownership equals 1, otherwise Claessens and  
Van Horen (2015)
Banking integration variables
FOR Numbers of foreign banks to Total number 
of banks (%)
Claessens and  
Van Horen (2015)
CLAIM Foreign claims extended by international banks/ 
GDP (%)
BIS CBS-IC
ASIAN Foreign claims extended by Asian international 
banks/ GDP (%)
BIS CBS-IC
NON_ASIAN Foreign claims extended by non-Asian 
international banks/ GDP (%)
BIS CBS-IC
CROSS Foreign claims extended across border by 
international banks/GDP (%)
BIS CBS-UR
LOCAL Foreign claims extended via local affiliates of 
international banks/GDP (%)
BIS CBS-UR
Country-level control variables
IFL Inflation rate = Annual % change of average 
consumer price index (%)
Global Financial 
Development (GFD)
GDP GDP growth rate = Annual % change of GDP (%) GFD
PRICRE Private credit to GDP = Bank credit to private 
sector/ GDP (%)
GFD
INT Real interest rate (%) World Development 
Indicator (WDI)
CRISIS Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the 
year of the financial crisis
Laeven and Valencia 
(2012)
INS Dummy variable to proxy for the deposit 
insurance coverage of a country. INS equals 1 
when the country has explicit deposit insurance 
and other wise  
Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Kane, and Laeven. 
(2014) 
HIGH A dummy variable equals 1 for countries with 
high level of integration (Hong Kong and 
Singapore); otherwise
The descriptive 
analysis of the 
sample
TOTAL Stocks of foreign assets and liabilities = the sum 
of the gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities 
to GDP
Lane and  
Milesi-Ferretti 
(2007)
KAOPEN Capital account openness Chinn and Ito 
(2008)
A 7.2 continued
continued on next page
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Variables Definition Source
REGQ Quality of regulation: The indicator measures 
the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote market competition and 
private sector development. The “estimate” 
score is used. Higher values mean higher quality 
of regulation.
World Governance 
Indicators (WGI)
ACT Overall restrictions on banking activities 
index measures the degree to which banks are 
allowed to engage in securities, insurance, real 
estate investment, and ownership of non-
financial firms. Higher value indicates more 
restrictiveness.
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2013)
SUP Supervisory power index measures whether the 
supervisory authorities have the authority to take 
specific actions to prevent and correct problems. 
Higher value denotes that supervisory agencies 
are authorized more oversight power.
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2013)
PRIMON Private monitoring index measures the degree 
of private monitoring which requires banks to 
release accurate and comprehensive information 
to the public. Higher value indicates greater 
regulatory empowerment of the monitoring of 
banks by private investors.
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2013)
Source: Authors.
A 7.2 continued
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Appendix 7.3: Descriptive Statistics for Banking 
Integration Indicators
Panel A
CLAIM (%) FOR (%)
Mean Std. Min Max Mean    Std. Min  Max
Full sample 34.31 42.74 3.36 290.07 28.26 15.82 0.00 76.00
High group 171.52 39.58 123.44 290.07 64.65 9.21 43.00 76.00
Low group 23.32 14.79 3.36 58.82 25.18 11.96 0.00 50.00
The table reports descriptive statistics for the banking integration indicators used in the first study. 
Nine economies (including the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Malaysia; 
Philippines; Republic of Korea; Singapore; Thailand; and Viet Nam) during 1997–2014 are sampled. The 
high–group economies include Hong Kong, China; and Singapore. The remaining economies are in the 
low group. Std. refers to standard deviation, Min and Max are the minimum and maximum observations 
for each variable in the sample. 
Panel B
Mean Std. Min Max
CLAIM (%) 28.136 38.240 3.357 290.071
ASIAN (%) 5.126 7.063 0.644 50.360
NON_ASIAN (%) 16.230 26.975 1.718 189.181
LOCAL (%) 14.388 27.132 1.446 186.572
CROSS (%) 8.035 7.915 1.761 50.262
The table reports descriptive statistics for the different types of banking integration measures used in the 
second study. Eight economies (including the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; 
Malaysia; Philippines; Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Thailand) during 1999–2014 are sampled. 
Std. refers to standard deviation, Min and Max are the minimum and maximum observations for each 
variable in the sample.
Panel C
Mean Std. Min Max
CLAIM (%) 25.043 33.933 3.357 290.071
ASIAN (%) 4.431 0.644 50.360 5.762
NON_ASIAN (%) 14.148 1.718 189.181 24.155
LOCAL (%) 13.071 1.446 25.906 186.572
CROSS (%) 7.443 1.761 6.891 50.262
The table reports descriptive statistics for the different types of banking integration measures used in the 
third study. Seven economies (including the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; 
Malaysia; Philippines; Republic of Korea; and Thailand) during 1999–2014 are sampled. Std. refers to 
standard deviation, Min and Max are the minimum and maximum observations for each variable in the 
sample.
Source: Authors.
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Does Fintech Contribute to 
Systemic Risk? Evidence from 
the United States and Europe
Lavinia Franco, Ana Laura García,  
Vigor Husetović, and Jessica Lassiter
8.1 Introduction
Since the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, systemic risk, how to 
recognize it, how to evaluate it, and how firms (specifically financial 
firms) can contribute to it have received considerable attention. We define 
systemic risk here following Das and Uppal (2004, 2810), who stated 
that systemic risk is, “the risk from infrequent events that are highly 
correlated across a large number of assets.” Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2016) developed a measure of systemic risk, ∆CoVaR, which shows the 
change in value at risk (VaR) of one institution or system based on the 
state of distress of another institution or system.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the fintech industry’s 
contribution to systemic risk in the United States (US) and in Europe 
by conducting a ∆CoVaR analysis of a sample of publicly traded fintech 
firms. As important as it was to evaluate the landscape of the financial 
system and factors such as systemic risk that contributed to the financial 
crisis, it is also important to remember that the landscape of financial 
institutions prior to the financial crisis has changed since that event. 
This is due in large part to the rise of financial technology, which has 
the potential to disrupt business models, transform processes, redefine 
customer relations, bypass, enhance, or change regulatory oversight, 
and provide new innovative products (Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation 2017). It is imperative to study and evaluate this changing 
landscape, particularly its effect on systemic risk.
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Fintech is a reference either to financial innovation itself—whether 
it emerged inside or outside the financial industry—or to institutional 
forms that engage in the use of fintech. In our analysis, we were 
interested in the second type: corporations utilizing fintech. Some 
recent innovations in fintech have been cryptocurrencies, blockchain, 
machine learning, artificial intelligence, robo-advising, peer-to-peer 
(P2P) lending, mobile payment systems, crowdfunding, and others 
(Philippon 2016). For the purposes of this chapter, the fintech firms that 
we analyzed fall into seven categories: 1) alternative financing, 2) data 
analytics, 3) digital banks, 4) market and trading support, 5) payments 
and remittances, 6) robo-advisors and personal finance, and 7) software 
solutions and information technology. We will discuss these categories 
in greater detail in section 8.4.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows: section 8.2 reviews the 
relevant literature, section 8.3 presents the theoretical discussion and 
hypothesis, section 8.4 describes the data and methodology, section 8.5 
provides the results, and section 8.6 concludes the chapter.
8.2 Review of the Literature
Fintech has grown significantly in recent years. According to an Ernst 
& Young (2017) report, which surveyed more than 22,000 consumers 
in 20  markets, consumers are becoming more aware of fintech: their 
awareness grew from 62% in 2015 to 84% in 2017. Additionally, the 
adoption (the movement from being a non-user to being a user) of 
fintech has grown to 33% across those 20 markets in the last 2 years, 
an increase of 16% from the previous study in 2015 (EY 2017). In 2017, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) also initiated a global survey regarding 
the use of fintech, but, rather than consumers, the survey focused on 
chief executive officerss and other leaders in companies within the 
financial services industry in 71 countries. The survey found that 88% 
of the leaders of those businesses believe that they are losing revenue 
to innovative financial technology, 77% intend to increase their own 
efforts to innovate, and 82% expect to increase their partnerships with 
fintech in the next 3 to 5 years (PwC 2017). These reports, when taken 
together, show that both individuals and financial sector corporations 
are increasing their fintech use. Lee and Teo (2015) further discussed 
the growth of fintech in reference to global investments in fintech 
ventures. From 2013 to 2014, investments grew more than three times, 
from $4.05 billion to $12.21 billion (Lee and Teo 2015). KPMG (2018) 
estimated that investments in fintech (ranging from mergers to venture 
capitalism) totaled roughly $31 billion in 2017.
Fintech has, alternatively, evolved significantly in the 100 years, 
and its last evolution has been recent and fast. It has seen three periods: 
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the first was the analog era (telegraphs, railroads, etc.), the second was 
digitalization (technology for communications and transfers), and 
the third and current era began in 2008 (Arner, Barberis, and Buckley 
2016).
The critical difference in Fintech 3.0 (from the second era) 
lies in: first, who provides financial services, with start-ups and 
technology firms supplanting banks in providing niche services to 
the public, business and the banks themselves; and second, the speed 
of development. In many markets, there has been a shift in customer 
mindset as to who has the resources and legitimacy to provide financial 
services, combined with an entirely new speed of evolution, particularly 
in emerging markets. (Arner, Barberis, and Buckley 2016).
Both Lee and Teo (2015) and Arner, Barberis, and Buckley (2016) 
discussed the ever-increasing role of fintech in emerging markets. In 
these markets, where there is little or no access to banking, fintech has 
the potential to make large impacts.
Fintech has not only affected the financial sector but is also becoming 
increasingly integrated with it via partnering with financial institutions 
(PwC 2017). The past literature has found that the interconnectedness 
of the financial sector leads to spillover or contagion when one area 
experiences distress. Allen and Gale (2000), in fact, postured that the 
interconnectedness and whether it is complete can determine the 
strength of the spillover effects. According to Magnuson (2018, 1191), 
interconnectedness becomes an issue because, “If firms in a market 
are highly dependent on each other, by for example relying on other 
participants for essential parts of their business or having contracts and 
agreements that require the cooperation (and solvency) of the others, 
then it will be more likely for shocks in one institution to spread to other 
institutions.” Meanwhile, Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012) suggested 
that the degree of contagion within a financial system is due to the 
degree to which institutions have overlapping portfolios.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) developed the methodology that 
this chapter used. ∆CoVaR is a measure of systemic risk that evaluates 
the tail dependency between one institution or system and another 
institution or system. In this measure, one might see that an institution 
is individually systemic or that a group of institutions is systemic 
as a whole, which the authors referred to as “systemic as a herd” 
(Adrian and Brunnermeier 2016). The CoVaR of a system is the VaR 
of the whole system given the particular state that the institution is 
experiencing. Then ∆CoVaR is the difference in the system given that 
the institution has moved from one state to another (generally from 
its median state of VaR to some lower state that represents distress). 
Essentially, ∆CoVaR captures the tail co-movements of the system and 
the institution.
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Other researchers have taken Adrian and Brunnermeier’s 2016 risk 
measurement and extended its application to other or more specific 
areas. Examples of this include extending ∆CoVaR to sovereign credit 
default swap (Fong and Wong 2011), to regional banks (Fong et al. 2011), 
and to risk spillovers (Adams, Füss, and Gropp 2014). There are many 
other types of systemic risk measures as well. Acharya, Engle, and 
Richardson (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2016) developed systemic 
risk indicators that measure the decrease in equity given the market 
stress condition. Billio et al. (2012) introduced a systemic risk measure 
that they based on Granger causality between companies.
8.3 Theoretical Discussion and Hypothesis
Hypothesis: Fintech firms do not contribute greatly to systemic risk at 
this time.
The methodology that this study used, ∆CoVaR, is a measure of systemic 
risk that considers the co-movements of tail distributions of the 
institution and the financial system (Adrian and Brunnermeier 2016). 
Which factors can contribute to systemic risk and do fintech firms 
display those attributes? To define systemically important financial 
institutions, Thomson (2010) proposed five ways (size and the four Cs) 
in which institutions may have a systemic impact, and the Financial 
Stability Board (2017a) recommended an additional way, substitution:
•	 size—while not the only factor to consider, institutions that 
make up at least 10% of activities or assets in any single financial 
sector may be large enough to be systemically important;
•	 contagion—it is possible to consider institutions for which their 
failure could have real spillover effects on other institutions 
as systemically important. Examples include locking up of 
essential payment systems, creating illiquidity in institutions 
accounting for up to a third of the assets in the financial system, 
and collapsing important financial markets;
•	 correlation—this factor of systemic risk occurs when institutions 
take risks that are highly correlated across many others. In this 
way, many smaller institutions can have a systemic impact akin 
to that of large ones;
•	 concentration—a small number of firms engaging in key 
financial activities (such as essential payment processes) can 
give rise to systemic importance, since the role of that firm is 
not easy for other firms that engage in the same activities to fill;
•	 substitution—similar to the concept of concentration, if firms 
are engaging in key financial activities for which there are no 
easy substitutions, this can give rise to systemic risk; and
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•	 conditions/context—these refer to the phenomena of an 
institution becoming systemically important due to the state of 
the economy or financial market.
Fintech and Size
According to Statista (2018), the value of the total transactions in the 
fintech market amounted to over $4.22 trillion in 2018, as of May. The 
transactions value in the digital payment sector of fintech accounted 
for over $3.26 trillion, approximately 77% of the total transactions 
in the fintech market, followed by the alternative lending sector with 
12% of the total and personal finance with 10%. Similarly, in 2016 and 
2017, the digital payment sector dominated the total transaction value. 
Therefore, in relation to the size factor, digital payment (as section 8.4.1 
denominates, according to our categories, payments and remittances) 
is the sector that is more likely to have a systemic impact. On the other 
hand, while fintech institutions may have a large impact in the realm of 
digital transactions, their overall portion of assets in the financial sector 
remains relatively small, with Market Watch (French 2017) reporting 
that the largest fintech firm in the US at the end of 2017 was Stripe, with 
$9.2 billion in assets, while the largest financial institution in the US 
was J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., with $2.5 trillion in assets, as Bankrate 
reported (Dixon 2018).
Fintech and Contagion
Fintech, through its mere existence, is increasing interconnectedness. 
Connections are easier and faster, particularly in payment processing, 
but there are also fintech firms that provide data analytic services to other 
corporations, which integrate that service into their own operations. 
Fintech firms undertake human resource activities (hiring, tax reporting, 
payroll management, etc.) to make these activities more expedient, more 
trackable, and more accurate. According to the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB 2017b), fintech increases the interconnectedness of the financial 
sector, and this effect carries macrofinancial risks. On the other hand, 
the same report mentioned that the decentralization potential of some 
fintech activities, such as P2P lending, could have the effect of lessening 
interconnectedness by providing traditional financial activities outside 
of the traditional network.
Fintech and Correlation
Financial institutions’ portfolio risks might become highly correlated 
in a period of financial distress, as financial institutions might have 
an incentive “to take on risks that are highly correlated with other 
institutions because policymakers are less likely to close an institution if 
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many other institutions would become decapitalized at the same time” 
(Thomson 2010, 140). This concept does not directly apply to the fintech 
sector; however, there are other factors that might matter in terms of 
correlation for the fintech industry. According to the FSB (2017b, 19), the 
cyber-risk, on one side, can undermine some fintech companies, since a 
“greater use of technology and digital solutions expand the range and 
number of entry points cyber hackers might target.” On the other side, 
the same work underlined how fintech can increase competition and 
reduce the systemic relevance of a single cyberattack. We can therefore 
expect that, if the risks due to cyber-attacks are correlated, then the 
fintech sector faces strong exposure to that risk. Another factor related 
to correlation among fintech companies regards the possibility of 
taking correlated risks of unbanked consumers. “FinTech in many cases 
attempts to fill the gap by providing easy to understand and convenient 
services, which tend to lower costs of adoption and lower barriers to 
access for customers” (FSB 2017b, 35). Indeed, fintech can increase 
social inclusion, which might bring some correlated risks.
Fintech and Concentration
Fintech could affect the concentration of activities in the financial sector. 
The caveat is that fintech has the potential to change the concentration 
in the market. Fintech could increase the number of players in financial 
activities by providing alternatives to traditional players ((DTCC 2017), 
an example being P2P lending, which provides credit to borrowers as 
an alternative to a traditional bank. On the other hand, fintech could 
lead to a situation in which there is only a small number of players in 
key financial activities, as it potentially provides new services that other 
firms do not provide, or, from a geographic standpoint, enters new 
markets in which there are not many players.
Fintech and Substitution
According to the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (2017), people 
should consider the risk that the substitutability of fintech firms poses on 
a case-by-case basis. The concentration might be such that one firm can 
easily substitute another, as is likely to be the case with electronic payment 
systems. P2P lending might be an area, however, in which substitutability 
is low, since the lender often supplies individuals or businesses that might 
have difficulty obtaining this service from a traditional bank (De Roure, 
Pelizzon, and Tasca 2016).
Fintech and Context/Conditions
As Thomson (2010, 142) put it, “Firms that might be made systemically 
important by conditions/context are probably the most difficult to 
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identify in advance.” Not only are they difficult to identify, but they are 
also dependent on the probability of occurrence of the condition that 
would cause said firms to become systemically important (Thomson 
2010). Fintech would not necessarily be immune to conditional systemic 
importance, but there have not been instances of this occurring either.
Keeping these indicators of systemic importance in mind and 
relating them to the current and “historical” states of fintech, our 
hypothesis is that fintech firms do not contribute greatly to systemic risk 
at this time. 
8.4 Data and Methodology
8.4.1 Data
In our analysis, we used a unique dataset composed of 75 fintech 
companies quoted on the Nasdaq and Frankfurt stock exchanges. We 
based the sample of companies on the KBW Nasdaq Financial Technology 
Index (KFTX) for the Nasdaq Stock Exchange and on the CedarIBS 
FinTech Index (CIFTI) for the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. According 
to Nasdaq (2017), the KFTX “is designed to track the performance of 
financial technology companies that are publicly traded in the U.S.” 
The index began in July 2016, and it currently includes 50 companies. 
According to IBS Intelligence’s website, “the CIFTI is a unique equity 
index comprising of selected FinTech companies from around the world, 
across 25 exchanges” (IBS 2018). The CIFTI comprises four key indexes 
that track the performance of 50 large fintech companies (CIFTI 50) 
and large-, medium-, and small-cap fintech companies (respectively, 
CIFTI Large Cap, CIFTI Mid Cap, and CIFTI Small Cap). For the scope 
of our analysis, among these companies, we selected only the companies 
quoted on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
The final sample includes 39 fintech companies for the US stock 
exchange and 53 fintech companies for the European stock exchange.1 
Seventeen companies are quoted on both stock exchanges and therefore 
the panel comprises a total of 75 fintech companies. We obtained the 
estimations that section 8.4.2 reports separately for the US and the 
European sample. The panel of companies extends from January 2010 
to December 2017 and is unbalanced, since, given the recent evolution 
of the fintech industry, it also includes companies that began operation 
1 Note that the number of companies that we included is smaller than the original 
number (48 companies for the Nasdaq index and 73 companies for the IBS index 
related to the Frankfurt Stock Exchange) due to data availability.
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and/or became publicly quoted after 2010. Table A8.1 classifies the 
fintech companies according to the following categories:
•	 alternative financing—firms that provide credit (loans) to 
individuals and/or businesses but do not fall into the bank 
classification because they do not engage in other traditional 
banking activities;
•	 data analytics—firms that provide solutions via data analytics;
•	 digital banks—firms that provide banking services without 
bricks and mortar;
•	 market and trading support—markets that provide financial 
services and firms that provide support via technological 
solutions for trading activities;
•	 payments and remittances—firms that provide payment systems 
and products;
•	 robo-advisors and personal finance—firms that provide advice 
and/or management for financial assets for individuals; and
•	 software solutions and IT—firms that provide software and 
information technology solutions for business processes, 
including human resources, supply chain management, cloud-
based services, security, and so on.
Since we chose to use stock indices in the market, we did not control 
the number of firms that fell into each category. As such, some categories 
contained relatively few (or no) firms; for example, in our analysis of 
European fintech firms, no firms fell into the category of alternative 
financing. In reality, regardless of the popularity of P2P lending, not 
many P2P lending firms have public listings, and none are listed on the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Therefore, we had none in the category for 
alternative financing for Europe and only one in that category for the 
US. Other categories in our list included a relatively low number of 
firms (with the payment and remittances and the software solutions and 
information technology categories comprising the bulk) as a result of 
the indices that we used.
We also included a representative sample of the US and European 
financial industries to determine the impact that fintech companies have 
on systemic risk within the entire financial industry. We obtained the 
estimations in section 8.4.2 using the US and European fintech samples 
and their respective financial industry. We based the US financial 
industry sample on the panel of companies that Brownlees and Engle 
(2016) selected to measure the contribution of a financial firm to systemic 
risk. According to the authors, “the panel contains all US financial firms 
with a market capitalization greater than 5 bln USD as of the end of June 
2007” (Brownlees and Engle 2016, 15). We based the European financial 
Does Fintech Contribute to Systemic Risk? Evidence from the United States and Europe 181
industry sample on the panel of companies that the Center for Risk 
Management at Laussane (CRML) selected to measure systemic risk in 
Europe. The CRML’s systemic risk measures follow the methodology 
that Engle, Jondeau, and Rockinger (2014) developed and the sample 
of “financial institutions involve several categories, including banks, 
insurance companies, and real estate firms” (CRML 2018). The final 
sample of the US financial industry consists of 41 companies, and the 
final sample of the European financial industry contains 54 companies2 
(Table A8.1.2 reports the list of companies).3
We obtained the daily adjusted closing prices, the daily market 
capitalization, and the daily beta from Thomson Reuters Eikon, and 
we obtained the quarterly balance sheet data for the book value (total 
assets and total shareholders’ equity) from Orbis. We used the market 
capitalization, the total assets, and the total shareholders’ equity to 
compute the market value of assets (MVA) of each firm. We then took 
the growth rate of the MVA to estimate the ∆CoVaR. We computed the 
MVA of each firm as follows:
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎′ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 ) = 5% 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 (𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05) = 5% 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 = ?̂?𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖  
 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖  
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖 ) 
 
𝜌𝜌 = 1 − 6
∑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖2
𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐2 − 1) 
 
 
 (1)
We used the total assets (as a proxy for the company’s size) and the 
beta to estimate the correlation table (see Table A8.1.3 for a detailed 
description of the variables). The estimations have a weekly frequency. 
We obtained the weekly data using the last available daily point of each 
week. Following the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s method for 
using quarterly data more frequently (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
2016), we assigned to each week the respective quarter (therefore, 
quarterly data repeat over the 3-month period).
Tables A8.1.4 and A8.1.5 report the summary statistics for the set of 
variables that we used to estimate the ∆CoVaR measure, broken down 
2 The original sample of Brownlees and Engle (2016) contained 95 companies, and the 
original sample of the CRML consisted of 87 companies. Our samples are restricted 
due to data availability (in particular, our US sample is restricted with respect to 
the sample of Brownlees and Engle, since a portion of companies merged or failed 
following the financial crisis).
3 From now on, we will refer to the US financial system to indicate the representative 
sample of the US financial industry and those fintech firms that are part of the KBW 
Nasdaq Financial Technology Index. Similarly, we will refer to the European financial 
system to indicate the representative sample of the European financial industry and 
those fintech firms that are part of the CedarIBS FinTech Index and are quoted on 
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
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by the type of firm—either from the traditional financial industry or 
from the corresponding fintech category—for the US and the European 
sample, respectively. Concerning the market capitalization of the US 
sample, we can classify the median fintech firm as mid-cap (between 
$5.9 billion and $8.6 billion), whereas the median financial industry 
firm corresponds to the large-cap category (about $15 billion). As for 
the European sample, the median market capitalization in each category 
ranges from $2.9 billion to $7.8 billion, thereby corresponding to mid-
cap stocks. The higher market capitalization of firms in the traditional 
financial system, compared with fintech, reflects the degree of maturity 
of the two sectors; however, it is worth mentioning that, in the case 
of Europe, the maximum market capitalization is generally higher for 
fintech firms (about $23 billion) than for those in the traditional financial 
system. Similarly, shareholders’ equity for the median fintech firm 
is smaller than for that in the traditional financial sector; the median 
shareholders’ equity of fintech firms represents about 10% of that of the 
traditional financial companies. 
As one might expect, since many fintech firms are in relatively early 
stages of development with respect to the whole financial sector, the 
median of the weekly stock returns is higher for the former (apart from 
the alternative financing category). Thus, the median stock returns for 
the US (European) traditional financial firms is 0.2% (–0.1%) and about 
0.4% (0.2%) for fintech firms.
In terms of total assets, fintech firms represent around 2% (1%) of 
the traditional financial firms in the US (European) sample. Indeed, as 
section 8.3 mentioned, the overall portion of assets of fintech institutions 
in the financial sector remains relatively small.
8.4.2 Estimation of CoVaR and ∆CoVaR Measures
As section 8.2 mentioned, CoVaR and ∆CoVaR became widely known 
measures of systemic risk after Adrian and Brunnermeier’s 2016 seminal 
paper. We used their method for our purpose of assessing whether 
fintech firms contribute to systemic risk based on the observed average 
of these indicators within the period 2010–2017.
It is possible to interpret the CoVaR measure, which makes possible 
the calculation of the ∆CoVaR afterwards, as the VaR of a firm (or 
system) x conditional on firm y already being at its value at risk. This 
definition requires us to take one step back to explain what the latter is.
Value at Risk
There are different ways to estimate VaR; nevertheless, here we will just 
focus on the methodology that we used for our estimations. Estimating 
the historical empirical distribution of stock returns of a firm enables 
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the calculation of a threshold at which the firm itself is in distress. It is 
worth mentioning that the researcher decides the level associated with 
distress, but it is typically 5%, which is the threshold that we utilized. 
Taking this into consideration, we can write VaR as:
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎′ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 ) = 5% 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 (𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05) = 5% 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 = ?̂?𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖  
 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖  
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖 ) 
 
𝜌𝜌 = 1 − 6
∑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖2
𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐2 − 1) 
 
 
 (2)
This means that we consider the observed stock return at the 
5th percentile of the empirical distribution as a signal of concern 
regarding the performance of the firm, since this percentile contains 
the lowest returns observed during the period under consideration (see 
Figure A8.2.1 for a graphical representation of VaR). Hence, identifying 
the VaR for each firm comprised in our sample represents the basis of 
the estimations to evaluate finally how a distressed fintech firm affects 
the entire financial system when the latter is also at its VaR.
Conditional Value at Risk
After identifying the 5% VaR of firm i, we must check how the VaR of 
the financial system comoves with (conditional on) each of the former, 
which is what the  measure will indicate, as the following equations 
show: 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎′ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 ) = 5% 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 (𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05) = 5% 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 = ?̂?𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖  
 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖  
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖 ) 
 
𝜌𝜌 = 1 − 6
∑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖2
𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐2 − 1) 
 
 
(3)
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎′ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 ) = 5% 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 (𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05) = 5% 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 = ?̂?𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉 .05𝑖𝑖  
 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖  
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖 ) 
 
𝜌𝜌 = 1 − 6
∑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖2
𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐2 − 1) 
 
 
 (4)
As one can observe, to calculate the CoVaR, we need the estimates 
of α and β at the 5th percentile, which we can obtain through a quantile 
regression of the form:
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎′ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 ) = 5% 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 (𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05) = 5% 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 = ?̂?𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖  
 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖  
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖 ) 
 
𝜌𝜌 = 1 − 6
∑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖2
𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐2 − 1) 
 
 
 (5)
Unlike ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, quantile regression 
coefficients capture the change in a specified quantile of the dependent 
variable that a one unit change in the regressors produces. As 
Bjarnadottir (2012, 9) stated, “when estimating CoVaR the focus is on a 
specific low quantile of a distribution and hence it is convenient to use 
quantile regression here.”
Considering the data definitions that section 8.4.1 introduced, our 
specification for this estimation took into account the modification 
that Lopez-Espinosa et al. (2012) proposed of regressing the sum of the 
asset returns of each financial institution in the system, weighted by 
184 Macroeconomic Stabilization in the Digital Age
its lagged MVA (Xsys), on the asset returns of firm i (Xi), just as Adrian 
and Brunnermeier (2016) did but excluding firm i from Xsys to avoid a 
spurious relationship with the regressor. This means that we computed 
N (number of firms) different Xsys variables, each one omitting each firm 
i at a time.
∆CoVaR
Having calculated the 5% CoVaR for each firm, we then estimated 
the median CoVaR, which represents the VaR of the financial system 
conditional on firm i being in its normal state.
Together, both CoVaR estimations allowed us to identify how much 
the fact that firm i is distressed contributes to the financial system 
VaR. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) estimated this as the difference 
between the 5% and the 50% CoVaR:
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎′ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 ) = 5% 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 (𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05) = 5% 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 = ?̂?𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖  
 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖  
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖 ) 
 
𝜌𝜌 = 1 − 6
∑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖2
𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐2 − 1) 
 
 
 (6)
which it is possible to reduce to:
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎′ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 ) = 5% 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 (𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05) = 5% 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 = ?̂?𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖  
 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖  
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖 ) 
 
𝜌𝜌 = 1 − 6
∑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖2
𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐2 − 1) 
 
 
 (7)
To sum up, the output obtained from these computations will yield 
the contribution of each firm to systemic risk, denoted as a negative 
∆CoVaR, which we will ultimately rank from least to greatest.
8.4.3 Spearman’s Rank Correlation
Finally, to evaluate whether the ranking that we derived from the ∆CoVaR 
estimation contributes to improving the systemic risk measurement—
in addition to variables such as size or volatility associated with 
the systemic importance of firms—we computed Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficients. 
This statistic calculates the level of association of two ranked 
variables using the following formula:
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎′ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 ) = 5% 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 (𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05) = 5% 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖0.05 = ?̂?𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖  
 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼0.05𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖  
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝛽0.05𝑖𝑖 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.05𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉0.5𝑖𝑖 ) 
 
𝜌𝜌 = 1 − 6
∑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖2
𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐2 − 1) 
 
 
 (8)
where di is the difference in ranks for each firm and n is the number of 
firms in our final sample.
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Afterwards, we needed to verify the significance of this correlation 
coefficient by testing the null hypothesis of no monotonic correlation. 
Section 8.5 presents both the correlation coefficients and the p-values.
8.5 Results
Our results seem to be in line with previous evidence that has excluded 
the fintech industry from systemic risk estimations in the sense that the 
empirical literature, such as Brownlees and Engle (2016), and regulatory 
authorities, as in the case of the European Banking Authority, have 
already recognized many of the financial companies that our estimations 
identified as systemic—that is, Citigroup and Morgan Stanley in the 
US and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) and Credit Suisse 
in Europe—as some of the most systemically risky financial firms.4 
Although identifying systemic financial firms is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, those results ultimately allowed us to validate our findings for 
the fintech industry using the methodology proposed.
Having said this, the ∆CoVaR computations showed that we cannot 
consider fintech companies as systemically important according to their 
historical performance in comparison with other financial companies. 
In the remainder of this section, we will provide a detailed explanation 
of the results for each particular sample.
8.5.1 United States
Within the whole financial system, 20 fintech companies—out of 36 in 
our final sample—contribute to systemic risk, 0.03% being the maximum 
contribution of any individual fintech firm (see Table A8.1.6). In fact, 
among the 10 fintech companies that contribute the most to systemic 
risk, the majority corresponds to firms of which the main business 
relates to payments and remittances and market and trading support. 
In addition, it is worth mentioning that LendingClub, the only fintech 
providing alternative financing in our sample, has the second-highest 
contribution within this “Top 10.”
Another interesting result from our estimations is that the remaining 
16 fintech firms alleviate systemic risk. We can consider this as partial 
evidence for the previous literature conceiving fintech as an emerging 
alternative to the traditional financial system.
4 For the updated list of global systemically important institutions for 2017, see 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/global-systemically-important-
institutions/2017.
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The second step consisted of implementing the ∆CoVaR 
methodology while isolating the fintech industry in an attempt to 
identify those firms that are leading the sector’s performance. The 
results in Table A8.1.8 are very similar to those of the exercise for the 
whole financial system; indeed, fintech companies related to payments 
and remittances seem to be highly relevant when assessing the risk of 
the industry.
As we mentioned in section 8.4, we computed the Spearman’s rank 
correlation to evaluate whether the ranking that we derived from the 
∆CoVaR measure surpasses the identification of systemic firms based on 
their size (respectively beta) or whether the latter alone is sufficient; that 
is, the bigger (respectively the more volatile in relation to the market) 
the firm is, the more systemic it is and vice versa. Before discussing the 
overall correlation, Figures A8.2.2 and A8.2.3 present these relationships 
by firm and the corresponding category, and we can observe that it is 
not possible to associate greater size (respectively beta) with either high 
or low ∆CoVaR. As for the Spearman correlation, the results indicate 
that the two measures are positively and fairly correlated (ρ = 0.51), 
which means that the ∆CoVaR measure indeed contributes to a better 
identification of systemic risk rather than drawing conclusions based 
just on the size ranking. This supports previous advice from financial 
authorities, such as the Office of Financial Research in the US (2017, 6), 
which highlighted that “size is not always a good proxy for systemic 
importance.” Additionally, we computed the Spearman correlation 
associating the ∆CoVaR ranking with that of the beta of the firms. In this 
case, the correlation between the two rankings was low, ρ = 0.31, meaning 
that a more volatile firm is not highly associated with its systemic 
importance (according to ∆CoVaR) and vice versa (see Table A8.1.10 for 
a summary of the results).
8.5.2 Europe
In the European financial system, the results show that 32 fintech 
firms, out of 53, contribute to systemic risk. However, the individual 
contribution of each firm is nearly 0% (see Table A8.1.7) and the 
aggregate contribution is roughly 0.05%. As in the US case, the remaining 
fintech firms (21) reduce systemic risk by 0.11%, which also supports 
their little relevance within the industry under our methodology. Table 
A8.1.9 shows the results from the estimation of the ∆CoVaR within the 
fintech industry. Interestingly, contrary to the US industry, fintech firms 
providing software solutions and information technologies seem to 
contribute the most to the risk of the sector.
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Finally, the Spearman’s rank correlation between the ranking 
of the ∆CoVaR measure and the firm size indicates a slightly higher 
correlation between the two of them, ρ = 0.58, in comparison with the 
US results. Nevertheless, this still supports the contribution of our 
estimations to improving the assessment of systemic risk. Regarding 
the additional correlation with the beta, we found that the correlation is 
ρ = 0.59—slightly higher than that with size—suggesting that the 
volatility of European fintech firms could also help in evaluating their 
systemic importance (see Table A8.1.8 for a summary of the results and 
Figures A8.2.4 and A8.2.5 for the disaggregated representation).
8.5.3 Final Remarks on the Results
Despite the fact that our results confirmed that fintech firms are not 
contributing significantly to systemic risk, we endeavored to conduct 
further research regarding the increase in partnering between them and 
financial companies. Since our main concern is systemic risk, we focused 
on those financial firms in the “Top 10” of the ∆CoVaR estimations, given 
that previous empirical research has already identified most of them as 
systemic.
With respect to the US sample, out of the 10 most systemic financial 
companies, seven of them are partnering and/or investing in fintech. For 
instance, according to the media company Bank Innovation (Kulkarni 
2018), Citigroup Inc. is among the top global banks that invest in fintech 
and has 26 fintech firms in its portfolio; another example is Goldman 
Sachs, which owns 27 fintech firms, adding six new ones in 2017 (CB 
Insights 2018).
In the case of the top systemic European financial companies, six of 
them are partnering and/or investing in fintech. BBVA (2018), which has 
recently announced an investment in the UK online mortgage brokerage 
Trussle, is an example. In addition, Groupe Crédit Agricole (2018) 
has participated in the private fundraising of SETL—an institutional 
payment and settlement infrastructure provider that uses blockchain 
technology.
8.6 Conclusions
This chapter tackles the role that fintech might have in systemic risk. 
Using a unique dataset of European and US fintech companies, we 
estimated the ∆CoVaR, which captures the tail dependency between the 
financial system and a specific institution. This allowed us to rank firms 
by how much their individual distress contributes to the VaR of the 
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whole system. We conducted the exercise both for the fintech industry 
and for the entire financial system to capture, respectively, the fintech 
firms that are leading the risk of the industry and the position of the 
fintech firms within the entire financial sector. 
The results that section 8.5 reported show that, for the US, the 
payment and remittances and the market and trading support categories 
contribute the most to the VaR of the fintech industry. Instead, in 
Europe, fintech firms that provide software solutions and information 
technologies seem to be contributing the most to the risk of the sector. 
The estimation that includes fintech firms and the representative sample 
of the financial sectors show that fintech firms are not systemically 
important. Within the US financial system, the fintech companies 
that do contribute to systemic risk increase it by around 0.03%, while, 
in Europe, fintech firms contribute very little to the systemic impact 
(close to 0%). The Spearman’s rank correlation between a fintech firm’s 
∆CoVaR and its respective size and between a fintech firm’s ∆CoVaR 
and its beta strengthens the importance of our estimations for a better 
assessment of systemic risk rather than just relying on the size and the 
beta of the firms to determine their likely contribution to systemic risk.
While our results show that these fintech firms do not contribute 
greatly to systemic risk, confirming our hypothesis of section 8.3, 
we should approach that conclusion with caution because of the 
interconnectedness of the financial industry with fintech and fintech 
firms. As the DTCC (2017, 4) stated, “The boundaries between fintech 
start-ups and traditional incumbents are blurring quickly as they become 
increasingly interconnected.” As section 8.5 mentioned, financial 
companies such as Citigroup Inc. and BBVA are partnering with and/or 
investing in fintech, and there are many other examples.
Some limitations of our study include the scope of our analysis 
method (∆CoVaR), the representation of the fintech sector, and the 
analysis of only two markets. ∆CoVaR represents “the increase in system-
wide risk due to the distress of a financial institution” (Castro and 
Ferrari 2014, 12), but disregards some firm-specific factors, such as the 
capital shortfall or the leverage of a firm, since ∆CoVaR is the measure 
of tail co-movement between the system and the firm. Methods such as 
SRISK, which Brownlees and Engle (2016) proposed, and the leverage 
ratio exposure measure of the European Banking Authority (2017) take 
these into account. While we chose to use indices that theoretically 
should be representative of fintech in their respective markets, as we 
mentioned previously, some categories (i.e., alternative financing or 
digital banks) do not have a large representation among public fintech 
firms either because not many are publicly traded or they were simply 
not part of the indices. As such, it is difficult to draw safe conclusions on 
Does Fintech Contribute to Systemic Risk? Evidence from the United States and Europe 189
which categories of fintech companies have a greater potential impact 
on systemic risk because of the sample considered. Another limitation 
of our study is the fact that our analysis concerned only two markets, 
both of which are developed markets, but fintech has different potential 
in emerging markets (Lee and Teo 2015). This is apparent from the P2P 
lending and other fintech activities in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), where the adoption rate of fintech for consumers is 69% while 
the global average is 33% (EY 2017).
Given the diversity of fintech firms, micro-level data analysis 
focusing on each individual fintech category could reveal the specific 
risks attached to each of them, highlighting key research lines. For 
instance, Buchak et al. (2017) analyzed lending fintech firms using loan-
level data for the US, whereas, as section 8.2 mentioned, both Ernst and 
Young (2017) and PwC (2017) have started implementing surveys to 
track fintech evolution.
Beyond further research, it is important to include fintech firms 
when considering the regulation of the financial industry. Even though 
our analysis did not show that fintech contributes greatly to systemic 
risk at this moment, we agree with the former managing director of 
the International Monetary Fund (Lagarde 2018) on fintech regulation. 
According to Lagarde (2018), it is necessary to consider and develop 
a regulatory framework now, before fintech contributes to risk in the 
financial system. On the other hand, she cautioned against regulating 
in such a way that hinders the evolution of technology, stating, “We 
must guard against emerging risks without stifling innovation” (Lagarde 
2018, 9). We see that “regulatory sandboxes” are emerging in many 
economies to give fintech a place to “play.” In other words, a sandbox is 
a framework that regulators set up (generally for a limited period) and 
that allows fintech to grow, change, or evolve in a live but controlled 
setting (European Commission 2018). Given these considerations, our 
chapter is an initial contribution giving policy makers and regulators a 
better understanding of fintech, which is necessary to regulate fintech 
firms without inhibiting innovation.
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Appendix 8.1: Tables
Table A8.1.1: Fintech Samples
Alternative 
Financing
Data 
Analytics
Digital 
Banks
Market and 
Trading 
Support
Payments 
and 
Remittances
Robo-
Advisors 
and 
Personal 
Finance
Software 
Solutions/
Information 
Technology
United States
LendingClub FactSet
IHS Markit
Moody’s
S&P Global
Verisk  
 Analytics
Green Dot  
 Corporation
Cboe
CME Group
Intercontinental  
 Exchange
MarketAxess
Nasdaq
Virtu Financial
ACI Worldwide
American  
 Express
Blackhawk  
 Network  
 Holdings
Cardtronics
Euronet  
 Worldwide
Evertec, Inc.
First Data
Fiserv
FLEETCOR
Global  
 Payments
Mastercard
PayPal
Square
Verifone
Visa
Western Union
WEX, Inc.
Worldpay
Envestnet
MSCI
SEI  
 Investments  
 Company
Broadridge  
 Financial  
 Solutions
Equifax
Jack Henry &  
 Associates
SS&C  
 Technologies
Thomson  
 Reuters
Europe
 FactSet
FICO
IHS Markit
PRGX  
 Global,  
 Inc.
Teradata
Genpact Amber Road Inc. American  
 Express
Blackhawk  
 Network  
 Holdings
Cognizant 
Euronet  
 Worldwide
Everi 
Evertec, Inc.
First Data
Fiserv
FLEETCOR
Global  
 Payments
Ingenico
Mastercard
MercadoLibre
MoneyGram
SafeCharge
TSYS
Verifone
Western Union
WEX, Inc.
Wirecard
Envestnet
Intuit
IRESS
ADP
CANCOM
China  
 Information  
 Tech
Diebold  
 Nixdorf, AG
Diebold  
 Nixdorf, Inc.
DST Systems
DXC  
 Technology
Equifax
FIS
Jack Henry &  
 Associates
Luxoft
Model N
NCR
PFSweb
Points
SAP
ServiceSource
Syntel
Temenos
Tungsten  
 Corporation
Virtusa
Wipro
Xero
Source: Authors.
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Table A8.1.2: Financial Industry Samples
United States Europe
Citigroup, Inc. Aareal Bank
Legg Mason Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi AS
Principal Alpha Bank
Goldman Sachs Banca Carige
BNY Mellon Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena
Morgan Stanley Banca Popolare di Sondrio
T. Rowe Price Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria
Janus Henderson Group Banco BPI
Northern Trust Banco BPM
AGNC Investment Corp. Banco Comercial Portugues
PNC Financial Services Banco de Sabadell
CBRE Group Banco Santander
New York Community Bank Bank of Ireland Group
Comerica Bankia
U.S. Bancorp Barclays
M&T Bank BNP Paribas
State Street Corporation BPER Banca
BB&T CaixaBank
Marsh & McLennan Companies Commerzbank
Fifth Third Bank Crédit Agricole
KeyCorp Credit Suisse
Synovus Credito Emiliano
Western Union Deutsche Bank
Bank of America Dexia
Ameriprise Certificate Company EFG International
Suntrust Banks Erste Group
Wells Fargo Company Eurobank Ergasias
TD Ameritrade ING Group
Blackrock Intesa Sanpaolo
E-Trade Jyske Bank
Freddie Mac London Stock Exchange Group
Charles Schwab Marfin Investment Group
People’s United Financial National Bank of Greece
Fannie Mae Nordea Bank
Franklin Resources Oldenburgische Landesbank
Regions Financial Corporation Permanent TSB Group
Zions Bancorporation Piraeus Bank
Capital One Plaza Centers N.V.
SLM Corporation Raiffeisen Bank International
CIT Group RBS Group
Huntington Bancshares Sekerbank
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken
continued on next page
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United States Europe
Société Générale
Standard Chartered
Svenska Handelsbanken AB
Swiss Life
TP ICAP
Turkiye Halk Bankasi
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi
UBS Group AG
UniCredit
UBI Banca
VTB Bank
Wuestenrot & Wuerttembergische
 Source: Authors.
Table A8.1.2 continued
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Table A8.1.3: Variable Definitions
Variable Formula
Financial 
Statements Definition Source
Total Assets Fixed Assets + 
Current Assets
Fixed Assets Total amount (after depreciation) of non-
current assets (intangible assets + tangible 
assets + other fixed assets)
Orbis 
Intangible Fixed 
Assets 
All intangible assets, such as formation 
expenses, research expenses, goodwill, 
development expenses, and all other expenses 
with a long-term effect
Tangible Fixed 
Assets 
All tangible assets, such as buildings, machinery, 
and so on 
Other Fixed 
Assets 
All other fixed assets, such as long-term 
investments, shares and participations, pension 
funds, and so on
Current Assets Total amount of current assets (stocks + debtors 
+ other current assets) 
Stocks Total inventories (raw materials + in progress  
+ finished goods) 
Debtors Trade receivables (from clients and customers only) 
Other Current 
Assets 
All other current assets, such as receivables 
from other sources (taxes, group companies), 
short-term investment of money and cash at 
bank and in hand
Total 
Shareholders’ 
Equity
Capital + Other 
Shareholders’ 
Funds
Capital Issued share capital (authorized capital) Orbis 
Other 
Shareholders’ 
Funds 
All shareholders’ funds not linked with the 
issued capital, such as reserve capital and 
undistributed profit, also including minority 
interests if any
Adjusted 
Stock Price
Closing Price Closing Price The latest available closing price. If there are no 
trades for the most recent completed tradable 
day, the most recent prior tradable day with 
trading activity is used, provided the last tradable 
day for the instrument is within 378 completed 
calendar days (54 weeks).
Thomson 
ReutersEikon
Market 
Capitalization
Number of 
Outstanding 
Shares* Current 
Stock Price
Market Cap. The company market capitalization represents 
the sum of market value for all relevant issue-
level share types. The issue-level market value 
is calculated by multiplying the requested 
share type by the latest close price. This item 
supports default, free float, and outstanding 
share types. The default share type is the most 
widely reported outstanding shares for a market 
and is most commonly issued, outstanding, or 
listed shares.
Thomson 
ReutersEikon
Beta Covariance 
(r_i, r_m) /
Variance (r_m)
Beta CAPM beta: a measure of how much the stock 
moves for a given move in the market. It is the 
covariance of the security’s price movement 
in relation to the market’s price movement. 
Based on data availability, various look-back 
periods can be used to calculate it. In order of 
preference, the beta 5Y monthly, beta 3Y weekly, 
beta 2Y weekly, beta 180D daily, and beta 90D 
daily are used in the calculation.
Thomson 
ReutersEikon
Note: The total assets and total shareholders’ equity are book values.
Source: Authors.
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Table A8.1.4: Summary Statistics: United States Financial System
N Mean Median Min. Max. SD
Financial Industry
Market Capitalization 14,808 32.5 15.3 0.2 311.7 48.0
Stock Returns (%) 14,808 0.2 0.2 –48.5 79.4 4.2
Total Assets 14,808 384.8 105.8 2.5 3,345.5 686.0
Shareholders’ Equity 14,808 31.8 9.8 0.1 272.5 55.9
Fintech
Alternative Financing
Market Capitalization 117 20.3 8.6 1.1 240.8 32.8
Stock Returns (%) 117 –1.0 –0.7 –70.4 23.2 10.2
Total Assets 117 5.4 5.6 4.6 5.9 0.4
Shareholders’ Equity 117 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.0
Data Analytics
Market Capitalization 1,576 17.4 6.6 0.3 253.8 30.5
Stock Returns (%) 1,576 0.3 0.3 –31.3 15.7 3.0
Total Assets 1,576 4.6 4.7 0.6 14.6 3.3
Shareholders’ Equity 1,576 1.2 0.6 0.0 8.4 1.7
Digital Banks
Market Capitalization 208 19.2 7.3 0.9 195.2 32.6
Stock Returns (%) 208 0.4 0.4 –27.0 26.9 4.9
Total Assets 208 1.6 1.7 1.1 2.2 0.3
Shareholders’ Equity 208 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.1
Market Trading and Support
Market Capitalization 1,514 16.1 6.4 0.3 250.9 29.3
Stock Returns (%) 1,514 0.4 0.4 –18.8 20.4 3.4
Total Assets 1,514 14.2 3.5 0.3 78.5 23.5
Shareholders’ Equity 1,514 4.8 0.5 0.2 22.4 7.0
Payments and Remittances
Market Capitalization 5,287 16.4 6.7 0.3 258.4 29.0
Stock Returns (%) 5,287 0.3 0.4 –54.8 22.8 4.0
Total Assets 5,287 8.5 3.6 0.5 68.0 12.0
Shareholders’ Equity 5,287 3.2 0.9 0.0 32.9 6.6
continued on next page
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N Mean Median Min. Max. SD
Robo-Advisors and Personal Finance
Market Capitalization 766 15.4 6.2 0.3 249.2 26.5
Stock Returns (%) 766 0.4 0.5 –28.7 22.1 4.2
Total Assets 766 1.7 0.9 0.1 3.4 1.3
Shareholders’ Equity 766 0.7 0.4 0.1 1.7 0.6
Software Solutions/IT
Market Capitalization 1,956 15.3 5.9 0.3 210.2 25.5
Stock Returns (%) 1,956 0.3 0.4 –28.2 13.3 2.9
Total Assets 1,956 9.0 3.0 1.2 36.0 11.7
Shareholders’ Equity 1,956 4.5 1.3 0.7 20.2 6.0
IT = information technology.
Note: The table reports key characteristics, over the period 2010–17, for the US financial industry and 
for the fintech firms that are part of the KBW Nasdaq Financial Technology Index. It presents the market 
capitalization, total assets, and shareholders’ equity in $ billion. We calculated stock returns as the weekly 
difference of log stock prices.
Source: Authors.
Table A8.1.4 continued
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Table A8.1.5: Summary Statistics: European Financial System
N Mean Median Min. Max. SD
Financial Industry
Market Capitalization 16,061 19.1 7.8 0.0 125.6 23.1
Stock Returns (%) 16,061 –0.2 –0.1 –188.8 142.9 7.5
Total Assets 16,061 531.1 197.6 0.3 2,800.1 662.4
Shareholders’ Equity 16,061 27.5 11.9 0.0 128.4 32.0
Fintech
Data Analytics
Market Capitalization 1,730 10.5 3.2 0.0 162.4 21.1
Stock Returns (%) 1,730 0.2 0.2 –28.2 19.8 4.0
Total Assets 1,730 1.9 1.2 0.1 14.6 2.9
Shareholders’ Equity 1,730 1.0 0.5 0.0 8.4 1.6
Digital Banks
Market Capitalization 417 9.6 2.9 0.0 127.3 18.6
Stock Returns (%) 417 0.2 0.2 –20.3 12.5 3.4
Total Assets 417 2.6 2.7 1.8 3.4 0.4
Shareholders’ Equity 417 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.6 0.1
Market Trading and Support
Market Capitalization 194 10.5 3.7 0.1 157.2 22.3
Stock Returns (%) 194 –0.4 0.1 –25.3 25.3 7.0
Total Assets 194 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Shareholders’ Equity 194 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Payments and Remittances
Market Capitalization 6,921 10.1 3.1 0.0 159.7 19.7
Stock Returns (%) 6,921 0.3 0.3 –72.1 28.4 4.6
Total Assets 6,921 13.8 3.7 0.0 181.1 35.1
Shareholders’ Equity 6,921 2.7 1.1 0.0 21.9 4.6
Robo-Advisors and Personal Finance
Market Capitalization 960 9.3 3.2 0.0 121.0 17.1
Stock Returns (%) 960 0.3 0.2 –24.9 18.0 4.1
Total Assets 960 2.2 0.9 0.1 5.8 2.2
Shareholders’ Equity 960 1.0 0.4 0.1 3.6 1.1
continued on next page
Does Fintech Contribute to Systemic Risk? Evidence from the United States and Europe 201
N Mean Median Min. Max. SD
Software Solutions/IT
Market Capitalization 8,213 9.7 3.0 0.0 161.7 18.7
Stock Returns (%) 8,213 0.2 0.3 –61.8 64.2 5.4
Total Assets 8,213 6.6 1.6 0.0 51.1 11.3
Shareholders’ Equity 8,213 2.6 0.6 0.0 30.6 4.9
IT = information technology.
Note: The table reports key characteristics, over the period 2010–17, for the European financial industry 
and for the fintech firms that are part of the CedarIBS FinTech Index and that are quoted on the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange. It presents the market capitalization, total assets, and shareholders’ equity in $ billion. We 
calculated the stock returns as the weekly difference of log stock prices.
Source: Authors.
Table A8.1.5 continued
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Table A8.1.6: ∆CoVaR Results: United States Financial System
Rank Company Category ∆CoVaR (%)
1 Citigroup, Inc. Financial Industry –2.297
2 Legg Mason Financial Industry –1.702
3 Principal Financial Industry –1.553
4 Goldman Sachs Financial Industry –1.453
5 BNY Mellon Financial Industry –1.393
6 Morgan Stanley Financial Industry –1.364
7 T. Rowe Price Financial Industry –1.198
8 Janus Henderson Group Financial Industry –1.191
9 Northern Trust Financial Industry –1.186
10 AGNC Investment Corp. Financial Industry –1.131
11 PNC Financial Services Financial Industry –1.113
12 CBRE Group Financial Industry –1.098
13 New York Community Bank Financial Industry –1.094
14 Comerica Financial Industry –1.074
15 U.S. Bancorp Financial Industry –1.065
16 M&T Bank Financial Industry –0.992
17 State Street Corporation Financial Industry –0.937
18 BB&T Financial Industry –0.928
19 Marsh & McLennan Companies Financial Industry –0.925
20 Fifth Third Bank Financial Industry –0.915
21 KeyCorp Financial Industry –0.902
22 Synovus Financial Industry –0.752
23 Western Union Financial Industry –0.721
24 Bank of America Financial Industry –0.713
25 Ameriprise Certificate Company Financial Industry –0.616
26 Suntrust Banks Financial Industry –0.593
27 Wells Fargo Company Financial Industry –0.581
28 TD Ameritrade Financial Industry –0.487
29 Blackrock Financial Industry –0.455
30 E-Trade Financial Industry –0.422
31 Freddie Mac Financial Industry –0.405
32 Charles Schwab Financial Industry –0.381
33 People’s United Financial Financial Industry –0.212
continued on next page
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Rank Company Category ∆CoVaR (%)
34 Fannie Mae Financial Industry –0.186
35 First Data Payments and Remittances –0.027
36 LendingClub Alternative Financing –0.026
37 Virtu Financial Market and Trading Support –0.014
38 Square Payments and Remittances –0.009
39 CME Group Market and Trading Support –0.007
40 Blackhawk Network Holdings Payments and Remittances –0.006
41 MarketAxess Market and Trading Support –0.006
42 Mastercard Payments and Remittances –0.005
43 IHS Markit Data Analytics –0.005
44 PayPal Payments and Remittances –0.004
45 Jack Henry & Associates Software Solutions/IT –0.003
46 WEX, Inc. Payments and Remittances –0.003
47 Global Payments Payments and Remittances –0.003
48 Cboe Market and Trading Support –0.003
49 Broadridge Financial Solutions Software Solutions/IT –0.003
50 Equifax Software Solutions/IT –0.002
51 Thomson Reuters Software Solutions/IT –0.002
52 Fiserv Payments and Remittances –0.001
53 S&P Global Data Analytics –0.001
54 MSCI Robo-Advisors and  
Personal Finance
0.000
55 Verifone Payments and Remittances 0.001
56 Verisk Analytics Data Analytics 0.001
57 ACI Worldwide Payments and Remittances 0.001
58 Western Union Payments and Remittances 0.001
59 Cardtronics Payments and Remittances 0.001
60 Nasdaq Market and Trading Support 0.001
61 Visa Payments and Remittances 0.002
62 Evertec, Inc. Payments and Remittances 0.002
63 Worldpay Payments and Remittances 0.003
64 Moody’s Data Analytics 0.004
65 FactSet Data Analytics 0.004
Table A8.1.6 continued
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Rank Company Category ∆CoVaR (%)
66 FLEETCOR Payments and Remittances 0.009
67 SS&C Technologies Software Solutions/IT 0.011
68 Euronet Worldwide Payments and Remittances 0.022
69 Envestnet Robo-Advisors and  
Personal Finance
0.036
70 Green Dot Corporation Digital Banks 0.041
71 Franklin Resources Financial Industry 0.109
72 Regions Financial Corporation Financial Industry 0.178
73 Zions Bancorporation Financial Industry 0.182
74 Capital One Financial Industry 0.220
75 SLM Corporation Financial Industry 0.258
76 CIT Group Financial Industry 0.529
77 Huntington Bancshares Financial Industry 1.273
IT = information technology.
Source: Authors.
Table A8.1.6 continued
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Table A8.1.7: ∆CoVaR Results: European Financial System
Rank Company Category ∆CoVaR (%)
1 Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi Financial Industry –6.667
2 Turkiye Halk Bankasi Financial Industry –5.863
3 Credito Emiliano Financial Industry –5.796
4 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Financial Industry –5.434
5 Credit Suisse Financial Industry –4.996
6 CaixaBank Financial Industry –4.874
7 Raiffeisen Bank International Financial Industry –4.838
8 ING Group Financial Industry –4.282
9 Crédit Agricole Financial Industry –4.061
10 Plaza Centers N.V. Financial Industry –3.733
11 Nordea Bank Financial Industry –3.640
12 Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi AS Financial Industry –3.260
13 Intesa Sanpaolo Financial Industry –3.040
14 Commerzbank Financial Industry –2.789
15 Marfin Investment Group Financial Industry –2.784
16 Société Générale Financial Industry –2.760
17 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Financial Industry –2.724
18 BNP Paribas Financial Industry –2.443
19 Banco Santander Financial Industry –2.378
20 Jyske Bank Financial Industry –2.328
21 Svenska Handelsbanken AB Financial Industry –2.040
22 Banco de Sabadell Financial Industry –1.917
23 UniCredit Financial Industry –1.852
24 Banca Popolare di Sondrio Financial Industry –1.804
25 Permanent TSB Group Financial Industry –1.538
26 London Stock Exchange Group Financial Industry –1.483
27 Sekerbank Financial Industry –1.340
28 Piraeus Bank Financial Industry –1.114
29 RBS Group Financial Industry –1.049
30 Swiss Life Financial Industry –0.989
31 Banco Comercial Portugues Financial Industry –0.829
32 Dexia Financial Industry –0.781
33 Banco BPM Financial Industry –0.662
continued on next page
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Rank Company Category ∆CoVaR (%)
34 Standard Chartered Financial Industry –0.614
35 UBI Banca Financial Industry –0.604
36 Banca Carige Financial Industry –0.450
37 Alpha Bank Financial Industry –0.445
38 Aareal Bank Financial Industry –0.407
39 Erste Group Financial Industry –0.401
40 Oldenburgische Landesbank Financial Industry –0.323
41 UBS Group AG Financial Industry –0.286
42 Bank of Ireland Group Financial Industry –0.237
43 VTB Bank Financial Industry –0.196
44 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Financial Industry –0.188
45 TP ICAP Financial Industry –0.080
46 Eurobank Ergasias Financial Industry –0.019
47 Barclays Financial Industry –0.011
48 Bankia Financial Industry –0.009
49 Envestnet Robo-Advisors and  
Personal Finance
–0.005
50 Points Software Solutions/IT –0.004
51 Blackhawk Network Holdings Payments and Remittances –0.002
52 Verifone Payments and Remittances –0.002
53 FICO Data Analytics –0.002
54 China Information Tech Software Solutions/IT –0.002
55 Cognizant Payments and Remittances –0.002
56 DXC Technology Software Solutions/IT –0.002
57 Tungsten Corporation Software Solutions/IT –0.002
58 MercadoLibre Payments and Remittances –0.002
59 CANCOM Software Solutions/IT –0.002
60 Diebold Nixdorf, AG Software Solutions/IT –0.002
61 Xero Software Solutions/IT –0.001
62 DST Systems Software Solutions/IT –0.001
63 Model N Software Solutions/IT –0.001
64 NCR Software Solutions/IT –0.001
65 TSYS Payments and Remittances –0.001
continued on next page
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Rank Company Category ∆CoVaR (%)
66 SafeCharge Payments and Remittances –0.001
67 American Express Payments and Remittances –0.001
68 Wirecard Payments and Remittances –0.001
69 PFSweb Software Solutions/IT –0.001
70 ServiceSource Software Solutions/IT –0.001
71 Virtusa Software Solutions/IT –0.001
72 WEX, Inc. Payments and Remittances –0.001
73 FactSet Data Analytics –0.001
74 First Data Payments and Remittances –0.001
75 Ingenico Payments and Remittances –0.001
76 Euronet Worldwide Payments and Remittances 0.000
77 SAP Software Solutions/IT 0.000
78 Intuit Robo-Advisors and  
Personal Finance
0.000
79 IHS Markit Data Analytics 0.000
80 Global Payments Payments and Remittances 0.000
81 Syntel Software Solutions/IT 0.000
82 Jack Henry & Associates Software Solutions/IT 0.000
83 FLEETCOR Payments and Remittances 0.000
84 Luxoft Software Solutions/IT 0.001
85 FIS Software Solutions/IT 0.001
86 Everi Payments and Remittances 0.002
87 Wipro Software Solutions/IT 0.002
88 MoneyGram Payments and Remittances 0.002
89 Fiserv Payments and Remittances 0.002
90 Western Union Payments and Remittances 0.002
91 Genpact Digital Banks 0.002
92 IRESS Robo-Advisors and  
Personal Finance
0.003
93 Mastercard Payments and Remittances 0.004
94 Teradata Data Analytics 0.004
95 ADP Software Solutions/IT 0.004
96 Temenos Software Solutions/IT 0.006
97 PRGX Global, Inc. Data Analytics 0.010
continued on next page
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Rank Company Category ∆CoVaR (%)
98 Amber Road Inc. Market and Trading Support 0.010
99 Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. Software Solutions/IT 0.012
100 Evertec, Inc. Payments and Remittances 0.021
101 Equifax Software Solutions/IT 0.025
102 National Bank of Greece Financial Industry 0.062
103 Banco BPI Financial Industry 0.227
104 Wuestenrot & 
Wuerttembergische
Financial Industry 0.379
105 EFG International Financial Industry 0.483
106 BPER Banca Financial Industry 1.154
107 Deutsche Bank Financial Industry 1.170
IT = information technology.
Source: Authors.
Table A8.1.7 continued
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Table A8.1.8: ∆CoVaR Results: United States Fintech Industry
Rank Company Category ∆CoVaR (%)
1 First Data Payments and Remittances –0.107
2 LendingClub Alternative Financing –0.039
3 MarketAxess Market and Trading Support –0.030
4 CME Group Market and Trading Support –0.024
5 Square Payments and Remittances –0.019
6 Global Payments Payments and Remittances –0.018
7 Thomson Reuters Software Solutions/IT –0.015
8 WEX, Inc. Payments and Remittances –0.015
9 PayPal Payments and Remittances –0.013
10 Western Union Payments and Remittances –0.007
11 Equifax Software Solutions/IT –0.005
12 Blackhawk Network Holdings Payments and Remittances –0.003
13 Jack Henry & Associates Software Solutions/IT 0.000
14 Intercontinental Exchange Market and Trading Support 0.000
15 MSCI Robo-Advisors and 
Personal Finance
0.000
16 Evertec, Inc. Payments and Remittances 0.001
17 American Express Payments and Remittances 0.001
18 SEI Investments Company Robo-Advisors and 
Personal Finance
0.002
19 Worldpay Payments and Remittances 0.003
20 Visa Payments and Remittances 0.003
21 Virtu Financial Market and Trading Support 0.003
22 Broadridge Financial Solutions Software Solutions/IT 0.004
23 Fiserv Payments and Remittances 0.004
24 FLEETCOR Payments and Remittances 0.006
25 Mastercard Payments and Remittances 0.006
26 ACI Worldwide Payments and Remittances 0.008
27 Verisk Analytics Data Analytics 0.008
28 Nasdaq Market and Trading Support 0.009
29 Cardtronics Payments and Remittances 0.010
30 Cboe Market and Trading Support 0.011
31 SS&C Technologies Software Solutions/IT 0.011
continued on next page
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Rank Company Category ∆CoVaR (%)
32 IHS Markit Data Analytics 0.012
33 S&P Global Data Analytics 0.014
34 Green Dot Corporation Digital Banks 0.019
35 Moody’s Data Analytics 0.021
36 FactSet Data Analytics 0.025
37 Euronet Worldwide Payments and Remittances 0.034
38 Envestnet Robo-Advisors and 
Personal Finance
0.041
39 Verifone Payments and Remittances 0.074
IT = information technology.
Source: Authors.
Table A8.1.8 continued
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Table A8.1.9: ∆CoVaR Results: European Fintech Industry
Rank Company Category ∆CoVaR (%)
1 PFSweb Software Solutions/IT –0.013
2 Blackhawk Network Holdings Payments and Remittances –0.012
3 DXC Technology Software Solutions/IT –0.009
4 ServiceSource Software Solutions/IT –0.008
5 MercadoLibre Payments and Remittances –0.007
6 Tungsten Corporation Software Solutions/IT –0.007
7 China Information Tech Software Solutions/IT –0.006
8 Intuit Robo-Advisors and 
Personal Finance
–0.005
9 Diebold Nixdorf, AG Software Solutions/IT –0.005
10 Xero Software Solutions/IT –0.005
11 Cognizant Payments and Remittances –0.005
12 Points Software Solutions/IT –0.004
13 SafeCharge Payments and Remittances –0.004
14 Verifone Payments and Remittances –0.004
15 TSYS Payments and Remittances –0.004
16 DST Systems Software Solutions/IT –0.002
17 NCR Software Solutions/IT –0.002
18 FactSet Data Analytics –0.002
19 Mastercard Payments and Remittances –0.002
20 First Data Payments and Remittances –0.001
21 FIS Software Solutions/IT –0.001
22 Euronet Worldwide Payments and Remittances –0.001
23 SAP Software Solutions/IT –0.001
24 ADP Software Solutions/IT –0.001
25 Teradata Data Analytics –0.001
26 Ingenico Payments and Remittances –0.001
27 WEX, Inc. Payments and Remittances –0.001
28 IHS Markit Data Analytics –0.001
29 Wipro Software Solutions/IT –0.001
30 Virtusa Software Solutions/IT –0.001
31 FICO Data Analytics –0.001
continued on next page
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Rank Company Category ∆CoVaR (%)
32 Global Payments Payments and Remittances 0.000
33 FLEETCOR Payments and Remittances 0.000
34 Temenos Software Solutions/IT 0.001
35 Syntel Software Solutions/IT 0.001
36 Genpact Digital Banks 0.001
37 Fiserv Payments and Remittances 0.001
38 Luxoft Software Solutions/IT 0.001
39 American Express Payments and Remittances 0.002
40 Jack Henry & Associates Software Solutions/IT 0.002
41 Envestnet Robo-Advisors and 
Personal Finance
0.002
42 MoneyGram Payments and Remittances 0.003
43 Model N Software Solutions/IT 0.004
44 Equifax Software Solutions/IT 0.004
45 PRGX Global, Inc. Data Analytics 0.005
46 Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. Software Solutions/IT 0.005
47 Western Union Payments and Remittances 0.006
48 Evertec, Inc. Payments and Remittances 0.006
49 CANCOM Software Solutions/IT 0.006
50 Wirecard Payments and Remittances 0.008
51 IRESS Robo-Advisors and 
Personal Finance
0.010
52 Amber Road Inc. Market and Trading Support 0.016
53 Everi Payments and Remittances 0.018
IT = information technology.
Source: Authors.
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Table A8.1.10: Spearman’s Rank Correlation with ∆CoVaR
Sample Size Beta
United States
Coefficient 0.505 0.305
p-value 0.000 0.042
Europe
Coefficient 0.581 0.591
p-value 0.000 0.000
 Source: Authors.
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Appendix 8.2: Figures
Figure A8.2.1: Value at Risk
Source: Authors.
Weekly First Data, Inc. Returns Weekly Envestment, Inc. Returns
US Firm: Envestnet, Inc. European Firm: First Data Corp.
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Figure A8.2.2: United States Fintech: ∆CoVaR and Size
IT = information technology.
Source: Authors.
Size
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
–0.08
–0.10
–0.12
–0.06 Alternative Finance
Data Analytics
Digital Banks
Markets and Trading Support
Payment and Remittances
Robo-Advisors and Personal Finance
Software Solutions/IT
–0.04
–0.02
0.00
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
∆C
oV
aR
 
Does Fintech Contribute to Systemic Risk? Evidence from the United States and Europe 215
Figure A8.2.3: United States Fintech: ∆CoVaR and Beta
IT = information technology
Source: Authors.
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Figure A8.2.4: European Fintech: ∆CoVaR and Size
IT = information technology
Source: Authors.
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Figure A8.2.5: European Fintech: ∆CoVaR and Beta
IT = information technology
Source: Authors.
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The Nexus of Safe Asset 
Shortage, Credit Growth,  
and Financial Instability
Sujin Kim
9.1 Introduction
Does a safe asset shortage (SAS) sow the seeds of financial instability? 
This is an important and timely question given the resurgence of credit 
booms during the subdued global recovery1 since the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Despite fully fledged macroprudential measures2 
implemented to moderate excessive credit creation, rapid credit growth 
in economies such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC)3 is deepening 
policy makers’ woes. 
In terms of bank credit flows to the private nonbanking sector 
(Figure  9.1a), a simple comparison of the average annual increase in 
credit-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratios in 38 countries4 in the 
post-crisis period (2009–2017) against the pre-crisis period (2000–
2007) reveals that only 32% of the sample countries, most of which were 
hit by the global financial crisis, resumed to delever after the crisis. In the 
subgroup of 18 that experienced the 2007–2008 banking crisis (Laeven 
and Valencia 2018), only 60% saw a drop in terms of credit-to-GDP, 
1 At the time of writing in 2018.
2 Refer to Alam et al. (2019) for the extensive use of macroprudential policies after 
the GFC.
3 In terms of total credit to the private nonfinancial sector, Canada, the Netherlands, 
Singapore, and Switzerland. See also the even more rapid surge of credit growth in 
the post-crisis period (see Figure 9.1b).
4 See Appendix A9.1: List of Economies.
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whereas the credit level in the rest5 reached a record high. Moreover, 
26% of the sample countries, mainly emerging economies,6 swung from 
a deleverage to a leverage position after the crisis.
The surging credit volume in some developed economies does not 
seem to be in tune with secularly low private investment. Moreover, it is 
surprising to observe a sudden switch to leverage in emerging economies 
after the global financial crisis, especially some leverage at an alarming 
pace,7 given that the economic structure might not crave greater credits 
in a period of weakened economic growth. A suspicion emerges that an 
endogenous credit supply within a financial system is at play. What is 
the key factor or condition in triggering risky upturns in credit cycles? Is 
an SAS playing a role? This is a pivotal question that might help account 
for the global financial crisis as well as prevent a future one. 
A growing strand of literature on safe assets has argued for 
(macroeconomic) shortages of safe assets as a potential root of (global) 
financial instability (Gourinchas and Jeanne 2012; Gorton and Ordonez 
5 Including France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Sweden, 
and Switzerland. 
6 Specifically, the PRC; Hong Kong, China; Singapore; Malaysia; and Thailand.
7 The credit-to-GDP in the PRC has escalated to 156% (245%) in 2017 from 106% 
(151%) in 2007.
Figure 9.1: Private Credit Growth:  
Pre- and Post-Crisis Comparison
Note: (a) and (b) plot a simple annual average percentage point increase of bank credit (total credit) 
to private nonfinancial sector relative to nominal GDP level in the post-crisis period 2009–2017 
in comparison to records in the pre-crisis period 2000–2007. There are 38 sample countries 
(37 without Luxembourg). See Appendix List A9.1 List of Economies for abbreviations.
Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS); author’s calculation.
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2013; Gorton 2016; Gourinchas and Rey 2016; Caballero, Farhi, and 
Gourinchas 2017; Golec and Perotti 2017; Kacperczyk, Perignon, and 
Vuillemey 2017). To read its main view, with a focus on the question 
of this chapter,8 the demand for safe assets is generally assumed to 
increase proportionally with output or wealth (Caballero, Farhi, and 
Gourinchas 2017),9 with a search for a reliable store of value, liquid 
collaterals for banks, key components of prudential regulation, and 
capital preservation in portfolio construction (Gorton and Ordonez 
2013). On the other hand, the supply of safe assets can be constrained by 
the level of financial development, the fiscal capacity of the sovereign, 
the track record of the central bank for inflation and exchange rate 
stability, and the willingness of central banks to “backstop” government 
debts (Gourinchas and Jeanne 2012). The seeds of financial instability 
are sowed when excessive (insufficient) demand (supply) arises for 
safe assets. Such a shock to safe asset shortages distorts an incentive of 
the financial system to issue “private label safe assets”10 by utilizing the 
input of excessive risky claims on firms and households (Gourinchas 
and Jeanne 2012).11 The whole process consequently spurs the volume 
of credits independently from real factors (Golec and Perotti 2017).
Despite empirical evidence attesting to the presence of an SAS 
either in the form of safety premiums12 or a fall in natural interest 
8 The issue has been discussed in the separate fields of international macro and 
finance. Accordingly, macro shortage is more closely related to the real sector of 
households and firms, while its origin in the latter field is found in the financial 
system. However, recently, as in Golec and Perotti (2017), we have seen an increasing 
effort to understand the nexus of safe assets and financial stability in a more unified 
framework.
9 This has been assumed in the literature, such as for a model for “global” demand for 
safe assets, or in the context of foreign reserve accumulation by emerging economies 
and their demand for United States (US) treasury securities or international liquidity. 
For a critical review, see Bordo and McCauley (2017). 
10 Bernanke et al. (2011) note that such private label safe assets are non-safe to a 
negative aggregate shock even though they are expected to be the most safe, as seen 
in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012). Moreover, Kacperczyk, Perignon, and Vuillemey 
(2017) empirically demonstrate that the supply of private safe assets fails during 
episodes of market stress. 
11 Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012) present the mechanism but argue that the demand 
for safe assets “primarily” comes from a precautionary motive from firms and 
households owing to financial frictions, not from within the financial system.
12 See Gorton, Lewellen, and Metrick (2012), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2012) and (2015), and Gorton (2016). On the other hand, Jordà et al. (2019) have 
recently questioned the shortage of safe assets, documenting that risk premiums stay 
around their historical average. I will discuss the issue based on a sample average 
correlation analysis in Section 9.3.
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rates,13 the economic growth-based safe asset demand, often adopted 
as a constant in the literature, remains an elusive concept to apply. For 
instance, why should changes in wealth (economic growth or savings) 
inflate a safe rather than risky asset demand, or why should we assume 
that the composition of demand for risky and riskless assets is fixed? 
As an alternative step forward to the real economy, I propose two 
long-run trends as key determinants of safe asset demand and supply. 
One is population aging, which has progressed globally in recent 
decades. The other is an increasing tendency to use some rule-based 
fiscal policy, at least in developed economies, to manage the level of 
public debt around certain rates.14
Demographic factors affect demand through two channels. First, an 
increasing life expectancy stimulates precautionary savings that search 
for safe stores of value, providing a huge funding source on the liability side 
of balance sheet of banks and institutional investors, such as insurance 
and pension funds. As a consequence, financial institutions also need 
more “safe debt securities” as sound collateral, as well as to match their 
increasing asset liabilities (Greenwood and Vissing-Jorgensen 2018). 
Second, population aging shifts up an aggregate demand for safe assets 
in an economy (composition effects) via age-dependent or household 
life cycle portfolio choice on risky and riskless assets. Numerous 
empirical studies support a hump-shaped (an approximate U-shaped) 
age profile of risky (safe) share in household portfolios (see Cocco, 
Gomes, and Maenhout [2005], and Chang, Hong, and Karabarbounis 
[2018] for the US case; Brunetti and Torricelli [2010] for the Italian; and 
Fagereng, Gottlieb, and Guiso [2017] for the Norwegian). Therefore, in 
the case that government bonds are the only safe assets, a wave of aging, 
driving demand for safe assets, could constitute a potential contributor 
to financial vulnerability when it meets a specific condition, such as 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy.
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically explore the hypothesis 
of safe asset shortage-induced excess credit booms and financial 
instability. Despite vigorous debates on the issue since the global 
financial crisis, empirical evidence on how it works remains rather 
13 Refer to Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2017) and Del Negro et al. (2017). The 
former additionally argue that real interest rates adjust to safe asset shortages in 
incomplete markets. The secular fall in natural or the real risk-free interest rates, 
measured as an equilibrium outcome of such safe asset shortages, puts an economy 
into still deeper recession at the near Zero Lower Bound. Only a reduction in wealth 
decreases the shortage. These authors focused more on the consequences of deeper 
safe asset shortages since the crisis and on policy responses.
14 Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2016) describe the long-run evolution of public debts 
in advanced economies as counter-cyclical.
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scarce. A domestic focus (excluding the US) is even rare. Against this 
backdrop, the study makes a couple of contributions. First, I construct 
a new SAS index that reflects the trends of aging and fiscal policies. To 
my knowledge, this is the first attempt of its kind at the time of writing. 
The index for each country is built on a data set for old-age dependency 
ratios and central government debt (CGD) from 18 developed economies 
in 1960–2017.15 The new stylized fact I found is that the sample average of 
the individual SAS index in terms of year-over-year differences depicts 
some cyclical behavior, specifically a deep shortage before crises (see 
Figure 9.4a). The cyclical feature has been mainly affected by the supply 
side (changes in government debt) up to year 2009, and then markedly 
driven by aging factors after the global financial crisis (see Figure 9.4b).
Second, the paper adds new empirical evidence regarding the 
hypothesis. The SAS-financial instability hypothesis is assessed in two 
steps. In the first part, I evaluate the validity of the SAS index, its link 
to bank credits and their interaction as a predictor of domestic banking 
crises. The empirical exercise uses the classification model of Jordà, 
Schularick, and Taylor (2016) (hereafter JST [2016]) and Schularick 
and Taylor (2012) (hereafter ST [2012]). The credit expansion in the 
private sector is adopted as a proxy for the endogenous build-up of 
aggregate risks in a financial system that could result in an extreme 
event like a financial crisis such as in ST (2012). The study provides 
a basic framework in which only government debt or securities are 
narrowly classified into safe assets as stores of value. The test finds that 
it is not the level of government debt but its change (a decrease in safe 
asset supply) that is associated with risky private credit booms that 
potentially give rise to banking crises. Using the SAS index yields the 
same result. The estimation outcomes of the probabilistic models for 
17 developed economies in 1960–2013 demonstrate that the high level of 
private credits at a time of increasing SAS is the most powerful indicator 
of a financial crisis.
As a second step, the study sets up a fixed-effect panel model, 
derived from the results of the previous exercise, and estimates the 
causality effects of an SAS on the growth of domestic bank credits to 
the private sector and the role of securitization in the presence of the 
shortage. The main mechanism is as follows. When the demand for safe 
assets intensifies at their limited supply, for instance a big wave (band) 
of retirement (to-be retirees) or a sudden drop in government bond 
issuance, it triggers an endogenous, bubbly credit supply by financial 
15 The observation period and the sizes of the sample countries vary slightly for here 
and each empirical analysis in the paper, owing to data availability. The time series of 
the SAS index used for empirical exercise is also slightly different in terms of range. 
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intermediaries as in Shin (2009).16 In the process, banks, using their 
balance sheets, exploit excessive demand for safe assets, either from 
households’ portfolio channels or from outside the banking sector, 
such as institutional investors. Securitization enables banks to keep in 
leverage, inventing quasi-private-safe assets, constructed on loans on 
balance sheets, proceeds from whose sales are new funding sources to 
issue new credits. 
The shortage pressure is eventually mitigated with excessive private 
credits, exposing the financial system’s vulnerability to a negative shock 
like in the global financial crisis. In an open economy, such domestic risks 
can be reduced via capital outflows, exporting the shortage. Through 
introducing a capital-flow term in the model, the chapter also verifies 
whether cross-border investment flows economically increase or 
decrease domestic credit risks. The fixed effects estimation of the credit 
model for 18  developed economies in 1980–2016 confirms a positive 
effect of an SAS on a domestic bank credit growth. The total effect of 
an SAS on domestic credit booms is affected positively by securitization 
growth and negatively by capital outflows. The latter effect is estimated 
as considerably stronger than the former. 
This study is inspired by broad strands of literature on safe assets, 
the link between credit cycles and financial stability, and capital flows. 
It benefits greatly from the literature on safe assets discussions when 
developing ideas and assumptions. To my knowledge, however, empirical 
studies on the nexus of SAS-credit growth-financial instability in a 
unified framework are rarely found in the literature. To present a few, 
scattered but directly relevant to the paper, my work is indebted to JST 
(2016) and ST (2012) in terms of empirical strategy and data. JST (2016) 
investigate the role of private and public debts and their interactions 
in causing financial crisis episodes. In an analysis of 17 developed 
countries in 1870–2012, the authors argue that it is mainly the private 
debt pile-up that induces financial crises, while public debt ex ante is 
scarcely relevant. Instead, the negative impact of public debt is evident 
in the aftermath of crises, as excessive public leverage tends to prolong 
the recession and is associated with weak growth after crises. 
By contrast, this paper supports the strong interaction between 
public and private debt as the main crisis predictor. This distinctive 
result comes from the use of government debt. JST (2016) employ the 
level of general government debt for the interaction term with private 
credits, while my chapter uses the change in central government debt 
(CGD), that is, net safe asset supply. While the former studies focus only 
16 Shin (2009) points to the endogeneity of credit supply as the origin of the subprime 
crisis.
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on domestic factors, Cesa-Bianchi, Eguren-Martin, and Thwaites (2017) 
add a global factor to the credit banking crisis discussion. They study the 
impact of credit growth abroad on the risk of a domestic banking crisis, 
using data from 38 developed and emerging economies over 1970–2011. 
They empirically show a significant role of cross-border portfolio inflows 
as the main channel explaining the large positive effect of foreign credit 
booms on the probability of domestic banking crises. However, the study 
barely deals with structural factors behind the relationship. Perugini, 
Holscher, and Collie (2015) investigate the roots of financial instability, 
empirically estimating the relationship of inequality, credit growth, 
and financial crisis for 18 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development countries in the period 1970–2007. Authors find a positive, 
significant effect of income inequality on private debt growth, but their 
empirical model seems to miss a clear link, for instance, an interaction 
term of credit growth and inequality in the crisis model, to explain why 
inequality-driven credit booms are directly relevant to increasing the 
probability of banking crises. In terms of an asset index, Chen and Imam 
(2014) construct an “asset” shortage index and show its positive effect 
on banking crisis occurrences for 41 emerging economies for 1995–2008. 
They argue that one origin of banking crises, asset bubbles, and uphill 
capital flows in emerging markets lies in general asset shortages, not in 
safe asset shortages. Besides a different focus on the sample group, the 
indexing approach used in the paper, relying on flows of funds of assets, 
is distinct from this chapter, which constructs a structural factor-based 
SAS index for developed economies.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.2 estimates the public 
debt (safe assets) to financial instability nexus in probabilistic models, 
and discusses the results. Section 9.3 describes the SAS index and the 
stylized facts of the data related to empirical exercises, and explores the 
role of the index in the crisis classification model. Section 9.4 presents 
the fixed-effects panel model for private credit growth and the estimation 
results. Section 9.5 concludes with policy implications. 
9.2  Channel of Financial Instability:  
Government Debt and Bank Credit 
I revisit the crisis classification model of JST (2016) to assess the 
relationship between an SAS and financial fragility via credit booms. 
The first empirical exercise replicates JST (2016) for the data selection 
check. Before creating the SAS index, it is necessary to examine the test 
results for a case using only the supply side of the SAS index, associated 
with government debt, and assess the suitability of the data set as a 
proxy for safe assets.
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The empirical model is the following probability logit model, as in 
JST (2016) and ST (2012): 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
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∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
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𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
 (1)
where the log-odds ratio (
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
 of a financial crisis 
episode in country (i) in year (t) is a linear function of lagged controls Xi,t 
and country-fixed effects b0,i . The lagged control variables include 5-year 
moving averages of changes in the private credit-to-GDP and the public 
debt-to-GDP. They are further augmented by lagged levels of the private 
and public debt-to-GDP, as well as an interaction term of them.
The analysis adopts the data set from JST (2017),17 aside from public 
debt data. Given that the study limits safe assets to (central) government 
bonds as stores of value in its narrowest definition,18 it opts for the CGD 
data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Global Debt Database 
(Mbaye, Badia, and Chae 2018),19 which represents an extensive public 
debt database over a long-time horizon back to the year 1950. The CGD-
to-GDP is employed as a proxy for safe assets20 in the entire empirical 
models of the study. The sample include 17  developed economies as in 
JST (2016) (see List A2), but the observation period covers only the range 
of 1960–2013, shortened from the period of 1870–2012 in JST (2016). 
Table 9.1 documents the main results. Private credit growth is still 
a strong crisis predictor as in Column (1), while public debt growth 
alone does not offer any information (see Column (2)). This is a similar 
outcome as in JST (2016). A new observation is found in Column (5). 
When we add the lagged level of public debt-to-GDP and the interaction 
term between the lagged private credit and public debt-to-GDP level to 
the model, the estimation of the specification yields further information 
to predict a crisis. 
The result is substantially different from JST (2016) that found 
little association between private credit and public debt to predict 
crises. Column (5) shows that CGD both in change and in level play 
a role in restraining the occurrence of a financial crisis event, while a 
high level of public debt in the high level of private credit would raise 
the possibility of a future crisis. The coefficient of the interaction term 
17 See the Appendix Table A9.1, or visit http://www.macrohistory.net/data/#Download 
Data for more information. 
18 Golec and Perotti (2017) provide a good overview of the types of safe assets, classified 
by safety and liquidity and issuers. See Figure 1 (Golec and Perotti 2017, 7).
19 https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets/GDD for more information.
20 As for data selection background, refer to the safe shortage index description in 
Section 9.3.
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Table 9.1: Financial Crisis Classification Ability:  
Central Government Debt 
Classifier Logit Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in private credit/GDP
(5-year moving average)
34.59***
(3.81)
34.55***
(9.19)
23.66*
(12.31)
Change in public debt/GDP
(5-year moving average)
–9.48
(8.82)
–0.20
(10.13)
–22.73*
(11.80)
Lagged level of private  
credit/GDP
1.47
(1.53)
Lagged level of public  
debt/GDP
–4.50**
(1.74)
Interaction terma 0.36
(1.03)
6.18***
(1.85)
Observations 1810 987 987 999 996
AUROC 0.65
(0.03)
0.60
(0.06)
0.74
(0.05)
0.79
(0.04)
0.76
(0.05)
AUROC = area under the receiver operating characteristic curve, GDP = gross domestic product.
Notes: For the Netherlands, general government debts are used in all empirical exercises and indices as its 
CGD data are not available in the International Monetary Fund Global Debt Dataset.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
a The interaction between the lagged level of private credit-to-GDP and of public debt-to-GDP. 
Source: Author’s estimation. The government debt data is from the International Monetary Fund Global 
Debt Dataset and other data is from JST (2017).
in Column (5) is statistically significant. The AUROC21 shows a better 
performance for Specification (5) than for the same specification in 
JST (2016). The different outcomes of this study and JST (2016) may 
result from the distinct sample period and data selection for public debt. 
However, what deserves our attention is that when government debt is 
approached as (safe) assets in the use of CGD in change, instead of as 
an indicator of general fiscal soundness in its level, the role of public 
debt and its interaction with private credits are positively verified as a 
useful information source in the model. The data selection of CGD for 
safe assets, based on the hypothesis, is assessed as appropriate. 
Next, I generate an interaction term of lagged level of private credit-
to-GDP 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
and lagged yearly change in CGD-to-GDP 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
. 
Given that government debt is annually collected in terms of stock, its 
difference roughly approximates year-over-year net government bond 
21 AUROC is a measure of the binary classification ability of the model. ST (2012) 
explain the method in detail.
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issuance. This enables the interaction term to capture the effect of 
private credit expansion on financial risks at a time of a drop in safe 
asset supply. 
Surprisingly, unlike the previous exercise, Columns (1) and (3) in 
Table 9.2 report that the level of private credit in response to the change 
in government debt (net government bond issuance) mainly accounts 
for future crises. The interaction term measuring the effect is the most 
powerful information source as a crisis predictor, followed by the 
private credit level. The coefficient estimates for the two terms are all 
statistically significant. The change in private credits or public debt loses 
its forecasting power when the former two control variables are added. 
Specifications (1) and (3) show better predictive ability compared to the 
result of Table 9.1. The AUROC of Specification (1) for the augmented 
model of private credit growth is 0.85 (standard error [SE.] of 0.04) and 
that of Specification (3) for the modified model of public debt growth is 
0.88 (SE. 0.03). 
It is the high private credit level at a time of diminishing public debt, 
that is, a drop in safe asset supply, which warns of a build-up of financial 
risks in developed economies over the period 1960–2013. Given that 
this result empirically supports the hypothesis of the chapter, the next 
section presents an SAS index combined with a demand component, 
and tests its validity in the same classification model.
Table 9.2: Financial Crisis Classification Ability  
in the Modified Model: Central Government Debt
Classifier logit model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in private credit/GDP
(5-year moving average)
10.28
(11.67)
12.18
(12.18)
Change in public debt/GDP
(5-year moving average)
15.86
(10.68)
5.94
(14.74)
Lagged level of private credit/GDP 3.42**
(1.54)
2.57*
(1.44)
3.99***
(1.35)
3.26***
(1.03)
Interaction term: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  )     (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
wher  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln(𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
–31.95**
(9.34)
–41.38***
(8.38)
Observations 984 968 984 968
AUROC 0.85
(0.04)
0.79
(0.05)
0.88
(0.03)
0.79
(0.05)
AUROC = area under the receiver operating characteristic curve, GDP = gross domestic product.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Source: Author’s estimation.
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9.3  Safe Asset Shortage Index,  
Data and Stylized Facts
9.3.1 Safe Asset Shortage Index (1970–2017)22 
The SAS index is constructed on the assumption of household life 
cycle portfolio choice. Households’ portfolio shares in risky (riskless) 
assets drop (increase) substantially with the age of household heads.23 
According to Fagerang, Gottlieb, and Guiso (2017) analyzing Norwegian 
household data, the portfolio share in risky assets is high and constant up 
to mid-phases of the life cycle, remaining at around 50%. Subsequently, 
households start gradually decreasing their risky asset shares until 
investors’ age reaches around 65.24 When they retire, most people exit 
the stock market. 
Based on such empirical evidence on household portfolio choice 
in the micro data analyses, the study assumes that investors have two 
choices of risk and riskless assets (such as safe government bonds), and 
their demand for safe assets grows as they age.25 Thus, an aggregate 
demand for safe assets evolves contingent on a demographic transition 
in the economy. I simplify the relationship into a relative term, such that 
a relative demand for safe assets to risky shifts contingent on the ratio 
of old to young people. The study takes the retirement age of 6526 as the 
threshold for exiting from a risky asset market or at least the lowest and 
constant level of risky asset share in terms of life cycle investment. The 
old-age dependency ratio is a useful tool here. It efficiently summarizes 
the relative demand for riskless assets on aggregate in an economy. The 
empirical strategy is that the relative demographic shift toward old 
against that of the base-year proxies for the relative increase in the safe 
asset demand compared to the level in the base year. 
22 I present the index series ranging from 1970–2017 in this section. They were 
originally constructed from the year 1950, based on an unbalanced data set.
23 See again for empirical results, Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) and Chang, 
Hong, and Karabarbounis (2018) for the US case and Brunetti and Torricelli (2010) 
for the Italian, especially Chang and colleagues in terms of participation rate.
24 According to the study, participation in the stock market also follows a hump shape. 
It increases rapidly with investors’ age up to a high level at age 45, and stays constant 
or slightly grows afterwards but investors leave the stock market at retirement.
25 In the process, increasing precautionary savings on the balance sheet of banks and 
financial institutions also call for more safe assets. I abstract the financial sectors, 
linking their behavior to the motivation of household investors. 
26 The threshold age or range could be adjusted to construct a better index. 
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It is formulated as in the first element on the right-hand side of 
Equation (2) for the SAS index. The index for demographics-based safe 
asset demand captures the relative increase of the old-age dependency 
ratio27 against its level in 2000 of the base year 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
.
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
 (2)
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
 (3)
The supply of safe assets is determined by government bond 
issuance. The index for safe asset supply measures the relative increase 
of government debt-to-GDP against its level in the base year 2000 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
. I opt for the central government debt series, which is compiled 
mostly by core debt instruments such as debt securities. Given that it 
reports the gross outstanding stock of government liabilities, the annual 
change of the stock approximately quantifies the net amount of safe 
asset issuances. The CGD-to-GDP is thus employed as a proxy for the 
safe asset supply as a portion of GDP. 
A shortage of safe assets is assumed to occur when the government 
bond supply does not meet the age-dependent safe asset demand. The 
SAS index in Equation (2) measures the gap between two indices. There 
is no weight on each component. The relationship between two indices 
in the basic framework is simple and straightforward. Equation (3) 
presents the index in difference, which captures the annual gap between 
the yearly change in the size of new and old retirees relative to young, 
and the change in net government debt issuance to GDP.
Discussion. In terms of the baseline indices above, I assume that 
the ratio of the old generation’s financial assets to the young generation 
is constant over time. In addition, the supply side of the index does not 
include the asset purchase by major central banks during and after the 
global financial crisis, despite its substantial shock to the amount of safe 
assets available to the public. However, such counterfactual elements 
are certainly worth testing. The extended indices to reflect them could 
be presented as follows. 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
,  (4)
where 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
wh r 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
, 
27 The number of people older than 64 years per 100 working age population aged 
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𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
 (5)
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
 (6)
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
 (7)
The extended index for safe asset demand is weighted by 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
,
the level of over 64 old agents’ financial wealth relative to the young, 
compared to the base year. Taking a log on each safe asset demand 
and supply index in Equation (4) gives more direct intuition when we 
solve the shortage in level 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000, 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
in Equation (6) and in yearly 
changes 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑏𝑏0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
(logit (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = ln (
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ )) 
 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝  )      (∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
( 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2 0,
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
−
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 
 
( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000)   
 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
,  (4) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,2000
, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝_𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 ) = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
),  ln (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
 (5) 
𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000
) − ln ((𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,2000 ) (6) 
∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∆ ln(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙_𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (7) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)    (∆𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
in Equation (7). Then, the extended SAS index 
in difference is affected by a change in the relative share of old agents’ 
financial wealth and by the central banks’ asset purchase shock to the 
amount of safe assets available to the public.28
The variation in age-contingent financial wealth distribution over 
time is substantial. A comparison of the figures in the Republic of Korea 
and the US explains why the ratio of financial wealth could be important 
in safe asset debates. Financial wealth by age does not increase evenly. 
Figure 9.2 (a) depicts that the amount of financial wealth held by people 
aged over 63 grows faster than that of younger agents. Moreover, the 
growth rate of this ratio in the US is much steeper than in the Republic 
of Korea. The financial wealth share of agents over 63 accounts for 
69% of the younger generation’s in 2001 in the US. However, the figure 
records 131% in 2016, rising by 62 percentage points. In the Republic of 
Korea, the level of financial wealth of senior agents reaches only 13% of 
younger generations’ in 2001, steadily increasing to 46% in 2016. During 
the same period, it only grows by 33 percentage points, approximately 
half of the US figure. This simple micro data analysis reveals that the 
demand for safe assets in the US may have been stronger than in the 
Republic of Korea, given that the relative asset share of senior agents in 
the US dominates that in the latter in scale and growth. In Figure 9.2 (c), 
younger household heads held more financial assets in per-head average 
term in the Republic of Korea in 2000. By contrast, Figure 9.2 (b) shows 
28 It could be further extended and modified, as other determinants of the supply and 
demand of safe assets such as a series of uncertainty and regulations also need to be 
considered.
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that already in 1995, the age profile of average total financial assets in the 
US saw a peak in agents over 60.
9.3.2 Demographics 
The present and the following part describe the data from the sample of 
18 countries used for the empirical analysis of Section 9.429 and stylized 
facts. The level of population aging is heterogenous over countries, 
but the trend of aging over time is a significant global phenomenon, 
29 See Appendix List A9.3 and Table A9.1.
Figure 9.2: Total Financial Wealth Distribution:  
Republic of Korea vs. the United States
Notes: (a) summarizes the ratio of aggregate financial wealth between the group of household heads 
aged over 63 and the young aged below 64. The data for the Republic of Korea come from the Korean 
Labor & Income Panel Study of the Korea Labor Institute, adjusted to the 2015 price level, while the 
data for the US come from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) of the Federal Reserve Board. 
(b) and (c) are the age profile of the households’ average amounts of total financial assets for the US 
and the Republic of Korea in US dollars. Also refer to Figure A9.2.
Source: Author’s calculation.
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with a secular fall in fertility and a surge in longevity.30 It may imply a 
gradual increase in safe asset demand globally, or at least in developed 
economies31 from the view of an investor’s portfolio choice over the 
life cycle. According to data from the United Nations (UN) World 
Population Prospects, most sample countries belonged to the group of 
aging society32 in 1950, except for the Republic of Korea (2000),33 the 
Netherlands (2004), and Norway (1977). In 2015, most economies were 
classified in the aged society, while Germany (21.1%),34 Italy (22.3%), 
and Japan (26%) entered the hyper-aged society. Besides the Republic 
of Korea (elderly population share, 13%), the US (14.6%) is the youngest 
country in the sample, followed by Australia (15%), Canada (16.1%), and 
Norway (16.3%). From 2000 to 2015, aging occurred fastest in Japan 
(average annual growth of 0.6 percentage points in elderly population 
share), with the Republic of Korea (0.4 percentage points), Finland 
(0.4 percentage points), and Germany (0.3 percentage points) behind. 
Figure 9.3 depicts the time interval progress of old-age dependency 
ratio. The 5-year interval data also come from the UN World 
Population Prospects. For here and the following empirical study, I 
interpolate the data set to the annual data. The figure is little different 
from the evolution of the elderly share in the total population, owing 
to a stagnant birth rate and increasing longevity across countries. 
In 2017, Japan showed the highest record of 45, followed by Italy 
(36.3), Finland (34), and Germany (33). Relative to the level in the 
base year of 2000, the safe asset preference share of population (the 
old-age dependency ratio) grew most quickly in Japan (annually by 
1.18 percentage points). Next was Finland (0.68 percentage points), 
followed by Italy (0.55 percentage points), the Republic of Korea 
(0.54 percentage points), Portugal (0.54 percentage points), and the 
Netherlands (0.53 percentage points), while Norway (0.12 percentage 
points) and Belgium (0.19 percentage points) showed rather slow 
progress in aging over 2000–2017. 
30 Refer to Amaglobeli et al. (2019) and Barany, Coeurdacier, and Guibaud (2019) for a 
broad description of the global and regional aging trend, including fertility and life 
expectancy rates.
31 With substantially high financial assets held in the private sector.
32 According to the UN definition, when the elderly population (+65) in a country 
exceeds 7% of its total population, it is classified as an aging society. When it accounts 
for 14% (21%) or more, it is defined as an aged society (a hyper-aged or super-aged 
society).
33 The figure in parentheses refers to the year in which the countries became part of the 
aging society.
34 This refers to the percent share of elderly population (+65) in the total population.
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Figure 9.3: Demographics: Old-Age Dependency Ratio
Note: See Appendix List A9.1 List of Economies for abbreviations.
Source: UN World Population Prospects. Author’s calculation.
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Figure 9.4: Safe Asset Shortage Index in Difference  
(Average across Countries)
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Source: Author’s calculation.
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In Figure 9.4(b), the sample average of annual changes in the old-age 
dependency ratio revealed a striking feature. Though it seemed stable 
in early 2000s, it was not constant at all in the long-run time series; 
rather, it exhibited big swings. The recent hike is dramatic, driving the 
SAS index after the global financial crisis. The average change in the 
ratio elevates in year 1986, 1991, 1996, 2006, 2010, and 2012. Some of the 
upturns came roughly before banking crises. 
9.3.3 Government Debt
The CGD-to-GDP ratio is adopted as a proxy for annual safe asset supply 
in the study, and the data set comes from the Global Debt Database (2018) 
released by the IMF. The Global Debt Database provides the widest 
coverage in terms of time series of debt starting in 1950 and of sample 
countries (190 countries). It enables the study to overcome problems 
arising from data coverage and access to government debt issuance. The 
data set is unbalanced over the period 1950–2017. Among the 18 sample 
countries, the time series of debt for Canada (1990),35 Germany (1961), 
the United Kingdom (UK) (1974), and the Republic of Korea (1960) are 
relatively short. 
Figure 9.5 summarizes the evolution of the CGD across countries 
over time intervals. The countries that maintained a lower level of 
sovereign debt in 2017, compared to the level in 2000, were Belgium 
(98.2 [2000]36→77.0 [2007]→88.1 [2017]), Canada (46.3→29.7→39.1), 
Switzerland (22.7→20.0→14.5), Denmark (53.6→27.1→30.0), Norway 
(19.0→11.3→15.8), and Sweden (65.5→39.6 (2008)→39.7). The group of 
countries that saw a big jump in debt by more than 50 percentage points 
after the crisis were Portugal (66.2 [2007] →131.3 [2016]), Japan (137.3 
[2007]→196.7 [2016]), and Spain (29.5 [2007]→87.1 [2015]). By contrast, 
Switzerland shrunk liabilities by about 5 percentage points over the same 
period. The Republic of Korea expanded its debt-to-GDP from 17.1% in 
2000 to 29.3% in 2006, reducing it slightly in 2007–2008 to 28.2%. After 
the global financial crisis, the level rose to 39.5% in 2017.
One stylized fact indicates that the government debt-to-GDP 
generally dropped in the year before the global financial crisis and 
dramatically inflated after the crisis, although the latter saw some 
variation by countries. In the case of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, 
all 13 countries out of 18 dropped the debt ratio, that is, net government 
bond issuance relative to GDP, at the lowest point in 2007 or 2008 since 
35 This denotes the year that the data run back to.
36 This indicates the year of the record. 
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year 2000.37 Interestingly, a year before some banking crises, the sample 
average of annual changes in government debt declined, while the old-
age dependency ratio jumped. In Figure 9.4(c), this decreased in 1987 
(1986),38 1996 (1996), 2006 (2006), 2010 (2010), and 2013 (2012), except 
for a lift in the demand index (old-age dependency ratio) in 1991. 
9.3.4  Index-Based Safe Asset Shortage  
across Countries, 1970–2017
Figure 9.6 provides an overview of the index-based SAS trend across 
countries over 1970–2017. Certain features emerge. First, out of all 
the sample countries except for the UK, the SAS index moved up 
consecutively for a couple of years just ahead of the 2007–2008 
global financial crisis. The relatively sharp bounce during this period 
could be observed in the Scandinavian countries. The SAS index in 
Norway picked up by 28 percentage points in 2005–2007, Denmark 
37 The US, Germany, France, and Japan reduced the level but not much by the scale 
compared to other countries. The UK did not curtail the level. 
38 The year of local peak in the sample average change in the old-age dependency ratio.
Figure 9.5: Government Debt: CGD-to-GDP Ratio
CGD = central government debt, GDP = gross domestic product.
Note: See Appendix List A9.1 List of Economies for abbreviations.
Source: The Global Debt Database, IMF. Author’s calculations.
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by 26 percentage points, and Finland by 18 percentage points. The 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and Canada experienced a rise in the index 
by 16 percentage points, 10 percentage points, and 12 percentage points, 
respectively. The shortage grew modestly in the US by 4 percentage 
points. By contrast, the UK did not show such a trend. Rather, the index 
steadily fell over 2004–2015, rebounding only recently. 
The second feature is the resurgence of the shortage after the 
culmination of the deep repercussion of the crisis. A strong upturn in 
the shortage could be observed in Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and 
the Netherlands. The SAS index of Switzerland revealed a dramatic 
surge from 2003, reaching the point of 0.58 in 2016, the deepest shortage 
since 1980. Denmark also recorded the greatest shortage of 0.83 in 2017 
since 1980, rebounding from the level of 0.41 in 2011. Sweden and the 
Netherlands also experienced the most severe safe asset shortages in 
2017 over the entire observation period of 1970–2017, with indexes of 
0.58 and 0.25, respectively. 
Another distinct case is Japan. During the observation period, 
Japan showed a relatively decreasing trend in the SAS after 1991. 
The anticipated strong demand pressure for safe assets, coming 
from steep aging in Japan, looks alleviated by the corresponding 
huge government debt. The index for the Republic of Korea headed 
downward from 1996. 
A new, interesting finding is that the sample average of annual 
difference in the SAS index moved cyclically. The safety pressure 
tends to hike just before crises and dampen after them. I decompose 
the contribution of demand (aging) and supply (public debt) factors 
to the sample average change in the safe asset shortage. Figure  A9.1 
displays the dominant role played by government debt supply over the 
entire period, specifically up to year 2009, but a closer look also reveals 
that, at a time of a rise in SAS before crises, the portion of demand 
side contribution increased. Further, the post-global financial crisis 
role of aging has been escalating. This necessitates greater attention to 
demand-side factors in the shortage.
Using the data set from Jordà et al. (2019), I check the correlation 
among sample average changes in the SAS index and the sample average 
returns on risky (equities), safe (government bonds) and quasi-private-
safe assets (housing). While Jordà et al. (2019) combined housing and 
equities in a risky asset basket, I split them, defining housing as quasi-
private safe assets in terms of stores of values, and whose securities 
are alternative long-term assets for financial institutions. If SAS is 
driven by aging-contingent demand, the returns on both government 
bonds and equities would decrease, as the shift in demands toward 
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safe assets negatively affects (spurs) the prices of equities (bonds). 
The housing returns increase in the process of interaction between 
financial institutions and real sectors to narrow the shortage. In 
the case of a supply shock to the shortage, the association between 
government bonds and equities returns is not clear-cut. However, the 
returns on alternative safe assets of housing would still appreciate in 
the shortage. 
Table A9.2 documents the results for 16 countries39 in 1970–2015. 
The sample average returns on bonds correlate positively with the 
equity returns, but negatively with the housing returns. As expected, 
the association of annual changes in the SAS index with the returns 
on bonds and equities is negative, while the shortage changes are 
positively related to housing returns. This implies that the risk 
premiums, that is, the spreads between the returns on equities and 
government bonds, would not get wider in a rise in the SAS since both 
returns tend to move in same direction to the shortage shock, but the 
spreads between the returns on housing and government bonds would 
increase in the shortage. The last three rows of Table A9.2 support this 
interpretation. The spreads between the returns on equities and bonds 
co-move negatively with the index in difference, although it is not 
statistically significant, while the changes in the index are positively 
and significantly related to risk premiums on housing.
Jordà et al. (2019) doubt the SAS argument based on recent risk 
premiums at the historical average. The risky assets in this seminal paper 
include equity and housing whose returns tend to move in opposite 
directions of the SAS in my exercise, canceling out the risk premiums40 
in 1970–2015. The definition of risky assets and the hypothesis on SASs 
would affect the debate on risk premiums. 
39 The sample countries are the same as in the List A9.3, excluding Canada and the 
Republic of Korea.
40 In Table A9.2, the shortage change is positively correlated with the returns and the 
premiums on the risky assets, which are composed of both equity and housing, as in 
Jordà et al. (2019). However, the equity returns alone are negatively associated with 
the shortage change.
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Figure 9.6: Safe Asset Shortage Index, Individual
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Note: The panel on the left-hand side of the Figure plots the evolution of indices in level (year 
2000=1 for supply and demand indices, year 2000=0 for SAS index) while the panel on the right-
hand side plots it in terms of yearly difference.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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9.3.5  Financial Crisis Classification Ability:  
Safe Asset Shortage Index (1960–2013)41
In this section, I assess the power of the SAS index as a crisis predictor 
in the same empirical model as in Section 9.2. Table 9.3 presents 
similar results as in Table 9.2. The change in private credit-to-GDP 
still has a significant impact on the possibility of crises as in Columns 
(2) and (3), while there is no role of change in the SAS used alone 
(see Column (1)). Nevertheless, the private credit growth loses power 
when the model facilitates an interaction between private debt and 
safe asset shortage. 
41 I used the same time range of the SAS index from 1960–2013 despite some missing 
data points in government debt, for instance, for Canada, for a better comparison 
with the former exercises in Tables 9.1 and 9.2. 
Table 9.3: Financial Crisis Classification Ability: SAS Index
Classifier Logit Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Change in private  
credit/GDP
(5-year moving average)
34.26***
(9.20)
34.03***
(9.26)
17.18
(13.72)
9.70
(11.36)
Change in SAS index
(5-year moving average)
4.96
(3.99)
1.42
(4.12)
–6.83
(4.76)
–3.64
(5.40)
Lagged level of  
private credit/GDP
2.11*
(1.28)
4.21***
(1.46)
3.63**
(1.62)
Lagged level  
of SAS Index
0.32
(0.77)
0.94
(0.94)
Interaction term: 
     𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1  
 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 
 
0.36
(1.03)
Interaction term:    
     
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1  
 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 
 
22.56***
(3.86)
18.06***
(3.46)
16.21***
(3.75)
Observations 938 938 950 950 935 935 935
AUROC 0.60
(0.06)
0.74
(0.05)
0.75
(0.05)
0.79
(0.05)
0.85
(0.03)
0.89
(0.03)
0.88
(0.03)
AUROC = area under the receiver operating characteristic curve, SAS = safe asset shortage, GDP = gross 
domestic product.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
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The AUROCs in Specifications (2) and (3) are clearly lower than 
in Columns (6) and (7), where the lagged private credit-to-GDP level 
and the interaction term of the lagged level of private credit as well as 
the lagged change in the SAS index are added. Specifications (6) and 
(7) show that in the presence of the two former terms, neither private 
credit growth nor the change in the SAS index provides any information 
on future financial turbulence. Instead, the (high) level of private credit 
associated with a (positive) change in the SAS index demonstrates 
significant power to detect a financial vulnerability. The coefficient 
estimates for the interaction term of lagged difference of the SAS index 
and the lagged level of private credit-to-GDP are statistically significant 
(see Columns (6) and (7)). The AUROC value for each specification is 
0.89 (SE. 0.03) and 0.88 (SE. 0.03), respectively, exhibiting the strong 
crisis forecasting power of the models. Both are significantly different 
from the AUROC=0.54 (SE. 0.03) for the null reference model with only 
a country-fixed effect as a control variable.
The key finding in this exercise is two-fold. First, the test result 
offers empirical support for the interaction between the SAS and private 
credits as a useful financial risk predictor. Second, it is not the level of 
the shortage but its change that destabilizes the financial system via 
private credit channels. 
9.4 Empirical Model and Analysis
9.4.1 Empirical Model 
This section studies the causality effect of safe asset shortages on 
private credit expansion as part of an extended econometric model. 
In doing so, it focuses on the contribution of safe asset shortages to 
boosting the risky upturn of private credits. For this purpose, the 
chapter sets up the fixed-effects panel models of Equations (8) and 
(9) with unobserved country-specific (αi ) and time-fixed effects 
(τt ). The securitization term (secui,t ) explains the role of banks in 
producing quasi-private safe assets that foster private credit growth. 
The interaction term of lagged securitization growth and lagged yearly 
change in the SAS index measures the causality effect of an increase 
in securitization in the presence of a safe asset shortage, that is, the 
potential role of banks in filling the gap between supply and demand 
for safe assets.
Equation (8) is for the closed version of the economy that does not 
consider cross-country capital flows. All variables are in real terms, 
where subscripts (i) and (t) denote countries and years, respectively.
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𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
× ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (8) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽7∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ + 𝛿𝛿2∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (9) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   ( 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 )    (∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)    (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ )   (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖i,t−1) 
∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) 
 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡   𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡  
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
𝛽𝛽 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛿𝛿 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
𝛽𝛽 𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛿𝛿 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
𝛽𝛽 𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛿𝛿 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡      𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡     𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
 
( 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 
( 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖i,t ) 
( 𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) 
( 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 
(𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 
( 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 
𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 
 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡   𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡  
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
+𝛽𝛽 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
× 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +𝛽𝛽 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
𝛽𝛽 𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
+𝛽𝛽 𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡      𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡     𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
 
( 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 
( 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖i,t ) 
( 𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) 
( 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 
(𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 
( 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 
𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 
 
 (9)
The dependent variable ∆crediti,t is the annual growth rate of bank 
credit to private non-financial sectors, for which data come from the Bank 
for International Settlements database. The SAS index in difference, the 
main explanatory variable of interest, is introduced as a 1-year lagged 
term to measure the causality effect of the shortage on credit growth. In 
the same account, a variable for securitization growth is also employed 
in a lagged form. Adding an interaction term of the lagged change in 
the SAS index and securitization growth, the model examines if the SAS 
affects private credit growth via securitization. Other control variables 
include the lagged investment-to-GDP (iyi,t-1 ) ratio, the 3-year moving 
average of GDP growth (∆gdp3i,t ), lagged short-term interest rates and 
lagged GDP per capita level in local currency, as generally employed in 
studies on credit growth. 
Augmented by the term of net international investment position from 
the IMF database, Equation (9) measures the effect of an SAS on credit 
growth in the presence of cross-border investment. For this purpose, the 
lagged yearly difference in the net international investment position-
to-GDP ratio 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
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is introduced. The positive net investment 
position in difference indicates a rise in net capital outflows, which I 
assume would subdue the risk of excessive credit boom in a domestic 
economy. Employing the interaction term of the lagged change in the net 
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, the model evaluates the extent 
to which this effect determines the total effect of an SAS on domestic 
credit growth. 
9.4.2 Estimation Results (1980–2016)
The data cover 18 developed economies42 (see List A9.3) in annual 
observations from 1980 to 2016. Table 9.4 summarizes the main empirical 
42 The Republic of Korea is added to the sample countries of 17 used for the previous 
estimations. 
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outcomes. First, the SAS substantially drives the growth of bank credits. 
Across all variations of the model, the contribution of a SAS is robust 
and statistically significant. 
Specification (4) in a closed economy framework indicates that a 1 
percentage point lift in SAS growth stimulates a growth of bank credits 
by 0.15 percentage points in the following year. The securitization 
variable alone does not account for credit growth, but its role turns 
out to be substantial and statistically significant in an interaction with 
the lagged change in the SAS index. Once the SAS has intensified, the 
securitization expands credit volumes. A 1 percentage point increase 
in securitization growth, associated with an increasing asset shortage, 
raises credit growth by 0.09 percentage points. One caveat of this 
exercise is that the securitization issuance data set from the Association 
Table 9.4: Main Results
Bank credit growth
(∆crediti,t) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L(1) diff. safe asset shortage 
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𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
× ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (8) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽7∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ + 𝛿𝛿2∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (9) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   ( 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 )    (∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)    (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ )   (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖i,t−1) 
(∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) 
( 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ ) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
0.173***
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∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽7∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ + 𝛿𝛿2∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (9) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   ( 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 )    (∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)    (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ )   (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖i,t−1) 
(∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) 
( 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ ) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
0.791***
(0.210)
0.573*
(0.310)
0.620**
(0.313)
0.646**
(0.318)
0.590*
(0.317)
L(1) short-term interest 
rates 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
× ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (8) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽7∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ + 𝛿𝛿2∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (9) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   ( 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 )    (∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)    (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ )   (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖i,t−1) 
(∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) 
( 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ ) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
–0.003
(0.003)
–0.006
(0.005)
–0.006
(0.005)
–0.006
(0.005)
–0.006
(0.005)
L(1)gdp per capita (log)
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
× ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (8) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽7∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ + 𝛿𝛿2∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (9) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   ( 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 )    (∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)    (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ )   (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖i,t−1) 
∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) 
 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ ) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
0.099
(0.061)
0.008
(0.072)
0.009
(0.070)
0.016
(0.071)
0.020
(0.070)
L(1)change in net int’l 
investment position/gdp 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 1 
× ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 8  
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽7∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ + 𝛿𝛿2∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (9) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   ( 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 )    (∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)    (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ )   (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖i,t−1) 
(∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) 
( 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ ) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
–0.016
(0.045)
–0.068
(0.053)
Interaction term:
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 1  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 1 
× ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 8
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽7∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ + 𝛿𝛿2∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (9) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   ( 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 )    (∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)    (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ )   (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 1) 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖i,t−1) 
(∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) 
( 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ ) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
–0.568*
(0.320)
Nr. countries/observations 18/306 18/288 14/177 14/177 14/172 14/172
R-squared 0.369 0.390 0.486 0.496 0.511 0.524
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. The dependent variable is the 
annual growth of bank credits to the private non-banking sector. 
Source: Author.
250 Macroeconomic Stabilization in the Digital Age
for Financial Markets in Europe database is short, available from 1999 
and unbalanced across sample countries. This is why the number of 
countries and observations shrink in Columns (3) to (6). 
As expected, physical investment and economic growth are strong 
predictors of credit expansion, with a 1 percentage point increase in 
each variable inflating the credit growth by 0.91 percentage points and 
0.62 percentage points, respectively. A rise in short-term interest rates 
tends to subdue the credit volume but the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. The per capita GDP, a proxy for the level of economic 
advancement, is statistically irrelevant in the sample analysis. 
The estimation outcome of Equation (9) with cross-border capital 
flows shows that the coefficient of the variable for the change in net 
capital outflows displays a negative sign. While the estimate would 
partially signal that increasing capital outflows reduces the domestic 
credit boom, it does not have a statistically significant meaning in 
Column (5). The interaction term, however, makes a surprising 
difference. Specification (6) reports that an increase in net capital 
outflows (1 percentage point) at an increasing SAS significantly 
restrains domestic credit expansion (by 0.57 percentage points), which 
is comparable to the magnitude of the GDP growth. Investment and 
GDP growth are still key drivers of credit growth in the open economy. 
A 1 percentage point rise in the growth of the shortage inflates domestic 
credit growth by 0.16 percentage points. The role of securitization 
has strengthened. A 1 percentage point rise in securitization growth 
in response to a rise in the shortage boosts credit growth by 0.12 
percentage points. 
The total effect of a SAS on private credit expansion depends on 
the interaction with securitization growth and capital outflows. The 
latter effect is considerably dominant. Net capital (in)outflows could 
significantly (intensify) mitigate the potential financial risk coming 
from the shortage-induced domestic credit expansion. 
9.5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
An SAS contributes to a build-up of financial risks by driving private 
credit growth. Through employing the newly constructed SAS index, 
I have demonstrated that shortage-induced private credit expansion 
is the key crisis predictor. Neither the SAS index nor private credit 
growth provides better information when used alone in the crisis 
classification model. But, the study has found that when the two 
variables are combined in an interaction term, private credit booms that 
are in response to a surge in SAS reveal strong power to warn of financial 
crises in developed economies in the period 1960–2013. The chapter 
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has also confirmed economically a significant, positive causal effect of 
an SAS on a domestic credit boom. The total effect of the shortage is 
positively associated with securitization growth and negatively with net 
capital outflows. An increase in net outflows at a time of rising shortage 
reduces domestic credit growth to the extent that it could make the total 
effect of the shortage on credit growth negative. From this result, we can 
infer that capital flows may have played a significant role in determining 
the (de)leverage position of the domestic financial system. However, 
this study has not examined the externality of net capital flows in the 
presence of the shortage at home and abroad. This remains an issue for 
further research. 
The findings of the chapter have important policy implications. 
The timing of counter-cyclical fiscal policy and its magnitude matter 
for financial stability, specifically when policy causes a sudden drop 
in the net government bond issuance facing a high retirement wave. 
Such a deep shock to the shortage could evoke bubbly credit booms. 
From the view of SAS-financial instability, fiscal and macroprudential 
policies need to be coordinated, minimizing a fiscal shock to the 
financial market, and carefully monitoring the scale of new retirees or 
soon-to-be retirees, associated with its shock to a portfolio rebalance 
of an economy. 
Second, a proper response to capital flows is crucial. A real challenge 
comes when the SAS is a global or a regional phenomenon. A couple of 
Asian economies have recently become exposed to an unprecedented 
deep aging shock (see Figure A9.3). As fiscal and monetary policies have 
gotten more synchronized across countries, most economies could face 
a negative mega-global or regional shock to safe asset supply at a time of 
a major influx of new retirees. In such cases, the solid macroprudential 
measures of one country might exacerbate a financial risk in others via 
capital flows. Under this condition, where should the shortage-induced 
capital flows go? International cooperation for financial stability may 
need to pay due attention to a new way of managing a safe asset supply 
and the externality of macroprudential policy, tracking the evolution of 
an individual SAS in either the global or the regional context. Central 
banks would find their role in more active, proper asset management via 
their balance sheets. 
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Appendix 9.1
List A9.1 List of Economies
Argentina (ARG); Australia (AUS); Austria (AUT); Belgium (BEL); 
Brazil (BRA); Canada (CAN); Czech Republic (CZE); Denmark 
(DNK); Finland (FIN); France (FRA); Germany (DEU); Greece (GRC); 
Hong Kong, China (HKG); Hungary (HUN); India (IND); Indonesia 
(IDN); Ireland (IRL); Italy (ITA); Japan (JPN); Luxembourg (LUX); 
Malaysia (MYS); Mexico (MEX); Netherlands (NLD); Norway (NOR); 
People’s Republic of China (PRC); Poland (POL); Portugal (PRT); 
Republic of Korea (KOR); Russian Federation (RUS); Singapore (SIN); 
South Africa (ZAF); Spain (ESP); Sweden (SWE); Switzerland (CHE); 
Thailand (THA); Turkey (TUR); United Kingdom (GBR); and United 
States (USA)
List A9.2 Country List (17) and Systemic Banking Crises, 
1960–2013 
AUS: 1989; BEL: 2008; CAN; CHE: 1991, 2008; DEU: 2008; DNK: 1987, 
2008; ESP: 1977, 2008; FIN: 1991; FRA: 2008; GBR: 1974, 1991, 2007; 
ITA: 1990, 2008; JPN: 1997; NLD: 2008; NOR: 1988; PRT: 2008; SWE: 
1991, 2008; USA: 1984, 2007
Note: Systemic Banking Crises Classification and Records from http 
://www.macrohistory.net/data/.
List A9.3 Country List (18)
AUS, BEL, CAN, CHE, DEU, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, ITA, JPN, 
KOR*, NLD, NOR, PRT, SWE, USA
Note: *The fixed-effects panel analysis includes the Republic of Korea.
The Nexus of Safe Asset Shortage, Credit Growth, and Financial Instability 255
Table A9.1: Data Source
Variable Source
(Crisis Probabilistic Model) Data for Tables 1, 2, and 3 
(1960–2013)
Central government debt Global Debt Database IMF
Old-age dependency ratio UN World Population 
Prospects
UN World Population 
Prospects
Other variables Jordà, Schularick, and 
Taylor (2017)
www.marohistory.net 
/data#DownloadDate
(Fixed-Effects Panel Model) Data for Table 4  
(1980–2016)
Dependent Variable
Private credit growth:  
(
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
× ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (8) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽7∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ + 𝛿𝛿2∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (9) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   ( 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 )    (∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)    (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ )   (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖i,t−1) 
(∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) 
( 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ ) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
)
annual growth of bank credit to 
private nonfinancial sector
Bank credit to private 
non-financial sector,  
local currency
BIS
Explanatory Variables
Change in SAS index: (
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
× ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (8) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽7∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ + 𝛿𝛿2∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (9) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   ( 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 )    (∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)    (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ )   (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖i,t−1) 
(∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) 
( 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ ) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
) Autor’s calculation
Securitization growth:  
(
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
× ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (8) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽7∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ + 𝛿𝛿2∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (9) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   ( 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 )    (∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)    (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ )   (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖i,t−1) 
(∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) 
( 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ ) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
)
Unbalanced. Converted 
into local currency, using 
year-end average US 
exchange rates from  
the BIS.
Association for 
Financial Markets  
in Europe 
NIIP-to-GDP change:  
(
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ∗ ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
× ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (8) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽4∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
+𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ 𝛿𝛿2∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡 (9) 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   ( 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 )    (∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)    (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ )   (∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
(∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖i,t−1) 
(∆𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) 
( 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 1) 
(𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ ) 
(∆𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ × ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 
 
)
Unbalanced. 
Net International 
Investment Position, 
converted into local 
currency, using year-end 
average US-exchange 
rates from the BIS.
GDP in local currency.
International Financial 
Statistics, IMF
Other Control Variables
GDP growth (previous 3-year 
moving average), Investment-
to-GDP ratio, Short-term 
interest rates, Per capita GDP 
(in log), CPI
For sample countries  
(excl. Republic of Korea): 
Jordà, Schularick, and 
Taylor (2017)
www.marohistory.net 
/data#DownloadDate
For the Republic of Korea, 
all corresponding data 
compiled.
IMF
CPI = consumer price index, GDP = gross domestic product, IMF = International Monetary Fund, BIS = 
Bank for International Settlements, NIIP = net international investment position, UN = United Nations.
256 Macroeconomic Stabilization in the Digital Age
Figure A9.1: Contribution of Demand and Supply Factors 
to Annual Change in the SAS
SAS = safe asset shortage.
Note: The black (light gray) shaded area represents the contribution of sample average change in 
demand (supply) side to the sample average change in the SAS index. Dotted lines denote the year 
of banking crises of 18 countries. The boxes show the years in which safe asset shortages deepened. 
Among them, the black-bordered boxes indicate the year for a dual drop in demand and supply sides, 
where a drop in government debt dominated. The gray-bordered boxes boxes mark the year the 
safe asset shortages deepened, but in such cases the demand side of the sample average ratio of the 
retiree population increased while the supply of the net government securities declined. 
Source: Author’s calculation.
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Figure A9.2: Age-Dependent Contribution 
to the Weighted Average of Total Financial Wealth
Note: The distribution is normalized by the weighted average of total financial wealth.
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Figure A9.4: Safe Asset Shortage Index, Individual  
(Asian Economies)
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SAS = safe asset shortage, GDP = gross domestic product.
Note: The graphs on the first row show the evolution of indices in level, while the graphs on the 
second row plot it in terms of yearly difference. As for the range of time series of each index, refer to 
the note in Figure A9.3.
Source: Author’s calculation.
Figure A9.4 continued
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Table A9.2: Sample Average Return Correlation  
(16 Countries, 1970–2015)
Bond Equity Housing
Risky 
Asset
Safe  
Asset
SAS  
Index
Bond 1
Equity 0.230*
(0.0000)
1
Housing –0.154*
(0.0000)
0.174*
(0.000)
1
Risky Asset 0.004
(0.9076)
0.812*
(0.0000)
0.622*
(0.0000)
1
Safe Asset 0.967*
(0.0000)
0.270*
(0.0001)
–0.078*
(0.0296)
0.063
(0.078)
1
SAS index –0.286*
(0.0000)
–0.141*
(0.0001)
0.698*
(0.0000)
0.289*
(0.0000)
–0.253*
(0.0000)
1
R.P. Equity
(the spreads between returns on equity and bond)
–0.024
(0.5174)
R.P. Housing
(the spreads between returns on housing and bond)
0.521*
(0.0000)
R.P. Risky
(the spreads between returns on risky assets and safe assets,  
defined in Jordà et al. [2019])
0.397*
(0.0000)
SAS = safe asset shortage.
Note: * Indicates significance at 5% level. Data, except for SAS index, from JSTdatasetR4 (Release 4 May, 
2019) and Jordà et al. (2019). All variables are real terms. R.P. denotes risk premium, and bonds in the analysis 
are government bonds. The SAS index is used in annual difference. The sample countries are the same as in 
List A9.3, excluding Canada and the Republic of Korea. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Rationales for the Use of 
Capital Flow Management 
Measures since the Global 
Financial Crisis
Mitali Das and Evgenia Pugacheva1
10.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an initial set of stylized facts and empirical 
evidence on the incidence of capital controls (now increasingly 
referred to as “capital flow management measures” or CFMs) and the 
factors that motivate their use.2 Our study is focused on the experience 
of 11 developed and emerging markets in the Asia and Pacific region. 
This study is facilitated by a new dataset that records high-frequency 
changes to capital account policies (Binici, Das, and Pugacheva 2020). 
The underlying data for Binici, Das, and Pugacheva come from the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) new Taxonomy of Capital Flow 
Management Measures (henceforth Taxonomy), which is a textual 
repository of all changes since 2008 to capital account restrictions that 
the IMF classifies as a CFM.
The years since the global financial crisis have seen a significant use of 
CFMs. Between 2008 and 2019, over 40 countries adjusted restrictions on 
1 The views expressed in this chapter are purely those of the authors and do not 
necessarily represent those of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), its Executive 
Board, IMF management, or IMF policy.
2 As defined by the International Monetary Fund, capital flow management measures 
include capital controls and any other capital account restrictions on cross-border 
financial transactions that discriminate by residency, as well as prudential measures 
that do not discriminate by residency but nevertheless limit capital flows (IMF 2012).
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their capital account policies in the face of the inflow or outflow of foreign 
capital. The rationales offered for the use of CFMs during these episodes 
ranged from domestic overheating, to the loss of competitiveness and 
threats to their export sector, financial stability risks, balance of payment 
pressures, and a desire to curtail hot money flows. In parallel with these 
developments, there has been a renewed debate on the benefits and costs 
of the free flow of cross-border capital. The question of whether CFMs 
have a role in policymakers’ toolkits to address the scale or volatility of 
capital flows has become a central issue in international fora, as well as 
the subject of numerous Group of 20 communiques since 2011. There are 
three potentially interrelated reasons for the renewed interest. 
First, in the years immediately following the global financial 
crisis there was a tremendous surge of foreign capital from developed 
to emerging markets. The causes of these flows have been discussed 
extensively,3 and were linked to a multitude of factors including the 
relatively advanced cyclical positions of emerging markets, the improved 
risk-return tradeoffs amid a decisive re-rating of emerging markets’ 
fundamentals and policy frameworks, and favorable interest rate 
differentials due to the unconventional monetary policies in developed 
economies. These factors prompted large flows of capital to emerging 
market equity and bond markets and their banking sectors. Capital flows 
were also spurred by the ongoing and rapid improvements in fintech, 
which facilitated cheaper, faster, and more decentralized means of 
transmitting capital across borders (Adrian and Mancini-Griffoli 2019).  
Official statements of policy makers during these episodes clearly 
highlight their concerns about the scale and volatility of these capital 
flows. Guido Mantega, then Minister of Finance in Brazil, stated in 
September 2010: “We are in the midst of an international currency war. 
This threatens us because it takes away our competitiveness.” (Financial 
Times 2020). Echoing these sentiments, then President of Brazil Dilma 
Rousseff noted in March 2012 that richer nations of the world were 
unleashing a “tsunami” of capital flows that forced countries such as 
Brazil to limit their impact on local industries (Soto and Pariz 2012). 
Raghuram Rajan, then Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, warned in 
August 2014 of the risk of “a global market crash” when investors began 
to pull out of risky assets created by the monetary policies of developed 
economies (Times of India 2014).
Second, faced with questions about managing capital flows in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis from countries in its membership, 
3 See, e.g., IMF (2010, 2012), Eichengreen and Rose (2014), Alfaro, Chari, and Manczuk 
(2017), Forbes, Fratzscher, and Straub (2015), Fratzscher (2014).
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the IMF softened its decades-old position on the benefits of free capital 
mobility. In 2012, the IMF declared that, “for countries that have to 
manage the risks associated with inflow surges or disruptive outflows, 
a key role needs to be played by macroeconomic policies, as well as by 
sound financial supervision and regulation, and strong institutions. In 
certain circumstances, CFMs can be useful. They should not, however, 
substitute for warranted macroeconomic adjustment” (IMF 2012). The 
change in the IMF’s position, viewed by some as a qualified endorsement 
of the use of capital controls, was a significant impetus in bringing the 
discussion of them back into the spotlight.
Third, in parallel with the IMF’s work, a new body of academic 
research began to assess the role of CFMs—as well as broader prudential 
measures that were domestically oriented but, by their design, could 
limit capital flows—as a potential policy response to the surge or flight 
of capital when conventional macroeconomic or financial stabilization 
policies are unavailable.4 This body of work advanced CFMs as a second-
best welfare improving policy option when distortions in the economy 
made conventional first-best policies unavailable. Such distortions 
could reflect price inertia and downward nominal wage rigidity that 
result in large gains in real wages during the upswing of capital flows 
but result in employment losses when foreign capital recedes (see, e.g., 
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2012; Farhi and Werning 2012); imperfect 
cross-border risk-sharing that results in large output fluctuations and 
large swings in terms of trade (e.g., de Paoli and Lipinska 2013); and 
inadequate financial sector regulation (e.g., Bianchi and Mendoza 2010; 
Korinek 2018). This influential body of academic work may have at 
least indirectly lent support to their use among emerging market policy 
makers (Eichengreen and Rose 2014). 
The interest from policy makers, international institutions, and 
academics alike suggests that continued examination of CFMs and the 
factors that motivate their use remains a worthwhile endeavor. In this 
context, the Asia and Pacific region is an interesting region to consider 
because it consists of a large number of both developed and emerging 
markets, which have recalibrated their capital account policies—
although with significant variation across countries—since the global 
financial crisis. 
4 See Eichengreen and Rose (2014) for a summary of using CFMs as a second-best 
alternative to monetary, fiscal, and financial policies (e.g., Bianchi and Mendoza 
2010; Jeanne and Korinek 2010; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2012; Farhi and Werning 
2012; Forbes, Fratzscher, and Straub 2015; Korinek 2018).
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Moreover, the nature of capital account restrictions in these 
countries, with regard to whether they are focused on capital inflows or 
outflows, whether they are targeted to the equity market, bond market, 
or housing sector, and the duration of time for which the measures are 
kept in place provide for a rich differentiation across countries and over 
time in empirical analysis. Countries in this region differ significantly 
in their historical usage of capital controls and the overall openness of 
their economies. In some, the use of CFMs has been significant as an 
active tool of stabilization policies, while in others their use has been 
more episodic. 
Our work complements an earlier literature that has analyzed the 
factors that determine the probability of implementing a CFM. Alesina, 
Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti (1993), Berger, Sturm, and de Haan (2001) 
and Hagen and Zhou (2005) find that capital controls are more likely 
to be imposed when the exchange rate is either a peg or managed. Grilli 
and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) find a positive association between capital 
controls and countries with large governments, i.e., those where the 
central bank is less independent. Capital controls are also found to 
be more likely used by governments that repress the financial sector, 
as well as those that are facing balance-of-payment crises (Leblang 
1997) and those at intermediate development levels (Alfaro 2004). In 
discriminating between various objectives of CFMs, Aizenman and 
Pasricha (2013) find that overheating and foreign exchange valuation 
concerns lead to tightening capital controls. Fratzscher (2014) finds 
evidence indicating that they are driven primarily by appreciation of 
the real exchange rate. 
The main innovation of our chapter from the earlier research is the 
use of a unique and high-frequency dataset on CFMs rather than annual 
measures of capital account openness, which can remain static even 
when there are significant within-year changes in CFMs (see Binici et al. 
2020). Furthermore, we cover nearly 10 years after the global financial 
crisis, extending the time period of analysis several years beyond that in 
other recent papers, thus capturing many changes in the global financial 
cycle. Using data on CFMs at monthly frequency permits us to relate 
economic and financial developments at business cycle frequency to the 
recalibration of CFMs. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 10.2, we 
describe the data used in the study along with stylized facts about the 
incidence of CFMs in our sample. Section 10.3 presents the different 
motivations for using CFMs that have been discussed in the literature. 
In Section 10.4, we describe our empirical strategy and discuss the 
quantitative evidence. Section 10.5 concludes.  
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10.2 Data and Stylized Facts
This section describes the data used in the study and provides a detailed 
set of stylized facts about the incidence of CFMs in the countries 
analyzed.
10.2.1 Data on CFMs
The primary dataset on CFMs used in this study is Binici, Das, and 
Pugacheva (2020). This database draws primarily from the Taxonomy, 
which is a textual repository of the changes to capital account policies 
undertaken by the IMF member countries since 2008. Binici et al. 
compile a quantitative database from the Taxonomy, recording the 
introduction of new measures, the removal of existing measures, the 
tightening or loosening of existing measures, as well as changes to the 
enforcement of any measures. The country coverage in their database 
is 44 economies that have recalibrated their CFMs between the first 
quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2019. Our analysis is based 
on the 11 economies in the Asia and Pacific region in their data, which 
includes six developed economies and five emerging and developing 
markets. The list of economies is given in Appendix Table A10.1. 
Table 10.1: Types of CFMs
  Inflows Outflows
Approval requirement New Zealand (+)  
Ban   Malaysia (+)
Fees Australia (+)  
Loan-to-value requirement Macau, China (+)  
Limit Australia (+), PRC (-/+), 
India (-/+), Indonesia (+),  
Rep. of Korea (-/+), 
Malaysia (+), Sri Lanka (-/+)
PRC (-/+), India (-/+), 
Malaysia (-/+)
Limit / Approval 
requirement
India (-)  
Reserve requirement PRC (-/+)
continued on next page
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Figure 10.1: CFMs Undertaken Economies  
in the Asia and Pacific Region
CFM = capital flow management measure.
Source: Binici, Das and Pugacheva (2020); IMF (2019).
Tax
Limit
Limit / Approval requirement
Reserve requirement
Stamp duty
Surrender / Repatriation requirement
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Approval requirement
Ban
Fees
Loan-to-value requirement
  Inflows Outflows
Stamp duty Australia (+),  
Hong Kong, China (+), 
Singapore (+)
 
Surrender / Repatriation 
requirement
  Malaysia (-/+),  
Sri Lanka (+)
Tax Australia (+),  
Rep. of Korea (+),  
Malaysia (+)
 
CFM = capital flow management measure, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Note: The table lists countries that have introduced/tightened (+), removed/eased (-), or both removed/
eased and introduced/tightened (-/+) CFM measures of each type since 2008.
Sources: Binici, Das and Pugacheva (2020); IMF (2019).
Table 10.1 continued
Table 10.1 and Figure 10.1 summarize the CFMs deployed by 
these 11 economies, with Table 10.1 showing that economies used a 
wide range of capital account restrictions. “Limits”—which represent 
a broad range of quantitative restrictions on the notional value or 
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currency of denomination in specific asset classes or on individuals or 
institutions—on the cross-border flow of capital were used by several 
countries. “Bans”, which could be viewed as an extreme case of a 
limit, were used just in one. “Reserve Requirements”, which require 
foreign investors to deposit a percentage of their capital for a given 
duration in either a non-interest or low-interest bearing account and 
are typically levied on banks, depositary institutions, and financial 
corporates, were imposed exclusively by emerging markets. Price-
based controls, such as taxes and fees, had a high incidence among 
developed economies. Among these price-based CFMs, “stamp duties” 
(taxes on cross-border real estate transactions) have a particularly 
high incidence in the developed economies of the region. Their use 
was motivated by prudential and affordability concerns due to a price 
boom in their domestic residential real estate sectors. These are also 
macroprudential measures, but because they can affect capital flows, 
regardless of their intent, the Taxonomy classifies them to be both a 
macroprudential measure and a CFM.
Table 10.2: CFMs by Exchange Rate Regime,  
Monetary Policy Regime, and Income Level
 
All 
Measures Tightening Easing
Inflow 
Tightening
Inflow 
Easing
Outflow 
Tightening
Outflow 
Easing
Net Inflow 
Measures
Net 
Outflow 
Measures
Exchange rate 
Flexible 25 22 3 19 1 3 2 21 4
Fixed 82 48 34 34 25 15 9 43 40
Monetary policy
IT 51 33 18 33 18 0 0 33 18
Non-IT 56 37 19 20 8 18 11 31 26
Economy Group
Developed 38 36 2 36 2 0 0 36 2
Emerging 69 34 35 17 24 18 11 28 42
Total 107 70 37 53 26 18 11 64 44
CFM = capital flow management measure, IT = inflation targeting..
Notes: Net inflow measures = inflow tightening + outflow easing. Net outflow measures = outflow tightening + inflow 
easing. Flexible exchange rate regime is defined based on Ilzhetzki et al. (2019). Inflation targeting (IT) countries (time 
varying): Australia, India, Indonesia, Rep. of Korea, and New Zealand. For a list of developed and emerging  economies 
see Appendix Table A10.1.
Sources: Binici, Das and Pugacheva (2020); IMF (2019).
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In Table 10.2, based on monthly data, we further break down these 
CFMs by exchange rate regime and monetary policy regime and income 
level. We use the fine classification from Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff 
(2019) to determine exchange rate regimes, and data from the IMF to 
classify countries by inflation-targeting status and income level.5 The 
incidence of CFMs presents stylized evidence of the links between the 
exchange and monetary policy regime and the use of capital controls. 
In countries with fixed or managed exchange rates, the use of CFMs 
in general facilitates maintaining the level, consistent with the higher 
number of CFMs observed in fixed rather than flexible rate regimes. 
Non-inflation targeting regimes are more likely to use CFMs, as monetary 
policy is not constrained by an explicit inflation target consistent with 
their higher incidence in these countries. Developed economies, which 
are in general more open (as measured, for example, by the Chinn-Ito 
index), had a much lower number of CFMs in this period (Figure 10.2). 
In general, since 2008 there were more tightening CFMs than easing 
CFMs (Figure 10.3). 
5 Some economies changed their inflation-targeting status during the 2008–19 period. 
Table 10.2 shows their latest status.
Figure 10.2: CFMs: Advanced versus  
Emerging Economies in the Asia and Pacific Region
CFM = capital flow management measure.
Sources: Binici, Das and Pugacheva (2020); IMF (2019).
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Figure 10.3: Tightening versus Easing Measures  
(Economies in the Asia and Pacific Region)
CFM = capital flow management measure.
Sources: Binici, Das and Pugacheva (2020); IMF (2019).
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10.3 Motivations for the Recalibration of CFMs
The literature has offered many motivations for the recalibration of 
CFMs. Erten, Korinek, and Ocampo (2019) provide an overview of the 
current debates on their role in macroeconomic management and a 
review of recent advances in the literature on CFMs. Drawing on this 
literature, we broadly divide the objectives behind CFMs into four 
(possibly overlapping) categories: (1) macroeconomic stabilization 
motives; (2) capital flow management motives; (3) financial stability 
goals; and (4) exchange rate motives.
10.3.1 Macroeconomic Stabilization
A longstanding explanation for the use of CFMs is macroeconomic 
stabilization. This includes recalibrating CFMs to limit the impact of 
capital flows on overheating or the domestic business cycle. Indicators 
of overheating used in previous research include output growth, output 
volatility, terms of trade volatility, inflation, and the growth of nominal 
exports or imports. The motive for macroeconomic stabilization 
encompasses the broader objective of achieving monetary or exchange 
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rate autonomy when faced with inconsistent objectives under trilemma 
considerations (see, e.g., Calvo, Liederman, and Reinhart 1996; de 
Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdes 2000). For example, inflow controls can 
be used to limit exchange rate appreciation pressures while retaining 
some control over domestic monetary policy. This is because limiting 
the volume of capital flows gives policy makers room to raise the 
policy rate without concomitant (or, at the least, a proportional) loss of 
external competitiveness. In a capital flight episode, capital controls on 
outflows give authorities some ability to avoid disorderly exchange rate 
depreciation without raising interest rates that could otherwise choke 
investment and output objectives. 
Macroeconomic stabilization motives could also include “financial 
repression” (Laban and Larrain 1997). Capital controls on outflows lower 
the cost of government borrowing—and determine its allocation across 
sectors—by retaining domestic saving within the country. This argument 
has been presented in terms of lowering debt-service costs by using 
capital controls on outflows to keep domestic interest rates low (Drazen 
1989). In general, CFMs for financial repression are accompanied by 
a wide range of restrictions on interest rates, credit ceilings, limited 
product market competition, and high reserve requirements for banks. 
10.3.2 Capital Flow Management
A second rationale for the use of CFMs is to manage one or more 
features of foreign capital flow. The objective can range from targeting 
the volume of foreign capital flows, to its composition (e.g., recalibrating 
CFMs to engineer a shift from equity to debt flows), or its maturity 
structure. 
In some cases, capital account restrictions may be implemented to 
reflect the shallowness of the domestic financial sector and the inability 
to absorb the foreign capital without creating significant financial 
imbalances. These concerns may be amplified when the exchange rate is 
not freely floating and when monetary policy is not pinned to an explicit 
inflation target. This use of CFMs in such cases is sometimes justified 
by asymmetric information problems that give rise to herding among 
foreign investors (see, e.g., Eichengreen and Mussa 1998) that necessitate 
their use to limit the volatility of capital flows and exchange rates. 
CFMs could be targeted to specific asset classes, such as the price- 
or quantity-based controls on hot money flows that were used by Brazil 
in the years after the global financial crisis to limit flows to their equity 
markets (see, e.g., Alfaro, Chari, and Manczuk 2017). By imposing 
administrative controls on short-term portfolio flows, CFMs can also 
alter the relative risk-return profile of longer-term flows, such as foreign 
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direct investment, and thus also affect the maturity structure of foreign 
capital flows.
10.3.3 Financial Stability Concerns
A third objective is the use of CFMs to limit the buildup of risks to the 
financial sector from large and/or volatile capital flows, particularly 
those targeted to the banking and financial sector (see, e.g., Jeanne 2012; 
Korinek 2018). Examples of financial stability risks include an excessive 
increase in the foreign-currency denomination of domestic banking 
sector liabilities, financial sector volatility, a rapid growth of foreign 
credit to the private sector intermediated by the domestic financial 
system, as well as localized sectoral risks, such as a boom in residential 
real estate or construction financed by foreign capital. 
The overarching concern is that the build-up of such financial 
stability risks can lead to boom-bust cycles, which have historically been 
followed by financial crises and large output losses (Laeven and Valencia 
2018). Moreover, due to the significant growth in inter-linkages between 
sovereigns, the nonfinancial sector, and the banking sector, the rise in 
foreign-currency exposure in any one sector can rapidly escalate to a 
domestic financial crisis. Such concerns may be amplified in financially 
fragile economies, e.g., those with limited financial market depth and 
weaker institutions for the regulation and resolution of financial distress 
(Fratzscher 2014). 
10.3.4 Exchange Rate Rationale
A fourth objective may be an explicit exchange rate goal. While the 
previously noted rationales may have the consequence of limiting 
exchange rate movements, an explicit exchange rate goal is one that 
is carried out even in the absence of domestic overheating, financial 
stability risks, or concerns about the volume or composition of capital 
flows. In particular, policy makers target the level of the exchange rate 
to maintain competitiveness, prevent the exchange rate from being away 
from its fundamental level, or, in the case of capital outflows, prevent 
disorderly depreciation in the case of capital outflows. 
Such motives of “competitive devaluations” are often the target 
of criticisms of CFMs because of their zero-sum nature. That is, 
depreciation in one country necessitates a nominal appreciation 
and potentially lower competitiveness in trading partners. A related 
externality is that restrictions on capital inflows in one country distort 
international capital flows to other countries, including those which 
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may have weaker policy frameworks and shallower financial markets to 
effectively absorb them (Giordani et al. 2017). 
However, it has also been recognized (see, e.g., Baldwin 1988; 
Baldwin and Krugman 1989) that transitory capital inflow surges that 
lead to temporary exchange rate appreciation cause lasting damage on 
the export sector through hysteresis effects. In its re-examination of 
the role of inflow controls, the IMF noted that such permanent effects 
from transitory capital flows could be one circumstance under which 
temporary controls on capital inflows may be warranted (IMF 2010). 
10.3.5 Other
In addition to the motives described above, there are other structural, 
long-standing, or institutional features that may influence the use of 
CFMs. For instance, fixed or managed exchange rate regimes may in 
general be helped by the use of controls on capital flows in maintaining 
their exchange rate levels. By contrast, in inflation-targeteting countries, 
particularly those with flexible exchange rates, the emphasis on price 
stability as the primary goal of monetary policy is likely to subordinate 
the use of capital controls in trying to attain domestic policy objectives. 
The openness of the economy—measured by the Chinn-Ito index, 
for example—may also influence the probability of implementing 
CFMs, although it is not a priori clear in which direction. On the one 
hand, more open economies are more exposed to external shocks and 
may use CFMs to minimize the impacts of these shocks. On the other 
hand, more open economies in general—and also in our sample—have 
a greater commitment to free capital mobility and in general have 
flexible exchange rate regimes and oftentimes an inflation-targeting 
framework. We control for such structural characteristics in our 
empirical analysis.
10.4 Empirical Strategy and Evidence
Consistent with the different objectives discussed above, we empirically 
link proxies for each of these objectives to the probability of implementing 
a CFM as discussed below.
10.4.1 Empirical Strategy
We begin by outlining the empirical framework within which we test 
among the different motives described above for recalibrating capital 
controls. Given the richness of our data, we present results by grouping 
274 Macroeconomic Stabilization in the Digital Age
CFMs in several interesting ways. Our baseline regression is a binary 
choice probit model that takes the form:
          Pr(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 = 1) = 𝑓𝑓(𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖+𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗  
          Pr(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 = 1) = 𝑓𝑓(𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖+𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗  
  (1)
 ( j=1,...,6);  (i=1,…,11); (t=1,…,T)
where f(.) represents the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution, MS are the covariates that capture 
the macroeconomic stabilization motive, FS are the proxies for 
financial stability objectives, CF are variables that capture capital flow 
management motives, and ER proxies exchange rate concerns. We use O 
to denote the other variables, such as exchange rate regime and capital 
account openness. The proxies for each of these objectives are described 
below. In terms of the sample size, we have 11 economies observed over 
varying subsets of the period between the first quarter of 2008 and the 
third quarter of 2019.6 Altogether, this gives us a quarterly panel data 
with 268 observations.
The dependent variable, denoted 
         Pr(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 = 1) = 𝑓𝑓(𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖+𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗  , is one of six possible 
indicators of CFMs that we describe below. In each case, the dependent 
variable takes the value 1 when the particular measure is taken and 0 
otherwise. The six possible indicators 
         Pr(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 = 1) = 𝑓𝑓(𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖+𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗  are:
(1) All measures. This includes all 107 CFMs, with no distinction 
between inflow and outflow measures, tightening and easing 
measures, or measures designed to restrict either net capital 
inflows or net capital outflows. This measure is closest to the 
one considered in most of the existing literature.
(2) Tightening measures. We extract from All measures only those 
70 that are classified as tightening measures, including the 
introduction of those to limit capital flows, as well as any 
changes designed to tighten enforcement, either on inflows or 
outflows or both inflows and outflows.
(3) Easing measures. We extract from All measures only those 37 
that are classified as easing measures, including the removal 
of measures to limit capital flows, as well as any changes 
designed to ease enforcement, either on inflows or outflows or 
both inflows and outflows.
6 Countries enter into the Taxonomy with the first CFM that they implement in the 
2008:q1–2019:q3 period. For several, this is a quarter in some year after 2015.
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(4) Net inflow measures. We use the Taxonomy to construct net 
inflow CFMs, defined as measures designed to limit capital 
inflows and encourage capital outflows.7 This includes all 
CFMs classified as tightening measures on inflows as well as 
all CFMs classified as easing measures on outflows. As shown 
in Table 10.2, column (8), there were 64 net inflow measures.
(5) Net outflow measures. We use the Taxonomy to construct net 
outflow CFMs, defined as measures designed to limit capital 
outflows and encourage capital inflows. This includes all 
CFMs classified as tightening measures on outflows as well as 
all CFMs classified as easing measures on inflows. Column (9) 
in Table 10.2 indicates there were 44 such measures.
(6) Inflow measures. This includes 79 distinct measures targeted 
to inflows (including the introduction, removal, tightening or 
easing, targeted to inflows).8
We use several proxies to empirically capture the different objectives 
of recalibrating CFMs. With regard to the macroeconomic stabilization 
motive, we consider the growth rate of real GDP, the volatility of GDP 
(measured as the standard deviation of real GDP over the previous six 
quarters) along with one period lagged import growth rates, export 
growth rates and consumer price index inflation (Aizenman and 
Pasricha 2013, Fratzscher 2014). 
With regard to financial stability objectives, a key concern of policy 
makers is that large inflows fuel domestic credit booms and asset market 
bubbles (see, e.g., Jeanne 2012; Korinek and Sandri 2016). To capture 
these developments, we consider the growth rate of private sector credit 
(the change in credit issued to the private sector in ratio to GDP), the 
volatility of stock market (measured as the standard deviation of equity 
market total returns over the last 52 weeks, using weekly information on 
stock price indices), and the annualized change in total returns on the 
stock market.
7 The terminology of net inflow and net outflow measures originates in Pasricha 
(2012) and Aizenman and Pasricha (2013). Our definition of net inflow (net 
outflow) measures is equivalent to “NKI” reducing (increasing) measures in these 
papers. Using this terminology, a tightening of net inflow measures can imply 
either a tightening of CFMs on inflows, a loosening of CFMs on outflows or both. 
Analogously, tightening net outflow measures can reflect either the tightening of 
CFMs on outflows, a loosening on inflows, or both.
8 We do not include the corresponding outflow measures in our results because there 
are too few measures, leading to a fully determined discrete choice regression.
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Regarding capital flow management goals of CFMs, our proxies 
include the change in net portfolio flows in ratio to GDP over the past 
two quarters, the volatility of net portfolio flows (measured as the 
standard deviation of net portfolio flows over the last six quarters), and 
the annual change in gross capital outflows and gross capital inflows 
both in percent of GDP, to determine whether CFMs are deployed with 
a capital flow motive (see, e.g., Forbes et al. 2015). 
Finally, for the exchange rate motive, our proxies are: the change in 
the real effective exchange rate (REER) over the past two quarters; the 
volatility of the REER (measured as the standard deviation of the REER 
over the past six quarters); and the percent change in official reserves 
over the past two quarters scaled by GDP. Following Aizenman and 
Binici (2016), we add an index of quarterly exchange market pressure, 
defined as the standardized difference between the exchange rate, 
short-term interest rate, and changes in foreign reserves. The measure is 
defined so that an increase in exchange market pressure implies greater 
depreciation pressure.
Our regressions also include policy variables. When faced with a 
capital flow episode, policy makers may first consider countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies if there is space to implement them (IMF 
2012). We use the short-term interest differential vis-à-vis the Group 
of Four economies to capture monetary policy space and the primary 
fiscal balance for fiscal space (Aizenman and Pasricha 2013). Additional 
controls include the current account balance in percent of GDP, an 
indicator for a floating exchange rate, an indicator for inflation targeters, 
and a measure of capital account openness. The complete list and 
sources of the variables used are given in Appendix Table A10.2.
As our sample size is relatively small and there are several proxies 
for each of the considered objectives of CFMs, a preliminary step is a 
stepwise regression where we estimate the six binary choice models for 
each of the four objectives to test the empirical support of the various 
proxies. Drawing on the results of these individual regressions, we 
then narrow down the set of covariates to use in joint tests of all the 
objectives. Following Binici and Das (2021), our approach is to select 
all covariates that are within a 20% error level in at least four of the 
six distinct regressions. An additional practical benefit of this approach 
is that it lowers the dimensionality of the regression given the high 
correlation among variables which are proxying for closely related 
developments. Eliminating country-quarter pairs for which we do not 
have data on certain variables, our sample size consists of a panel of 227 
country-quarter observations. 
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10.4.2 Evidence
Tables 10.3–10.6 present the estimated results. We begin with presenting 
results for the entire sample in Table 10.3. Overall, the models of 
tightening measures and net outflow measures have the best fit, while 
the model of easing measures has the weakest fit. Nevertheless, the Wald 
test comfortably rejects the null hypothesis of the joint insignificance of 
the covariates in all the six regressions. 
Table 10.3: Determinants of CFMs: Full Sample
 
All  
measures
Tightening 
measures
Easing 
measures
Net inflow 
measures
Net 
outflow 
measures
Inflow 
measures
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output growth 0.20 0.34* 0.15 0.21 0.15 0.14
(0.15) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.30) (0.17)
Inflation 0.37 0.84* 0.31 0.82** 0.28 0.29
(0.23) (0.44) (0.24) (0.36) (0.30) (0.25)
Private Credit 
Growth
0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stock Market 
Volatility
–0.23 –0.05 –0.19 –0.16 –0.33 0.03
(0.29) (0.32) (0.33) (0.37) (0.39) (0.30)
Net Portfolio 
Flows
–0.78 1.24 –0.14 2.02 –25.93* –0.17
(4.92) (4.37) (4.18) (3.65) (14.20) (4.06)
Capital Flow 
Volatility
0.24** 0.36*** 0.24** 0.28** 0.66** 0.27**
(0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.27) (0.12)
REER % 
Change
0.09** 0.05 0.08** 0.06 0.13 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04)
REER Volatility 0.45** 0.48* 0.37* 0.48** 0.72* 0.26
(0.21) (0.28) (0.21) (0.24) (0.38) (0.23)
EMP Index 0.02 0.17 0.03 0.09 –0.23 0.04
(0.18) (0.26) (0.18) (0.23) (0.33) (0.20)
Current 
Account 
Balance
0.09 0.11 0.07 0.10 –0.11 0.02
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.18) (0.07)
Capital 
Account 
Openness 
0.29 0.62 0.37 0.51 –1.26 0.45
(0.28) (0.43) (0.28) (0.37) (0.78) (0.30)
continued on next page
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Table 10.3 continued
continued on next page
 
All  
measures
Tightening 
measures
Easing 
measures
Net inflow 
measures
Net 
outflow 
measures
Inflow 
measures
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Floating 
Exchange Rate
–0.48 –2.01 –0.43 –1.97 5.19** –0.01
(1.22) (1.88) (1.20) (1.76) (2.27) (1.21)
Inflation 
Targeter
0.45 1.74* 0.29 1.43* 0.27 0.08
(0.73) (0.89) (0.78) (0.83) (1.06) (0.88)
Interest rate 
differential
0.40*** 0.32** 0.44*** 0.26* 0.39** 0.52***
(0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14)
Primary 
Balance
0.24 0.54* 0.30 0.31 0.08 0.58**
(0.19) (0.28) (0.22) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27)
Constant –11.41** –14.05** –9.86** –12.98** –17.58* –8.36
(4.88) (6.13) (4.96) (5.46) (9.01) (5.36)
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227
Pseudo R2 0.158 0.187 0.154 0.149 0.288 0.181
Wald χ2 37.20 23.84 33.11 30.21 42.41 29.54
REER = real effective exchange rate, CFM = capital flow management measure, EMP = exchange market 
pressure.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 10.4: Determinants of CFMs: Emerging Markets
 
All  
measures
Tightening 
measures
Easing 
measures
Net inflow 
measures
Net 
outflow 
measures
Inflow 
measures
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output growth 0.28 0.47* 0.18 0.02 0.31 0.26
(0.21) (0.28) (0.22) (0.23) (0.36) (0.28)
Inflation 0.53* 0.90** 0.47 1.10** 0.34 0.43
(0.28) (0.45) (0.30) (0.47) (0.33) (0.32)
Private Credit 
Growth
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 –0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stock Market 
Volatility
–0.32 –0.09 –0.30 –0.45 –0.30 0.00
(0.37) (0.43) (0.45) (0.59) (0.45) (0.42)
Net Portfolio 
Flows
–11.06 –7.57 –5.98 9.32 –25.49 –6.99
(11.94) (20.06) (11.49) (13.57) (16.49) (11.37)
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All  
measures
Tightening 
measures
Easing 
measures
Net inflow 
measures
Net 
outflow 
measures
Inflow 
measures
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Flow 
Volatility
0.52** 0.98 0.46** 1.18* 0.53* 0.43**
(0.22) (0.66) (0.19) (0.70) (0.31) (0.18)
REER % 
Change
0.18*** 0.17* 0.18*** 0.11 0.18* 0.17**
(0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07)
REER Volatility 0.99*** 0.95* 0.98*** 1.04* 0.97* 0.93**
(0.36) (0.57) (0.37) (0.62) (0.52) (0.39)
EMP Index –0.27 –0.12 –0.25 –0.31 –0.27 –0.19
(0.28) (0.44) (0.30) (0.41) (0.40) (0.33)
Current 
Account 
Balance
–0.13 0.01 –0.17 –0.01 –0.28 –0.27
(0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.18) (0.24) (0.17)
Capital 
Account 
Openness 
–1.66** –0.83 –1.67** –1.38 –2.87** –1.64**
(0.68) (0.99) (0.74) (1.02) (1.30) (0.80)
Floating 
Exchange Rate
– – – – – –
           
Inflation 
Targeter
2.15* 3.72* 2.03 3.51* 1.02 1.90
(1.19) (2.06) (1.28) (1.91) (1.45) (1.36)
Interest rate 
differential
0.46*** 0.44** 0.52*** 0.33* 0.41** 0.63***
(0.16) (0.22) (0.17) (0.20) (0.17) (0.19)
Primary 
Balance
0.19 0.35 0.24 0.01 0.18 0.60*
(0.25) (0.45) (0.27) (0.37) (0.32) (0.35)
Constant –24.06*** –25.11* –23.62*** –23.57* –25.51** –23.97***
(8.47) (13.50) (8.68) (14.29) (12.35) (9.30)
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156
Pseudo R2 0.252 0.246 0.243 0.255 0.276 0.256
Wald χ2 42.96 31.13 45.44 33.23 39.09 39.59
REER = real effective exchange rate, CFM = capital flow management measure, EMP = exchange market 
pressure.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 10.4 continued
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Table 10.5: Determinants of CFMs: Non-Floating Exchange Rates
 
All 
measures
Tightening 
measures
Easing 
measures
Net inflow 
measures
Net 
outflow 
measures
Inflow 
measures
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output growth 0.22 0.36* 0.17 0.22 0.32 0.16
(0.15) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.36) (0.18)
Inflation 0.41* 0.97* 0.35 0.92** 0.34 0.34
(0.24) (0.50) (0.25) (0.39) (0.33) (0.26)
Private Credit 
Growth
0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 –0.00* 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stock Market 
Volatility
–0.25 –0.05 –0.21 –0.17 –0.31 0.03
(0.30) (0.33) (0.35) (0.39) (0.44) (0.32)
Net Portfolio 
Flows
0.12 2.48 0.73 3.21 –25.77 0.71
(4.33) (4.00) (3.71) (3.25) (16.57) (3.65)
Capital Flow 
Volatility
0.26** 0.42*** 0.26** 0.34*** 0.54* 0.29**
(0.11) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.31) (0.12)
REER % 
Change
0.09** 0.05 0.09** 0.05 0.18* 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04)
REER Volatility 0.47** 0.55** 0.39* 0.53** 0.97* 0.29
(0.22) (0.28) (0.22) (0.25) (0.51) (0.25)
EMP Index 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.07 –0.26 0.01
(0.18) (0.28) (0.18) (0.24) (0.39) (0.20)
Current 
Account 
Balance
0.09 0.11 0.07 0.11 –0.29 0.01
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.24) (0.08)
Capital 
Account 
Openness 
0.36 0.81* 0.45 0.65* –2.95** 0.54*
(0.28) (0.47) (0.29) (0.39) (1.33) (0.31)
Floating 
Exchange Rate
– – – – – –
           
Inflation 
Targeter
0.46 1.80* 0.29 1.45* 0.99 0.06
(0.74) (0.93) (0.79) (0.85) (1.46) (0.89)
Interest rate 
differential
0.41*** 0.35** 0.45*** 0.28** 0.41** 0.54***
(0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15)
Primary 
Balance
0.26 0.62** 0.33 0.37 0.18 0.62**
(0.19) (0.30) (0.22) (0.27) (0.32) (0.29)
Constant –11.91** –15.35** –10.32** –13.89** –25.48** –8.89
(5.11) (6.29) (5.21) (5.61) (12.34) (5.65)
continued on next page
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Table 10.6: Determinants of CFMs: Non-Inflation Targeting
 
All  
measures
Tightening 
measures
Easing 
measures
Net inflow 
measures
Net 
outflow 
measures
Inflow 
measures
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output growth 0.26 0.03 0.15 –0.47 0.65 0.20
(0.23) (0.42) (0.22) (0.41) (0.50) (0.25)
Inflation 0.62** 1.26** 0.54* 1.32** 0.64* 0.47
(0.29) (0.61) (0.30) (0.62) (0.33) (0.31)
Private Credit 
Growth
0.05 0.27 0.05 0.37** –0.01 0.05
(0.04) (0.18) (0.05) (0.17) (0.17) (0.08)
Stock Market 
Volatility
–0.33 –0.02 –0.34 –0.46 –0.40 –0.01
(0.43) (0.51) (0.53) (0.65) (0.58) (0.48)
Net Portfolio 
Flows
2.75 3.41 3.15 3.66* –22.28 2.72
(2.65) (2.84) (2.42) (2.03) (15.90) (2.60)
Capital Flow 
Volatility
0.17 0.12 0.19 0.17 0.47 0.16
(0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.50) (0.13)
REER % Change 0.19** 0.11 0.18** 0.03 0.30** 0.16*
(0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.09)
REER Volatility 1.03*** 0.59* 0.96*** 0.60 1.69*** 0.85**
(0.34) (0.30) (0.36) (0.41) (0.60) (0.38)
EMP Index –0.25 0.31 –0.22 0.09 –0.67 –0.12
(0.29) (0.38) (0.31) (0.40) (0.45) (0.35)
Current 
Account 
Balance
–0.15 –0.01 –0.20 –0.20 –0.48* –0.26
(0.16) (0.23) (0.19) (0.31) (0.28) (0.21)
Table 10.5 continued
 
All 
measures
Tightening 
measures
Easing 
measures
Net inflow 
measures
Net 
outflow 
measures
Inflow 
measures
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Observations 208 208 208 208 208 208
Pseudo R2 0.170 0.218 0.167 0.172 0.335 0.198
Wald χ2 35.61 25.40 31.27 34.70 44.01 27.74
REER = real effective exchange rate, CFM = capital flow management measure, EMP = exchange market 
pressure.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
continued on next page
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Table 10.6 continued
 
All  
measures
Tightening 
measures
Easing 
measures
Net inflow 
measures
Net 
outflow 
measures
Inflow 
measures
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Account 
Openness 
1.08 –0.73 1.41 0.13 – 1.29
(0.84) (0.93) (1.08) (1.16)   (1.17)
Floating 
Exchange Rate
– – – – – –
           
Inflation 
Targeter
– – – – – –
           
Interest rate 
differential
0.37** –0.03 0.41** –0.30 0.57** 0.50**
(0.19) (0.54) (0.20) (0.51) (0.26) (0.22)
Primary Balance 0.27 0.63* 0.29 0.34 0.45 0.57**
(0.20) (0.38) (0.22) (0.32) (0.33) (0.28)
Constant –21.22*** –14.21 –19.04** –7.97 –37.92*** –18.18**
(7.96) (9.01) (8.29) (10.63) (14.31) (8.34)
Observations 120 120 120 120 83 120
Pseudo R2 0.243 0.280 0.233 0.285 0.228 0.234
Wald χ2 20.73 29.02 17.90 23.24 20.56 16.78
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
While there are some differences across columns (1)–(6), the overall 
finding is that policy makers had multiple objectives in recalibrating 
CFMs. The estimated coefficients of capital flow volatility and exchange 
rate volatility, in particular, are statistically significant in all regression, 
pointing to the importance of a capital flow management and exchange 
rate rationales. Furthermore, the magnitude and significance of inflation 
in the tightening measures and net inflow measures suggest that policy 
makers responded to overheating and stabilization concerns as well. 
While exchange rate and capital flow volatility mattered for 
recalibrating CFMs, we do not find evidence that their levels mattered 
as much, supporting the arguments presented in Eichengreen and 
Mussa (1998). We also do not find much evidence in support of financial 
stability objectives, as evidenced by the estimated coefficients on stock 
market volatility and private credit growth. Furthermore, while the 
coefficients of flexible exchange rates are negative in accordance with 
our priors in all but one regression, they are not statistically significant. 
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With regard to policies, our prior is that, for capital outflows, the 
larger the interest differential, the lower the scope to further raise 
interest rates (due to concerns about choking domestic demand), and 
thus the greater the probability of tightening controls on outflows or 
easing controls on inflows. Conversely, our prior is that, for capital 
inflows, the larger the differential, the greater the scope to lower 
interest rates and discourage flows, and thus the lower the probability 
of tightening controls on inflows or easing them on outflows. While the 
estimated coefficients of interest rate differential in the regression on 
tightening measures, easing measures, and net outflow measures are 
consistent with this hypothesis, the positive coefficient on net inflow 
measures is unexpected. With reference to fiscal policy, our results do 
not find a statistically significant relation with any of the measures.
To explore the robustness of the results from the overall sample, 
we next partition the sample into three groups: emerging markets, 
non-flexible exchange rates, and non-inflation targeting regimes. For 
instance, developed economies which are generally more open, have 
deeper financial markets and effective adjustment policy frameworks, 
and are committed to free capital mobility, may resort to CFMs much less 
frequently. Policy makers in fixed exchange rate regimes may rely more 
on capital controls to manage capital flow episodes as the exchange rate 
does not act as a shock absorber. In countries where monetary policy 
does not target inflation or price stability, officials may be more likely to 
use CFMs to achieve their policy objectives than otherwise.  
The results for emerging markets are given in Table 10.4. The results 
are qualitatively consistent with the overall sample. The estimated 
coefficients on capital flow volatility and exchange rate volatility are 
substantively larger than in the overall sample, suggesting that volatile 
conditions in exchange markets and capital flows more often led 
emerging markets, rather than developed economy policy makers, to use 
CFMs. This is consistent with our prior, as all emerging markets in our 
sample had non-flexible exchange rate regimes,9 which would naturally 
lead to more responsiveness to volatile exchange rate and capital flow 
developments to manage their exchange rates. 
The results for non-flexible exchange rate and non-inflation 
targeting regimes are given in Tables 10.5 and 10.6, respectively.10 The 
estimated impact of inflation is stronger in the non-flexible exchange 
rate sample than in the overall sample, consistent with the notion that 
9 For this reason, the flexible exchange rate regime indicator drops out from Table 10.4. 
10 While all emerging markets in the sample are non-flexible exchange rate countries, 
some developed economies also have non-flexible exchange rate regimes. Thus, the 
samples are different in Tables 10.4 and 10.5. 
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officials were more likely to recalibrate CFMs to achieve domestic policy 
objectives when the exchange rate was not an effective shock absorber. 
For the non-inflation targeting sample, the estimated coefficient on 
inflation is even higher than in the non-flexible exchange rate sample 
and substantially larger than in the overall sample. Furthermore, the 
estimated coefficients on exchange rate volatility is nearly three times 
the magnitude than in the overall sample. This finding is consistent with 
our prior that officials will rely more on CFMs to manage their domestic 
policy objectives when monetary policy is not pinned to maintaining 
price stability. 
10.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents the incidence of CFMs in the 11 developed and 
emerging economies of the Asia and Pacific region that recalibrated 
them between 2008 and 2019. Using a new high-frequency dataset on 
CFMs, we then empirically analyze the factors that motivate their use in 
these economies, discriminating between macroeconomic stabilization, 
financial stability, capital flow, and exchange rate objectives. 
Our results indicate that the relevance of these objectives differ 
across measures of CFMs. Capital flow management and exchange 
rate objectives appear to be strong predictors of net inflow, easing and 
tightening measures, while macroeconomic stabilization additionally is 
another driver of tightening measures. These results are qualitatively 
similar, but quantitatively stronger, for emerging markets, non-flexible 
exchange rates, and particularly non-inflation targeting countries. Thus, 
an overall conclusion is that the probability of using CFMs was higher 
in countries where financial markets were shallow or undeveloped, the 
exchange rate could not act as an effective shock absorber, and policy 
frameworks did not provide an adequate adjustment mechanism. 
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Appendix Table A10.1: Economy Sample
Developed Economies Emerging Market and Developing Economies
Australia People’s Republic of China
Hong Kong, China India
Rep. of Korea Indonesia
Macau, China Malaysia
New Zealand Sri Lanka
Singapore
Source: Authors’ compilation based on IMF (2019).
Appendix Table A10.2: Variables Descriptions 
and Sources
Variable
Description  
and Original frequency Source
CFMs Capital flows management 
measures based on the 2019 
CFM taxonomy; monthly 
IMF (https://www.imf.org/~ 
/media/Files/Data/2019/imf-
2019-taxonomy-of-capital-flow 
-management-measures.ashx, 
accessed 5 October 2020)
Net inflow 
measures
Tightening measures (including 
introduction) on inflows of 
capital and easing measures 
(including removal) on outflows 
of capital
Binici, Das and Pugacheva 
(2020)
Net outflow 
measures
Tightening measures (including 
introduction) on outflows of 
capital and easing measures 
(including removal) on inflows 
of capital
Binici, Das and Pugacheva 
(2020)
Output growth, 
lagged 1 quarter 
Real GDP growth year-over-year; 
quarterly
IMF, International Financial 
Statistics
Inflation, lagged  
1 quarter
Consumer price index inflation, 
year-over-year change; quarterly
IMF, International Financial 
Statistics
continued on next page
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Variable
Description  
and Original frequency Source
Private credit 
growth
Annual change in quarterly credit 
to the non-financial private 
sector normalized by quarterly 
nominal US dollar GDP; quarterly
BIS, ECB, IMF International 
Financial Statistics
Stock market 
volatility
Standard deviation of equity 
market total returns over the 
last 52 weeks using weekly 
information on stock price 
indices, weekly
Haver, national stock market 
websites
Net portfolio 
flows, lagged 
1 quarter
Net inflows (gross asset flows 
less gross liability flows) in 
percent of quarterly nominal 
GDP; quarterly
IMF, International Financial 
Statistics, authorities
Capital flow 
volatility
Standard deviation of net 
portfolio flows over the last six 
quarter
IMF, International Financial 
Statistics, authorities
REER % change, 
lagged 1 quarter
Change in CPI-based real 
effective exchange rate over 
previous quarter; monthly. 
Increase is appreciation.
BIS, IMF International Financial 
Statistics
REER volatility Standard deviation of the REER 
over the past six quarters
BIS, IMF International Financial 
Statistics
EMP Index Calculated as the standardized 
difference between the exchange 
rate, short-term interest rate 
and changes in foreign reserves; 
annual. Higher values indicate 
higher depreciation pressure. See 
Aizenman and Binici (2016).
All series from IMF International 
Financial Statistics
Capital account 
openness
Normalized index that lies 
between 0 (fully closed capital 
account) and 1 (fully open capital 
account), annual. See Chinn and 
Ito (2006).
Updated Chinn-Ito (http://web 
.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website 
.htm; accessed 5 October 2020)
Floating 
exchange rate
An indicator variable for a 
floating exchange rate regime 
using fine classification (if rank = 
12, 13); monthly
Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2019)
Inflation targeting An indicator variable for an 
inflation-targeting monetary 
policy; monthly
IMF World Economic Outlook
Table A10.2 continued
continued on next page
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Variable
Description  
and Original frequency Source
Current account 
balance, lagged 1 
quarter
Current account balance as a 
share of GDP; quarterly
IMF, International Financial 
Statistics
Primary fiscal 
balance  
(% of GDP)
General government primary net 
lending/borrowing as share of 
GDP; annual
IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database 
CFM = capital flow management measure, ECB = European Central Bank, BIS = Bank for International 
Settlements, CPI = consumer price index, GDP = gross domestic product, IMF = International Monetary 
Fund, REER = real effective exchange rate, CFM = capital flow management measure, EMP = exchange 
market pressure.
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Table A10.2 continued
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Assessing Macroeconomic 
Uncertainties for an  
Emerging Economy
Motilal Bicchal and S. Raja Sethu Durai
11.1 Introduction
The importance of economic uncertainty in policy making is 
well documented in the literature (see, for example, Issing 2002; 
Aikman et al. 2010). Recent studies on the business cycle identified 
macroeconomic uncertainty as one of the key drivers in frequent 
business cycle fluctuation (Stock and Watson 2012; Bloom et al. 2018). 
As observed by Bloom (2014), uncertainty rose during the financial 
crisis period of 2008, and its likely role in shaping the subsequent 
global recession focused policy attention on this topic, as evidenced by 
the introduction of Fan chart1 forecasts of output and inflation across 
central banks. Also, reading the minutes of the central banks’ monetary 
policy committees reveals that policy makers dwell on macroeconomic 
uncertainty a good deal before changing policy instruments. However, 
measuring true uncertainty is a difficult task as it is neither directly 
observable nor quantifiable. The literature on uncertainty, therefore, 
developed proxy measures and incorporated the Knightian notion of 
risk in a broader definition of the term. Many proxy measures have 
been proposed, mostly since the 2008 financial crisis, and research on 
uncertainty is still evolving. 
The proxies are broadly classified as finance-based measures, news-
based measures, forecast-based measures, and measures of dispersion 
1 Fan charts, first introduced by the Bank of England, depict the probability distribution 
of forecasts, with information on the risk factors affecting them and the surrounding 
uncertainties.
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among forecasters. Bloom (2009) first suggested realized stock market 
volatility and the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s implied volatility 
index (VIX) as proxy measures for the United States (US). VIX is 
derived from call and options prices, so it is said to be a forward-looking 
indicator of market uncertainty. The idea is that markets are more 
volatile during a period of increased macroeconomic uncertainty, and 
several studies have used the stock market volatility measures to assess 
uncertainty shocks. However, VIX is useful for capturing uncertainty 
originating from the financial sector rather than the real economy. In 
their study, Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013) decomposed the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index VIX into a risk aversion component 
and an uncertainty component and examined the effect of monetary 
policy on both.
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) developed a news-based economic 
policy uncertainty (EPU) index for the US that searches keywords 
associated with uncertainty in relevant media articles. Following their 
methodology, many studies have attempted to develop similar indices 
for countries such as India (Bhagat, Ghosh, and Rangan 2016). At first 
glance, such a measure looks practical for capturing major economic 
events of uncertainty, even though it is after the fact and does not 
disentangle the effect of purely economic uncertainty from that of more 
general uncertainty news. Particularly in developing countries’ media, 
sociopolitical uncertainty-related events are seen as a more dominant 
discourse, and often may die off without any economic consequence. 
Some studies consider the cross-sectional variance of forecasts given 
by forecasters to be an indicator of ex ante uncertainty (Bachmann, 
Elstner, and Sims 2013; Banerjee, Kearns, and Lombardi 2015). However, 
one major drawback of such a measure is that it reflects differences of 
opinion rather than an economic uncertainty, so it potentially presents 
a misleading picture. 
More recently, an econometric approach has been developed, 
focusing on the variance of the forecast errors. In this line, Scotti 
(2013), using Bloomberg forecast data, built an index based on the 
surprise component of the data releases relative to the forecasts. Jurado, 
Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) derived macroeconomic uncertainty measures 
using the common volatility of forecasts of several economic series, 
arguing that it is the predictability that matters for economic decision 
making and, therefore, the variance of forecast errors and not the 
dispersion that would provide better statistics for uncertainty measures. 
Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015) extended this notion of uncertainty in a 
more general way and proposed a measure using the US Federal Reserve 
Bank’s survey data of professional forecasters. This index, which has 
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several advantages, is based on relating the realized forecast error to the 
historical distribution of a variable. It uses the unconditional likelihood 
of the observed outcome and is not dependent on any parametric model, 
which is very useful for emerging economies, where the dearth of large 
sample data is a major problem. 
Several studies provide evidence on the macroeconomic effect 
of uncertainty for advanced countries. Among others, Bloom (2014) 
shows that uncertainty is highly countercyclical, and developing 
countries exhibit more uncertainty than developed countries. Indeed, 
the burgeoning literature on uncertainty has identified real option, 
precautionary savings, and risk premia channels, among others, through 
which uncertainty affects the economy.
The prime focus of this chapter is to construct measures of 
macroeconomic uncertainty using Rossi and Sekhposyan’s 2015 
methodology and compare them with other measures for India in terms 
of tracing the transmission channels and mapping with business cycles. 
The main contributions of this study are twofold. First, it identifies 
different propagation channels of uncertainty by estimating a series of 
vector autoregression models with suitable proxy variables. Second, it 
assesses the uncertainty measures and relates them to the business cycles 
in India. The study evaluates holistically the effect of macroeconomic 
uncertainty from an emerging economy perspective. 
The study is organized as follows. Section 11.2 describes the data and 
method used for the uncertainty indices and also provides a criterion 
for choosing a data set for constructing a forecast-based macroeconomic 
uncertainty index. Section 11.3 analyzes the macroeconomic effect of 
uncertainty, and the final section concludes with policy implications.
11.2 Measuring Macroeconomic Uncertainty
11.2.1 Data
The availability of the data drives the choice of sample period and 
frequency. The uncertainty indices are computed using quarterly data 
for the period 2008Q1 to 2018Q2, and are built upon forecast errors. The 
data are compiled from the Reserve Bank of India’s various issues from 
a survey of professional forecasters (SPF). The median forecast of gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth, inflation rate, and exchange rate over 
one-quarter and four-quarter horizons are used. The corresponding 
actual data for the variables are then used to generate forecast errors 
and uncertainty indices. The study uses survey data on the Business 
Expectations Index, which are collected from various issues of the 
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Reserve Bank of India’s Survey quarterly Industrial Outlook Survey.2 
The details on other variables used in the study are given in Appendix 
Table A11.1.1.
11.2.2 Uncertainty Indices 
We outline below various uncertainty measures used in the analysis.
Uncertainty Index based on Forecast Error Distributions 
The forecast-based uncertainty is based on the notion that the large 
forecast errors in the economic predictions are an indication of 
macrocosmic uncertainty. Along the same lines, the uncertainty index 
proposed by Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015) suggests that if the probability 
of observing a forecast error of θ % is very unlikely, for example, in the 
99th quantile of the historical distribution of forecast errors, and the 
actual observed forecast error value is indeed θ%, then it is indicative 
of substantial uncertainty. Following the Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015) 
methodology, the overall uncertainty index 
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𝑋𝑋′= [Foreign uncertainty, domestic uncertainty, Dollar-rup e exchange rate, Business expectations, 
Caltrate, IIP] 
 
 
and f(e), 
𝜃𝜃   
(𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡∗   
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 , 𝑡𝑡 , , ,𝑇𝑇 ,  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡   𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡        𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒    𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡   
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡      (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈      (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷   
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 ,    𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 ,  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈 . ,   
 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 .   
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡∗ |𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 | . 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  𝐴𝐴 𝐵𝐵 𝐿𝐿 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡   𝐵𝐵 𝐿𝐿      𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝑁𝑁 ,           𝑋𝑋′  
𝑋𝑋′  [II , I fl ti  i ti , i  t ti , rt i t ] 
𝑋𝑋′  [II , ll r t , i  t ti , ift , rt i t ] 
𝑋𝑋′  [ rt i t , ift , i  t ti , ll r t , II ] 
𝑋𝑋′  [ , , r j t t lli  r , i  t ti , ll r t , rt i t ] 
𝑋𝑋′  [ , r f ri t  i t t r j t  , r j t t lli  r , i  t ti , 
ll r t , rt i t ] 
𝑋𝑋′  [ , , i  t ti , ll t , ift , t i t ]   
𝑋𝑋′   [ , , i  t ti , ll t , ift , t i t ]   
𝑋𝑋′  [ , ll i , ll t , i  t ti , ift , t i t ]   
𝑋𝑋′  [ i  t i t , ti  t i t , ll -   t , i  t ti , 
lt t , II ] 
 
 
is calculated as:
 
𝜃𝜃%  
(𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ )  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ = 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ), = 1, 2, … ,𝑇𝑇 − ℎ,  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ   𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ       𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)      𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ = ∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)d𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ
−∞
 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 )     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 )  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 =
1
2 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2 , 0} and  𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ
𝐷𝐷 = 12 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {
1
2 − 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ, 0} 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 > 0.5,   
 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 > 0.5  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ =
1
2 + |𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2| . 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 =  𝐴𝐴0 + 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡   𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,∑)     ∑̂     𝑋𝑋′  
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Inflation deviation, Business expectations, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Call rate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [Uncertainty, Nifty, Business expectations, Call rate, IIP] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, GFCF, Project stalling rate, Business expectations, Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Number of private investment projects announced, Project stalling rate, Business expectations, 
Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, PFPE, Business expectations, Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (6) 
𝑋𝑋′  = [GDE, GE, Business expectations, Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (7) 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Small saving, Callrate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (8) 
𝑋𝑋′= [Foreign uncer ainty, domestic uncertainty, Dollar-rupee exchange rate, Business expectations, 
Caltrate, IIP] 
 
 
The value of 
𝜃𝜃%  
(𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ )  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ = 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ), 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 2, … ,𝑇𝑇 − ℎ,  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ   𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ      𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)    𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ = ∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)d𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ
−∞
 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 )     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 )  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 =
1
2 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2 , 0} and  𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ
𝐷𝐷 = 12 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {
1
2 − 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ, 0} 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 > 0.5,   
 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 > 0.5  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ =
1
2 + |𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2| . 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 =  𝐴𝐴0 + 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡   𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,∑)     ∑̂     𝑋𝑋′  
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Inflation deviation, Business expectations, Un er inty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Call rate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncert inty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [Uncertainty, Nifty, Business expectations, Call rate, IIP] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, GFCF, Project stalling rate, Business expectations, Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Number of private investment projects an ounced, Project stalling rate, Business xpectations, 
Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, PFPE, Business expectations, Callrat , Nifty, Uncertainty]  (6) 
𝑋𝑋′  = [GDE, GE, Business expectations, Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (7) 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Small saving, Callrate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (8) 
𝑋𝑋′= [Foreign uncertainty, domestic uncertainty, Dollar-rupee exchange rate, Business expectations, 
Caltrate, IIP] 
 
 
by construction lies between zero and one. To 
obtain information about upside uncertainty 
𝜃𝜃%  
(𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ )  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ = 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ), 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 2, … ,𝑇𝑇 − ℎ,  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ   𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ       𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)      𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ = ∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)d𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ
−∞
 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 )     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 )  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 =
1
2 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2 , 0} and  𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ
𝐷𝐷 = 12 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {
1
2 − 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ, 0} 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 > 0.5,   
 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 > 0.5  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ =
1
2 + |𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2| . 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 =  𝐴𝐴0 + 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡   𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,∑)     ∑̂     𝑋𝑋′  
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Inflation deviation, Business expectations, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, ll r t , Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [Uncertainty, Nifty, Busin ss expectations, Call rate, IIP] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, GFCF, Project stalling r te, Business exp ctations, Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Number of private investment projects announced, Project stalling rate, Business expectations, 
Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, PFPE, Busines  expectations, Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (6) 
𝑋𝑋′  = [GDE, GE, Business expectations, Callrate, Nifty, Uncerta nty]  (7) 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Small saving, Callrate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (8) 
𝑋𝑋′= [Foreign uncertainty, domestic uncertainty, Dollar-rupee exchange rate, Business expectations, 
Caltrate, IIP] 
 
 
and downside 
uncertainty 
𝜃𝜃%  
(𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ )  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ = 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ), 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 2, … ,𝑇𝑇 − ℎ,  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ   𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡        𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)      𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ = ∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)d𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ
−∞
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 )     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 )  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 =
1
2 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2 , 0} and  𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ
𝐷𝐷 = 12 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {
1
2 − 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ, 0} 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 > 0.5,   
 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 > 0.5  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ =
1
2 + |𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2| . 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 =  𝐴𝐴0 + 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡   𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,∑)     ∑̂     𝑋𝑋′  
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Inflation deviation, Business expectations, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Call rate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [Uncertainty, Nifty, Business expectations, Call rate, IIP] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, GFCF, Project stalling rate, Business expect ions, Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Number of private investment projects announced, Project stalling rate, Business expectations, 
Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, PFPE, Business expectations, Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (6) 
𝑋𝑋′  = [GDE, GE, Business expectations, Callr te, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (7) 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Small saving, Callrate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (8) 
𝑋𝑋′= [Foreign uncertainty, domestic uncertainty, Dollar-rupee exchange rate, Business expectations, 
Caltrate, IIP] 
 
 
the normalized version of 
𝜃𝜃%  
(𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ )  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ = 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ), 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 2, … ,𝑇𝑇 − ℎ,  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ   𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ      𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)      𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ = ∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)d𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ
−∞
 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 )     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 )  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 =
1
2 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2 , 0} and  𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ
𝐷𝐷 = 12 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {
1
2 − 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ, 0} 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 > 0.5,   
 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 > 0.5  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ =
1
2 + |𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2| . 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴0 + 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,∑)     ∑̂     𝑋𝑋′  
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Inflation devia ion, Business expectations, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Call rat , Business expectations, Nifty, Unc rtainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [Uncertainty, Nifty, Business expectations, Call rate, IIP] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, GFCF, Project stalling rate, Business expectations, Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Number of private investment projects announced, Project stalling rate, Business expectations, 
Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, PFPE, Business expecta ions, Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (6) 
𝑋𝑋′  = [GDE, GE, Business expec atio s, Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (7) 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Sm ll saving, Callrat , Business expectatio s, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (8) 
𝑋𝑋′= [Foreign uncertainty, domestic uncertainty, Dollar-rupee exchange rate, Business expectations, 
Caltrate, IIP] 
 
 
is computed as 
follows:3
  
𝜃𝜃%  
(𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ )  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 ℎ 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ), 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 2, … ,𝑇𝑇 − ℎ,  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ   𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ       𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)      𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ = ∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)d𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ
−∞
 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 )     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 )  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈 =
1
2 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2 , 0} and  𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝐷 = 12 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {
1
2 − 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ, 0} 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 > 0.5,   
 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 > 0.5  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ =
1
2 + |𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2| . 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 =  𝐴𝐴0 + 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡   𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,∑)     ∑̂     𝑋𝑋′  
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Inflation deviation, Business exp c tions, Uncertain y] 
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Call rate, Business expectations, Nifty, Unce tain y] 
𝑋𝑋′= [Uncertainty, Nifty, Business exp ctations, Call rate, IIP] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, GFCF, Project stalling rate, Business expectations, Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Number of private investment projects announced, Project stalling rate, Business expectations, 
Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, PFPE, Business exp ctatio s, Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (6) 
𝑋𝑋′ = [GDE, GE, Business expecta ons, Callra e Nifty, Uncertainty]  (7) 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Small saving, Callrate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (8) 
𝑋𝑋′= [Foreign uncertainty, dom tic uncertainty, Dollar-rupee exchange rate, Business expectations, 
Caltrate, IIP] 
 
 
  and 
𝜃𝜃%  
(𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ )  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ = 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ), 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 2, … ,𝑇𝑇 − ℎ,  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ   𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ       𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)      𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ = ∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)d𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ
−∞
 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 )     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 )  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 =
1
2 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2 , 0} and 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ
𝐷𝐷 = 12 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {
1
2 − 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ, 0} 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 > 0.5,   
 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 > 0.5  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ =
1
2 + |𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2| . 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 =  𝐴𝐴0 + 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑡𝑡   𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,∑)     ∑̂     𝑋𝑋′  
IIP, Infl tion deviation, Bu iness expectations, Uncertainty] 
IIP, Call rate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncer a nty]
Uncertainty, Nifty, Business expectations, Call rate, IIP] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, GFCF, Project st ling rate, Business expectations, Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Number of private investment proj cts annou ced, Project stalling rate, Business expect tions, 
Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, PFPE, Business expectations, Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (6) 
𝑋𝑋′  = [GDE, GE, Business expectations, Callrate, Nifty, U t i t ]  (7) 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Small saving, Callrate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (8) 
𝑋𝑋′= [Foreign uncertainty, domestic uncertainty, Dollar-rupee exchange rate, Business expectations, 
Caltrate, IIP] 
 
 
2 The Business Expectations Index is a weighted average index derived from the 
quarterly net responses of businesspeople on the situation of nine indicators related 
to the manufacturing sector. These indicators are as follows: overall business 
situation, production, order books, inventory of raw material, inventory of finished 
goods, profit margin, employment, exports, and capacity utilization.
3 Since at any given time either positive or negative forecast errors are observed, the 
normalized version of the Ut+h provides the information on the upside (positive) and 
downside (negative) uncertainty.
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The upside uncertainty, 
𝜃𝜃%  
(𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ )  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ = 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ), 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 2, … ,𝑇𝑇 − ℎ,  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ   𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ       𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)      𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ = ∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)d𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ
−∞
 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 )     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 )  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 =
1
2 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2 , 0} and  𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ
𝐷𝐷 = 12 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {
1
2 − 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ, 0} 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 > 0.5,   
 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 > 0.5  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ =
1
2 + |𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2| . 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 =  𝐴𝐴0 + 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡   𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,∑)     ∑̂     𝑋𝑋′  
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Inflation deviation, Business expectations, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Call rate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [Uncertainty, Nifty, Business expectations, Call rate, IIP] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, GFCF, Project stalling rate, Business expectations, Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Number of private investment projects announced, Project stalling rate, Business expectations, 
Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, PFPE, Business expectations, Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (6) 
𝑋𝑋′  = [GDE, GE, Business expectations, Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (7) 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Small saving, Callrate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (8) 
𝑋𝑋′= [Foreign uncertainty, domestic uncertainty, Dollar-rupee exchange rate, Business expectations, 
Caltrate, IIP] 
 
 
will be observed only when 
the realized value exceeds the expected value, and the downside 
uncertainty, 
𝜃𝜃%  
(𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ )  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ = 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ), 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 2, … ,𝑇𝑇 − ℎ,  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ   𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ       𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)      𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ = ∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)d𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ
−∞
 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 )     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 )  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 =
1
2 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2 , 0} and  𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ
𝐷𝐷 = 12 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {
1
2 − 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ, 0} 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 > 0.5,   
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 > 0.5  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ =
1
2 + |𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2| . 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 =  𝐴𝐴0 + 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡   𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,∑)     ∑̂     𝑋𝑋′  
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Inflation deviation, Business expectations, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Call rate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [Uncertainty, Nifty, Business expectations, Call rate, IIP] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, GFCF, Project stalling rate, Business expectations, Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Number of private investment projects announced, Project stalling rate, Business expectations, 
Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, PFPE, Business expectations, Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (6) 
𝑋𝑋′  = [GDE, GE, Business expectations, Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (7) 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Small saving, Callrate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (8) 
𝑋𝑋′= [Foreign uncertainty, domestic uncertainty, Dollar-rupee exchange rate, Business expectations, 
Caltrate, IIP] 
 
 
, only when the realized value goes below the 
expected.4 Lastly, the overall uncertainty index is defined as:
 
𝜃𝜃%  
(𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ )  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ = 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+ℎ), 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 2, … ,𝑇𝑇 − ℎ,  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ   𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ       𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)      𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ = ∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)d𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+ℎ
−∞
 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 )     (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 )  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 =
1
2 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2 , 0} and  𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ
𝐷𝐷 = 12 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {
1
2 − 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ, 0} 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑈𝑈 > 0.5,   
 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝐷𝐷 > 0.5  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ∗ =
1
2 + |𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+ℎ −
1
2| . 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 =  𝐴𝐴0 + 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡   𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,∑)     ∑̂     𝑋𝑋′  
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Inflation deviation, Business expectations, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [IIP, Call rate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [Uncertainty, Nifty, Business expectations, Call rate, IIP] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, GFCF, Project stalling rate, Business expectations, Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Numb  of private investment projects announced, Project stalling rate, Business expectations, 
Call rate, Uncertainty] 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, PFPE, Business expectations, Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (6) 
𝑋𝑋′  = [GDE, GE, Business expectations, Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (7) 
𝑋𝑋′= [GDE, Small saving, Callrate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (8) 
𝑋𝑋′= [Foreign uncertainty, domestic uncertainty, Dollar-rupee exchange rate, Business expectations, 
Caltrate, IIP] 
 
 
.
The uncertainty values for all normalized indices thus lie between 
0.5 and 1. Using this methodology, we derive two economic uncertainty 
indices as follows: 
(i) Domestic macroeconomic uncertainty index (SPFGDP_U): The 
literature broadly defines fluctuations in the business cycle 
in terms of changes in GD . We derive the uncertainty index 
using the SPF error of GDP variable and consider it to be an 
indicator of domestic macroeconomic uncertainty. 
(ii) Open economy uncert inty index (SPFMACRO_U): 
Additionally, we derive a wider open macroeconomic 
uncertainty index using the SPF forecast information from 
other macro variables. It is obtai ed by computing Rossi and 
Sekhposyan (2015) uncertainty indices of GDP, exchange 
rate, and inflation rate se arately, and th  the average of the 
derived indices is defined as an open economy uncertainty 
index that captures both domestic and external sources.
The Implied Volatility Index  
Bloom (2009) proposed VIX as a measure of uncertainty and it is 
widely used as a proxy in the literature. This measure is considered 
an expectation indicator of market volatility and is computed using 
data from the call and options prices of stock indexes such as S&P 500 
options contracts for the US or Nifty options for India. We derived a 
quarterly average of VIX uncertainty for India using the average of daily 
data compiled from the National Stock Exchange of India website and 
called it “AVIX_U.” 
News-based Economic Policy Uncertainty Index 
The EPU index was developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) to 
capture the frequency of US media articles referring to terms related to 
economic and policy uncertainty. This idea of a news-based uncertainty 
4 The definitions of positive and negative shocks depend on the variable under study. 
In the case of GDP, upside uncertainty implies positive shocks.
298 Macroeconomic Stabilization in the Digital Age
index is subsequently expanded to calculate category-based uncertainty 
indices like monetary policy uncertainty, fiscal policy, and trade policy 
indices. We obtained India’s news-based economic policy uncertainty 
(IPU) index from the website given in Appendix 11.1 and used the quarter 
end as well as a three-month average of data in the analysis. 
11.2.3 Assessing the Data Set for an Uncertainty Index
The uncertainty-based business cycle theory postulates that common 
variations across many data series is required for measures of 
macroeconomic uncertainty (Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng 2015). We use 
the bias, variance, and covariance decomposition of the mean square 
error5 to assess whether a professional forecast of a variable under 
inquiry is useful for constructing a macroeconomic uncertainty index. 
Table 11.1 presents the decomposition for one-quarter-ahead forecast 
error data.6
The results show that the bias and variance proportions are very 
insignificant for SPF-based forecasts, suggesting that the model of 
5 The mean square error of forecasts is decomposed into three sources: the bias 
proportion, which measures how far the mean of the forecast is from the mean of 
the actual series; the variance proportion, which measures how far the variation of 
the forecast is from the variation of the actual series; and the covariance proportion, 
which measures unsystematic error, the error remaining after taking into account 
bias and variance proportion. For further details on computation, see Sharma and 
Bicchal (2018).
6 Similar results are found for the four-quarter-ahead forecast data.
Table 11.1: Mean Square Error Decompositions
Bias Proportion Variance Proportion Covariance Proportion
SPFGDP 0.02 0.01 0.97
SPFINF 0.03 0.00 0.97
SPFEXC 0.12 0.03 0.85
Note: SPFGDP denotes a survey of professional forecast series gross domestic product, SPFINF denotes a 
survey of professional forecasts on inflation, and SPFEXC denotes a survey of professional forecast series 
on rupee-US dollar nominal exchange rate.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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professional forecasters provides a good estimate of the underlying 
data-generating process. They further reveal that there is neither 
systematic bias nor any variance (uncertainty) about the forecast 
of individual series, but all the errors are due to the covariance 
proportions. These covariance proportions must be associated with the 
common variations of uncertainty fluctuation that exist across the many 
macroeconomic data series affecting them at the same time. The SPF-
based forecast errors can thus be considered reliable data for generating 
macro uncertainty indices. 
The inferences from the mean square error results can be 
corroborated by findings of cross-correlation of uncertainty measures. 
The results in Table 11.2 show that SPF-based uncertainty measures 
have a significant positive correlation among them and with AVIX_U, 
suggesting that the forecast error of professional data includes the 
common variations of cyclical fluctuations. Further, it appears that SPF-
based uncertainty indices are correlated more closely with AVIX_U 
than IPU, indicating the existence of common underlying uncertainty 
between them. Overall, the forecast error of SPF can be considered 
useful data for generating macroeconomic uncertainty indices. 
Table 11.2: Cross-Correlations of Uncertainty Measures
SPFGDP_U SPFINF_U SPFEXC_U SPFMACRO_U AVIX_U
SPFINF_U 0.48
(0.00)
SPFEXC_U 0.27 0.20
(0.08) (0.22)
SPFMACRO_U 0.77 0.73 0.70
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AVIX_U 0.35 0.47 0.20 0.46
(0.02) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00)
IPU 0.28 0.06 0.09 0.20 0.27
(0.06) (0.67) (0.56) (0.20) (0.08)
SPF = survey of professional forecasters, IPU = India policy uncertainty.
Note: SPF uncertainty measures are based on one-quarter-ahead forecast error. P-values of cross-correlations 
are in parenthesis.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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11.3 Analyzing Macroeconomic Uncertainty 
The following sections assess uncertainty proxies, described in the 
previous section, mapping with the business cycles in India.
11.3.1 Recession and Uncertainty
One of the stylized facts about uncertainty is countercyclical behavior, 
which is high during recessions and low in normal times. However, in 
India, like the US, where the National Bureau of Economic Research 
officially defines recession dates, there is no agency that formally 
announces the dates of a recession. We, therefore, use recession dates 
identified for India in a study by Pandey, Patnaik, and Shah (2017)7 and 
track some stylized behaviors of various uncertainty measures against 
them (see Figures 11.1 to 11.5). 
Figure 11.1 shows that the domestic macroeconomic uncertainty 
closely captures two recession episodes as the SPFGDP_U values are 
persistently above their average during the recession periods. It also 
spikes above the average on two other occasions—notably, the upside 
uncertainty spike during the time of demonetization, indicating that 
forecasters are uncertain about the actual growth rate resulting in an 
underestimation, while on another occasion, the downside uncertainty 
spikes around goods and services tax implementation, suggesting that 
forecasters overestimated the growth rate. On both occasions, however, 
the uncertainty does not persist in subsequent periods, thereby ruling 
out recessions. The open economic uncertainty (SPFMACRO_U) in 
Figure 11.2 shows some variability with a higher mean value than the 
SPFGDP_U, reflecting additional uncertainty stemming from the 
forecast bias of the exchange rate.
The AVIX_U in Figure 11.3 illustrates that the financial crisis of 2008 
was picked up a priori and observed as starker and more persistent. In 
contrast, the IPU index in Figure 11.4 exhibits substantial uncertainty 
during the second recession period but very low uncertainty during 
the financial crisis period. Thus, this finding underlines that the two 
measures may capture two different types of uncertainty: AVIX_U could 
be a better proxy for the uncertainty that originates from the financial 
market, whereas India’s IPU measure may be better at capturing a 
7 The authors show that their identified recession dates are robust to the methods 
used and to the choice of the business cycle indicator. We, therefore, consider the 
recession dates identified by this study for the analysis. For further details, refer to 
Pandey, Patnaik, and Shah (2017).
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broader policy uncertainty. Looking at the IPU spike in Figure 11.4 
and related events in India suggests that non-economic events broadly 
drive it. For instance, in the second recession period between 2011Q3 
and 2012Q1, there was a series of political events and scams, such as the 
coal scam and the 2G spectrum scam, which, along with a nationwide 
anti-corruption protest, were the primary reasons for the rise in the 
IPU index and were further amplified by global economic events such 
as the Fed tantrum policy and the Greek sovereign debt crisis. Thus, 
when compared with two popular measures, namely the finance-based 
VIX and news-based IPU, the SPF-based index, as shown in Figure 11.5, 
provides a good proxy indicator of macroeconomic uncertainty. It not 
only meaningfully enfolds both the recession periods, but it also rises in 
other specific economic events such as government switching the GDP 
measurement from the factor cost to gross value-added methodology,8 
demonetization, and goods and services tax. 
8 From January 2015 onward, India’s official statistical agency, the Central Statistics 
Office, started measuring India’s GDP growth by gross value-added at basic prices, 
replacing the previously followed factor cost method of measuring it.
Figure 11.1: Plot of SPFGDP_U Uncertainty  
with PPS Recession Dates
GDP = gross domestic product, GST = goods and services tax, PPS = Index based on Pandey, Patnaik, 
and Shah (2017).
Note: The shaded area denotes the PPS recession dates, and the horizontal dotted line is the mean 
value of SPFGDP_U.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 11.2: Plot of SPFMACRO_U Uncertainty  
with PPS Recession Dates
GDP = gross domestic product, GST = goods and services tax, PPS = Index based on Pandey, Patnaik, 
and Shah (2017).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 11.3: Plot of AVIX_U Uncertainty  
with PPS Recession Dates
PPS = Index based on Pandey, Patnaik, and Shah (2017).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 11.4: Plot of IPU Uncertainty with PPS Recession Dates
IPU = India policy uncertainty, PPS = Index based on Pandey, Patnaik, and Shah (2017).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 11.5: Plot of Measures of Uncertainty  
with PPS Recession Dates
GDP = gross domestic product, GST = goods and services tax, IPU = India policy uncertainty, 
PPS = Index based on Pandey, Patnaik, and Shah (2017).
Note: The left axis measures standardized uncertainty series. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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11.3.2 Transmission Channels of Uncertainty Shocks
Uncertainty shocks affect both aggregate demand and supply side of 
the economy through different propagation channel. The “real options” 
channel predicts that heightened uncertainty affects both the demand and 
the supply sides of the economy. In a period of uncertainty, firms postpone 
costly decisions about hiring and investment; once the uncertainty 
subsides, investment will catch up (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Thus, the 
initial fall in investment witnesses a sharp decline in output, and the 
subsequent rise in investment sees a rebound in the real output (Bloom 
2009). Such a horizontal “S” shape-type impulse response of output is 
known as “uncertainty overshoot”. The precautionary savings channel 
predicts that a rise in uncertainty reduces discretionary consumption, 
which increases household saving (Carroll 1997). Last, the risk premia 
channel envisages that uncertainty will adversely affect the demand and 
supply of a flow of funds in the financial market and predicts increased 
risk premia and credit speeds, which could negatively influence the real 
output through low investment. Additionally, heightened uncertainty 
also discourages banks from supplying funds, which creates tightening 
credit conditions and eventually results in a decline in the real output 
(Haddow et al. 2013).9 To identify various transmission channels of 
uncertainty, we use the standard vector autoregressive (VAR) models 
with impulse response and variance decomposition. The standard VAR 
(p) model is described as follows:
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 to identify structural 
shocks with alternative ordering and with suitable proxy variables, as 
described in the following sections. Another problem in VAR modeling 
is the appearance of nonstationarity in some variables. To this end, 
the uncertainty literature seems to be oblivious to the stationarity of 
variables in analyzing the effe t of uncertainty hocks. This inattention 
is partly because the VAR model in levels to some extent affects only 
the estimators’ efficiency but not consistency. Furthermore, Bjørnland 
9 With the lack of appropriate data on credit spreads, we do not explicitly assess the 
risk premia channel. However, its effects can eventually be observed in the reduced 
investment and industrial output.
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(2000) pointed out that time series is not just a random walk process; it 
may still display transitory fluctuations around a determinist trend. So 
here we estimated all VAR models in logarithmic level variables except 
rate variables and uncertainty indicators and included a constant and 
deterministic trend in the estimation with two lags identified by the 
Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion. 
11.3.3  Examining the Supply Side of the Real Option 
Channel of Uncertainty Shocks 
A recursively ordered two-variable VAR with log of the index of 
industrial production (IIP) and an uncertainty measure is used one at 
a time to examine whether impulse responses of output to shocks to 
an alternative measure of uncertainty are on expected lines. Figure 11.6 
shows the impact of uncertainty measures on industrial production, 
and the results show that all uncertainty measures except Baker, Bloom, 
and Davis’s 2016 IPU index show an adverse effect on future output. 
These findings are robust to alternative orderings and including other 
variables in the model. Given that the impulse response is conditional 
on information used in the model, we expanded the basic 2-VAR 
by including business expectations and inflation deviation with the 
following recursive ordering of the vector of the endogenous variable 
X' as:
 X' = [IIP, Inflation deviation, Business expectations, Uncertainty]  (1)
In the above specification, the inflation deviation is the difference 
between actual inflation and the professional forecasters’ expectations. 
The business expectations are a weighted composite index of an average 
net response of expectations on nine determinate variables of output. 
Shock to business expectations, therefore, could be interpreted as shock 
to first-moment (mean) determinants of output and that uncertainty 
in the model can be considered as shock to the second movement of 
output. The equation of IIP in the VAR estimation thus stands for a 
representative aggregate supply curve.10 The IIP output in the model is 
determined by its lags, inflation deviation, business expectations, and 
uncertainty shocks.11
10 The standard aggregate supply curve is determined by the potential output, 
deviations of the price level from the expected level, and shocks. Specification (1) 
could be viewed as a representative form of a typical aggregate supply curve.
11 The uncertainty shocks here imply the common variations that exist across macro 
variables. 
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The recursive ordering of the specification means that shocks to 
uncertainty only affect other variables with lags.12 The relationship 
between expectations13 and uncertainty is considered to be closely 
linked to variables (Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2016; Perić and Sorić 
2017). The changes in confidence and uncertainty are unlikely to occur 
independently (Haddow et al. 2013).14 Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) 
and Redl (2018) included the confidence variable in their benchmark 
VAR model to disentangle uncertainty (volatility) from unexpected bad 
news (a change in mean). The above specification allows changes in the 
confidence in the form of the expectations variable.15 The results of the 
estimation from specification (1) are shown in Figure 11.7. It can be seen 
that these impulses are similar to the two-variable VAR estimation.
12 This assumes an important policy implication that policy makers will have time to 
respond to the heightened uncertainty.
13 In the uncertainty literature, confidence and expectations are used as interchangeable 
terms.
14 Particularly during a crisis period, most often changes in confidence are seen as being 
driven by shocks to uncertainty. 
15 The confidence channel is empirically traced using a survey of expectations; refer to 
Kamber et al. (2016).
Figure 11.6: Responses of IIP  
to Alternative Uncertainty Shocks
IIP = index of industrial production, IPU = India policy uncertainty.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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We check the robustness of the impulse response of the IIP in 
alternative VAR specifications.16 In particular, we estimate a VAR with 
the following recursive ordering: uncertainty, inflation deviation, and 
IIP gap. We also consider a VAR specification (3) that includes Nifty 
and Call rate, and they are ordered from fast to slow as in Baker, Bloom, 
and Davis (2016), i.e., placing uncertainty first assuming uncertainty 
shocks contemporaneously affect all variables. We also estimate VAR 
specification (2), which considers ordering variables from slow- to 
fast-moving as in Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) and Rossi and 
Sekhposyan (2015), i.e., putting uncertainty last, assuming it responds 
to other variables contemporaneously. Specification (2) is taken as the 
baseline model. 
 X' = [IIP, Call rate, Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (2)
 X' = [Uncertainty, Nifty, Business expectations, Call rate, IIP]  (3)
A rationale for the above specifications is that all the variables in the 
level are trend stationary. Table A11.1.2 reports the results of the unit root 
test. It indicates that all variables are trend stationary while interest rate 
16 Bjørnland (2000) argued that the robustness of the impulse responses will be 
established if the extended model is consistent and is invariant to an extension of the 
information used.
Figure 11.7: Responses of IIP  
to Alternative Uncertainty Shocks (Specification 1)
IIP = index of industrial production, IPU = India policy uncertainty.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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variables in the literature are considered stationary variables. Hence, as 
mentioned above, all VARs are estimated with constant and trend. 
The impulse responses of macro variables to each uncertainty 
measure from the baseline estimation are reported in Appendix 11.2. 
The results show that barring the IPU, the effects of a shock to AVIX_U 
and SPF uncertainty measures on all the variables are consistent with 
Figure 11.8: Responses of IIP  
to Alternative Uncertainty Shocks (Specification 2)
IIP = index of industrial production, IPU = India policy uncertainty.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 11.9: Responses of IIP  
to Alternative Uncertainty Shocks (Specification 3)
IIP = index of industrial production, IPU = India policy uncertainty.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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the predictions of the effects of uncertainty.17 Figures 11.8 and 11.9 show 
the key results from specifications (2) and (3), respectively, that, except 
for IPU uncertainty, all measures are consistent with the predictions 
of the supply-side channel of uncertainty. Particularly given that the 
quarterly growth rate of IIP averaged around 3.15% over the sample 
period, it is observed that the immediate fall in the production of 
around 1.40 percentage points is a noticeable effect. Further, the results 
confirm Bloom’s 2009 overshoot prediction of an initial fall in output 
following an uncertainty shock and subsequent rise over the baseline 
and then falling back to the baseline. Overall, the results of the supply-
side channel show consistency in terms of alternative ordering and also 
alternative variable sets. 
11.3.4  Examining the Demand-side Transmission 
Channels of Uncertainty Shocks
To identify demand-side transmission channels of uncertainty shocks, 
we expand the VAR model with variables relevant to the component of 
aggregate demand.
Real Options Channel of Investment
The investment channel functions on both the demand side and the supply 
side of an economy. It affects not only aggregate demand today but also the 
future productive capacity of an economy. To capture this transmission 
channel of uncertainty, we consider gross domestic expenditure at 
constant prices (GDE) 18 and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) with 
the following recursive ordering of endogenous X' variables as:
 X'=  [GDE, GFCF, Project stalling rate,  
Business expectations, Call rate, Uncertainty]  (4)
The project stalling rate is calculated as the total number of stalled 
projects as a percentage of the overall projects under implementation.19 
The above specification after accounting for aggregate expenditure 
17 Impulse responses of macro variables from specification (3) show similar results. 
Further, these results do not change, regardless of the quarter end (IPU_Qend) or 
3-month average of the IPU index (IPU_Avg) used, as shown in Appendices 2 and 3.
18 GDE is reported in the ordinal data source as gross domestic product at constant 
prices measured by the expenditure method with the base year 2011‒2012. 
19 We consider the project stalling rate so that it can be comparable across time.
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and other first-movement information allows us to assess the impulse 
responses of investment and project stalling rate to shocks to an 
alternative measure of uncertainty. We further propose the use of the 
number of projects announced in place of GFCF as it is directly linked 
with the wait-and-see decision effect of investment (Bernanke 1983).
 X'=  [GDE, Number of private investment projects  
announced, Project stalling rate, Business  
expectations, Call rate, Uncertainty]  (5)
The impulse responses of all variables from estimation 4 to each 
uncertainty measure are reported in Appendix 3.20 Again barring the 
IPU, the impact of AVIX_U and SPF uncertainty is broadly consistent 
with the theoretical effects of uncertainty. Figure 11.10 shows that, 
except for the IPU, a rise in the uncertainty is associated with a decline 
in GFCF. The stalled project rate is an additional indicator of investment 
slowdown. It is expected that during a period of uncertain environment, 
firms often hold off on many financial decisions associated with the 
project. As a result, the stalled project rate may rise. The response of the 
project stalling rate to uncertainty shocks except for the IPU in Figure 
11.11 supports the investment channel. For the robustness of these results, 
a VAR specification (5) is estimated by replacing GFCF in specification 
(4) with the number of private projects announced. A similar negative 
effect of uncertainty shocks on the project’s announcement decisions is 
observed in Figure 11.12. The SPFMACRO_U measure has a maximum 
uncertainty effect on GFCF, with a peak fall noticed around 1.75% as 
against the average quarterly rate of GFCF of about 2% over the sample 
period. The result from specification (4) is robust to a VAR that includes 
Nifty and also robust to one with the uncertainty measure ordered first 
and replaces GFCF with the number of projects announced. 
20 It should be noted here that the impulse response results of all specifications from 
(1) to (8) for all the variables to each uncertainty measure are found to be qualitatively 
the same as those reported in Appendices 11.2 and 11.3 from specifications (2) and (4).
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Figure 11.10: Responses of GFCF  
to Alternative Uncertainty Shocks
GFCF = gross fixed capital formation, IPU = India policy uncertainty.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 11.11: Responses of Project Stalling Rate  
to Alternative Uncertainty Shocks
IPU = India policy uncertainty.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 11.12: Responses of Number of  
Private Investment Projects Announced
IPU = India policy uncertainty.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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The Precautionary Channel of Private Consumption  
and Government Consumption
The precautionary saving channel of uncertainty postulates that a rise 
in uncertainty leads to an increase in household saving and a decrease 
in discretionary consumption. The consumption effect of uncertainty is 
expected to have two different effects: on the one hand that heightened 
uncertainty can induce households to postpone consumption, 
particularly a discretionary one, analogous to private investment 
channels; on the other hand, the government may increase its fiscal 
activity as it responds aggressively to uncertainty with increased 
spending to stimulate the economy. These two effects are captured 
using private final personal expenditure (PFPE) and final government 
expenditure (GFE) with the following recursive ordering of X':
 X' =  [GDE, PFPE, Business expectations,  
Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (6)
 X' =  [GDE, GE, Business expectations,  
Callrate, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (7)
In the case of PFPE response, as shown in Figure 11.13, it appears that 
its initial response to SPF and VIX uncertainty innovations is supportive 
of the precautionary savings channel, but it shows a relatively short-lived 
response—fluctuating around the baseline. This transient reaction is 
because the PFPE is a poor measure of discretionary expenditure, which 
Figure 11.13: Responses of PFPE  
to Alternative Uncertainty Shocks
PFPE = private final personal expenditure, IPU = India policy uncertainty.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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is expected to be affected most. Therefore, we consider below a small 
saving as a more suitable variable to trace the precautionary savings 
channel. The response of government expenditure in Figure  11.14 is 
consistent with the economic prediction. However, note that the delayed 
response of government expenditure to AVIX_U shock is indicative of 
inside fiscal policy lag, but its response is persistent. This finding implies 
that the government does not respond instantly to uncertainty arising 
from the stock market until it becomes widespread and persistent. 
The Precautionary Channel of Saving
The flip side of consumption effect is an increase in precautionary 
savings following a rise in uncertainty. We trace this effect by replacing 
private final consumption effect in specification (6) with small saving as:
 X' =  [GDE, Small saving, Callrate,  
Business expectations, Nifty, Uncertainty]  (8)
The saving response in Figure 11.15 provides evidence of the relative 
effectiveness of alternative measures of uncertainty. Its response to VIX- 
and SPF-based measures supports the precautionary savings channel 
prediction that the small saving rises following uncertainty shock and 
stays persistently at an elevated level. The highest peak impact is about a 
1.75% increase for AVIX_U, followed by about 0.60% for SPFMACRO_U 
and 0.40% for SPFOUTPUT_U. AVIX_U uncertainty roughly triples the 
positive impact of uncertainty shocks on small savings. This uncertainty 
Figure 11.14: Responses of Government Expenditure  
to Alternative Uncertainty Shocks
IPU = India policy uncertainty.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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effect on saving is notable as the actual quarterly growth of small savings 
during the sample period is around 0.90%, and year-on-year growth is 
about 3.40%. On the other hand, the response of saving to IPU shocks 
shows an adverse effect, which is inconsistent with a precautionary 
saving channel. 
International Spillovers Channel of Uncertainty 
Bloom (2017) postulated that uncertainty shocks in a domestic economy 
might sometimes originate from a foreign country. We test this 
proposition by using US VIX uncertainty to assess the international 
spillover effect of uncertainty using the following ordering of X':
 X' =  [Foreign uncertainty, domestic uncertainty,  
Dollar-rupee exchange rate, Business  
expectations, Caltrate, IIP]  (9)
In the above recursive VAR estimation, the foreign/US uncertainty 
is placed first, and then its response is restricted such that it does not 
respond to domestic variables, but domestic variables can respond to 
shocks to the US uncertainty.21
Figure 11.16 shows a substantial positive impact of US VIX 
uncertainty on the domestic VIX uncertainty and exchange rate, and 
exerts a negative effect on the level of business expectations, IIP, and 
21 Specification (9) is similar to that of baseline VAR estimation (2), but it includes the 
exchange rate to account for uncertainty arising from the external sector.
Figure 11.15: Responses of Small Saving  
to Alternative Uncertainty Shocks
IPU = India policy uncertainty.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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call rate. These responses are similar to a VAR that uses domestic 
uncertainty; therefore, they are perfectly consistent with the expected 
theoretical channels. Further, the results are qualitatively not different 
to the use of US EPU or world EPU, suggesting that the overall story is 
intact. We use the variance decompositions of estimation (9) to quantify 
the actual role of foreign-originated uncertainty shocks in explaining the 
fluctuation of domestic variables, shown in Figure 11.17. These findings 
clearly demonstrate that US VIX uncertainty shocks are much more 
significant than India’s VIX uncertainty in explaining the movements of 
domestic variables. 
Overall, the VAR analysis of the uncertainty effect suggests that 
forward-looking variables are more responsive to uncertainty shocks 
than variables of current perceptions. The response of fiscal policy 
shows a considerable inside lag in recognizing the state of the economy 
and is found to be less effective in terms of size, although along expected 
lines. On the other hand, the monetary policy decisions are based on 
the forward-looking framework; hence, call rate responses are seen to 
be swift and substantial. Similarly, the reaction of business expectations 
appears to be more profound and substantial vis-à-vis all other responses. 
However, it also rebounds quickly, signifying that the expectations are 
data driven and so more rational. Likewise, the investment responses 
appear to be data driven as responses are more immediate and persistent 
than their counterpart consumption expenditure. 
Figure 11.16: Responses of Domestic Variables  
to US VIX Uncertainty Shocks
US = United States, VIX = implied volatility index.
Note: The left axis measures the rate variables, exchange rate and call rate and India’s VIX uncertainty 
index, and the right-hand axis measures the log variables in the percentage.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 11.17: Variance Decompositions of Variables
IIP = Index of industrial production.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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11.4 Conclusion
This study constructs the macroeconomic uncertainty indices of Rossi 
and Sekhposyan (2015) for an emerging economy, India, and considers 
various other macroeconomic uncertainty indices to validate their 
suitability in tracing the business cycles and their consistency in shock 
transmission channels defined by different theoretical channels. Using 
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quarterly data from 2008Q1 to 2018Q2, this study estimates a series 
of VAR models to identify different uncertainty channels of aggregate 
demand and supply. The derived measures of uncertainty are at a higher 
level around recessions and other structural changes like demonetization 
and GST implementation in India. Further, the empirical results also 
suggest that uncertainty shocks reduce industrial output, in line with 
the supply side of the real-option channel and correspondingly reduces 
the gross fixed capital formation and the number of private investment 
projects announced as well as raising the project stalling rate, in line 
with the demand-side channel of investment. Similarly, uncertainty 
raises household savings while reducing consumption and increasing 
government expenditure, which is consistent with the precautionary 
channel. 
Finally, this study also examines the international spillover of 
uncertainty by measuring the effects of US uncertainty measures on 
the domestic variables. The results show that US uncertainty has a 
substantial effect in explaining movements of domestic variables, much 
more than domestic uncertainty, suggesting a significant international 
spillover effect in the Indian economy. The empirical results also suggest 
that, among alternative measures, the forecast-based measure of Rossi 
and Sekhposyan (2015) and the market-based implied volatility measure 
of Bloom (2009) are found to be suitable proxies for uncertainty, while 
the news-based economic policy uncertainty of Baker, Bloom, and Davis 
(2016), which is widely used in developed countries, has not properly 
captured the state of economic uncertainty in India. This finding may 
suggest that news-based economic uncertainty indices may not be 
useful for developing countries since related local sociopolitical events 
are seen to be a more dominant discourse in the media, and often such 
uncertainty may die off without any economic recession.
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Appendix 11.1
Table A11.1.1: Data and Sources
Variables Source
1. US economic policy index (EPU)
2. World policy uncertainty index 
3. India’s economic policy index (IPU)
http://www.policyuncertainty.com/
4.  India’s implied volatility index (VIX) 
data
https://www.nseindia.com/
5. US VIX data http://www.cboe.com/
6. Business expectations index data Reserve Bank of India quarterly survey  
of industrial outlook:
https://www.rbi.org.in/
7.  Survey of professional forecasters 
(SPF) data 
Reserve Bank of India quarterly survey 
of professional forecasters (SPF):  
https://www.rbi.org.in/ 
8. Gross domestic product (GDP) 
9. Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF)
10. Government expenditure (GE)
11.  Final private consumption expenditure 
(PFPE)
12. Index of industrial production (IIP)
13.  Number of private investment projects 
announced
14. Total number of stalled projects
15.  The overall number of projects under 
implementation
CMIE economic outlook database:
https://economicoutlook.cmie.com/
Note: All links accessed 26 September 2020.
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Table A11.1.2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test Results
Variables p-Values of Intercept
p-Values of Trend  
and Intercept
SPFGDP_U 0.00 0.00
SPFMACRO_U 0.00 0.00
AVIX_U 0.29 0.00
IPU 0.05 0.07
log(IIP) 0.39 0.01
log(Nifty) 0.82 0.05
log(Business expectations) 0.03 0.00
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Appendix 11.2:  
Impulse Responses of Baseline Specification (2): 
The Supply Side of the Real Option Channel
Figure A11.2.1: Responses to SPFGDP_U Uncertainty Shocks
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure A11.2.2: Responses to IPU_Qend Uncertainty Shocks
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure A11.2.3: Responses to IPU_Qavg Uncertainty Shocks
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure A11.2.4: Responses to AVIX_U Uncertainty Shocks
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Business expectations
CallrateIIP
NIFTY
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
–0.5
–1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
40
60
80
20
0
–20
–40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
4
6
2
0
–2
–4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3
2
1
0
–2
–1
–3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Assessing Macroeconomic Uncertainties for an Emerging Economy 323
Appendix 11.3:  
Impulse Responses from the Specification (4): 
The Demand-Side Real Option Channel of 
Investment
Figure A11.3.1: Responses to IPU_Qavg Uncertainty Shocks
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure A11.3.2: Responses to IPU_Qend Uncertainty Shocks
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure A11.3.3: Responses to AVIX_U Uncertainty Shocks
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure A11.3.4: Responses to SPFGDP_U Uncertainty Shocks
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure A11.3.5: Responses to SPFMACRO_U Uncertainty Shocks
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Do Fintech Activities Affect 
Monetary Policy? 
Muhammad Zubair Mumtaz,  
Zachary A. Smith, and Zafar Mahmood
12.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the emergence of new financial technologies 
(fintech) has posed serious threats and challenges to the structure of 
the financial sector. The evolution of electronic money, digital banking, 
crowdfunding platforms, and distributed ledger technology raises 
various concerns for the banking industry and macroeconomic policy 
(Paternoster and Dessimirova 2017). The innovation in fintech has 
tremendously changed the accessibility of financial services. For instance, 
peer-to-peer lending permits customers to get funds in the absence 
of a banking channel, new modes of payments (e.g., mobile software) 
allow people to transact through a smartphone, and distributed ledger 
technology (e.g., blockchain) facilitates new means of reporting and 
executing transactions. These developments have started to influence 
the ability of central banks to conduct monetary policy effectively with 
a goal of financial stability. 
In a Global Fintech Summit, Jun Zhu, director-general of the 
International Department at the People’s Bank of China claimed that, 
“the growth of fintech will have an impact on the formulation and 
implementation of monetary policy” (CBN 2018). He emphasized that 
the growth of fintech will generate competition in the financial sector 
and cause the market to become more responsive to interest rates. 
This implies that technological innovation increases the sphere of 
intangible assets that are likely to affect the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy. Zhu also argued that fintech could affect price changes 
based on targets set under monetary policy, and this aspect becomes 
more prevalent through real-time changes in goods and services via 
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algorithmic technology that may have a significant effect on inflation 
(CBN 2018). 
On another front, International Monetary Fund Managing Director 
Lagarde (2017) claimed that virtual currencies pose little to no threat to 
fiat currencies and central banks because they are too volatile, cost too 
much to maintain, and are not scalable; however, she envisages a future 
in which countries with weak central banks move to this type of digital 
currency as the technology evolves. She refers to this as dollarization 
2.0, a time in which countries with weak institutions rely on something 
other than the dollar or a foreign government’s currency to provide the 
necessary functions of money that its citizens demand. She continues to 
provide an example of Seychelles from 2006 to 2008 and indicates that 
the dollarization of its currency rose from 20% to 60% during this time. 
Further, she claims that this movement from current forms of money 
could improve payment systems by reducing costs for transfers of funds 
for simple transactions.  
Tule and Oduh (2017) examined the impact of financial innovations 
on the monetary policy in Nigeria during the period from January 
2009 to February 2015. They argued that, “the constant substitution 
of e-money for cash among other things, will enhance the efficiency 
of production, strengthen the interest rate channel of monetary policy 
transmission and reduce the effects of price on money demand” (p. 472). 
Alternatively, it is challenging for the central bank to control the money 
supply through its influence on the operating goal, surges in the velocity 
of money, interest rate elasticity of the demand for money, and the cost of 
monetary policy arising from the trade-off between inflation and output. 
The emergence of technological innovations in the financial sector 
affected the dynamics of businesses as well as the banking system. 
Digital currencies are used as a model of modern technology to transact 
business, which may affect the demand for and the supply of money. To 
raise this concern, it is important to analyze how markets are reacting 
to fintech instruments.  The purpose of this study is to examine the 
impact of fintech on the monetary policy in developed countries. We 
consider 25 developed economies and identify the income velocity 
and money multiplier before and after the initiation of fintech. The 
results report no change in income velocity and the money multiplier 
after the era of fintech. The other objective of the study is to investigate 
the money demand using the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimator. We identify that gross domestic product (GDP), real interest 
rates, inflation, and wealth are significant determinates. When fintech 
instruments are included, the results indicate that mobile technology, 
internet technology, and Bitcoin are the robust predictors of money 
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demand. We also examine the product market equation and cost function 
and determine that after the start of fintech activities, monetary policy, 
as proxied for through interest rates, may have an insignificant effect. 
Moreover, we report that Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Ripple are robust 
determinants of the output gap. Further, we interact fintech instruments 
with interest rates, and report that the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy may influence the mobile and internet technology, 
Ethereum, and Ripple. Finally, we investigate the innovations of fintech 
instruments and find that GDP, real interest rates, inflation, and financial 
development indexes are the significant factors.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 
12.2 provides an overview of the channel of money demand and supply 
in terms of fintech. Section 12.3 describes the overview of financial 
technology. Section 12.4 discusses the research methodology and data, 
Section 12.5 examines the empirical results, and Section 12.6 concludes 
the study.  
12.2  What is Fintech and How Does It Affect  
the Monetary Policy? 
Fintech is generally referred to as “a portmanteau of financial 
technologies,” which is characterized by the financial services of the 
21st century. Initially, the innovation process supported and recognized 
consumer and trade financial institutions, which eventually turned 
into a full-fledged process by creating digital currencies like Bitcoin 
and altcoin. Though there are various negative concerns associated 
with the cryptocurrencies, fintech products affect the sales of banking 
products, and speed up innovation. Prior studies (Bernanke and Blinder 
1988; Arize 1990) explored the influence of financial innovation on 
the monetary policymaking and the role of central banks. Due to the 
emergence of the innovation process, central banks are supposed to 
have a pivotal role in conducting monetary policy after the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system (Arize 1990). It seems as though there 
is a complicated relationship between the central bank and its ability 
to implement monetary policy, which greatly influences the supply of 
money or credit throughout the financial system. 
12.2.1 The Supply Side
In line with this general idea that central banks had some control 
over the money supply, Werner (2016) sought to answer the following 
question: do banks lend existing money or create money? This led to 
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a more nuanced understanding of what the central bank’s role is as a 
supplier of credit and how much influence it might have over the money 
supply. Werner (2016) indicates that over the last century, there have 
been three dominant theories about banking’s role in the economy. The 
first is that they act as intermediaries and collect deposits, then lend 
them out to consumers. The second is that banks on their own are not 
able to create money, but do so collectively through the fractional reserve 
system and the multiplier effect. The third suggests that banks do not act 
collectively, but each individual bank creates credit and money when 
they make loans. Based on an empirical test and case studies, Werner 
(2016) indicates that the first two theories are rejected and found 
empirical evidence supporting the third (similar to Werner 2014). 
Traditionally, the suppliers of credit have been banking institutions, 
not the central bank. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016) provide a good 
overall summary of the role that banks play in terms of monetary policy 
and the creation of money. According to them, their role is to, “take stakes 
in the households’ risky projects, absorbing and diversifying some of the 
households’ risk. They are active in maturity and liquidity transformation, 
as they issue liquid, at notice redeemable, (inside) money and invest in 
illiquid long-term investments.” By creating money, the banks take on 
risks associated with the mismatch between assets and liabilities. When 
the economy is functioning properly, this process of banks creating inside 
money for individuals to allow them to make investments in projects that 
they would otherwise be unable to afford is effective; however, when the 
economy contracts, banks shrink their balance sheets, the availability 
of inside money decreases, and the demand for money increases. This 
is when outside money becomes valuable (i.e., provided by a central 
authority). They highlight two cases: (i) one in which the banks have 
sufficient capital and are able to provide households with that capital to 
invest in projects; and (ii) one in which the banks do not have sufficient 
capital (either because they choose not to lend or their access to capital is 
somehow restricted) to provide to the markets. 
To understand the issues that are created from the supply side, this 
chapter uses the convention provided in Braun (2016), which illustrates 
the differences between inside and outside money and indicates that 
“legally” only outside money is legal tender. Further, he attempts to 
discredit the myth that banks use deposits to create loans and suggests 
that banks make loans, which creates a deposit by expanding its balance 
sheet through making two offsetting entries, i.e., a loan on the asset side 
and a deposit on the liability side. Moreover, he contends that banks 
loan funds and then borrow the necessary reserves to satisfy the United 
States Federal Reserve (the Fed) requirements for making that loan. 
So, the creation of inside money is not dependent on the amount of 
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outside money available in the system, but it is dependent on the 
market’s demand for loanable funds. Similarly, he contends that external 
money is not an exogenous variable under the control of the central 
authority. Concisely, he explains that “both inside and outside money 
are endogenous to the interaction of loan demand and lending behaviour 
in the economy.” Finally, he explained that the monetization of “private 
loans by making them exchangeable with sovereign promises to pay is 
the hallmark of capitalist credit money, which finds its contemporary 
expression in central banks’ collateralized open market operations. In 
this public-private partnership, demand deposits created through bank 
loans make up the largest part of the ‘privately contracted debts’ that 
circulate as money.” 
Prior to fintech and innovations associated with nontraditional 
lenders, the implementation of monetary policy through more traditional 
measures (i.e., changing the reserve requirements and increasing or 
decreasing the monetary base to influence the Federal Funds Rate) seemed 
like adequate measures to take to successfully implement monetary 
policy actions. However, as these alternative credit facilities enter the 
market and are governed by a separate, laxer, set of regulatory oversight, 
the effectiveness of monetary policy actions could be stymied. Lucas and 
Nicolini (2015) contend that the relationship between monetary aggregates 
(such as M1, M2, and the Monetary Base) and prices and interest rates 
deteriorated in the 1980s and have yet to be re-established (this point is 
revisited in the section about demand). Therefore, when implementing 
monetary policy actions, central bankers rely mainly on interest rates as 
a tool to intervene in markets; hence, monetary aggregates seem to be 
of little interest to those that implement monetary policy. However, this 
transmission channel seems to be less effective in a system that has ample 
liquidity, as is evident today. Wolla (2019) contends that, in an environment 
where there is ample liquidity flowing through the system, small changes 
to the supply of reserves will not affect interest rates, in the case of the 
United States (US), the Federal Funds Rate. To overcome this obstacle, in 
the US, the Fed has created new rates (i.e., Interest on Excess Reserves, 
and Overnight Reverse Repurchase Agreements), which it uses to create 
arbitrage opportunities in the marketplace to force banks to either reduce 
or expand their borrowing and lending activities. The tools that central 
banks have previously used to implement monetary policy initiatives 
seem to be changing and the traditional banks are losing market share 
to credit- (i.e., money-) creating facilities in the fintech space; these two 
taken together seem to have some ramifications for the financial markets 
and the implementation of monetary policy. 
As was noted in the introduction, from 2007 to 2015, the shadow 
banking industry’s market share grew from 14% to 38% in the US 
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(Buchak et al. 2018). Given that the banks and, by association, the 
shadow banks, play a pivotal role in creating money and the fact that 
these nontraditional banks are exposed to a different set of standards 
and oversight, the increase in the market share of this sector leads to 
questions about how this rise is likely to affect the traditional channels 
that central banks use to implement monetary policy. There is already 
evidence that some of the more traditional methods are failing 
because there is excess liquidity throughout the financial system, i.e., 
manipulation of the Federal Funds Rate, and some of the institutions 
issuing credit are not exposed to the same requirements as traditional 
banks. In light of these emerging issues, this chapter examines how 
fintech and the rise of the shadow banking industry have influenced 
the money supply.
12.2.2 The Demand Side
Braun (2016) shows how two primary objectives of money are to 
strike a balance between elasticity and the public’s trust in that money. 
Hendrickson and Salter (2018) state that a “key factor underlying 
the utility of money is imperfect commitment” (p. 23). Further, they 
contend that if individuals knew exactly what they were willing to trade 
for future actions, then all transactions would be executed on credit; 
however, in the face of uncertainty, money is necessary to facilitate 
exchange and it expands the individual’s opportunity set. In their 
opinion, banks exist because of imperfect commitment and uncertainty, 
because if individuals were certain about their future needs, they would 
convert a certain portion of their savings to outside money and save the 
remaining in interest-bearing deposits; as financial innovation persists, 
the boundaries between these two assets seem to be disappearing.
Reiss (2018) claims that the movement toward a cashless society 
is neither new nor disruptive, but it has been occurring gradually, with 
money already becoming digital. Further, he contends that the monetary 
authorities are already aware of this change. In addition, Reiss (2018), 
in regards to the demand for money, illustrates that the ratio of cash in 
circulation outside of banks to broad money (i.e., M4) has been relatively 
stable from 2006 to 2015 for countries across the globe with a few minor 
exceptions. The three reasons that they provide for why people rely 
on an actual currency are: (i) as a medium of exchange when no other 
forms of payment are acceptable; (ii) as a protection against institutional 
instability throughout the financial sector; and (iii) for privacy concerns.
Lucas and Nicolini (2015) illustrate a negative relationship between 
the demand for currencies and M1 over GDP from 1915 to 1980, but 
indicate the breakdown in this relationship from 1980 onward, primarily 
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due to the definition of M1 and M2 and the fact that the demand for 
“deposits” has shifted to a demand for money market deposit accounts 
since the 1980s. After redefining their definition of M1 to include money 
market deposit accounts, the negative relationship between the ratio 
of M1 to GDP compared to its opportunity cost (measured by interest 
rates) remains significant over time. The main purposes of highlighting 
this finding is to illustrate, as both Ireland (2015) and Lucas et al. (2015) 
relate, that the standard definitions associated with published monetary 
aggregates typically fail to illustrate a continued relationship between 
the monetary aggregates and short-term interest rates, which would 
question the empirical value of the quantity theory of money. However, 
as Lucas et al. (2015) illustrate, the relationship between rates and the 
demand for money is still apparent in practice, but financial innovations 
affect this relationship and how the theory works empirically. 
Ireland (2015) indicates that the quantity theory of money links 
actual demand to the nominal money supplied by the banks and 
government through inflation, which provides its sound macroeconomic 
base. Further, he contends that, normally, central bankers refer to and 
rely on rates to make adjustments in policy throughout the economy 
and ignore discussions of the money supply; however, empirically, 
studies that focus explicitly on engaging in monetary policy actions 
during times of hyperinflation, central bankers implement policies to 
restrict the money supply to curtail inflation. Ireland (2015) questions 
whether monetary policy should be “summarized on observations of 
interest rates alone” (p. 67), as the New Keynesian models used today 
seem to suggest. He indicates how the Lucas et al. (2015) model, which 
illustrated that money demand has been relatively stable over time by 
creating a new monetary aggregate (similar to Reiss 2018), relates the 
velocity of money to short-term interest rates as the quantity theory of 
money predicts, and overcomes objections raised by economists that 
the association between the monetary aggregate and rates is no longer 
intact based on their use of traditional proxies for monetary aggregates 
(Goldfeld et al. 1976). This is because the traditional proxies do not 
seem to appropriately incorporate alternative forms of money, which 
are becoming very close substitutes to money as financial innovation 
changes the monetary policy landscape. 
To summarize, the definition of money, both in physical terms and 
how policy makers measure it, is changing as financial innovations 
occur throughout the system. The underlying relationships that have 
been established through empirical studies and theoretical debates 
pertaining to the quantity theory of money and the relationship between 
the demand for money, inflation, and rates are still intact; however, the 
definitions that policy makers use to refer to money aggregates have to 
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change as financial innovations occur in the economy. As the definition 
of money evolves, the channels that consumers use to access that money 
is likely to change as well. Policy makers should be more cognizant of 
the underlying changes in the alternative definitions of money and their 
potential ramifications for monetary policy as they relate to the quantity 
theory of money. 
12.3 Overview of Financial Technology
In this study, we consider the instruments of financial technology 
(fintech), which include mobile technology, internet technology, Bitcoin, 
Ethereum, Litecoin, and Ripple. This section specifically emphasizes 
digital currencies—more specifically, digital or virtual currencies 
that use cryptographic encryption techniques to generate units of the 
currency and verify transactions.
Digital currency is a broad term that can contain anything that 
represents value in a digital manner. Digital currency can contain what 
we would call electronic money, which is simply a digital representation 
of government-issued fiat currency; it can also cover virtual currency 
known as electronic currency that is not considered legal tender. Virtual 
currencies are controlled and created by their developers, with the value 
being appreciated in a specific community.  
Bitcoin is an encrypted currency and a payment system. It was 
invented by an unidentified programmer or a group of programmers 
under the name Satoshi Nakamoto. Bitcoin was introduced into a 
cryptography mailing list on 31 October 2008, and was released as open-
source software in 2009. There are various theories and speculations 
about Nakamoto’s identity, but none has been confirmed. The system 
is peer-to-peer and trades are made directly between users without 
intermediaries. These transactions are verified by network nodes and 
recorded in a public distributed ledger called blockchain, which uses 
Bitcoin as the unit of account. Because the system operates without a 
central repository or a single administrator, the US Treasury classified 
Bitcoin as a decentralized virtual currency. Bitcoin is often called the 
first cryptocurrency, although there were previous systems. It is more 
accurately described as the first decentralized digital currency; Bitcoin 
is the largest of its kind. The rest of the digital currencies are gaining 
popularity. 
Figure 12.1 presents the position of closing prices of digital currencies 
used in this study. Bitcoin is the older version of the cryptocurrency 
where closing prices were at an all-time high from 2013 to 2018. 
Litecoin is another digital currency, introduced in 2013; however, its 
closing prices are the lowest among other similar digital currencies. In 
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January 2015, Ripple was launched and we can see from Figure 12.1 it is 
competing with other digital currencies. From our sample, Ethereum is 
another popular cryptocurrency that came onto market in August 2015; 
still its prices are compatible from the perspective of the market. While 
Bitcoin is receiving the attention and interest of investors, other digital 
currencies are also competitive, and their flows will further be enhanced 
once they are regularized by the concerned authorities.   
12.4 Methodology and Data 
To examine the effect of financial innovation on the environment of 
monetary policy, this study follows the categorization proposed by 
Meltzer (1978): (i) financial innovations that overcome the regulatory 
and legal restrictions which may occur in the non-existence of 
restrictions; (ii) financial innovations that enhance lending and 
borrowing possibilities which may influence demand for and supply 
of money; and (iii) financial innovations that have instant effect on a 
respective kind of institution which may affect the equilibrium of the 
entire economy.
In terms of financial innovations, earlier studies (Tule and Oduh 
2017; Lenka and Bairwa 2016) used proxies like the number of ATMs, 
Figure 12.1: Pricing Pattern of Digital Currencies
Source: Authors.
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point of sales transactions, and online transactions. Since then, there has 
been a substantial change in the context of financial innovation. Over 
time, the surge of fintech affects the financial structure, as consumers 
are using digital currencies for placing their transactions outside the 
scope of the banking industry. These kinds of business transactions 
ultimately influence the demand for and supply of money. In this 
study, we use fintech as a proxy of digital currencies and mobile and/
or internet banking to examine their role on money demand and output 
gap to determine the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. The 
ensuing subsections elaborate on the modelling framework, sample, 
and data.
12.4.1 Modelling Framework
This study develops a two-tier model. In the first tier, the surge of money 
supply (M2) around the world is the result of financial and technological 
innovation, and this is investigated by employing: (i) the stability of 
income velocity of money and the money multiplier; and (ii) the stability 
of demand for money function. The other tier of the model examines 
whether fintech activities influence the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy. 
The stability of income velocity of money (υ)and the money 
multiplier (m) are measured through trend (τ) and can be expressed as:
 
 (𝑣𝑣) (𝑚𝑚) (𝜏𝜏)  
 
       𝑣𝑣 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇1                                                                                                            (1) 
 
       𝑚𝑚 =  𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇2                                                                                                         (2) 
 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =   𝜆𝜆0 + 𝛿𝛿0 ln(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼) +  𝛾𝛾0𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜛𝜛0 ln(𝑤𝑤) +  𝜚𝜚0𝜋𝜋 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖         (3) 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑦𝑦) (𝑟𝑟) (𝜋𝜋)  (𝛿𝛿0) (𝛾𝛾0) (𝜛𝜛0) 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 (𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖)  
 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3ln (𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                 +𝛽𝛽4𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                 
(𝜂𝜂) (𝑦𝑦) (𝑟𝑟)  
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =   𝜆𝜆1 + 𝛿𝛿1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾1(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜛𝜛1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
             + 𝜚𝜚1𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜁𝜁𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝜂𝜂) + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     
𝜂𝜂  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                +𝛽𝛽3𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                +𝛽𝛽5 ln(𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                +𝛽𝛽6 ln(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                +𝛽𝛽7𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) 
                + 𝛽𝛽8𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊ℎ𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) 
                + 𝛽𝛽9𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) 
                + 𝛽𝛽10𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑀𝑀   𝑊𝑊  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
(𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔) (𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔) 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝 𝑊𝑊 
 
 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 −  𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖   (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖)   𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
 
   𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                    (7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1)
 
 (𝑣𝑣) (𝑚𝑚) (𝜏𝜏)  
 
       𝑣𝑣 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇1                                                                                                            (1) 
 
       𝑚𝑚 =  𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇2                                                                                                         (2) 
 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =   𝜆𝜆0 + 𝛿𝛿0 ln(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼) +  𝛾𝛾0𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜛𝜛0 ln(𝑤𝑤) +  𝜚𝜚0𝜋𝜋 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖         (3) 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑦𝑦) (𝑟𝑟) (𝜋𝜋)  (𝛿𝛿0) (𝛾𝛾0) (𝜛𝜛0) 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 (𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖)  
 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3ln (𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                 +𝛽𝛽4𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                 
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 (2)
Analyzing how fintech affects the money demand function shows 
how monetary policy influences inflation and output and how the effect 
of the financial system on growth and development can be observed 
in the behavior of capital markets and real balances. Previous studies 
(e.g., Arrau and De Gregorio 1993; Tule and Oduh 2017) argued that 
long-run money demand function is normally distinguished by periods 
of “missing money”, unsteady factors, and autocorrelated errors. This 
consideration is important from the point of view that countries have 
experienced significant variations in economic conditions and financial 
markets. In light of these considerations, it is imperative to examine 
whether monetary policy is influenced by fintech activities and the 
stability of the demand for money function. 
To examine the effect of fintech, we develop the money demand 
function by considering before and after its initiation. We presume that 
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where mit refers to the real demand for money that is formed as the 
growing function of transactional (y) and uncertainty demand for money 
(r), and a decreasing function of price (π). We generally assume that an 
increase in income (δ0) raises the transactionary demand for money, an 
increase in the opportunity cost of idle fund (γ0) reduces the uncertain 
demand for money, whereas wealth effect (ϖ0) has a complex connection 
with money demand (Friedman 1988). ξt represents specific time effects 
and (υi) represents unobserved country effects. The simplified version 
of the model can be expressed as:
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We measure (η) in terms of mobile and internet subscribers and 
digital currencies. Over the past few years, mobile and internet banking 
enable customers to transact through the online system and the 
cryptocurrencies provide the opportunity to buy and sell goods without 
the financial system. The innovation of fintech influences the volume 
of transactions, as well as the income velocity of money. The simplified 
form of the model is written as:
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where GDPit is the natural logarithm of the GDP measured in real terms 
of country i at time t, and rit refers real interest rate of country i at time t, 
Wealthit is estimated as the logarithm of stock market indices, πit refers 
to price level, and fintech instruments include mobile and internet 
subscribers and digital currencies.  
The other objective of this study is, thus, to examine the relationship 
between fintech and monetary policy from two perspectives. First, we 
formulate an association between the equilibrium interest rate to the 
output gap. The other factor relates to the output gap that includes 
the variables relating to fintech and an interaction term of fintech 
with interest rates. The purpose of interacting both these parameters 
is to examine the impact of fintech on the credit channel in terms of 
transmission of monetary policy mechanisms (short-term interest 
rates). The relationship can be examined by assessing two operational 
equations: (i) the product market (IS) equation, and (ii) the cost function, 
that is, the output gap-inflation expectation equation. The output gap is 
defined as the difference between real and potential output. 
The output gap (yg ) is developed through the product market 
equation, which is a function of one-period lagged of the output gap 
and real interest rates. The output gap associates the relative demand 
and supply factors of economic movement and evaluates the extent 
of inflationary pressure in the economy, which connects inflation and 
the real economy. By employing the output gap, monetary bodies are 
presumed to perform in an organized way to overcome uncertainties in 
output around the natural rate, while, over a similar time period, being 
constrained by a trade-off between output and inflation. According to 
Walsh (2002), the central bank is required to stabilize the peripheral 
costs and assist in policy reforms. Output gap (yg ) is computed as: 
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 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 −  𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖   (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖)   𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
 
   𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                    (7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
, where
 (𝑣𝑣) (𝑚𝑚) (𝜏𝜏)  
 
       𝑣𝑣 =  𝛽𝛽0 𝛽𝛽1𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇1                                                                     (1) 
 
      𝑚𝑚 =  𝛽𝛽2 𝛽𝛽3𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇2                                                            (2) 
 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =   𝜆𝜆0 + 𝛿𝛿0 ln(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼) +  𝛾𝛾0𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜛𝜛0 ln(𝑤𝑤) +  𝜚𝜚0𝜋𝜋 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖        (3) 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑦𝑦) (𝑟𝑟) (𝜋𝜋)  (𝛿𝛿0) (𝛾𝛾0) (𝜛𝜛0) 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 (𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖)  
 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3ln (𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                +𝛽𝛽4𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖              
(𝜂𝜂) (𝑦𝑦) (𝑟𝑟)  
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =   𝜆𝜆1 + 𝛿𝛿1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾1(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜛𝜛1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
        + 𝜚𝜚1𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜁𝜁𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝜂𝜂) + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     
𝜂𝜂  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
              +𝛽𝛽3𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
              +𝛽𝛽5 ln(𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
              +𝛽𝛽6 ln(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
              +𝛽𝛽7𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) 
             + 𝛽𝛽8𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊ℎ𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) 
             + 𝛽𝛽9𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) 
             + 𝛽𝛽10𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼 ) + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑀𝑀 𝑊𝑊  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔) (𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔) 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝 𝑊𝑊 
 
 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 −  𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖  (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖)   𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
 
   𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                              (7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 is the GDP in real terms and 
 (𝑣𝑣) (𝑚𝑚) (𝜏𝜏)  
 
  𝑣𝑣 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇1                                                                  (1) 
 
𝑚𝑚 = 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇2                                                                     (2) 
 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =   𝜆𝜆0 + 𝛿𝛿 𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼)  𝛾𝛾0𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜛𝜛0 ln(𝑤𝑤) +  𝜚𝜚0𝜋𝜋 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖         (3) 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑦𝑦) 𝑟𝑟) (𝜋𝜋) (𝛿𝛿0) (𝛾𝛾0) (𝜛𝜛0) 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 (𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖)  
 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =  𝛽𝛽0 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3ln (𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
  +𝛽𝛽4𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                 
(𝜂𝜂) (𝑦𝑦) (𝑟𝑟)  
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =   𝜆𝜆1 + 𝛿𝛿1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾1(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜛𝜛1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
            + 𝜚𝜚1𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜁𝜁𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝜂𝜂) + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     
𝜂𝜂  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
               +𝛽𝛽3𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                +𝛽𝛽5 ln(𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
               +𝛽𝛽6 ln(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                +𝛽𝛽7𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) 
                + 𝛽𝛽8𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊ℎ𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) 
                + 𝛽𝛽9𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) 
               + 𝛽𝛽10𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑀𝑀   𝑊𝑊 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
(𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔) (𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔) 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝 𝑊𝑊 
 
 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 −  𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖   (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖)   𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
 
   𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                     (7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 is the potential output 
of the economy at time t. Potential output is defined as the level of GDP 
that is consistent with the full utilization of all factors of production and 
computed from the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) trend. 
340 Macroeconomic Stabilization in the Digital Age
Real interest rates are estimated as the variance between the 
interbank call rate and inflation expectations. It can be measured as 
 (𝑣𝑣) (𝑚𝑚) (𝜏𝜏)  
 
       𝑣𝑣 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇1                                                                                                            (1) 
 
       𝑚𝑚 =  𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇2                                                                                                         (2) 
 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =   𝜆𝜆0 + 𝛿𝛿0 ln(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼) +  𝛾𝛾0𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜛𝜛0 ln(𝑤𝑤) +  𝜚𝜚0𝜋𝜋 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖         (3) 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑦𝑦) (𝑟𝑟) (𝜋𝜋)  (𝛿𝛿0) (𝛾𝛾0) (𝜛𝜛0) 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 (𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖)  
 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3ln (𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                 +𝛽𝛽4𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                 
(𝜂𝜂) (𝑦𝑦) (𝑟𝑟)  
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =   𝜆𝜆1 + 𝛿𝛿1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾1(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜛𝜛1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
             + 𝜚𝜚1𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜁𝜁𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝜂𝜂) + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     
𝜂𝜂  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                +𝛽𝛽3𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                +𝛽𝛽5 ln(𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                +𝛽𝛽6 ln(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                +𝛽𝛽7𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) 
                + 𝛽𝛽8𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊ℎ𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) 
                + 𝛽𝛽9𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) 
                + 𝛽𝛽10𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑀𝑀   𝑊𝑊  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
(𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔) (𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔) 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝 𝑊𝑊 
 
 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 −  𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖   (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖)   𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
 
   𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                    (7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
, where rt is the real interest rate, which is obtained by 
deducting inflation from the nominal interest rate (Rt ). In light of the 
primary assumptions, the model implied the equilibrium of the product 
market, wherein the short-term interest rate clears the market. Hence, 
a change in interest rate affects the output gap and inflation, thereby 
impacting the cost of monetary policy. 
In a traditional macroeconomic model, the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy in the form of the interest rate is included in the IS 
framework. In the wake of the possibility of price stickiness, an increase 
in nominal interest rate inflates the cost of capital which restricts 
investment spending. The IS model is expressed by incorporating the 
real interest rate and output gap:
 
 (𝑣𝑣) (𝑚𝑚) (𝜏𝜏)  
 
       𝑣𝑣  𝛽𝛽0 𝛽𝛽1𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇1                                                                                                            (1) 
 
       𝑚𝑚 =  𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇2                                                                                                         (2) 
 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =   𝜆𝜆0 + 𝛿𝛿0 ln(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼) +  𝛾𝛾0𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜛𝜛0 ln(𝑤𝑤) +  𝜚𝜚0𝜋𝜋 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖         (3) 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑦𝑦) (𝑟𝑟) (𝜋𝜋)  (𝛿𝛿0) (𝛾𝛾0) (𝜛𝜛0) 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 (𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖)  
 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3ln (𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                 +𝛽𝛽4𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                 
(𝜂𝜂) (𝑦𝑦) (𝑟𝑟)  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =   𝜆𝜆1 + 𝛿𝛿1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾1(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜛𝜛1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
             + 𝜚𝜚1𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜁𝜁𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝜂𝜂) + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     
𝜂𝜂  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                +𝛽𝛽3𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                +𝛽𝛽5 ln(𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                +𝛽𝛽6 ln(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                +𝛽𝛽7𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) 
                + 𝛽𝛽8𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊ℎ𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) 
                + 𝛽𝛽9𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) 
                + 𝛽𝛽10𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀   𝑊𝑊  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔) (𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔) 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝 𝑊𝑊 
 
 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 −  𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖   (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖)   𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
 
   𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                    (7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (7)
where ygit is an output gap of country i at time t, and rit refers to the 
real interest rate of country i at time t. The effect of fintech on the 
transmission of monetary policy mechanism is measured by (a) mobile 
and/or internet banking and cryptocurrencies; and (b) the interaction of 
fintech with real interest rate. The model is expressed by incorporating 
the effect of fintech on the monetary policy credit channel of the 
transmission mechanism:
 
 𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
         + 𝛽𝛽4𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
         + 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽7𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) 
         + 𝛽𝛽8𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽9𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) 
         + 𝛽𝛽10𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽12𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
          ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽13𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖)  
         + 𝛽𝛽14𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽15𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) 
         + 𝛽𝛽16𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖) =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
                           +𝛽𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
 
 
𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 =  ∑𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1)                                                        (10) 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀 𝐼𝐼  𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  
 
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  
1
2 (𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1)  
  
𝑀𝑀 = 1, … . . , 𝑙𝑙  
 
 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
     𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
 (8)
where πit is the price level, Mobile Techit refers mobile subscribers, 
Internet Techit represents internet subscribers, and digital currencies 
include Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and Ripple. We interact fintech 
instruments with interest rates to determine their impact on the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. We expect a negative 
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relationship between fintech instruments and output gap as financial 
technology provides opportunities to make transactions through the 
online system as well as digital currencies which positively influence 
GDP, thereby reducing the output gap in an economy. 
The other contribution of the study is to examine the parameters 
that cause fintech activities. To test this proposition, we formulate the 
following model:
 𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
         + 𝛽𝛽4𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
         + 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽7𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) 
         + 𝛽𝛽8𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽9𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) 
         + 𝛽𝛽10𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽12𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
          ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽13𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖)  
         + 𝛽𝛽14𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽15𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) 
         + 𝛽𝛽16𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖
  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖) =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
                           +𝛽𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
 
 
𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 =  ∑𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1)                                                        (10) 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀 𝐼𝐼  𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  
 
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  
1
2 (𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1)  
  
𝑀𝑀 = 1, … . . , 𝑙𝑙  
 
 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
     𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
 (9)
where fintech activities are measured through mobile technology, 
internet technology, Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and Ripple. The 
possible factors that cause fintech instruments include GDP, real interest 
rates, price level, and stock market indices. FDIit refers to financial 
development index, which is a proxy of market openness of the financial 
sector and may influence digital currencies in the world. 
Barnett (1978, 1980) initially proposed the Divisia monetary 
aggregate, which is estimated as the rate of change of the weighted sum 
of the rates of change of the individual part of assets. The Divisia index 
of money demand is expressed as 
 
 𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
        + 𝛽𝛽4𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
        + 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽7𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) 
        + 𝛽𝛽8𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽9𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) 
         + 𝛽𝛽10𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽12𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
          ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽13𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖)  
         + 𝛽𝛽14𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽15𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) 
         + 𝛽𝛽16𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖) =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
                           +𝛽𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
 
 
𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 =  ∑𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1)                                                        (10) 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀 𝐼𝐼  𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  
 
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  
1
2 (𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1)  
  
𝑀𝑀 = 1, … . . , 𝑙𝑙  
 
 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
     𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
 (10)
where ln represents the natural algorithm of a variable, Dit denotes the 
Divisia measure of country i at time t, and Mdit is the money demand 
of country i at time period t. The composition of Divisia weights (nit) 
is measured as the money demand share average over the change in 
two-period 
 𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
         + 𝛽𝛽4𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
         + 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽7𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) 
         + 𝛽𝛽8𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽9𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) 
         + 𝛽𝛽10𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽12𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
          ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽13𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖)  
        + 𝛽𝛽14𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽15𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) 
         + 𝛽𝛽16𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
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where pit indicates the user cost of asset i at time t. 
12.4.2 Sample and Data
To examine the above linkages, this study considers 25 developed 
jurisdictions including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the People’s 
Republic of China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, and the US. For money demand and the output 
gap, this study utilizes quarterly data from 2001Q1 to 2018Q4 by splitting 
it into two subperiods, i.e., 2001–2009 (before fintech period) and 
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2010–2018 (after fintech period). The digital currencies are a new 
concept and availability of data varies with financial instruments. For 
Bitcoin, we utilize data from 2010Q1 to 2018Q4, for Litecoin from 2013Q3 
to 2018Q4, for Ethereum from 2015Q2 to 2018Q4 and for Ripple from 
2015Q1 to 2018Q4. The description of the variables and data sources 
used in this study are described in Table 12.1.
12.5 Results 
12.5.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 12.2 presents the summary statistics of the variables used for 
25  jurisdictions during the period from 2001Q1 to 2018Q4. The mean 
value of the natural logarithm of real GDP is 11.929, with a standard 
Table 12.1: Description of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Description Data source
GDPi Gross domestic product measured in real terms. DataStream
ygit It refers to the output gap, which is measured by 
taking the difference between real and potential 
GDP. Potential GDP is estimated using Hodrick-
Prescott filters.
Authors’ 
calculations
ri Real interest rate DataStream 
πi Inflation DataStream
M2 A proxy of money supply in the country DataStream
Mobile 
technology
Mobile telephone subscriptions that provide 
access to cellular technology. 
World Bank
Internet 
technology
Fixed broadband subscriptions that provide  
high-speed access to the internet. 
World Bank
Bitcoin A proxy of digital currency; Bitcoin is  
considered as the most popular form. 
Yahoo.finance
Litecoin A proxy of digital currency Yahoo.finance
Ethereum A proxy of digital currency Yahoo.finance
Ripple A proxy of digital currency Yahoo.finance
Wealth A proxy of the stock market index of a country. DataStream
Financial 
development 
index
A proxy of a country’s financial openness whose 
value ranges between 1 and 0. Index close to 
1 shows a higher value of openness. 
IMF
Source: Authors.
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deviation of 2.010. The output gap is measured by taking the difference 
between real and potential output and its median value is –2.418 with 
maximum and minimum values ranges between 11.949 and –12.315, 
respectively. On average, the real interest rate of the sample is 1.33%, 
with a standard deviation of 2.21%. The maximum and minimum values 
comprise 9.50% and –0.50% respectively. The mean value of inflation is 
1.83%, with a median value of 1.81%. On average, the mean value of the 
logarithm of money supply (M2) is 12.552, with a standard deviation of 
2.446. Wealth is a proxy of the stock market index of a respective country 
and the mean value of the logarithm of stock market indices is 12.552. The 
difference between maximum value (10.732) and minimum value (3.882) 
of ln(Wealth) shows the dispersion among sample countries. Mobile and 
internet subscribers and digital currencies are used as proxies of fintech. 
The mean value of mobile and internet technology subscribers is 16.809 
and 15.467 respectively. 
To observe the impact of digital currencies, this study uses the 
recognition of cryptocurrencies by a particular country as a dummy 
Table 12.2: Summary Statistics
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
ln(GDP) 11.929 12.298 15.257 4.368 2.010
yg –0.319 –2.418 11.949 –12.315 2.279
Real interest rate 1.331 0.750 9.500 –0.500 2.212
π 1.834 1.814 12.694 4.478 1.624
ln(M2) 12.552 13.130 17.598 4.905 2.446
ln(Wealth) 7.777 7.752 10.732 3.882 1.328
ln(Mobile technology) 16.809 16.541 21.128 12.740 1.719
ln(Internet 
technology)
15.467 15.177 19.792 11.601 1.663
ln(Bitcoin) 23.255 25.148 34.595 4.892 7.472
ln(Ethereum) 22.336 24.655 30.148 10.351 6.828
ln(Litecoin) 19.586 18.525 28.838 3.178 5.697
ln(Ripple) 11.300 11.259 23.654 2.370 8.906
Financial 
Development Index
0.721 0.736 1.000 0.376 0.132
GDP = gross domestic product.
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of the variables for 25 developed economies during the 
period from 2001Q1 and 2018Q4. However, the data relating to digital currencies varies. 
Source: Authors.
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variable. The mean value is 0.857, which shows that 24 countries have 
recognized the activities of digital currencies except for the People’s 
Republic of China. Financial development index refers to the openness 
of financial markets and its mean value is 0.721 with a standard deviation 
of 0.132.
12.5.2 Panel Unit Root Test 
We use the Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) method to test the stationarity 
of panel data. Table 12.3 exhibits the results of the panel unit root test 
and finds mixed results. Some variables are stationary at level and 
others at the first difference. To circumvent this problem, this study 
employs GMM.
GMM is considered superior to the alternatives in handling many 
econometric problems including endogeneity, heteroscedasticity, serial 
correlation, and identification. This technique uses a weighting matrix 
to account for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity of unknown 
form and for nonlinearities (see Hansen 1982; Newey and West 1987; 
Table 12.3: Panel Unit Root Test
Statistics Order of integration
ln(GDP) –17.102*** One
yg –4.557*** Zero
Real interest rate –4.203*** Zero
π –1.307* Zero
ln(M2) –8.039*** One
ln(Wealth) –9.815*** One
ln(Mobile technology) –4.315*** One
ln(Internet technology) –5.306*** Zero
ln(Bitcoin) –15.822*** Zero
ln(Ethereum) –11.116*** Zero
ln(Litecoin) –5.919*** One
ln(Ripple) –3.263*** Zero
Financial Development 
Index
–12.292*** One
GDP = gross domestic product.
Note: This table shows the result of the Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) panel unit root test. 
Source: Authors.
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White 1984). This technique requires moment conditions. A set of 
population moment conditions is specified on the regression errors. 
These set the expected value of the errors and the expected values of the 
products of errors with exogenous instrumental variables equal to zero. 
These population moments are then replaced by the sample moments 
to derive the parameter estimates. Identification in GMM requires that 
there should be at least as many instruments (including the intercept) 
and, hence, the moment conditions in each equation as the number 
of parameters to be estimated. An equation may be under-identified, 
exactly identified, or over-identified depending on whether the number 
of instruments and, thus, moment conditions in that particular equation 
are respectively less than, equal to, or greater than the number of 
parameters to be estimated. 
12.5.3  Stability of Income Velocity  
and the Money Multiplier 
To examine the stability of income velocity and the money multiplier, 
first we estimate the Hodrick-Prescott trend. This study considers the 
sample period between 2001Q1 and 2018Q4. The concept of digital 
currencies was initiated in 2010; thus, it is imperative to analyze the 
movements of income velocity and the money multiplier before and after 
fintech periods using the feasible generalized least square estimator 
(Table 12.4). We divide our sample into two subperiods: (i) 2001Q1 to 
2009Q4 (pre-fintech), and (ii) 2010Q1 to 2018Q4 (post-fintech). 
The velocity of money is the rate at which it is exchanged in an 
economy. It gauges the robustness of an economy by measuring the rate 
at which money in circulation is used for purchasing goods and services. 
We measure the velocity of money through the nominal GDP scaled by 
the average amount of money in circulation. During the period from 
2001Q1 to 2018Q4 (Model I), the results show that an increase in trend 
of income velocity by 1% increases the velocity of money by 1.003%. 
Separating the two periods, we find the same trend in income velocity 
of money (i.e., 1.002%) prior to the fintech period. After the initiation 
of fintech activities, we report that income velocity of money surged to 
1.026% in each quarter from 2010Q1 to 2018Q4. This shows that money 
in circulation has not affected the money by the fintech activities. 
The money multiplier is also referred to as monetary multiplier, 
which measures central bank economic stimulus. If the government’s 
goal is to stimulate the economy, they look to the multiplier to help 
decide how much should be applied and in what way. For example, the 
US government wants to increase the money supply and make it easier 
for businesses to access capital and vice versa. The finding suggests that 
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an increase in trend by 1% enhances the money multiplier by 0.99% 
during the entire sample period. Prior to the fintech period, we find the 
same results as of the entire sample. 
12.5.4 Monetary Policy and Money Demand  
This section examines the factors that affect money demand using 25 
jurisdictions, as well as segregating the sample into pre- and post-era 
of fintech activities. The purpose of splitting the sample is to analyze 
the factors that cause money demand before and after the initiation of 
financial technology. To examine the determinants, we estimate three 
equations using the GMM technique (Table 12.5). The results of Model 
I suggest that, as output increases, the money demand in the country 
increases. The coefficient of real interest rate is negative and significantly 
influences the money demand, which suggests that, as interest rates fall, 
this activity generates business opportunities for which investors borrow 
funds from financial institutions, thereby increasing money demand. 
The coefficient of inflation is inversely related to money demand but has 
an insignificant effect. ln(Wealth) is used as a proxy of the stock market 
indices. In line with the hypothesis on the substitution effect of near 
money, it has a positive substitution effect on money demand, indicating 
that, in a given investment portfolio, a rise in the stock prices shifts 
investors’ preferences towards equity investment. This positive activity 
in the stock market increases the money demand in the country.
Table 12.4: Income Velocity of Money and Money Multiplier
Income velocity Money multiplier
I II III I II III
Constant –0.004
(–0.64)
–0.001
(–0.17)
–0.030*
(–1.93)
0.079
(0.91)
0.202
(1.41)
–0.121
(–0.48)
Trend 1.003***
(179.21)
1.002***
(302.13)
1.026***
(72.00)
0.997***
(315.08)
0.993***
(151.57)
1.004***
(109.46)
Wald χ2 576.02*** 598.12*** 465.76*** 701.31*** 521.83*** 387.24***
No. of 
observations
1800 900 900 1800 900 900
Sample period 2001–18 2001–09 2010–18 2001–18 2001–09 2010–18
Notes: This table presents the results of growth of income velocity and money multiplier of 25 countries 
across different time periods. ***, and * show significance at 1%, and 10% level respectively.
Source: Authors.
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Model II presents the empirical results prior to fintech activities and 
reports that an increase in output of the country generates an increase 
in money demand, which shows a good omen for the market. With 
regard to monetary policy, the results report that the significance level 
is deteriorated to 10%, though it negatively influences money demand. 
The coefficient of inflation is negative, which demonstrates that a higher 
price level may inflate the cost of doing business, thereby restricting the 
demand for money in the country. The stock market indices demonstrate 
a positive relationship with money demand. 
Model III estimates the results of post-fintech activities and 
postulates that an increase in output and stock market indices results 
in increased money demand. With the introduction of fintech, the 
possibilities for investing in the stock market have increased. The 
results illustrate that if the stock market index increases by 1%, the 
money demand increases by 0.36% in each quarter. The real interest 
rate is used as a proxy for monetary policy and we find an inverse 
relationship between interest rates and money demand. This implies 
that people choose to use cash alternatives to obtain better returns. 
Table 12.5: Empirical Results: Monetary Policy and Money Demand
I II III
ln(GDP) 0.118***
(16.79) 
0.317**
(2.35)
0.522***
(12.61)
Real interest rate –0.099***
(–4.36)
–0.123*
(1.72)
–0.135***
(–8.85)
Inflation –0.161
(–0.81)
–0.534**
(–2.45)
–0.518***
(–6.15)
ln(Wealth) 0.150***
(13.08)
0.318**
(2.48)
0.357***
(4.41)
Sargan (p-value)a 0.41 0.11 0.18
AB 2 (p-value)b 0.53 0.59 0.40
F-test 83.92*** 3.02** 45.48***
Observations 1800 900 900
Sample period 2001Q1–2018Q4 2001Q1–2009Q4 2010Q1–2018Q4
Notes: This table exhibits the results of the effect of monetary policy on the money demand using the 
GMM technique. The dependent variable is the Divisia index of money demanded. We use three models to 
estimate the results. ***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
a Sargan test of over-identification. 
b Arellano-Bond test that second-order autocorrelation in residuals is zero.
Source: Authors.
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Inflation also had a significantly negative impact on money demand 
in our analysis. To summarize, we identify that economic output has 
increased in the post-fintech period due to increased money demand, 
which is also positively related to stock market activities. However, 
real interest rates and inflation are negatively associated with money 
demand.
12.5.5 Fintech, Monetary Policy and Money Demand  
To investigate the impact of fintech on money demand, we estimate 
three models and Table 12.6 reports the empirical findings. In Model I, 
we estimate the determinants of money demand by considering mobile 
and internet technologies during the period lasting from 2010Q1 to 
2018Q4. The results indicate that the output of the economy positively 
and significantly influences money demand. Inflation is another 
significant factor that negatively affects money demand. The monetary 
policy rate inversely affects the money demand, which shows that 
firms borrow funds at a lower interest rate and expand their business 
activities, thereby increasing the money demand in the country. Mobile 
technology and its use could be an indicator of prosperity in a given 
country, which would likely increase wealth and the money demand. 
We find a direct association between internet technology and money 
demand, which suggests that the internet provides an opportunity for 
business transactions using online networks, which inflates the demand 
for money in a country.
In Model II, we incorporate digital currencies to determine their 
impact on money demand and identify that GDP, real interest rates, 
and inflation are robust predictors of money demand. Among digital 
currencies, Bitcoin is the only determinant that inversely and significantly 
influences money demand. This evidence shows that people are using 
Bitcoin as a mode of conducting their business transactions, which 
restricts the possibilities of transacting in cash and eventually reduces 
the money demand in the economy. This finding holds true, as Bitcoin 
is being used as the major facilitator of business activities. However, we 
did not find any evidence of other digital currencies affecting money 
demand. 
In Model III, all the fintech instruments are added to find their impact 
on money demand. We report that mobile and internet technologies are 
significantly influencing money demand, which illustrates that access 
creates opportunities for businesses to transact with consumers. Bitcoin 
is the sole predictor among digital currencies that enable business 
activities using blockchain, thus reducing the money demand. 
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Table 12.6: Empirical Results:  
Fintech, Monetary Policy, and Money Demand
I II III
ln(GDP) 0.218***
(1.95) 
0.481***
(10.18)
0.605***
(10.94)
Real interest rate –0.143*
(–1.84)
–0.272**
(–2.56)
–0.426***
(–3.46)
Inflation –0.255***
(–3.93)
–0.544***
(–5.08)
–0.568***
(–5.74)
ln(Wealth) 0.462***
(5.12)
0.159
(1.55)
0.200*
(1.68)
ln(Mobile Techt) 0.261**
(2.02)
0.525***
(4.70)
ln(Internet Techt) 0.425***
(2.03)
0.619***
(4.19)
ln(Bitcoint) –0.286***
(–2.96)
–0.227**
(–2.22)
ln(Ethereumt) –0.024
(–1.38)
–0.029
(–1.42)
ln(Litcoint) –0.005
(–1.02)
 –0.008
(–1.23)
ln(Ripplet) –0.007
(–0.15)
 –0.019
(–0.47)
Sargan (p-value)a 0.31 0.39 0.50
AB 2 (p-value)b 0.78 0.93 0.92
F-test 43.92*** 25.88*** 22.17***
Observations 900 600 600
Sample period 2001Q1-2018Q4 2001Q1-2009Q4 2010Q1-2018Q4
Notes: This table exhibits the results of the effect of monetary policy on the output gap using the GMM 
technique. The dependent variable is the Divisia of money demanded. ***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. 
a Sargan test of over-identification. 
b Arellano-Bond test that second-order autocorrelation in residuals is zero.
Source: Authors.
12.5.6 Monetary Policy and the Output Gap
To examine the effect of monetary policy on the output gap, we 
estimate three models using the GMM technique. Table 12.7 presents 
the finding of monetary policy on the output gap. Model I covers the 
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period lasting from 2001Q1 to 2018Q4. The output gap measures how far 
the economy is from its full employment or potential level. It is a noisy 
signal of economic activity as it is based on the potential output, which 
is unobservable and depends on estimates of GDP. The result shows 
that the lagged output gap positively and significantly affects the output 
gap (ygt). We also report that the coefficient associated with the real 
interest rate negatively and significantly influences the output gap. This 
shows that a decrease in real interest rate reduces the cost of borrowing, 
thereby increasing the output of the economy.  
We divide our sample into pre- and post-fintech emergence periods 
to examine the effect of monetary policy on the output gap. Model II 
shows that the real interest rate inversely influences the output gap 
and Model III shows that the real interest rate has no effect on the 
output gap. This illustrates that there is excess liquidity throughout the 
financial system and traditional monetary policy tools may no longer be 
useful tools to conduct monetary policy interventions.  
12.5.7 Fintech, Monetary Policy, and the Output Gap
This section investigates the impact of fintech instruments on the 
output gap and their interaction with interest rates through estimating 
five equations using GMM (Table 12.8). In Model I, we consider mobile 
Table 12.7: Empirical Results: Monetary Policy and the Output Gap
I II III
ygt-1 0.991***
(616.74) 
1.010***
(404.86)
1.022***
(97.93)
Real interest rate –0.386***
(–7.74)
–0.531***
(–16.01)
–0.077
(–1.54)
Sargan (p-value)a 0.43 0.33 0.16
AB 2 (p-value)b 0.67 0.34 0.18
F-test 901.71*** 919.18*** 546.98***
Observations 1800 900 900
Sample period 2001Q1–2018Q4 2001Q1–2009Q4 2010Q1–2018Q4
Notes: This table exhibits the results of the effect of monetary policy on the output gap using the system 
GMM technique. The dependent variable is the output gap (ygt). ygt-1 represents the lagged output gap. ***, 
** and * show significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
a Sargan test of over-identification. 
b Arellano-Bond test that second-order autocorrelation in residuals is zero.
Source: Authors.
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Table 12.8: Empirical Results:  
Fintech, Monetary Policy, and the Output Gap
I II III IV V
ygt-1 1.011***
(560.96)
0.919***
(204.94)
1.011***
(468.73)
0.918***
 (190.37)
0.914***
(106.01)
Real interest rate –0.452***
(–7.89)
–0.525***
(–4.19)
–0.128***
(–6.15)
–0.073
(–1.05)
–0.177***
(–2.98)
ln(Mobile Techt) –0.187***
(–8.23)
–0.374***
(–11.06)
–0.335***
(–3.59)
ln(Internet Techt) –0.304***
(–7.84)
–0.624***
(–10.82)
–0.005***
(–3.50)
ln(Bitcoint) 0.304**
(2.58)
0.423**
(2.10)
0.608**
(2.50)
ln(Ethereumt) 0.226***
(4.34)
0.403***
(3.85)
0.253*
(1.89)
ln(Litecoint) 0.043
(0.67)
–0.114
(–0.96)
–0.182
(–1.26)
ln(Ripplet) –0.064
(–1.50)
–0.122
(–1.57)
–0.190**
(–2.02)
rt * ln(Mobile Techt) –0.048***
(–7.01)
–0.058**
(–2.59)
rt * ln(Internet Techt) –0.075***
(–6.48)
–0.097***
(–2.81)
rt * ln(Bitcoint) –0.042
(–0.60)
–0.045
(–0.54)
rt * ln(Ethereumt) –0.075*
(–1.92)
–0.172***
(–3.48)
rt * ln(Litcoint) –0.043*
(–1.93)
0.045
(0.85)
rt * ln(Ripplet) –0.000
(0.22)
–0.097***
(–2.81)
Sargan (p-value)a 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.29 0.68
AB 2 (p-value)b 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.28 0.30
F-test 616.45*** 523.98*** 673.92*** 489.56*** 632.89***
Observations 900 550 900 550 550
Notes: This table presents the empirical findings of fintech and monetary policy using the generalized 
method of moments covering 25 developed economies during the period lasting from 2010Q1 to 2018Q4. 
t-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
a Sargan test of over-identification. 
b Arellano-Bond test that second-order autocorrelation in residuals is zero.
Source: Authors.
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and internet technologies as proxies of fintech. The effect of internet 
technology on the output gap is indicative of an increase in aggregate 
demand, which increases the country’s production capacity. On the 
other hand, mobile technology negatively influences the output gap, 
which illustrates that the output increases as people are able to make 
transactions using it. However, both of these variables have a significant 
effect on economic output.
We include Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and Ripple to inquire about 
their impact on output as well as interaction with interest rates. Model 
II suggests that the economy is affected positively by Bitcoin, which 
increases the difference between actual and potential output. The 
coefficient of Ethereum is positive and significantly affects the output 
gap of the economy. However, other digital currencies are insignificantly 
contributing to the output of the countries in this study.
The other objective of the study is to determine the effect of fintech 
instruments along with the real interest rate. In Model III, we interact 
both mobile and internet technologies with real interest rates and 
find that they decrease the output gap, showing the importance of the 
interest rates. There is a surge in the volume of mobile-based banking 
transactions, including borrowing funds, which ultimately affects 
monetary policy. We also report a negative effect associated with both 
interest rates and internet technology on the output gap that illustrates 
that this mode of fintech provides an opportunity for firms to obtain 
bank funds and increase their production facilities, which lowers the 
output gap of the economy.
In Model IV, we employ other fintech instruments to find their 
impact on the real interest rates, showing that only Ethereum and 
Litecoin affect the output gap. The final model interacts all fintech 
instruments with interest rates, reporting that Bitcoin, Ethereum, and 
Ripple are significantly affecting the output gap but their directions are 
different. These digital currencies may influence the financial system 
once they are used for business transactions; however, alternatively 
they are affecting the output of the economy. In terms of the interaction 
of interest rates, Ethereum and Ripple may influence the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy as well as the output gap. An attempt to 
explain these results is as follows: Ripple helps businesses to convert 
currencies when engaging in global trade; so, Ripple may reduce the 
output gap by creating efficient ways for businesses to accept and 
convert global payments and Bitcoin and Ethereum may be used more 
as alternatives to money in countries that have questionable governance 
regimes.
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12.5.8 Determinants of Fintech Activities
Considering the importance and development of financial technology 
over the past few years, we determine the factors that cause innovation 
and development of fintech. In this context, we use GDP, real interest 
rate, inflation, financial development index, and wealth as the predictors 
that may affect financial technology. Table 12.9 presents the results of 
the empirical findings. 
Model I shows that the coefficient of GDP is positive and 
significantly influences the mobile technology variable. This illustrates 
that mobile technology is utilized for business transactions, which may 
increase production activities in the country. However, the coefficient 
of other variables is insignificant. In Model II, we identify the factors 
that influence internet technology and report that GDP and inflation 
Table 12.9: Determinants of Fintech Activities
I
(Mobile 
Tech)
II
(Internet 
Tech)
III
(Bitcoin)
IV
(Ethereum)
V
(Litecoin)
VI
(Ripple)
lnGDP 0.701***
(4.50)
0.037***
(4.09)
0.599***
(5.59)
0.686***
(5.74)
0.180*
(1.98)
0.326***
(3.25)
Real interest rate 0.003
(0.80)
0.000
(1.01)
–0.454*
(–2.01)
–0.587*
(–1.78)
–0.511**
(–2.39)
–0.528**
(–2.33)
Inflation –0.004
(–1.01)
–0.000
(–0.49)
–0.496*
(–1.92)
0.991***
(3.59)
0.978**
(2.25)
0.145***
(3.75)
FDI 0.229
(0.73)
0.037*
(1.83)
0.274
(0.17)
0.367**
(2.80)
0.100
(0.53)
0.618
(0.34)
ln(Wealth) 0.011
(0.61)
0.387
(0.33)
0.432***
(7.31)
0.179
(1.59)
0.149***
(7.87)
0.117***
(6.72)
Sargan (p-value)a 0.16 0.17 0.38 0.41 0.36      0.20
AB 2 (p-value)b 0.78 0.23 0.61 0.30 0.28 0.32
F-test 4.51*** 5.23*** 50.59*** 68.17*** 99.33*** 125.67***
Observations 900 900 900 400 550 550
Notes: This table presents the factors that cause fintech instruments considering 25 jurisdictions during the 
period from 2010Q1 to 2018Q4. The t-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. 
a Sargan test of over-identification. 
b Arellano-Bond test that second-order autocorrelation in residuals is zero.
Source: Authors.
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are robust predictors. Presently, it is a general practice that businesses 
are interconnected, thereby increasing GDP. We further identify that 
higher-level reforms relating to regulations of financial development 
facilitate businesses flourishing using internet technology. 
We also classify four digital currencies to examine their 
determinants (Model III to VI). In Model III, Bitcoin is employed as 
an important mode of fintech and the results reflect that it increases 
production activities. In the event of lower real interest rates and 
inflation, the volume of trade in Bitcoins is higher. To emphasize the 
substitution effect of money, firms make transactions, which increase 
the use of Bitcoin. An increase in Bitcoin trading volume provides an 
opportunity for the investors to get funds and invest in firms listed on 
the stock market to get abnormal returns. The other digital currencies 
like Ethereum, Litecoin, and Ripple indicate the same determinants as 
Bitcoin except inflation. In summary: (i) stronger financial development 
regulations promote digital currencies to trade in a rigorous manner; 
(ii) fintech instruments generate competition and promote stock 
market development; and (iii) the trading possibilities of fintech create 
opportunities to increase the output of the country.
12.6. Conclusion
With the innovation associated with financial technology around the 
world, the dynamics of the financial system have drastically changed. 
Firms use different modes of fintech to facilitate business transactions, 
which may influence income velocity, money demand, and output 
gap for different countries. Fintech is a novel concept that may also 
influence the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. To address 
these concerns, this study empirically investigates the role of fintech in 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
First, we report that there is no effect in income velocity and the 
money multiplier after the initiation of fintech activities. We also 
evaluate the money demand function and identify that GDP, real interest 
rates, inflation, and stock market indices are significant factors that 
affect money demand. By incorporating the fintech instruments into the 
money demand function, we identify that mobile technology, internet 
technology, and Bitcoin are influencing the money demand, while the 
other digital currencies have no effect.
We also examine the relationship between monetary policy and 
output gap and identify that, in the post-fintech era, the former may 
have an insignificant effect on the latter. In addition, we included fintech 
instruments as well as their interaction with the real interest rates to 
explore their relationship with the output gap. This study determines 
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that Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Ripple are significant determinates of the 
output gap, whereas the transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
may influence mobile and internet technology, Ethereum, and Ripple. 
Lastly, we examine the factors affecting fintech instruments and find 
that GDP, the real interest rate, inflation, the financial development 
index, and stock market indices are the robust factors that influence 
fintech instruments.
This study is useful for policy makers and should aid them in 
constructing a regulatory framework for digital currencies which may 
be implemented in true spirit and with consideration of the income 
velocity, money demand, and monetary policy. As these financial 
innovations become more commonplace and the historical data 
associated with them increase, researchers will be able to formulate a 
clearer picture of the relationship between monetary policy and fintech 
activities, specifically focusing on the transition mechanism.
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Foreign-Currency Exposures 
and the Financial Channel 
of Exchange Rates: Eroding 
Monetary Policy Autonomy in 
the Asia and Pacific Region?
Georgios Georgiadis and Feng Zhu
13.1 Introduction
A cornerstone of international macroeconomics is the notion that 
exchange rate flexibility confers monetary policy autonomy. The 
underlying rationale is that because in a flexible exchange rate regime 
the future exchange rate may change, deviations of a small open 
economy’s (SOE) interest rate from that in the rest of the world do 
not represent arbitrage opportunities and can hence persist. A large 
empirical literature has documented that the data have been consistent 
with this prediction since the 1970s and even over much longer, 
historical time periods (see, for example, Shambaugh 2004; Obstfeld, 
Shambaugh, and Taylor 2005; Klein and Shambaugh 2015). However, 
much has happened relative to the time periods studied in most of 
this literature. For one thing, financial globalization has taken off. For 
example, developed economies have accumulated large international 
investment positions, almost quadrupling the ratio of gross foreign 
assets and liabilities to gross domestic product (GDP). Emerging 
market economies (EMEs) have accumulated smaller international 
investment positions, but, in contrast to developed economies, exhibit 
large foreign-currency exposures. Particularly in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis when interest rates in developed economies 
reached historic lows, EMEs issued large amounts of foreign-
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Figure 13.1: Evolution of US Dollar and Euro Nonresident Credit
US = United States.
Note: The figure displays the evolution of US dollar and euro credit (bank loans and debt securities) 
of nonresidents and nonbank entities. The data are taken from the Bank for International Settlements 
Global Liquidity Indicators (BIS 2019).
Source: Authors.
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currency-denominated debt (Aldasoro and Ehlers 2018; BIS 2019). 
Figure 13.1 plots the evolution of total cross-border credit—including 
corporate bonds and bank loans—denominated in United States (US) 
dollars and euros to nonfinancial corporations. Clearly, both have risen 
substantially, even since the global financial crisis. In this study, we 
explore whether foreign-currency exposures that were accumulated 
since financial globalization took off have implied trade-offs between 
financial stability and macroeconomic stabilization and eventually 
eroded monetary policy autonomy as reflected in the “fear of floating” 
in SOEs in the Asia and Pacific region.1
It is widely known that foreign-currency exposures come with 
risks, as was vividly illustrated by a series of EME crises in the 1990s; 
hence the term “original sin” (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999). 
For example, Durdu, Martin, and Zer (2019) document that US 
monetary policy tightening has continuously raised the probability 
of banking and currency crises in the rest of the world since 1870, 
1 Georgiadis and Zhu (2019) consider a broader country sample.
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especially when economies exhibited foreign-currency exposures. In 
particular, when an SOE’s exchange rate depreciates—for example in 
response to a US monetary policy tightening—then foreign-currency 
liabilities become more difficult to service and to roll over, which 
might eventually put financial stability at risk (Bruno and Shin 2015). 
Against this background, SOE monetary policy may try to reduce 
exchange rate variation in a floating regime by mimicking base-country 
monetary policy; it may do so both in order to avoid foreign-currency 
exposures building up in the first place when the local currency has 
appreciated, and later in order to preserve financial stability when the 
local currency faces depreciation pressures after the accumulation 
of foreign-currency exposures. As a result, in this case, monetary 
policy would not only be geared toward stabilizing the business cycle, 
but also towards dampening the financial cycle. As these cycles are 
in general not synchronized and the transmission lags of monetary 
policy are different, foreign-currency exposures imply a trade-off. 
In other words, despite—and, in fact, precisely because of—a flexible 
exchange rate, monetary policy autonomy in the sense of being able to 
focus exclusively on macroeconomic stabilization would be reduced 
due to a trade-off with financial stability implied by foreign-currency 
exposures.2 Whether it is optimal for SOE monetary policy to reduce 
exchange rate variation in order to dampen the financial cycle rather 
than focus exclusively on macroeconomic stabilization depends on the 
strength of this “financial channel of exchange rates,” and is thus an 
empirical question (Gourinchas 2018). But at least some policy makers 
claim that such a financial channel of exchange rates operating on 
foreign-currency exposures is large in their economies (Basci, Ozel, 
and Sarikaya 2008; Gudmundsson 2017; Vegh et al. 2018).3
Early work discussing how SOE monetary policy may be reluctant 
to let the exchange rate float freely due to foreign-currency exposures 
goes back to Calvo and Reinhart (2002). More recently, a growing 
2 Foreign-currency exposures may also imply a trade-off between output and inflation 
stabilization. In particular, as an SOE’s exchange rate depreciates, the tightening in 
local financial conditions resulting from foreign-currency liabilities becoming more 
difficult to both service and roll over may depress output growth, while inflation may 
still be rising due to increasing local-currency import prices. The latter is particularly 
pronounced in the case of dominant-currency pricing, i.e., global import prices, even 
for trade not involving the US being invoiced in US dollars (Gopinath et al. 2020; 
Georgiadis and Schumann 2019).
3 Notice the subtle point also mentioned by Gourinchas (2019) that, for policy makers 
to decide to reduce exchange rate variation, it is sufficient that they believe such 
behavior to be optimal, regardless of whether this is true given the structure of the 
economy.
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body of work has explored optimal monetary policy in the presence of 
foreign-currency exposures in state-of-the-art New Keynesian general 
equilibrium models. Specifically, Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2018) 
study an SOE with currency mismatches on banks’ balance sheets. 
In the model, movements in the exchange rate triggered by shocks to 
foreign interest rates amplify spillovers to the SOE by worsening the 
balance sheets of banks, creating a trade-off between macroeconomic 
stabilization and financial stability. Davis and Presno (2017) consider 
an SOE model with collateral constraints in which variation in capital 
inflows triggered by shocks to foreign interest rates jeopardize financial 
stability. In the model, optimal monetary policy in a floating exchange 
rate regime manages the SOE’s external accounts by mimicking foreign 
monetary policy. Akinci and Queralto (2019) consider a two-country 
model in which spillovers from a US monetary policy tightening to 
EMEs are amplified due to currency mismatches. In contrast to Davis 
and Presno (2017), however, in the model of Akinci and Queralto (2019), 
it is not optimal for EME monetary policy to stabilize the exchange 
rate by mimicking US monetary policy. Mimir and Sunel (2019) explore 
the welfare implications of a variety of monetary policy rules in a rich 
medium-scale SOE model with currency mismatches on banks’ balance 
sheets. While they find that the optimal policy is not unique and depends 
on the particular model specification and the shocks hitting the SOE, 
reducing exchange rate variation by responding to US interest rates is 
generally welfare improving relative to standard Taylor rules.4
While the amount of theoretical work on the subject is large and 
growing, empirical evidence on how important foreign-currency 
exposures are in shaping trade-offs and fear of floating faced by SOE 
monetary policy in the data is limited. For example, little systematic 
empirical evidence exists on whether SOEs systematically pursue 
policies such as those prescribed by Davis and Presno (2017), that is, on 
whether SOE monetary policy mimics base-country monetary policy 
in order to reduce exchange rate variation in the presence of foreign-
currency exposures. Of course, it is widely known that foreign exchange 
interventions are being used in order to reduce excessive exchange rate 
volatility. But much less evidence exists on the recourse to conventional 
monetary policy instruments in this context. Indeed, Carstens (2019) 
4 Earlier work finding that reducing exchange rate variation may be optimal in the 
presence of foreign-currency exposures includes Cook (2004), Choi and Cook 
(2004), Elekdag and Tchakarov (2007), Rappoport (2009), and Kolasa and Lombardo 
(2014). In contrast, Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004), Devereux, Lane, and Xu 
(2006), and Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007), as well as Faia (2010) find that it 
is optimal to let the exchange rate float freely.
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forcefully discusses the importance of improving our understanding of 
monetary policy challenges in SOEs in the context of a highly financially 
integrated world from a policy maker’s perspective. 
In this study, we first document evidence that supports the 
hypothesis that SOE monetary policy exhibits fear of floating in the 
presence of foreign-currency exposures in a dataset for 10 SOEs in 
the Asia and Pacific region.5 In particular, we find that, even after 
controlling for real-time forecasts of macroeconomic fundamentals, as 
well as global variables, SOE monetary policy still responds to changes 
in base-country policy rates. Moreover, in line with the optimal policy 
prescriptions in Davis and Presno (2017), we find that the sensitivity 
of SOEs to base-country monetary policy is stronger the larger the 
SOE’s foreign-currency net short position; that is, the more foreign-
currency-denominated foreign liabilities exceed foreign-currency-
denominated foreign assets. We also find that the sensitivity of SOEs 
to base-country monetary policy is particularly large when the foreign-
currency exposures stem from portfolio debt instruments or bank loans 
rather than from more resilient foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
portfolio equity instruments with state-contingent payoffs and longer 
investment horizons; this finding is consistent with existing literature 
that documents that portfolio debt and other investment items are 
more fickle and more sensitive to swings in investor sentiment than 
portfolio equity and FDI. Finally, we find that the sensitivity of SOEs 
to base-country monetary policy is larger when the latter is tightened 
rather than loosened, suggesting that SOE monetary policy addresses 
immediate threats to financial stability in the face of depreciation 
pressures rather than pre-emptively mitigating the build-up of foreign-
currency exposures when the currency is appreciating.
We obtain these findings by estimating fixed effects dynamic panel 
data regressions of monetary policy reaction functions for 10 SOEs in the 
Asia and Pacific region with floating regimes for the time period from 
January 2002 to December 2012. The reaction function arguments we 
consider include real-time forecasts of real GDP growth and consumer 
price inflation, the implied volatility index, commodity prices, and 
the base-country policy rate. The inclusion of real-time forecasts and 
global variables accounts for the correlation between SOE and base-
country policy rates that is due to common shocks and spillovers 
through conventional macroeconomic and financial channels. Hence, 
the coefficient estimate on the base-country policy rate indicates the 
5 In Georgiadis and Zhu (2019), we explore a broader country sample and find very 
similar results.
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extent to which an SOE mimics base-country monetary policy over and 
above what we would expect to observe if macroeconomic stabilization 
was the only policy objective; in other words, we interpret a positive 
coefficient estimate on the base-country policy rate as empirical 
evidence of fear of floating. In order to explore the role of the financial 
channel of exchange rates in shaping this fear of floating, we additionally 
include interaction terms between the base-country policy rate and 
various variables reflecting the SOE’s foreign-currency exposure in 
the regression. While doing so, we control for alternative reasons why 
SOE monetary policy may want to reduce exchange rate variation, in 
particular high exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices and a 
low stock of foreign exchange reserves. 
13.2 Empirical Framework
13.2.1 Estimated Monetary Policy Reaction Functions
We estimate the dynamic panel data regression
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is the monetary policy rate of SOE 
i’s base-country bi. We include the vector of global variables zt in order 
to reduce the risk that the estimate for α is driven by common shocks, 
although the latter should already be captured by the real-time forecasts 
of local macroeconomic fundamentals. 
In order to test whether fear of floating is shaped at least in part by 
financial stability considerations related to exchange rate variation and 
foreign-currency exposures, we further estimate the regression
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(2)
where ξit represents a measure of the SOE’s foreign-currency exposure.
We omit time-fixed effects in the baseline specification because 
these would be highly correlated with the base-country policy rate, 
particularly given that we only consider two base countries—the US 
and the euro area (see below)—and that the correlation between their 
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policy rates during our sample period was very high.6 Moreover, notice 
that even if the coefficient estimate on the level of the base-country 
policy rate might be contaminated by common shocks, akin to a Bartik 
instrumental variable, the coefficient estimate on the interactions with 
SOE variables continue to be determined by variation in SOE monetary 
policy’s reluctance to let the exchange rate float freely across different 
degrees of foreign-currency exposures.
Notice also several remarks on the econometrics underlying the 
estimation of Equations (1) and (2). First, as we describe below, we 
consider a small-N/large-T panel data setting. This implies that, in 
contrast to the traditional large-N/small-T panel data setting, we expect 
the Nickell bias in the dynamic fixed effects panel regression—typically 
addressed by using generalized method of moments estimators—to be 
very small (Judson and Owen 1999). Second, Equations (1) and (2) can 
be interpreted as an error correction model. Then, if at least some of the 
variables are nonstationary, the corresponding equilibrium relationship 
is a cointegrating relationship; and if all variables are stationary, the 
equilibrium relationship is a long-run-level relationship. Importantly, 
if such an equilibrium relationship exists, then inference about the 
coefficient estimates is standard, regardless of whether the variables are 
nonstationary or stationary (Pesaran and Shin 1999). Third, we could in 
principle test for the existence of such an equilibrium relationship at 
the country level, even without knowledge of the orders of integration 
of the variables involved (Pesaran, Shin, and Smith 2001). However, we 
have a very strong prior that such an equilibrium relationship exists, as 
local monetary policy is almost surely determined either by forecasts 
of local macroeconomic fundamentals, global variables, or the base-
country policy rate. Moreover, while the corresponding tests have been 
worked out at the country level, they are not available in the panel 
context. One could then argue that it would be best to resort to panel 
cointegration analysis, which is, however, known to be rather sensitive 
to the assumptions on the nature of cross-country heterogeneity under 
the null and alternative hypotheses, as well as to pretesting for unit roots 
in panel data, which has its own, nontrivial pitfalls. We thus proceed 
assuming that there exists an equilibrium relationship between local 
policy rate, forecasts of local macroeconomic fundamentals, global 
variables, and base-country policy rates without carrying out formal 
tests at the (cross-)country level.
6 In Shambaugh (2004), Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2005), and Klein and 
Shambaugh (2015), the number of base countries is much larger and the sample 
period is much longer so that the correlation between base-country policy rates and 
the time dummies is much smaller.
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13.2.2 Data and Definition of Variables
Sample Period and Economies Included
We consider a sample of monthly data for 10 SOEs in the (broadly 
defined) Asia and Pacific region. We only consider country-month 
observations with floating regimes. Specifically, we consider the de 
facto exchange rate regime classification of Shambaugh (2004) and 
Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010), and include in our sample only 
country-month observations that are classified as a “float,” i.e., we drop 
observations classified as a “peg” or a “soft peg.”7 We additionally require 
that, for an economy to enter the sample, there are at least 12 country-
time observations. The resulting sample of economies includes 
Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Turkey. 
We specify the US as the base country. The time period we consider 
spans from January 2002 to December 2012; however, we drop the 
time period from July 2007 to December 2009 in order to preclude our 
estimates being unduly driven by events related to the global financial 
crisis. We cannot consider after 2012 because the data we use to measure 
economies’ foreign-currency exposure are not available for later years 
(see below).
Real-Time Forecasts and Global Variables
For the real-time forecasts of consumer price inflation and real GDP 
growth in 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝 = 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1
𝑝𝑝 + (1 − 𝜌𝜌) (𝜗𝜗′𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖+𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒 + 𝛾𝛾′𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝 ) + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝    𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒    𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖     𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝  bi  𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖  
 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝 = 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1
𝑝𝑝 + (1 − 𝜌𝜌) (𝜗𝜗′𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖+𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒 + 𝛾𝛾′𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , (2) 
ξit  
× 𝐼𝐼(∆𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃 ≥ 0) × 
 
 ,( 0)i
P
b tI i 
 ,( 0)i
P
b tI i  
 ,( 0)i
P
b tI i    
 ,( 0)i
P
b tI i   
 ,( 0)i
P
b tI i 
 ,( 0)i
P
b tI i  
 ,( 0)i
P
b tI i    
 ,( 0)i
P
b tI i   


 
 
, we would ideally use actual central bank projections. 
However, many central banks do not publish their projections. Moreover, 
among those central banks that do publish their projections, many 
7 In particular, a country-year observation is coded as a “peg” by Shambaugh (2004) in 
a particular year if its bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis its base country stays within 
a +/– 2% band over the course of that year, or if its exchange rate changes only in 1 
month. A country-year observation is coded as a “soft peg”’ by Obstfeld, Shambaugh, 
and Taylor (2010) if it is not classified as a “peg” and if the bilateral exchange rate 
vis-à-vis the ase country stays within a +/– 5% band in a given year, or if there is no 
month in which the exchange rate changes by more than +/– 2%.
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produce them only a few times per year.8 For these reasons, instead of 
considering actual central bank projections, we use data on real-time 
forecasts from Consensus Economics. In Georgiadis and Zhu (2019), 
we document that Consensus Economics real-time forecasts are highly 
correlated with publicly available, actual central bank projections.9 We 
include 12-months-ahead real-time forecasts of real GDP growth and 
inflation in 
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.10 In the vector of global variables 
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, we include the first 
difference of the logarithm of global commodity prices, and the level of 
the volatility index.
Local and Base-Country Policy Rates
Our sample reaches into the period in which the Federal Reserve hit 
the zero lower bound. A widely used measure that reflects the Federal 
Reserve monetary policy stance during this time period is the shadow 
8 This does not mean that policy makers are not updating their views on the outlook 
before monetary policy decision meetings that take place between the projection 
exercises. Typically, the projections are updated between projection exercises using 
a variety of macroeconometric tools, as well as anecdotal evidence and judgment. 
For example, the European Central Bank’s macroeconomic projections for the euro 
area are produced just four times a year, namely in March and September when 
they are produced by their staff alone, and in June and December when they are 
produced jointly by their staff and those of euro area national central banks. For the 
monetary policy decision meetings that take place between the projection exercises, 
the projections are updated using a variety of macroeconometric tools.
9 Notice that using Consensus Economics forecasts has the advantage of considering 
a large number of economies at the monthly frequency. Monthly data on real activity 
and inflation are typically available only for a smaller set of economies, and there are 
generally no real-time data available. Moreover, for real activity, one would typically 
consider industrial production, which is not defined identically across economies, 
and is more volatile than, and also only reflects a limited share of, overall real activity.
10 One disadvantage of Consensus Economics data is that they are fixed-event forecasts; 
that is, for example, a forecast in month t in year T of real GDP growth over year T+1. 
We adopt the approach of Dovern, Fritsche, and Slacalek (2012) to transform the 
Consensus Economics fixed-event forecasts into fixed-horizon forecasts.
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rate constructed by Wu and Xia (2016).11, 12 All data on interest rates are 
obtained through Haver. For conventional policy rates, we generally 
consider central bank policy rates obtained from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics, amended in a few cases by data from country-
specific sources.
Foreign-Currency Exposure Measurement and Data
We use the data on foreign-currency exposures of Lane and Shambaugh 
(2010a), as well as the update provided by Benetrix, Lane, and 
Shambaugh (2015). Unfortunately, at the time of writing, the data of Lane 
and Shambaugh (2010a) and Benetrix, Lane, and Shambaugh (2015) are 
available only until 2012. Hence, and as mentioned above, we estimate 
the sensitivity of local to base-country policy rates based on Equations 
(1) and (2) only for the period between January 2002 and December 
2012. For the regressions, we linearly interpolate the foreign-currency 
exposure data—which are available at the annual frequency—to monthly 
frequency. Figure 13.2 presents the averages of the foreign-currency-
denominated foreign assets and liabilities relative to GDP over the time 
period from 2002 to 2012—excluding foreign exchange reserves on the 
asset side—for the Asia and the Pacific SOEs in the country sample of this 
study, as well as an additional set of economies considered in Georgiadis 
and Zhu (2019). 
Lane and Shambaugh (2010a) define the net foreign-currency 
exposure as the difference between the foreign-currency-denominated 
foreign assets and liabilities, both scaled by GDP. The net foreign-
currency exposure is negative (positive) for an economy that is net 
short (long) in foreign currency on its external balance sheet. When an 
economy is net short in foreign currency, a depreciation of its currency 
implies an exchange rate valuation loss on its external balance sheet, 
as the local-currency value of its foreign-currency-denominated foreign 
11 Longer-term, such as 2-year, rates are another frequently used alternative. However, 
these are not available for several of the EMEs in our sample and/or for the period we 
consider. Moreover, even for the base countries we consider these to have been close 
to, or essentially at, the zero lower bound, especially for the euro area, for which 
German Bund yields are typically used.
12 Notice that even when short-term interest rates hit the zero lower bound, 
monetary policy—and in particular forward guidance—matters for exchange rate 
determination. This can easily be seen by iterating forward the uncovered interest 
rate parity condition and noticing that one of the fundamental determinants of the 
spot exchange rate is the path of future expected short-term interest rates, the so-
called “expectations component” of the yield curve. Incidentally, shadow rates are 
constructed exploiting information about the entire yield curve, thereby including 
the latter expectations component and thus being particularly appealing in a sample 
period in which the zero lower bound was binding.
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assets rises by a smaller amount than that of the foreign-currency-
denominated foreign liabilities. More specifically, the net foreign-
currency exposure also reflects the change in an economy’s net foreign 
asset position relative to GDP that results from a uniform depreciation 
of its currency against all foreign currencies by 1% (see Appendix B in 
Georgiadis and Mehl 2015). Hence, in terms of economic magnitude, 
Indonesia’s net foreign-currency exposure of about –25% of GDP implies 
that its net foreign asset position relative to GDP would decline by 
0.25 percentage points if its currency depreciated by 1%. Thus, for many 
of the economies in our sample, the net foreign-currency exposures are 
economically nontrivial. 
13.3 Empirical Results
In this section we present the results for the estimation of Equations 
(1) and (2). In order to account for alternative motivations for fear of 
floating, in Equation (2) we include additional variables interacted with 
the base-country policy rate. In particular, we interact the base-country 
policy rate with estimates of the SOE’s exchange rate pass-through to 
consumer prices (Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein 2001). Moreover, we 
interact the base-country policy rate with the SOE’s stock of foreign 
exchange reserves, which indicates the government’s ability to support 
Figure 13.2: Foreign-Currency Exposures from 2002 to 2012
GDP = gross domestic product; FX = foreign currency; NFX = net foreign currency.
Note: The figure shows the net foreign-currency exposure relative to GDP averaged over the sample period 
from 2002 to 2012. The data are taken from Lane and Shambaugh (2010a), as well as Benetrix, Lane, and 
Shambaugh. (2015).
Source: Authors.
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firms that are running out of foreign currency in the case of funding 
stress;13 a large stock of reserves also indicates ample ammunition for 
exchange rate interventions. For ease of interpretation of the coefficient 
estimates in the regression tables, we standardize the data on net 
foreign-currency exposure variables in ξit.
13.3.1  Baseline Results for the Role of Foreign-Currency 
Exposures in Fear of Floating
Column (1) in Table 13.1 reports the result of the regression of Equation 
(1), i.e., without any interaction terms between the base-country policy 
rate and the SOE’s foreign-currency exposure. The coefficient estimate 
on the base-country policy rate is positive and statistically significant. 
The evidence in column (1) suggests that SOE monetary policy responds 
to exchange rate pressures of the local against the base-country currency 
over and above what we would expect if macroeconomic stabilization 
was the only policy objective. The evidence is thus consistent with 
SOEs from Asia and the Pacific having exhibited fear of floating in the 
early 2000s. We next test for the role of foreign-currency exposures in 
shaping this fear of floating.
Column (2) reports the results from the regression of Equation (2), in 
which we add interaction terms between the base-country policy rate and 
the SOE’s foreign-currency asset and liability exposures shown in Figure 
13.2; for the regressions, we use positive numbers for the foreign-currency 
foreign liabilities, in contrast to Figure 13.2. The coefficient estimates 
for the SOE’s foreign-currency foreign asset and liability exposures are 
negative and positive, respectively, and statistically significant. The 
positive sign of the coefficient estimate on the interaction with the liability 
foreign-currency exposure is consistent with the notion that variations in 
the exchange rate give rise to variations in whether borrowing constraints 
of SOE firms with foreign-currency foreign liabilities are binding, and 
hence elicit positive feedback that might jeopardize financial stability 
and that monetary policy may want to prevent by reducing exchange rate 
variation. In turn, the negative coefficient estimate on the interaction with 
the foreign-currency foreign asset exposure is consistent with the notion 
that there are offsetting valuation effects on firms’ balance sheets that 
mitigate the extent to which variations in the exchange rate give rise to 
variations in whether borrowing constraints are binding. The results are 
13 Estimation of the exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices is described in 
Georgiadis and Zhu (2019).
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Table 13.1: Foreign-Currency Exposures and the Sensitivity  
of SOE Policy Rates to Base-Country Policy Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Base-country policy rate 0.41**
(0.03)
0.53***
(0.00)
0.50***
(0.00)
0.53***
(0.00)
0.53**
(0.00)
0.52***
(0.00)
× FX assets rel. to GDP –0.81***
(0.01)
× FX liabilities rel. to GDP 0.76***
(0.00)
× NFX rel. to GDP –0.72***
(0.01)
× NFX rel. to GDP × 
I(NFX ≥ 0)
–0.34*
(0.06)
× NFX rel. to GDP × 
I(NFX < 0)
–0.50*
(0.06)
× Non-debt NFX  
rel. GDP
–0.61
(0.11)
–0.54
(0.17)
× Debt NFX rel. to GDP –0.52***
(0.00)
× Debt NFX rel. to GDP × 
I(NFX ≥ 0)
–0.21**
(0.02)
× Debt NFX rel. to GDP × 
I(NFX< 0)
–0.52***
(0.01)
× FX reserves rel. to GDP –0.59**
(0.04)
–0.77***
(0.00)
–0.64***
(0.01)
–0.84*
(0.06)
–0.77*
(0.07)
× ERPT –0.11
(0.79)
–0.46
(0.24)
–0.07
(0.87)
–0.36
(0.51)
–0.30
(0.56)
R-squared (within) 0.12 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.20
Observations 513 513 513 513 513 513
Countries 10 10 10 10 10 10
GDP = gross domestic product; FX = foreign currency; NFX = net foreign currency; ERPT = exchange rate 
pass-through; SOE = small open economy.
Note: p-values in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Driscoll-Kraay robust standard errors. 
Coefficient estimates of real-time forecasts and global variables not reported.
Source: Authors.
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thus consistent with the hypothesis that the fear of floating documented 
in column (1) is at least partly due to the financial stability implications of 
foreign-currency exposures.14
Given the coefficient estimates on the foreign-currency asset and 
liability exposures in column (2) in order to increase efficiency in 
the following, we consider the latter’s difference, i.e., economies’ net 
foreign-currency exposures. While doing so, it should be understood 
that a balanced net foreign-currency exposure might mask large gross 
exposures. As for the analysis of gross relative to net capital flows, large 
gross flows and foreign-currency exposures might imply nontrivial 
vulnerabilities even if the net positions are balanced. Moreover, to the 
extent that negative foreign-currency exposures are concentrated in 
systemic sectors or firms—such as large banks—exchange rate variation 
might have a nontrivial effect on the local financial cycle even if the SOE’s 
aggregate net foreign-currency exposure is balanced or even positive.
With these words of caution in mind, column (3) reports the results 
from a regression in which we enter an interaction term between the 
base-country policy rate and the SOE’s net foreign-currency exposure. 
The relevant coefficient estimate is negative and highly statistically 
significant, which is consistent with the results in column (1). The results 
thus suggest that the sensitivity of the SOE to the base-country policy rate 
falls with the former’s net foreign-currency exposure; put differently, the 
sensitivity increases with the SOE’s net short position and falls with its 
net long position. Again, this finding is consistent with the hypothesis 
that exchange rate variation has affected financial cycles in SOEs, and, in 
particular, that SOE monetary policy has attempted to reduce exchange 
rate variation by mimicking base-country monetary policy in order to 
mitigate associated financial stability risks (Basci, Ozel, and Sarikaya 
2008; Gudmundsson 2017; Vegh, Morano, and Friedheim 2018). 
13.3.2  Results for Net Long/Short Positions  
and Different Financial Instruments
Columns (4) to (6) document results from regressions that explore more 
refined hypotheses regarding the role of foreign-currency exposures 
for shaping fear of floating in SOE monetary policy. First, column (4) 
14 Note that the coefficient estimate on the interaction between the base-country policy 
rate and the SOE’s foreign exchange reserves is consistent with the findings in Cheng 
and Rajan (2019). Specifically, Cheng and Rajan (2019) find that the sensitivity of an 
SOE to base-country policy rates is reduced when the SOE features larger foreign 
exchange reserves.
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reports results from a regression that distinguishes between negative 
and positive net foreign-currency exposures. The coefficient estimates 
on the interaction terms between the base-country policy rate and 
positive and negative net foreign-currency exposures are statistically 
significant. Notice that the coefficient estimate on the interaction with 
the negative net foreign-currency exposure is much larger than that on 
the interaction with the positive net foreign-currency exposure. This 
finding is consistent with the emphasis on negative foreign-currency 
exposures—i.e., net short positions—in the context of the financial 
channel of exchange rates and its financial stability implications of 
foreign-currency exposures. Specifically, variations in the exchange 
rate are more likely to induce positive feedback loops—i.e., loosen firms’ 
borrowing constraints in the case of positive shocks to the economy 
that are followed by local currency appreciation, and tighten borrowing 
constraints in the case of adverse shocks such as base-country monetary 
policy tightening that are followed by local currency depreciation—
when an SOE is net short in foreign currency.
Second, the overall net foreign-currency exposure arises as the 
sum of individual components. Specifically, in terms of instruments, in 
the definition of Lane and Shambaugh (2010a), the overall net foreign-
currency exposure is the sum of debt and nondebt components.15 
Interestingly, differences in the payoff and maturity structures between 
these two instruments imply testable predictions that allow us to 
corroborate the evidence that foreign-currency exposures shape fear 
of floating. In particular, foreign-currency exposures imply greater 
vulnerabilities if they stem from more fickle portfolio debt instruments 
and bank loans with nonstate-contingent payoffs than from more stable 
FDI and portfolio equity instruments with state-contingent payoffs and 
longer investment horizons. Indeed, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) 
and Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) document that bank loans and 
other investment instruments exhibited the greatest volatility during 
the retrenchment in global capital flows in the global financial crisis; 
similarly, Forbes and Warnock (2012) document that debt instruments 
are particularly likely to exhibit abrupt swings in capital flows. Against 
15 In the data of Lane and Shambaugh (2010a) and Benetrix, Lane, and Shambaugh 
(2015), non-debt instruments are given by portfolio equity and FDI, and debt 
instruments by portfolio debt and other investments, including bank loans. Lane 
and Shambaugh (2010a) and Benetrix, Lane, and Shambaugh (2015) assume that 
portfolio equity and FDI are always denominated in the currency of the issuer. 
Hence, a nondebt net foreign-currency exposure stems exclusively from holdings 
of foreign-currency-denominated foreign portfolio equity and FDI and can only 
assume positive values.
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this background, we expect that SOE monetary policy is more concerned 
about dampening the financial cycle when the economy’s net foreign-
currency exposure stems from debt rather than nondebt instruments. 
In line with these predictions, the results in columns (5) and (6) suggest 
that the sensitivity of SOEs to base-country policy rates is indeed 
stronger for smaller—in particular negative—debt net foreign-currency 
exposures.
13.3.3  Results for Fear of Floating across Local-Currency 
Appreciations and Depreciations
It is natural to explore asymmetries, not only in the sign of economies’ 
net foreign-currency exposures, but also in the direction of change of the 
base-country policy rate. Specifically, immediate financial stability risks 
arise, in particular in the case of a depreciation of the local currency and 
in the presence of negative net foreign-currency exposures. In contrast, 
even if the optimal policy is symmetric in theory, for political economy 
reasons it may plausibly be more difficult for SOE monetary policy to 
limit local-currency appreciation when base-country monetary policy 
is loosened in order to dampen a build-up of foreign-currency liabilities 
that could threaten financial stability only later when the tide turns as 
base-country monetary policy is tightened. Against this background, we 
expect the sensitivity of an SOE to base-country monetary policy to be 
greater when the latter is tightened rather than when it is loosened, and 
when the SOE exhibits negative net foreign-currency exposures. To test 
these predictions, we first run a regression analogous to that in Equation 
(1), but we additionally enter separate coefficients for the cases in which 
the base-country policy rate is raised and when it is lowered.
Accordingly, column (2) in Table 13.2 reports the results from a 
regression with separate coefficients for increases and reductions in the 
base-country policy rate without any interactions with foreign-currency 
exposure variables. In line with the hypothesis that the trade-off between 
financial stability and macroeconomic stabilization for SOE monetary 
policy is perceived to be weaker by policy makers when the local currency 
appreciates, we find that the sensitivity of SOE policy rates to base-country 
policy rates documented in the baseline results in Table 13.1 exclusively 
stems from cases in which base-country monetary policy is tightened; 
hence, our findings indicate evidence of a narrower “fear of depreciation” 
rather than a more general, symmetric fear of floating. 
Column (3) in Table 13.2 reports results from a regression 
analogous to that in Equation (2) in which we combine the hypothesis 
relating to asymmetries in the sensitivity of SOE monetary policy to 
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Table 13.2: Accounting for Asymmetries in the Sensitivity  
of SOE Policy Rates to Base-Country Policy Rates
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 × NFX exposure  
rel. to GDP × I(NFX < 0)
–1.85**
(0.04)
× FX reserves rel. to GDP –0.82***
(0.00)
–0.70***
(0.00)
× ERPT –0.48
(0.27)
–0.24
(0.52)
R-squared (within) 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.21
Observa ions 513 513 513 513
Countries 10 10 10 10
GDP = gross domestic product; FX = foreign currency; NFX = net foreign currency; ERPT = exchange rate 
pass-through; SOE = small open economy.
Note: p-values in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Driscoll-Kraay robust standard errors. 
Coefficient estimates of real-time forecasts and global variables not reported.
Source: Authors.
base-country monetary policy across local-currency depreciations 
and appreciations with that relating to differences in foreign-currency 
exposures. Specifically, we consider separate interaction terms 
between the base-country policy rate and SOEs’ net foreign-currency 
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exposures for the cases in which the former is raised and in which it is 
lowered. In line with the previous findings, the results suggest that the 
sensitivity of the SOE to the base-country policy rate when the latter 
is raised is amplified the smaller the net foreign-currency position, i.e., 
the more net short, the less net long in foreign currency the SOE has on 
its external balance sheet. In contrast, none of the coefficient estimates 
relating to the instances in which base-country monetary policy is 
loosened is statistically significant.
Finally, in column (4) we report results from a regression in which 
we again introduce separate interaction terms between the base-
country policy rate when it is raised/lowered as well as negative/
positive net foreign currency exposures, respectively. As in columns 
(4) and (6) in Table 13.1, only the coefficient estimate involving 
the interaction with the negative net foreign-currency exposure is 
statistically significant. This finding suggests that the sensitivity of 
an SOE to base-country monetary policy is particularly strong when 
the latter is tightened and the SOE is net short in foreign currency on 
its external balance sheet. This is the classic context in which several 
EME currency crises have erupted in the past, and hence it may not 
be surprising that this case stands out in our estimates. However, and 
in contrast to the results for the broader country sample considered 
in Georgiadis and Zhu (2019), the coefficient estimate on the base-
country monetary policy loosening interacted with a negative net 
foreign-currency exposure also is statistically significant. This suggests 
that SOEs in the Asia and Pacific region may potentially be subject to a 
somewhat more symmetric fear of floating. 
13.4 Conclusion
We estimate dynamic panel data regressions for a panel of 10 SOEs in 
the Asia and Pacific region with floating exchange rate regimes for the 
period from 2002 to 2012 in order to assess whether local responds to 
base-country monetary policy over and above what we would expect to 
observe if macroeconomic stabilization was the only policy objective. 
We find that the data are consistent with the hypothesis that SOE 
monetary policy in floating exchange rate regimes is generally subject 
to fear of floating, and that this is at least in part due to threats to 
financial stability implied by foreign-currency exposures. We find that 
the evidence of fear of floating due to financial stability considerations 
is particularly pronounced when the foreign-currency exposures arise 
through debt rather than nondebt instruments and when base-country 
monetary policy is tightened. In this context, mimicking base-country 
monetary policy tightening reduces exchange rate depreciation and 
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thereby prevents negative valuation effects on the economy’s external 
balance sheet from making local borrowers hit borrowing constraints. 
From a policy perspective, our findings are particularly relevant at 
the current juncture, as many EMEs have accumulated large foreign-
currency—typically US dollar—debt liabilities and US monetary policy 
is expected to be tightened, at least in the medium term.
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